In this elegant translation S. takes as his beginning the idea that ‘law is, in its specificity, an invention of the West’ (p. viii) and in particular of Roman jurisprudence. With the ambition of restoring the jurists' writings to their place in history, S. traces this invention of ‘law’ through examining the development of Roman legal thinking from the archaic period through to Ulpian against a background of expanding empire, trade and slavery and changes in the governance of Rome itself. In so doing, S. has produced a work that is insightful, stimulating and often complex – in his own words, it is ‘not an easy book’ (p. viii). In describing ‘law’ as a western, particularly Roman, invention, S. acknowledges other societies' normative systems, but claims that only in Rome did the system of legal ordering become subject to a strict specialisation with its own autonomy, removed from religion, morals and politics, from which arose an ideological discourse as to law's ‘independence’ and ‘neutrality’.

Part 1, ‘The Tradition and the History’, briefly outlines the formation of the Corpus Iuris Civilis and its reception into modernity, and summarises the past study of the jurists themselves, including the issue of post-classical alterations to juristic texts. S. concludes that such alterations cast only a ‘fairly tenuous veil’ over the originals (p. 30). He bemoans that past research has considered the jurists as ‘fungibles’ – something S. successfully corrects here.

Part 2, ‘The Birth of a Technique’, examines the emergence of ‘law’ from archaic Rome through to the second century b.c. For S., ius in this early period was not properly ‘law’, but rather an array of ritual compliances halfway between the human and divine. Archaic priests were repositories of specialised knowledge both of the rituals to be observed in relation to the gods (fas) and also of the rituals that solemnified transactions between household heads (ius). Information on ius was usually given as an oral response to the enquiries of patres. Thus, in the priests' role lay the germs of two distinctive features of Roman jurisprudence: specialised knowledge and the giving of responsa. This aristocratic concentration of specialised knowledge was not uncontested. The XII Tables were the product of political conflict and an effort to replace aristocratic oral ius with written lex, passed by an assembly as in a Greek polis. This distinction between ius and lex is important for S., who does not consider in detail legislation, or the jurists' relationship to it, outside this discussion of the XII Tables. The intervention of the XII Tables did not give rise to the Greek model of legislation, but rather, in the absence of other expertise the pontiffs resumed their role as interpreters of the law, though this time as guardians of the text. By the second century a further transformation had occurred, the wise aristocrat had replaced the priest in the role of giving responsa, and it becomes possible to speak of ius in the sense of ‘law’, an autonomous legal system detached from religious custom and politics consisting of three layers: archaic mores, the XII Tables and expert responsa.

In Part 3, ‘Science, Forms, Dominion’, S.'s focus turns to the jurists themselves. S. examines the emergence of the praetor's edict and the beginning of Roman legal writing over the second and first centuries b.c. The development of the edict is placed within the context of the growth of maritime exchanges and Rome's empire. Throughout the book, tectonic factors, in particular the growth of empire and slavery or changes in governmental form, are the key mechanisms in explaining development. However, while causes such as the growth of empire and trade can be seen as the impetus for aspects of the edict, they are less suited to explaining other significant changes such as in inheritance and family law, areas of key concern for the praetor and jurists, but falling largely outside S.'s examination.

Coinciding with the edict's development, Q. Mucius Scaevola undertook a decisive step in Roman written jurisprudence through his organisation of the ius civile by genera, which gave birth to the technique of legal abstraction that separated the functional forms of the relationships considered by ius from their particular application and endowed law with an autonomous life of its own. The legal thinking of Servius and Cicero also receives consideration here. Particularly revealing are S.'s analyses of Cicero's thoughts on the work of Mucius and Servius and on law as a means of legitimising empire.

Part 4, ‘The Heart of the Empire’, examines the changing role of jurists under the empire from Labeo through to Ulpian. S. posits a ‘silent agreement’ whereby the jurists guaranteed the new principate loyalty, in return for the recognition of the traditional jurisprudential hierarchy in the production of law, in accordance with which the emperor became a ‘response’ princeps, rather than a legislator. The early principate saw the stabilisation of both the normative civil law framework and the jurists' approach, which was centred on abstract concepts and case-based rationality. Drawing on his own rather pessimistic views expressed in La storia spezzata (2002 – on which see CR 52 [2002], 146–7), S. considers this normative framework to be stagnant and containing the seeds of its own deterioration. Nevertheless, S. also considers the period from Nerva to Marcus Aurelius a ‘golden age’ of Roman jurisprudence. However, his asseveration that in the era of Tacitus and the Second Sophistic the jurists were the ‘undisputed protagonists’ of intellectual life in a period otherwise characterised by ‘fragility and darkness’ in intellectual endeavours perhaps outstrips the evidence (p. 371). Throughout this Part, legal thought is set against the background of the princeps' increasing role as legislator; the role of law as legitimator of the emperor and the changing role of jurists in their service of the emperor. Here, S. focusses more on the jurists' view of their role, rather than questions as to their actual interaction with the emperor, such as to what extent they influenced rescripts or the emperor's judicial activity. In an interesting analysis, S. argues that for Gaius the only remaining sources of law were the jurists and the emperor, whereas for Pomponius the jurists were actually a precondition for ius. The chapters on Ulpian contain some of S.'s finest analysis. Ulpian comes alive as a conscious systemiser subjecting his material to ‘consciously manipulative pressure’ to achieve his ends (p. 399). S. argues that Ulpian conceived of jurisprudence as a check on the emperor's legislative power. In the final chapter, S. again builds on his La storia spezzata to argue that Roman law never developed a natural law critique of positive law due to the absence from Rome of strongly grounded individualism.

S.'s approach is selective, not all works or jurists are subject to in-depth study. Rather, S. focusses on close readings of particular passages of some jurists, often on contract law, to bring out nuances in their legal thinking and, occasionally, political views. His close readings of Gaius and Pomponius, on the sources of law, and Ulpian, on the foundation of law on iustitia, are particularly effective and revealing. It would be interesting to see these techniques applied more comprehensively. Certainly, this enables S. to restore the jurists as individual thinkers. However, while selection is inevitable given the volume of material in the Digest alone, some surprising giants of Roman jurisprudence, including Paul and Papinian, do not receive the same close analysis.

The translators deserve praise for conveying S.'s distinctive style. Rhetorical and arresting, S. frequently combines striking word choices and elegant phraseology: one reads of the edict emerging ‘from the magmatism of its nascent state’ (p. 358) and the Roman government being ‘devoured by an intrinsic autocratic vocation’ (p. 396). Such writing makes this anything but a dry law book. However, this vigorous style can sometimes lend a certain opacity to S.'s more complex arguments, and its complexity, combined with technical terminology and much untranslated Latin and Greek in the notes, presents some barriers for the non-specialist reader S. also hopes to reach.

This elegant, illuminating and challenging book should, rightfully, stimulate much discussion, if not always agreement, and further research into the jurists, their thinking and influence.