In this book, Miguel A. Badía Cabrera—Professor emeritus at the University of Puerto Rico—seeks to undermine the widespread views that Hume was deeply hostile to the Calvinism of his youth and that Hume’s philosophy is thoroughly anti-Calvinist. In place of these views, Badía Cabrera seeks to establish the contrary thesis that Hume’s philosophy is properly classifiable as nothing less than a form of “Enlightened Calvinism” (2). In arguing for this surprising thesis, Badía Cabrera relies to some extent on his earlier book, Hume’s Reflection on Religion, in which he argues that Hume wasn’t the atheist that he is often taken to be but was rather a sort of mitigated theist. But in the present book Badía Cabrera goes beyond his earlier study in arguing that, on many crucial points of both natural and revealed theology, Hume is on the same page as the sixteenth century Reformer, John Calvin.
In seeking to make this evident, Badía Cabrera devotes much space to showing that some of Hume’s core ideas in his celebrated essay, “Of Miracles,” and in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion are ‘similar’ to positions defended in Calvin’s magnum opus, the Institutes of the Christian Religion. For example, it is argued that Hume’s scepticism about the ability of human reason to demonstrate the existence of God is similar to Calvin’s view that human reason can’t obtain more than a fleeting, unclear, and uncertain knowledge of God (192–204); that Hume’s scepticism about human reason’s ability to demonstrate the existence of a loving and gracious God in view of the evil and suffering in the world is similar to Calvin’s view that because of the existence of evil in the world God’s goodness and mercy must be believed on the basis of faith and not on reason (212–218); that Hume’s scepticism about solving the problem of evil via any sort of free-will defence agrees with Calvin’s dismissal of this approach (213–215); and that Hume’s scepticism about establishing claims of religion via appeal to miracles is similar to Calvin’s view that miracles can serve the purpose of confirming a pre-existing religious faith but can’t provide a sound basis for such faith (221–247).
On the whole, Badía Cabrera does a good job of making the above ‘similarities’ between Hume and Calvin evident, and his study serves as an important reminder not to be too quick in construing Hume’s attack on eighteenth century religious rationalism as an attack on just any form of Christian theology, and especially not as an attack on the Reformation theology of Calvin. Nevertheless, there is a major methodological problem with Badía Cabrera’s case for classifying Hume’s thought on religion as a form of ‘Enlightened Calvinism’. In order to justify such a classification, Badía Cabrera would clearly have to do more than show that there are ‘similarities’ between Hume and Calvin on many important points, for all that the relevant similarities really show is that there is an overlap between the views of the two thinkers. But Badía Cabrera seems to think that the relevant ‘similarities’ do indeed suffice to establish the relevant claim. For sure, at many places Badía Cabrera seems to mean little more than that there is some overlap between the views of Hume and Calvin; we are told that there is an “affinity” between Hume and Calvin (207), that the views of the one are “akin to,” “close to,” or “reminiscent of” the views of the other (95, 192, 214), and so on. (There are even some disclaimers to the effect that in labelling Hume’s thought as a form of ‘Enlightened Calvinism’ it is not meant that Hume “held” or “recommended” an “orthodox Calvinistic faith,” nor that Hume wasn’t “critical” or even “appalled” by typical Calvinistic doctrines such as that of predestination; see 2, 218.) But still, in classifying Hume’s thought as a form of ‘Enlightened Calvinism’, Badía Cabrera clearly means more than that there is an overlap between the views of Hume and Calvin, for he says, e.g., that he is concerned with the “historical roots” of Hume’s thought on religion (vii); that Hume “retained” a “substantial part” of his “maternal faith” (245–246; 222); that we find in Hume an “acceptance” of “Calvin’s conception of faith and its relation to human reason” (2–3); and that Hume’s views on miracles are a “testimony” to “the force of the Calvinistic tradition” (214; 238). These claims show that Badía Cabrera means to say not only that there is an overlap between Hume and Calvin, but that Hume’s views derive from Calvin.
To support such a ‘derivation’ claim, Badía Cabrera would have to do more than simply document similarities between Hume and Calvin, however. He would have to make a convincing case for taking Calvin to have been a likely source of Hume’s views on religion. But virtually no effort is put into showing this latter point at all. There are occasional references to Hume’s famous 1751 letter to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, in which Hume reports that he spent much time in his youth wrestling with the topics he discusses in a first draft of the Dialogues (see 3 n3; and 222 n3), but as evidence for taking Calvin to have been the likely source of Hume’s views, this won’t do, for specifically Calvinistic ideas are not referenced in the relevant letter.
There have been serious efforts in recent years to reconstruct the religious and intellectual context of Hume’s early years.Footnote 1 Badía Cabrera’s book would have benefitted from taking the results of these studies into account.
