Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-2n9c9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-16T18:17:08.845Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Uncertainty Phobia and Epistemic Forbearance in a Pandemic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 October 2022

Nicholas Shackel*
Affiliation:
Cardiff University, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Oxford University
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In this chapter I show how challenges to our ability to tame the uncertainty of a pandemic leaves us vulnerable to uncertainty phobia. This is because, contrary to what we might hope, not all the uncertainty that matters can be tamed by our knowledge of the relevant probabilities. Unrelievable wild uncertainty is a hard burden to bear, especially so when we must act in the face of it. We are tempted to retreat into uncertainty phobia, leading to fixed definite opinions precisely when acting on sound judgement requires our opinions to be hedged and mobile. Coping with a pandemic requires us to bear the burden rather than give in to temptation: it requires us to practise the virtue of epistemic forbearance.

Information

Type
Paper
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2022
Figure 0

Figure 1Mundane confidence; x-axis for the balance of the evidence for and against the proposition, i.e. balance positive is support for its truth, balance negative is support for its falsehood; y-axis for confidence: positive is confidence in truth, negative is confidence in falsehood.

Figure 1

Figure 2High stakes confidence.

Figure 2

Figure 3Probability density curves showing a thin and a fat-tailed distribution.

Figure 3

Figure 4Uncertainty phobic confidence.