In the introductory pages of Political Philosophy, Beiner lays out his template for political philosophy. Political philosophers participate in an ongoing dialogue about “rival conceptions of the good” (xvi). “If we do not at least aspire to a theory that presents itself as more rationally compelling than all alternative views, it is hard to see how we can do theory at all” (xxvii). Because Beiner holds this view that a political philosopher aims for a comprehensive picture, he spends a lot of time in these first pages explaining why Isaiah Berlin cannot count as a political philosopher (because Berlin refuses to judge among competing conceptions of the good). A second prologue Beiner devotes to considerations on Freud and Weber. He calls them “epic” theorists (xxix), but they are more than epic: they are tragic. It is in these pages—of prologue no. 2—that we get the keenest insight into what Beiner really thinks political philosophy is. Freud is an Enlightenment rationalist but at the same time a “deep and uncompromising pessimist.” Weber appeals to Beiner because he held that one needs as a scholar “the courage to make up [one's] mind about [one's] ultimate standpoint” (xlix), even while acknowledging that we live in a “brutally disenchanted world” (l). Resolution in the face of tragedy is the core of political philosophy for Beiner.
Hannah Arendt “supplies an especially powerful articulation of why politics in particular is what truly humanizes human beings” (1). Her political philosophy “in a nutshell” is that “politics is meaning-conferring” (2). Readers of Arendt will be familiar with the triad of labor, work, and action in what Beiner identifies as her most significant work, The Human Condition. Labor is tied to the endless and repetitive cycles of life—sustaining and reproducing our biological organisms—and is the least “worldly” of human engagements, because it is embedded in necessity. Work is higher in the triad because work means the creation of artifacts—tools, buildings, monuments, art—that require a mixing of human ingenuity with the material of nature to create a human-specific world. But work in turn is surpassed by action, and action, Arendt is emphatic, is the most free of human activities. Action is free because it is tied neither to necessity (labor) nor to instrumental purpose (work). Political action, specifically, for Arendt is characterized by plurality, people coming together in unpredictable ways to constitute a public space in which true novelty is possible. Beiner characterizes Arendt's view of action as follows: “its spontaneity; its unpredictability; its capacity to generate the novel and the unprecedented; the idea that because we are bound together in a fabric of human interaction … that no one individual or group of individuals controls, we never know what will result and what ends will be accomplished or not accomplished” (20). In a footnote Beiner encapsulates Arendt's understanding of free action in an emphasis upon the “performative dimension” (20n23). While many have singled out the performative, or agonistic, characteristic of Arendt's political thought as the most definitive, Beiner remarks that “it would be utterly damning to say of any political actor that he or she put on a good show, but did not accomplish anything and did not even really try to” (21).
Sharp rebuke aside, Beiner's decision to include Arendt in this book is based upon her powerful defense of agonistic politics. I think he is right about this. Looking back at the profligate secondary literature on Arendt in the past few decades, it is apparent that it is in fact The Human Condition and its unique provocations that ensure that Arendt stands as one of the iconic modern political philosophers.
But I have always been more captivated by the turgid and meandering Life of the Mind, Arendt's posthumously published reflections in two parts, Thinking and Willing (and the sketch, Judging, that Beiner made available to us through his editing and compilation of Arendt's Kant lectures).Footnote 1 In the beginning of volume 1 of The Life of the Mind Arendt tells the reader that she embarked on this journey through “thinking” because of “certain doubts that had been plaguing me ever since I had finished a study of what my publisher wisely called ‘The Human Condition.’”Footnote 2 “What interested me in the Vita Activa,” she says, “was that the contrary notion of complete quietness in the Vita Contemplativa was so overwhelming that compared with this stillness all other differences between the various activities in the Vita Activa disappeared.”Footnote 3 The “vita contemplativa” inclines toward the quest for truth, not freedom, closure, not innovation, eternity, not change. The Human Condition was written as a fiery defense of the life of human activity against the tyranny of thought, and its pull toward stasis. But Arendt's encounter with Adolf Eichmann changed everything. Arendt's account of Eichmann as the incarnation of the “banality of evil” we know is controversial, but what struck Arendt forcibly about the man was his incapacity to think. Watching Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt asked: “Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of examining whatever happens to come to pass or to attract attention, regardless of results and specific content, could this activity be among the conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing or even actually ‘condition’ them against it?”Footnote 4
When we talk about the link between thinking and “conditioning men against evil,” it seems to me that we are talking about something graver than the celebration of freedom, plurality, and performance. At the end of his chapter on Arendt, Beiner suggests that her political philosophy “start[ed] to take on the appearance of being a set of propositions about ‘man in the singular’ (no less than the political philosophies of Plato or Aristotle or any later thinker in the political philosophy canon)” (24). Just like Aristotle, who lays the groundwork for an enduring theory of politics and citizenship, while at the same time telling us at the end of the Nicomachean Ethics that there are two ways of knowing—sophia and phronēsis—one way for philosophy, another for politics, Arendt tells us that there are two ways of being in the world, as an engagé and as a thinker. This, in the end, is what makes Arendt a political philosopher of the first order. She might ever and always be best known for the bold claims of The Human Condition, but she fits Beiner's template of the epic thinker. She forges boldly in the face of an underlying grasp of a tragic tension.
