Why do we need another book about populism? Given the mountain of commentary on the topic since the “populist explosion” of 2016, this is a reasonable question to ask. Takis Pappas agrees and captures the problem well when he argues that our problem with the concept of populism is “ontological.” We do not have a clear view of what it is that we are describing or talking about; thus we need to start from first principles to provide a satisfactory answer to the question.

Thus begins a thoughtful and engaging discussion. Pappas takes up the methodological challenge of trying to find an ontological basis for the concept of populism with great vigor, with erudition and insight gleaned not only from deep familiarization with the key texts on populism but also from a panoptic comparative approach that takes in data in an impressive global sweep.

Being an advocate for “parsimony,” Pappas lands on a pleasingly simple definition of populism that will be widely discussed because of its relative simplicity. After running the rule over the classic definitions from the likes of Cas Mudde, Margaret Canovan, and Ernesto Laclau, he argues that populism can be defined quite simply as “democratic illiberalism.” This is an interesting and original formula. By conjoining these two terms, Pappas overcomes some of the more obvious objections often made about rival interpretations.

First, he agrees that populism is to be differentiated from authoritarianism, which is often implicit if not explicit in media commentary. Populists, he wants to say, are democrats, but they are not liberal democrats, which is the default coupling for those who defend existing institutions and practices. Whereas liberal democrats see freedom of speech, a free press, and a tolerant and plural civil society as integral to a functional democracy, populists do not. They do not see any contradiction between seeking authorization from the people through the regular electoral process and mocking or undermining the conditions that liberal democrats argue are intrinsic to a democratic culture.

This contempt for the liberalism underpinning liberal democracy also helps us understand populism in power. Populists acknowledge the requirement to (minimally) respect institutions and processes, but throw bipartisanship, consultation, and respect for opposing opinions out the window. Having taken power, the point is to monopolize that power and to use it for whatever ends or purposes the regime has in mind. This is why for Pappas populism has a very different character from mainstream liberal democratic politics. Populism is assertive, aggressive, instrumental. It causes fear and panic among rival groups while inducing loyalty among its supporters.

There is, I think, much to agree with in Pappas’s analysis of populism. To begin with, it builds usefully from insights and observations that are very much part of the everyday usage of the term. Victor Orbán, whom everyone agrees is a populist, famously describes his own regime as democratic illiberalism. If Orbán describes himself in these terms, then there must be some truth to the description. Self-ascription is usually—if not always—a useful starting point for naming objects, at least for nominalists.

More generally the exploration of the space between “not quite authoritarian” and “not quite democratic” does resonate with consideration of figures such as Donald Trump, whose rambunctious yet charismatic style Pappas captures in his definition. This is one of the strengths of the book. Many populism studies scholars have been loath to acknowledge the likes of Trump as populist at all, either because they are not convinced that he possesses the requisite ideology that populism is said to represent or because by implication populism becomes a “boo word” that closes off the possibility for more constructive types of progressive or “left populist” initiatives. But as Pappas recognizes, if we allow too much of a gap between academic discussions of a concept such as populism and everyday usage, there is usually only one winner, and it’s not academics. We need to acknowledge that “populist” in everyday language refers to something disruptive, unpredictable, boisterous, and yet also in some sense democratic, albeit of a peculiar and indeed perhaps illiberal kind. Pappas’s discussion captures this well.

Yet, there are some issues to explore further. First, it is not obvious that progressive and left populist initiatives fit very easily within this definition. Everyone would agree with Pappas that, for example, the Spanish leftist party Podemos is populist, including its own founding figures. Yet few would agree that they are even prospectively illiberal. On the contrary, they have made great pains to put distance between themselves and earlier radical left groups in the Spanish context for precisely this reason. Those closely affiliated with Podemos who have exercised power in Spain such as Ada Colau and Manuela Carmena have demonstrated few if any illiberal tendencies. Indeed, they have opened up political participation in novel and innovative ways that have been recognized by the liberal democratic mainstream. Colau was awarded the EU’s Citizens Prize in 2013. and Carmena’s administration won a UN political participation award in 2018.

This is not to say that such figures are beyond reproach or criticism. Yet not only do they abide by the rules of the game but they also demonstrate an adherence to democratic norms and to liberal principles as explored by Pappas. So, do we then say that they are not really populists? Or do we say that radicals who seek to make a break with, change, or reform existing democratic practices are illiberal? If the latter, then of course the accusation that populism is little more than a boo word covering over a rather conservative stance in relation to the dynamic of contemporary politics may well have some legitimacy.

The last point leads me to a more general concern about the analysis: although it discusses populism in great detail, liberalism and, by extension, illiberalism are not. There is a brief discussion of the liberal tradition, referencing the classic thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, but there is little hint of the paradox at the heart of liberalism itself, which is that both in theory and in practice it is accused of being illiberal. It is worth mentioning here because the term “liberal” in the context in which Pappas is writing, namely the United States, can carry this connotation. Who are the “liberals” as far as conservatives are concerned? Those who, through their effort to promote the interests of myriad identities and minorities, have created a “cancel culture” whose pernicious effects can be felt across university life, the media, and public life. So has liberalism itself, the liberalism, of today’s “liberals” become illiberal?

One could go on. The point is more that “illiberalism” can itself come across as a catch-all boo word describing those who for whatever reason do not subscribe to dominant mainstream beliefs and standards. Again, it is easy for such an analysis to sound conservative even when this is not the intent.

Notwithstanding these issues, Pappas’s book is certainly an interesting, provocative, and thoughtful contribution to an admittedly overcrowded field, and it deserves wide readership both within and outside populism studies.