Few events in world history have intrigued scholars more than the Cuban missile crisis. This intrigue is hardly surprising, given how closely the United States and the Soviet Union were considering nuclear war after Soviet nuclear missiles were stationed on Cuba in October 1962. Even though these missiles were eventually disassembled and transported back to Russia, whether John F. Kennedy or Nikita Khrushchev ultimately emerged victorious from the crisis – or if there was, in fact, a “victor” – has been the subject of widespread historical debate. Beyond these debates, Kennedy and Khrushchev's fateful diplomacy also sparked far-reaching questions about the limitations of nuclear brinkmanship and the future of defence policies between competing nuclear powers.

Alice George's The Cuban Missile Crisis is an extensive examination that addresses these debates and questions. George offers a structured day-by-day account of the crisis as it developed, framed in its Cold War context. She covers all important aspects, including Khrushchev's decision to station nuclear warheads on Cuba and its implementation, discussions in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Ex Comm) over US retaliation and the eventual naval blockade, public announcements and private deliberations for resolving the crisis, and the final outcomes once the missiles were no longer in operation. She also details the effect of the crisis on the American people. This added dimension offers a more complete understanding of the crisis than previous studies, which often neglect the crisis's domestic impact.

So far as George is concerned, there was no clear winner or loser during the Cuban missile crisis. She concludes that both Kennedy and Khrushchev “showed courage” and “chose caution as a means of making the crisis gravitate toward peace instead of spiralling out of control and into war” (110–11). Moreover, she outlines clearly a list of American and Soviet faulty assumptions during the crisis (47, 59). This balanced appraisal reflects an overall positive outlook on the crisis's effect on the future of the Cold War. Though she recognizes correctly that it was the “world's closest brush with Armageddon,” the crisis “laid the groundwork for a more cautious approach to Cold War relations between the United States and the Soviet Union” (1).

Because neither country could rationally consider launching nuclear weapons at the other country in fear of an equal or greater retaliation, the crisis offered clear lessons to be learnt about cautious diplomacy, the limitations of nuclear brinkmanship, and relations between global superpowers. For George, the immediate lessons for US–Soviet relations were learnt: in 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This was the first agreement on arms control since the development of the atomic bomb in 1945. Other US administrations were less receptive to these lessons. George suggests that US Presidents Lyndon Johnson and George W. Bush's decisions to intervene in Vietnam and Iraq respectively were due at least in part to neither President seriously considering the usefulness of cautious diplomacy or the limitations of global superpowers. She colourfully described these wars as the “wicked stepchildren of the missile crisis” (127).

Though George's book will perhaps not offer the more experienced reader a fresh insight, The Cuban Missile Crisis is a necessity for those interested in the crisis, US–Soviet relations, and the Cold War. It is well written, structured to cater for academics and general readers alike, and argues convincingly that both Kennedy and Khrushchev are worthy of scholarly approbation. If nothing else, George's book highlights that the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated the importance of cautious diplomacy and limitations of global superpowers for future governments to consider.