There is a tension at the heart of Adorno's thought, where two of his overriding aims seem opposed to each other. On the one hand, he is engaged in a democratic political project. Adorno's theory and practice of negative dialectics work against the alienating modern tendency toward “identity thinking,” where we exchange fundamentally different things as equals in violation of their immediate, particular, and concrete qualities, where we think in terms of common categories in ways that maintain equilibrium, stability, and the status quo, and where we generally acquiesce to and accept the world we are given as natural and inevitable. Against these forces, Adorno fosters a recuperation of the critical capacities that he sees as vital to both our common humanity and to democracy. For Adorno, the essence of democracy is the practice of critique, and the normative value of democracy is the promise that humans can autonomously and maturely make decisions about their world, can govern their own world, instead of passively receiving it as second nature.
But such democratic commitments seem to be undermined by other aspects of Adorno's writing. Works such as Dialectic of Enlightenment, Minima Moralia, and Negative Dialectics are theoretically rigorous and conversant with much of the Western philosophical canon. But in addition to the breadth, depth, and complexity of his thought, Adorno's writing style itself is famously difficult, challenging, and inaccessible. Furthermore, he intends this. To counteract the modern sensibility that characterizes identity thinking and “damaged life,” Adorno tries to lift his language and thought out of the common marketplace of ideas. As part of his political project, in service of his democratic goals, Adorno often works against the easy exchange of ideas and makes us work hard to understand him.
So here we have the tension: how can Adorno's theory and practice be communicated to the demos? Can his thought be introduced and translated in ways that are consistent with, perhaps even working to fulfill, his larger social and political aims? Do we necessarily violate his own ideas and eviscerate the unique elements of his thought when we try to translate and introduce his ideas to the broader public that actually lies at the heart of his theoretical concerns? Not necessarily. It all depends on how it is done. Indeed, as we are increasingly learning, Adorno himself provides good models. During his time in America and after the return to Germany, Adorno recognized the need to communicate with a wider, nonspecialized audience: in radio addresses and lectures, Adorno valuably speaks in a different register to introduce his theories and critical methods in ways that further his democratic project.
Gerhard Schweppenhäuser's Theodor W. Adorno: An Introduction seems undertaken in just this spirit, joining several similar volumes already on the bookshelf: Martin Jay's Adorno (Harvard University Press, 1984), Fredric Jameson's Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence of the Dialectic (Verso, 1990), Simon Jarvis's Adorno: A Critical Introduction (Routledge, 1998), as well as an edited volume by Deborah Cook with separate essays introducing key themes in Adorno's work titled Theodor Adorno: Key Concepts (Acumen Publishing, 2008). These books necessarily cover some familiar terrain, laying out Adorno's thoughts on negative dialectics, the nonidentical, and identity thinking, exploring the culture industry and his understanding of critique and critical theory, analyzing his views on modern society and the liquidation of the individual, charting his thoughts on aesthetics, art, and music, as well as describing his intellectual debts to Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Benjamin. Schweppenhäuser ably introduces these key elements of Adorno's thought in a way that hits exactly the right balance between the general and the particular: even as he gives an overview, the reader never feels as though Schweppenhäuser is abstracting too far away from the essence of Adorno's ideas. If Schweppenhäuser generalizes at one moment, he refocuses at the next moment to hover closer to Adorno's own thought and language by employing an illuminating example drawn from Adorno's writings. There is no moment in Schweppenhäuser's book where Adorno's ideas seem problematically watered down to make them more accessible. Schweppenhäuser is intimately familiar with the complexity of Adorno's thought, but he is able to truly translate and introduce these ideas in a remarkably clear, engaging, jargon-free, and highly readable language. We might even see Schweppenhäuser's book as a valuable introduction to the other introductions to Adorno: readers might next find it useful to consult Simon Jarvis's Adorno: A Critical Introduction.
Other elements of Schweppenhäuser's book valuably set it apart from similar volumes. Most notably, Schweppenhäuser refreshingly puts in the forefront an image of Adorno that emphasizes the political commitments of his theory and shines a spotlight on how his thought reflects, and responds to, modern social and political conditions. For Schweppenhäuser, Adorno's project aims at recuperating the possibility of a more autonomous individual. He presents the negative and positive elements of Adorno's critique as part and parcel of each other and shows how Adorno combines critical reason with a romantic passion for an alternative life that could truly live: “By seeking to destroy the untrue, the false, the illusory, criticism aims to carry out the preliminary work for the construction of the true, the correct, and the essential” (15). Adorno strives toward “rescuing what is beyond hope” and approaches “philosophy from the perspective of redemption,” especially the redemption of culture: Schweppenhäuser sees “salvation” as a “core element” of Adorno's theoretical work (35–36). Schweppenhäuser's Adorno has a deep utopian impulse: he sees Adorno's critical theory as relentlessly motivated by the “drive to bring a humane social order into being” (144). Adorno saw the “just life” as necessarily tied to a “just politics” that is in turn indissolubly linked to the “structure of society” (71). In these ways, Schweppenhäuser recuperates the project of social and political change that is at the heart of Adorno's critique, as we are reminded in the final words of the book: “As he writes in Minima Moralia, ‘there is no emancipation without that of society.’ However, lack of illusion does not mean lack of hope, not so long as philosophy and social theory make ‘the rescue of the hopeless’ into their own cause” (158). In this way, Schweppenhäuser's book is consistent with Adorno's own democratic project in two ways: it introduces Adorno's thought to a broader audience while also recovering the political core of his work.
Despite the pathways into Adorno's thought that this book opens up, there is one structural aspect of the volume that works against its usefulness as a guide to further reading and research. The English translation of Schweppenhäuser's book published by Duke University Press that is under review here does not contain footnotes, citations, or bibliographic information for any quoted passages. In most cases, titles are not provided, so quotations cannot be traced to their original source or a corresponding English translation. This information is only omitted in the English volume: a German version of the book, Theodor W. Adorno zur Einführung (Junius Verlag, 2003) does contain standard citation and bibliographic information. In the German edition, Schweppenhäuser draws primarily from Adorno's Gesammelte Schriften, which has no corresponding English equivalent. But rather than try to address this particular problem of translation in some other way, the relevant citation information is omitted entirely in the English translation, a frustration for the reader given the overall value of the volume.
