The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have not turned international politics upside down, but they have, at a minimum, irritated the established ways of thinking about international relations. The title “Confounding Powers” of this monograph tries to capture this multiple sense of puzzlement about the powers of deviant international actors like Al Qaeda to challenge established patterns of political interaction at the systemic level. It asks two questions: “(H)ow and when do new, dissimilar kinds of political actors appear on the international stage and not only survive but have significant effects on international politics, and, second, how do these novel actors affect the development of international society?” (p. 1).
Employing an eclectic systemic approach, which combines neorealism and the English School, William J. Brenner finds that the decline of once-dominant powers provides opportunities for “marginal political organizations to exert themselves as systemic actors rather than subsystemic adjuncts” (p. 2). Yet in becoming “systemic actors” these new actors are not necessarily socialized to the established system as neorealism, among others, would lead us to expect. Rather, a complex set of mechanisms and strategies, which the author subsumes under the label “logic of dissimilation,” enables these “dissimilar” actors to deviate structurally and survive for some extended time, despite strong “likening pressures” from the respective international systems. In terms of effects, the study finds that certain functional societal adaptations result from the interaction between deviating challengers and predominant systemic actors. Moreover, processes of identity formation are spurred as a result of confrontations between sharply different types of actors. However, the study finds that systemic norms are not affected, nor does it observe any lasting systemic transformations.
The book has several strengths. First, it poses an important question from a disciplinary and political point of view, and it recovers historical cases and materials that have been considered largely irrelevant in the discipline of International Relations due to its predilection for theorizing a “Westphalian” state system made up of “like units.” Among the four cases examined, the contemporary case of deviance (Al Qaeda) and the case of the Mongols (13th century) are fairly well known. The two other cases, however, are likely to represent truly novel cases of systemic challengers for most IR scholars: the Nizari Ismailis (or “Assassins”), located in what we today would call the Middle East and operating from the late 11th century to mid-13th century, and the Barbary powers, located in today’s Maghreb and Northern Africa and active between the 16th and early 19th century. Second, Brenner performs an excellent job in mining diverse sets of historical scholarship. He also largely succeeds in arranging and tailoring it to his research needs and overarching theoretical arguments, while acknowledging controversies and diversity of opinion among historians as well as the partial dearth of records (especially for the cases of the Nizari Ismailis and the Mongols). Third, while some of the findings about tailor-made and partly novel strategies of concealment and conquest, identity formation, and overarching systemic transformation may not be too surprising, the key findings are less than obvious. The rise and extended survival of systemic challengers is not only linked to great power decline, and what is more, all of the eventual systemic challengers initially courted closer or loser relationships with the dominant powers, which they eventually challenged. Brenner provides quite a bit of evidence that this kind of breathing (and breeding) space may indeed be a critical variable which might help explain why there are, after all, surprisingly few historical instances of successful systemic challenges and why even gradual systemic change takes more than a sustained effort by daring challengers and happens, if at all, slowly at best.
Despite its strengths, the book also has some shortcomings. The decision to approach the subject matter from a systemic perspective, which eclectically combines neorealism and the English School, stands out in that regard. This structural bias is surprising for several reasons. First, agency in general and individual (and partly charismatic) leadership in particular stand out in all cases as prime candidates to explain the success of the respective movements. The author explicitly addresses this point at a general level (pp. 6, 19, 251-252) and, more or less strongly, in all the case studies (pp. 78-81, 108, 123, 157-159, 214). If “agency often plays a formative role” (p. 251) and if it obviously does so, as the historical record shows in all the cases examined here, why would one consciously limit oneself to a model which “emphasizes the material and structural constraints that actors face”? To be sure, it is an open question to what extent the individual leaders “produced or were products of their environments and circumstances” (pp. 252, 19). But in analogous form, the same question can be (and ought to be) raised about the potential causal impact of agency of different sorts upon prevailing structural conditions. Obviously, what we normally call “structures” are productive phenomena in the sense of being causally relevant. Yet it should be equally obvious that it is not merely structures that produce structures. All processes of socialization involve two types of agents, the socializers and the socialized. None can be reduced to be merely a product of structures. The second part of the research question that draws on the English School indirectly grants that agency-related factors may be instrumental in possibly bringing about systemic change (here, in the form of normative change).
Thus, it is not only counterintuitive but also quite arbitrary to opt one-sidedly for a systemic approach. It is also surprising in view of the fact that Brenner mobilizes a dual “pragmatist ethos.” First, he rightly draws on the liberating “analytical eclecticism,” which Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil have championed in order to muster “whatever analytical leverage” can be gained in addressing an important research problem, which may, at first sight, elude standard disciplinary approaches (p. 15). Second, in emphasizing (with explicit reference to John Dewey) the significance of possibility and novelty as drivers of social (inter)action (pp. 1, 243) he actually lays the ground for thoroughly engaging the so-called structure-agency problem head-on. To follow these tracks with a balanced research design, which pays equal attention to structural and agency-related factors, would have been much more obvious than the one-sided structural route actually taken. Anthony Giddens, to name one obvious point of departure for developing such an approach besides Dewey, is quoted in this study as well. Tellingly, however, the sociologist who has been most instrumental, especially via the work of Alexander Wendt, in popularizing the “co-constitution” of structure and agency in IR is mobilized rather lopsidedly in justifying a particular conceptualization of constraints (pp. 31, 265).
These restrictions notwithstanding, “Confounding Powers” makes a valuable contribution to the expanding literature on international systems with “dissimilar” types of actors. It also helps in opening up space for more innovative approaches that will hopefully reach, in truly “analytically eclectic” fashion, far beyond the constricting bounds of ahistorical structural approaches such as neorealism.
