Constructivism is inherent in the body of social theory developed by Hayek. Constructivism is practiced by Hayek. It is the fundamental logic of his life’s work. In a sense, his own practice constitutes the negation of his own argument.
—Warren Samuels, Erasing the Invisible Hand
I. INTRODUCTION
The core of Friedrich Hayek’s work consists of the idea that society ought not be consciously designed. As has been pointed out by several scholars,Footnote 1 Hayek develops this idea in two fields. On the one hand, he contends that the conscious organization of economic activity according to a central plan would inevitably entail a destruction of freedom and a considerable decline in the general wealth of the population—compared with the wealth that is spontaneously achieved within a decentralized capitalist system.Footnote 2 On the other hand, he contends that the development of civilization and its institutions ought to be spontaneous rather than consciously designed.Footnote 3
The present paper deals with this second aspect of Hayek’s thought. Specifically, it is an attempt to clear up an alleged contradiction, which can be described as follows. Despite his repudiation of constructivism, Hayek considers that the expansion of government in many Western democracies ought to be resisted by the construction of an appropriate constitution, a product of conscious design aimed at safeguarding the liberal order from totalitarian and dictatorial trends. Hence, many commentators have pointed to the presence of a tension, even a contradiction or inconsistency, in Hayek’s thought.Footnote 4
As has been recognized,Footnote 5 a more careful reading shows that in truth Hayek deems possible and desirable some piecemeal (partial) improvement of inherited institutions by conscious decisions. When he advocates spontaneous development, what he actually means is that the set of social institutions as a whole ought to remain the product of spontaneous growth rather than conscious design. At first glance, one could thus clear up the contradiction by emphasizing that Hayek’s constitutional construction is precisely an example of “piecemeal tinkering,” not an attempt to completely redesign the institutional system as a whole, and consequently it is compatible with the spontaneous growth of institutions as a whole. Under close textual scrutiny, however, this solution proves unconvincing because, according to Hayek, certain efforts at deliberate construction, although piecemeal, do prevent or interfere with the spontaneous growth of institutions. In order to understand why Hayek does not contradict himself in designing a model constitution, more precise definitions are needed. It is true that a spontaneous development of institutions, in Hayek’s sense, designates a process where the set of social institutions as a whole is not consciously designed, but such a definition is not sufficient.
The present paper shows more precisely that, according to Hayek, in order for the development of social institutions to remain as spontaneous as possible, the efforts at deliberate construction ought to be not only piecemeal but also consistent with the conditions of a liberal order. Such a definition enables one to understand why Hayek is not inconsistent when he proposes the design of a constitution. Indeed, his proposal aims to provide the most effective protection of freedom, and thereby to create conditions favorable to the spontaneous growth of institutions.Footnote 6 Because of the coercive powers of governments, Hayek contends, the spontaneous growth of institutions in various fields is often obstructed. Reducing such coercion as much as possible is the objective of Hayek’s deliberate constitutional construction.Footnote 7
In focusing on the internal consistency of one particular aspect of Hayek’s thought, the use of the ceteris paribus device is inevitable. We endeavor to prove by textual analysis that it is consistent of Hayek to deem desirable the conscious design of a constitution while asserting, at the same time, that the development of institutions ought to be spontaneous. Throughout our demonstration, other important issues must be put to one side. For example, is it true, as Hayek claims, that effective institutions have more chance to emerge out of a spontaneous, rather than consciously designed, process?Footnote 8 Is Hayek right to regard his model constitution as the best possible device to minimize coercion?Footnote 9 Moreover, the present paper is not concerned with Hayek’s contention that the development of the modern welfare state and unlimited democracy can unintentionally produce a totalitarian dictatorial state. Our focus is limited to Hayek’s contention that efforts at deliberate construction in modern democratic welfare states obstruct the spontaneous growth of institutions. Indeed, in order to clarify exactly what Hayek means in advocating a spontaneous process, it proves necessary to explain his assertion that such a process, in some cases, may be interfered with or prevented, hence the approach adopted here of focusing only on Hayek’s second claim.Footnote 10
The next section presents Hayek’s apparent self-contradiction. Then we show that, even though Hayek’s deliberate constitutional construction is not an attempt to completely redesign the institutional system as a whole, this fact cannot properly dispel the appearance of inconsistency in designing a model constitution (section III). According to Hayek, the development of institutions ought to remain as spontaneous as possible, which means being consistent with the conditions of a liberal order. We develop this thesis in a fourth section. Because societies are characterized by infringements against liberal conditions (section V), Hayek deems desirable the design of a constitution of liberty, described in a sixth section. The seventh section concludes.
II. HAYEK’S APPARENT SELF-CONTRADICTION
The institutions of the market system, Hayek contends, enabled the groups that adopted them to achieve an economical utilization of resources and consequently an immense increase of their general wealth. Such a system, however, “has not been deliberately invented”; “it has spontaneously grown up long before we had learnt to understand its operation” (1941, p. 581). Hayek indeed argues that the institutions of the market are not the result of an intention to augment the national wealth. They have not been, and could not have been, consciously adopted with that purpose in viewFootnote 11 because, when they developed and then spread, their benefits for the level of general wealth were actually not foreseen by anyone.
And to me the proof of this is that even now hardly anybody yet understands what the advantages of private property and the market society are. Man not only did not know what the advantages would be when he introduced it, he still does not understand it fully today although he owes to it (and now I am coming to one of my chief points) the possibility of multiplying the numbers of mankind by roughly 200 times. (1987, p. 40)
Hayek extends such analysis to argue that it is not solely the institutions of the market, but indeed civilizations more generally, that are not, and could not have been, the historical product of conscious design. The term “institution” is employed by Hayek in the broadest sense for every social phenomenon that makes up the framework of a group’s culture and civilization, such as language,Footnote 12 writing,Footnote 13 money,Footnote 14 rules of moralsFootnote 15 and of law,Footnote 16 insurance institutions,Footnote 17 etc. None of our ancestors, says Hayek, could have been intelligent enough to foresee the benefits these various institutions produced at the group level (security, order, advancement of knowledge, economic growth, etc.).
Modern man prides himself that he has built that civilization as if in doing so he had carried out a plan which he had before formed in his mind. The fact is, of course, that if at any point of the past man had mapped out his future on the basis of the then-existing knowledge and then followed this plan, we would not be where we are. We would not only be much poorer, we would not only be less wise, but we would also be less gentle, less moral; in fact we would still have brutally to fight each other for our very lives. (1968, p. 38)
From such past experience Hayek infers that beneficial institutions are far more likely to emerge out of a spontaneous, rather than consciously designed, development. He actually argues that only through spontaneous growth (or, synonymously, evolution) do people have a chance to discover institutions that are better than what their poor capacity of foresight can conceive. Out of consciously directed growth, by contrast, “nothing greater can emerge than the directing mind can foresee” (1979, p. 141), hence Hayek’s recommendation (Thesis One [T1]) so as to continue civilization’s progress.
T1: The development of institutions ought not be consciously designed—it ought to be spontaneous.
Hayek contrasts his view with the constructivist rationalist one, which “assumes that man was originally endowed with both the intellectual and moral attributes which enabled him deliberately to fashion civilization” (1958, p. 233). Such rationalism, exemplified notably by René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “was completely blind to the forces of historical development,” Hayek complains, and “what it applied to the past it proclaimed as programme for the future: that man in the full knowledge of what he was doing should deliberately create such a civilization and social order as the process of his reason enabled him to design” (1965, p. 3).
Yet, despite his repudiation of constructivism,Footnote 18 Hayek considers that the development of a utopian constitution could be expected to benefit people—especially the inhabitants of countries that do not already possess a well-established constitutionFootnote 19—by producing the foreseeable consequence of protecting their freedom against totalitarian and dictatorial collectivism. He contends that such protection cannot be satisfactorily achieved through evolution or spontaneous growth, but requires “constitutional design.”Footnote 20 This we shall call Hayek’s Thesis Two [T2].
T2: The conscious design of a constitution is necessary, so as to secure a desirable social order.
Is that not a constructivist view par excellence, which contradicts Hayek’s Thesis One? Similarly, as regards the monetary system, Hayek employs his theoretical knowledge to predict that people would greatly benefit from the design of a radically new system, a free market for currencies, which would properly solve the problem of inflation and unemployment. Such suggestions about the design of institutions through which Hayek attempts to consciously shape social change have provoked many comments in the literature. For example, even a generally sympathetic critic like James Buchanan ([1982] 1985) has questioned the internal consistency of Hayek’s thought.
In yet other parts of his work, however, Hayek himself seems clearly to be a ‘constructive rationalist’, or a ‘rational constructivist’ since he does not shy away at all from advancing specific proposals for institutional-constitutional reform. Two examples are provided in his widely discussed proposal for the denationalization of money issue and in his proposal for changes in the division of functions as between two separate elected assemblies. (Buchanan [1982] 1985, p. 76)
This sort of comment is so frequently repeated that it requires serious and thorough consideration. In a similar vein to Buchanan ([1982] 1985), we can quote the view expressed by John Gray (Reference Gray1980), according to which Hayek’s constitution proposal “is in some measure marred by a tone of constructivist utopianism of the sort he elsewhere deplores” (1980, p. 134). Other authors, such as Samuel Brittan (Reference Brittan1980) and Ellen Paul (Reference Paul1988), likewise consider that Hayek is attracted to two different political philosophies—classical liberalism and traditionalism—that cannot be combined into a single harmonious system in our times. Brittan states:
When in some golden age—say Gladstonian England, as seen through nostalgic spectacles—the prevailing tradition was itself that of classical liberalism the two systems of Hayek might seem in harmony. When prevailing constitutions are authoritarian or collectivist, there is tension between the two ideals. (Brittan Reference Brittan1980, p. 35)
Paul states:
It seems that Hayek is caught in something of a dilemma: if he accepts the consequences of his theoretical standpoint, he appears to be in a very weak position to contend against anti-liberal and particularly totalitarian regimes; but as a political observer he argues vehemently against the totalitarian regimes of our day. (Paul Reference Paul1988, p. 259)
According to Norman Barry (Reference Barry, Gray and Pelczynski1984) and Murray Forsyth (Reference Forsyth1988), Hayek’s role as a constitutional designer is thus paradoxical. Stavros Ioannides (Reference Ioannides and Ioannides1992), meanwhile, talks of “a serious methodological inconsistency” (1992, p. 148). One might think that, as they date back many years, these kinds of commentsFootnote 21 do not describe a view often professed today. More recent authors, like Jerry Muller (Reference Muller, Hunt and McNamara2007), Buchanan (Reference Buchanan2008), and Samuels (Reference Samuels2011), however, express a similar criticism.
All those scholars speak of a tension, a paradox, a contradiction, or an inconsistency in Hayek’s thought, because they do not see how these two propositions asserted by Hayek (T1 and T2) are reconcilable. In deeming desirable the design of a utopian constitution aimed at deliberately improving the social order, does Hayek not inevitably contradict his own thesis that the development of institutions ought to be spontaneous? It might be of interest for the history of economics to explore this still prevailing charge. The next section examines a first way to answer it that has been proposed in the literature, in order to show why it ought to be regarded as unconvincing.
III. HAYEK AS A PIECEMEAL DESIGNER
At first glance, the alleged self-contradiction could be cleared up as follows. Hayek calls “constructivist rationalism” the naive belief that all our institutions have been consciously designed and that this ought to continue in the future;Footnote 22 and the thesis Hayek opposes to the constructivists becomes, suitably nuanced, that the development of institutions ought not be entirely the product of conscious design.
T1*: The development of institutions ought not be consciously designed as a whole—it ought to be, on the whole, spontaneous.
Under this interpretation, Hayek does not contradict himself in attempting to consciously shape social change because what he deems possible and desirable to redesign is not our institutional system as a whole but only some of its parts—hence the absence of contradiction between T1* and T2. It seems this is what Karen Vaughn (Reference Vaughn1984) means when she asserts that, even when civilizations develop as an unintended outcome of human action, “the actions themselves originate from human intention,” and “the only way we have a chance of influencing the outcome is to participate in the game” (1984, p. 129). Hayek’s modest participation contrasts with the constructivist presumption to redesign the entire game for a recognizable purpose. This solution is also evoked by Leland Yeager (Reference Yeager, Leube and Zlabinger1985), Douglas Whitman (Reference Whitman1998), and Bruce Caldwell (Reference Caldwell and Mäki2002).
There is, in fact, a great deal of textual evidence in support of it. Hayek does frequently describe as “constructivist rationalism” the conviction that “all institutions which benefit humanity”Footnote 23 have been and ought to be deliberate inventions, not just some of them.Footnote 24 And as regards his own view, Hayek actually recognizes that “institutions have of course to be designed, even if they develop. I only object against the whole thing made to singly designed institutions” (1983, p. 348). Such a quotation, also confirmed by others,Footnote 25 proves that Hayek does assert proposition T1*. He does not deny man’s capacity to be guided by correct foresight, to know beforehand the benefits that some new institutions could procure for the people.Footnote 26
Despite being accurate, this clarification of Hayek’s Thesis One nevertheless cannot convincingly explain why Hayek does not contradict himself in designing a model constitution. Indeed, a careful reading shows that certain acts of deliberate design that do not aim at complete reconstruction of the whole are all the same regarded by Hayek as obstacles to the spontaneous growth of institutions. Consider, for example, what he says about legislation in contemporary democracies.
If by ‘social process’ we mean the gradual evolution which produces better solutions than deliberate design, the imposition of the will of the majority can hardly be regarded as such. The latter differs radically from that free growth from which custom and institutions emerge, because its coercive, monopolistic, and exclusive character destroys the self-correcting forces which bring it about in a free society that mistaken efforts will be abandoned and the successful ones prevail. (1960, p. 111)
Yet, in most cases, parliamentary majorities proceed step by step by modifying some bits of the legal system for the purpose of improving the social order, without a comprehensive overall view. Why, then, consider such a legislative process as an obstacle to evolution?Footnote 27
Similarly, as regards some attempts at deliberate change within education or the various social services (unemployment insurance, health insurance, etc.), one must wonder why Hayek judges that instituting a compulsory government scheme would mean “excluding a whole field from the scope of spontaneous growth.” Thereby, “we also prevent the gradual development of new types of solutions for the problem” (1955, p. 49). The spontaneous growth of better methods—for example, of provision for old age or for medical care—may be obstructed, according to Hayek, if these fields are controlled by monopolistic government.Footnote 28
Hayek also criticizes egalitarianism for putting an end to cultural evolution,Footnote 29 and he contends that the Rawlsian conception of justice “would have made the evolution of civilisation impossible.”Footnote 30 Yet, an egalitarian government does not need, and indeed rarely aims, to make each and every institution the product of conscious design (a few legislative changes as regards taxation and welfare benefits can alone greatly reduce material inequalities). John Rawls (Reference Rawls1971), for one, presents an account of certain distributive principles of justice that the basic structure of society ought to satisfy. His theory of justice does not undertake a rational assessment of all the virtues of all our institutions.Footnote 31
The argument described in this section ought, therefore, to be judged as unconvincing because of its incapacity to explain the above asymmetry. How, that is, can one present Hayek’s Thesis Two as being evolution-friendly on the ground that it prescribes mere “piecemeal redesign,” given the fact that Hayek describes certain acts of piecemeal design precisely as obstructive to evolution? This issue has puzzled more than one commentator. Jim Tomlinson (Reference Tomlinson and Tomlinson1990)Footnote 32 and Caldwell (Reference Caldwell2004),Footnote 33 for example, wonder how Hayek’s theory could really help people know when institutional design is indicated and when it is not. According to them, Hayek does not articulate any clear criterion for deciding. Yet, as our next sections show, such a criterion is discernible in Hayek’s own descriptions and defences of evolution.
IV. AN INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION UNDER FREEDOM
It may be helpful, first, to go deeper into our analysis of what Hayek calls “constructivist rationalism.” To claim, as constructivists do, that civilizations are the historical product of conscious design actually amounts to claiming that the persons concerned—the designers—possessed reason before civilization. This is what Hayek means when speaking of the “conception of an independently and antecedently existing human wisdom that has invented these institutions,”Footnote 34 or the “conception of an already fully developed mind designing the institutions which made life in society possible” (1973, p. 17). Thus, according to constructivist rationalists, civilizations have not resulted from “a hard school of trial and error”;Footnote 35 they have rather been invented in one go, deductively, by some genius(es) already endowed with an intelligence capable of such an act.
As regards present and future developments, then, Hayek emphasizes one crucial consequence of constructivist rationalism: the conviction that the persons most capable of discovering beneficial institutions—or, expressed differently, the persons who “assume that in their authority lies superior wisdom”Footnote 36—ought to enjoy a monopoly of creative activity.Footnote 37 Such a consequence is indeed consistent. If one believes in the ability of an elite to know beforehand which institutions are better, then one is naturally led to deny those outside this elite the right to try alternative institutions, on the ground that the trials would be useless anyway—a waste of time and energy. Constructivist presumptuousness thus tends to imply, in Hayek’s words, “monopolistic power to experiment in a particular field—power which brooks no alternative and is in its essence based on a claim to the possession of superior wisdom” (1958, p. 242).
Hayek, by exact contrast, contends that many of our institutions have originated from an experimental process of trial and error. He employs this term in two senses:Footnote 38 first, to designate a gradual selection among competing groups,Footnote 39 presenting as chief illustration how the institutions of the market have probably developed. People long lived within small food-sharing groups held together by highly collectivist institutions, Hayek explains, until a group of pioneers tumbled upon new institutions at the root of the development of a market system, without intending to augment people’s general wealth: “And the law-breakers, who were to be path-breakers, certainly did not introduce the new rules because they recognized that they were beneficial to the community, but they simply started some practices advantageous to them which then did prove beneficial to the group in which they prevailed” (1979, p. 161).
Next came a second period, when the groups who had adopted the institutions of the market became more prosperous and more prolific than others, and gradually displacedFootnote 40 (or were imitated by)Footnote 41 them. And only long after they grew up—this is the third period described by Hayek—did these superior institutions begin to be understood by professional economists.Footnote 42 At the time of their emergence (period one), their benefits on the level of general wealth were not, and could not have been, foreseen by anyone, hence Hayek’s contention that they are the historical product of an undesigned development.
The crucial point Hayek here makes against constructivist rationalists is that such undesigned discovery and spread of better institutions were made possible only by some dissenters’ being free to try alternative institutions.Footnote 43 The growth of insurance systems is a second historical example provided by Hayek.
In fact, the way in which insurance has evolved is the most telling commentary on the presumption of those who want to confine future evolution to a single channel enforced by authority. It has been well said that ‘no man ever aimed at creating marine insurance as social insurance was later created’ and that we owe our present techniques to a gradual growth in which the successive steps due to ‘the uncounted contributions of anonymous or historical individuals have in the end created a work of such perfection that in comparison with the whole all the clever conceptions due to single creative intelligences must seem very primitive.’ (1960, p. 291)
Besides such a pluralist process of competition among alternative institutions, Hayek also employs the term “trial and error” in a second very different sense when analyzing the development of law, in the sense of enforced rules of conduct.Footnote 44 He now speaks of evolution or spontaneous growthFootnote 45 to designate a single-channel development, where only one body of law comes to be experimented on the whole territory, by the monopoly of judicial power.
The chief of the primitive tribe, the judge-king of the Middle Ages, or the common law judge of modern times have articulated the law of their land in deciding disputes among litigants.Footnote 46 Such activity, according to Hayek, was in most cases merely one of finding a law already present implicitly in the group—an activity, that is, of mere discovery of pre-existing conceptions of justice,Footnote 47 not one of deliberate design.
The important point here is not that the rule has been explicitly stated before, but that when articulated it is accepted as corresponding to general usage. The first formulation of what has already guided the sense of justice and, when first stated, is recognized as expressing what men have long felt, is as much a discovery as any discovery of science. (1976, p. 16)
Thus, for example, rules condemning attacks against persons and property, violence, theft, fraud, etc., guided people’s sense of right and wrong and governed their everyday conduct long before having been articulated through judicial decisions. Hayek recognizes, however, that in other cases the law was developed not merely by making explicit already widely accepted customs, but by deliberate efforts to create new rules—a fact that might lead one to believe that, in such cases, the judges acted as conscious designers. Indeed, as certain disputes among litigants have no obvious settlement, the judges may occasionally be compelled to go beyond pre-existing general opinion,Footnote 48 on the ground that such an opinion simply does not pre-exist.
Despite this acknowledgment, Hayek contends that judges’ creative activity was, all the same, driven by inner necessity far more than by deliberate design. In order to make the group operate more smoothly and more efficiently, every new rule formulated by judges ought indeed to properly harmonize with the whole system of already established rules. Now, to this intellectual problem of improving the combined effect of all the legal rules by adding new ones, there will, according to Hayek, generally be “only one right solution,”Footnote 49 hence Hayek’s contention that the development of law, even when it proceeded through judges’ deliberate efforts to fill gaps in the legal system, was actually not the product of their design, or of anybody else’s.Footnote 50 The judges may err in their task, and hence the adequacy or inadequacy of their new rules can be appreciated “only by their effects on that order of actions, effects which will be discovered only by trial and error” (1973, p. 102).
Before moving on to our next section, it is essential here to briefly describe the virtues Hayek ascribes to the laws emerging from such an experimental judicial process. First, the laws are necessarily abstract; that is, they refer not to particulars (for example, the needs of definite persons or groups, or what a government wants done in a particular instance),Footnote 51 but to conducts prohibited in general, for everybody alike (violence, theft, fraud, deception, etc.), in an indefinite number of instances potentially occurring anywhere and at any time. These are “rules of universal significance which can be applied to new cases” (1973, p. 86). Second, as the process of law development takes place on the occasion of settling disputes among litigants, it can never prohibit the actions of a person that do not affect others, because naturally they cannot bring about disputes.Footnote 52
These formal properties explain why a liberal order always had more ease emerging in territories like ancient Greece, Rome, or modern Britain, where the law was conceived as a given object to be discovered by the efforts of judges or scholars, rather than an object redesignable at will by constructivist legislators. Hayek shares the view that “the ideal of individual liberty seems to have flourished chiefly among people where, at least for long periods, judge-made law predominated” (1973, p. 94). He recognizes, however, that, especially in such fields as the law on the relations between masters and servants, or between landlords and tenants, the legal rules “have been shaped largely by the views of one of the parties and their particular interests,” because it was one of the groups concerned (the masters and the landlords) “which almost exclusively supplied the judges” (1973, p. 89). Thus, according to Hayek, the laws enforced within a territory may emerge from a judicial process and yet not suffice to secure a liberal order. But, conversely, in order to secure conditions of freedom, the laws of a given group ought to possess certain formal properties that judge-made law necessarily possesses. Footnote 53
V. THE OBSTACLES TO INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION
For a better—more precise—clarification of Hayek’s Thesis One, it is essential at this stage to appreciate a fundamental fact that most commentators have failed to perceive,Footnote 54 namely that Hayek endeavors to understand the “general principle” or “the kind of forces”Footnote 55 that, in the past, made the discovery and spread of better institutions possible, so as to learn what “conditions”Footnote 56 would be “favourable”Footnote 57 to a continuation of civilization’s progress. His passage from a conjectural narrative of past developments to a political recommendation for the future becomes especially clear in the following quotation: “But to me there can be no doubt that it were favourable moral traditions which made particular groups strong rather than intellectual design that made the progress of the past possible and will do so also in the future. To confine evolution to what we can foresee would be to stop progress” (1979, p. 169).
Hayek here argues against monopolyFootnote 58 by contending that people ought to be given the possibility of dissent, the freedom to form alternative groups. When developments are tied exclusively to what an alleged elite deems worth adopting, outsiders who are eager to introduce alternative institutions cannot do this unless they can convince the elite that their alternative proposals would prove superior. Under free competition, in contrast, institutions are ultimately chosen, not by individual human wisdom, but by an impersonal group selection where the superior institutions become known only afterwards by what, among a variety of experiments, turns out to be more successful,Footnote 59 not beforehand by what an alleged elite thinks.
The fact that a society has come to regard the teaching of certain men as the embodiment of goodness is no proof that it might not be the society’s undoing if their precepts are generally followed. It may well be that a nation may destroy itself by following the teaching of what it regards as its best men. … There would be little danger of this in a society whose members were still free to choose their way of practical life, because in such a society such tendencies would be self-corrective: only the group dominated by such ‘impractical’ ideals would decline, and others, less moral by current standards, would take its place. (1958, p. 239)
To understand why Hayek does not contradict himself in designing a model constitution, it is crucial here to discern that Hayek wishes to improve upon a development of institutions that, in the past, has not operated as spontaneously as it could have done but has, rather, frequently been restricted,Footnote 60 hindered,Footnote 61 because of the coercive powers of governments.Footnote 62 It is notably the case in the monetary field, where, Hayek remarks, “people have never been allowed to experiment.”Footnote 63 The more one moves away from freedom, the less favorable conditions are for a “real evolution” based on group selection, and vice versa.Footnote 64 Such is Hayek’s thesis.
T1**: The development of institutions ought not be consciously designed—it ought to proceed spontaneously, which means being consistent with the conditions of a liberal order.
As some quotations have shown, it is true that Hayek asserts the proposition T1*, but, as becomes clear now, he goes beyond this, and argues for the stronger thesis expressed in T1**. This enables one to understand why, according to him, certain acts of deliberate design that do not aim at complete reconstruction of the whole nevertheless obstruct the spontaneous growth of institutions. Hayek indeed deplores “many of the new welfare activities of government,” because they “rest on its claiming exclusive rights in certain fields,”Footnote 65 such as social insurance, education, etc., which “may well be the most certain way to prevent new knowledge from emerging.”Footnote 66 It is only when the state does not take “complete control”—that is, when it does not arrogantly claim to already know what institutions are better—that we can witness “a variety of experiments which are almost certain to produce new answers to current needs, answers which no advance planning can contemplate.”Footnote 67 Hayek thus objects against the “exclusive and monopolistic powers”Footnote 68 that have become characteristic of the modern welfare state and that preclude group selection.
As regards egalitarianism, then, one ought to recall Hayek’s narrative of past evolution as undesigned development where some dissenting groups that tumbled upon superior institutions were able to prosper and to multiply more than others and therefore to displace (or be imitated by) them. It is, Hayek contends, because free competition enables one to know afterwards, far better than any constructivist designer could beforehand, which “manners of living are more successful than others”Footnote 69 that the enforcement of any egalitarian creed would prevent the continuation of civilization’s progress, by overtaxing the superior groups and subsidizing the inferior ones.Footnote 70
The parliamentary legislative process is described by Hayek as an obstacle to evolution because of its monopolistic character, which makes the voted laws compulsory for everyone, thereby precluding the possibility of alternative experimentation.Footnote 71 Hayek, who considers that civilizations have spontaneously developed thanks to some pioneers’ being allowed to dissent, sometimes adds that the dissenters were “a few”Footnote 72 or “a small minority.”Footnote 73 Therefore—and even though parliamentary democracy does not exist to achieve predetermined goalsFootnote 74—“the conception that the efforts of all should be directed by the opinion of the majority or that a society is better according as it conforms more to the standards of the majority is,” according to Hayek, “a reversal of the principle by which civilization has grown” (1960, p. 110).
More precisely, in the field of law, Hayek actually does not object to monopoly per se. On the contrary, he describes the single-channel development of law by the monopoly of judicial power as an evolution. Simply put, he laments that the model of abstract and general laws equally applicable to all, which “has for long guided legislation,”Footnote 75 then came to be abandoned as legislatures ceased “to emulate” judge-made law.Footnote 76 They no longer followed the constraining example of the judge in developing solely laws aimed at reducing the sources of disputes among people—that is, solely laws of an abstract and general character not intended to control those conducts of people that do not affect othersFootnote 77—but began increasingly to produce whatever laws they pleased,Footnote 78 with the result that the legal framework became less and less consistent with the conditions of an institutional evolution under freedom.
Leijonhufvud: But you have referred to the development of democratic government into omnipotent government, and certainly the trend has been in that direction. Is that not a process of social evolution?
Hayek: Again, it’s an inevitable consequence of giving a government unlimited powers, which excludes experimentation with other forms. A deliberate decision by a man has put us on a one-way track, and the alternative evolutions have been excluded. In a sense, of course, all monopolistic government limits the possibilities of evolution. I think it does it least if it confines itself to the enforcement of general rules of conduct. (1983, p. 66)
VI. THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION
It is, therefore, in order to secure “the closest possible approach to perfect freedom”Footnote 79 that Hayek proposes the design of a model constitution. But, as is made clear by our last quotation, it is also—this is actually a consequence, by definition—so as to limit the possibilities of evolution as little as possible. Hayek considers that law, in the sense of enforced rules of conduct, “is an essential condition of freedom,”Footnote 80 but, not being an anarchist,Footnote 81 he does not advocate free competition among alternative bodies of law. Rather, he advocates a unique body of law resulting from single-channel development, where the monopolistic power to experiment is placed in the hands of the state (via the judiciary and the legislature), as is the monopoly of coercion to enforce it (via the executive and the judiciary) within the whole territory.
Hayek, therefore, does not advocate a perfectly spontaneous development of institutions. According to him, a happy state of zero monopoly, or complete freedom to experiment, is impossible to achieve.Footnote 82 On the contrary, Hayek contends, it is precisely because people’s freedom ought to be protected that it is necessary to coerce them by obliging them to respect everyone’s freedom. Hayek’s philosophy is a “philosophy of second best.”Footnote 83 His solution, so as to limit the obstructive character of state monopoly as much as possible, is the doctrine of the rule of law, which consists in making compulsory laws that, like those emerging from a judicial process, refer solely to such actions as affect other persons and are general, equal, and abstract.
For example, acts such as violence and theft affect the persons upon whom they are imposed and can be prohibited by rules equally applicable to all. Likewise, a quack doctor who harms her customers by extorting money from them without being able to cure them commits an act of fraud and deception that can be easily prevented by a general rule forbidding all persons from pretending to have qualifications they do not possess. In such instances, one deals with laws that do not constitute serious restrictions of freedom, says Hayek. They coerce people so as to prevent worse coercion (“second-best solution”), hence his claim that the rule of law “seems to be as effective a method of minimizing coercion as mankind has yet discovered” (1961, p. 32).
Let us, then, uncritically accept his assertion.Footnote 84 The enforced rules of conduct that are needed in order to minimize coercion include, says Hayek, the civil and criminal law, the law of property and contract, the law of corporations, factory legislation, etc., and even the duty to assure a uniform minimum income for all who cannot earn more in the market.Footnote 85 But beyond this indispensable thin layer of enforced rules of conduct made compulsory for everyone, persons ought in other respects to be free to experiment with alternative institutions that are not enforced on all, so that, just as in the past, the superior ones may have a chance to develop and spread by the action of competitive group selection.
Unlike any deliberately imposed coercive rules, which can be changed only discontinuously and for all at the same time, growth of this kind makes gradual and experimental change possible. The simultaneous existence of individuals and groups observing partially different rules provides the opportunity for the selection of the more effective ones. (1958, p. 236)
According to Hayek, however, we cannot expect societies in a state of constitutional anarchy to bring about such a “favourable framework,”Footnote 86 namely the “conditions in which society can gradually evolve improved formations.”Footnote 87 He then imagines a model constitution aimed to prevent parliaments from coercing people beyond the thin layer of compulsory laws that is required to enforce guarantees of freedom. In other words, the majorities, in an effort to emulate judge-made law, ought to lay down only general, impartial, and abstract laws that are equally applicable to all, laws resting on an already existing opinion that certain kinds of action are right and others are wrong,Footnote 88 or laws found to be required complements of the already established laws. All laws that are more intrusive, that aim to bring about particular results in the private sphere, ought to be deemed unconstitutional.
Such a development will be possible only if the traditionalist majority does not have power to make compulsory for everyone those traditional manners and mores which would prevent the experimentation with new ways inherent in competition. This means that the powers of the majority must be limited to the enforcement of such general rules as will prevent the individuals from encroaching on the protected domains of their fellows, and should not extend to positive prescriptions of what the individuals must do. (1979, p. 76)
As one can see, Hayek explicitly discusses the kind of framework needed for a proper growth of institutions. Contrary to what is asserted by Viktor Vanberg (Reference Vanberg1994), it is therefore not necessary to reconstruct Hayek’s argument to any extent. Hayek’s evolutionary argument, which is conditional rather than unconditional,Footnote 89 means that the development of institutions ought to take place within specified constraints. The objective of his deliberate constitutional construction, as he puts it, is to give government “a shape in which it provides a beneficial framework for the free growth of society.” In this way “we may well hope to see the growth of civilization continue” (1979, p. 152).
Hayek’s advocacy of the rule of law permits us to answer the famous question posed by John Maynard Keynes ([1944] 1980) about where to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate government intervention,Footnote 90 and it also relativizes the criticism raised by Alvin Hansen (Reference Hansen1945), according to whom Hayek’s criterion about good and bad planning is very unclear, and who asks, for example, when speaking of Hayek: “Is he for the Beveridge program or against it? That is the kind of tough question we have to decide in our modern democracy” (1945, p. 10). It is true that Hayek himself favors a government-provided income for all whose market income falls below the minimum of sustenance. The fact remains, however, that the Beveridge program, as with all the modern welfare states, goes well beyond a mere insurance against extreme misfortune, and well beyond that thin layer of compulsory laws that Hayek deems inevitable.Footnote 91 Because it represents an historical step toward unifying the development of insurance solutions by state monopoly, Hayek regards it as an obstacle to the spontaneous growth of institutions in the field of social insurance.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our conclusion is that the two theses examined in this paper, when properly understood, complement rather than contradict each other.
T1**: The development of institutions ought not be consciously designed—it ought to proceed spontaneously, which means being consistent with the conditions of a liberal order.
T2*: The conscious design of a constitution is necessary, so as to secure a liberal order.
Of course, this is not to say that these theses themselves are incontestable. For example, one might doubt that the conditions of a liberal order are the most promising way to discover better institutions, or, even if one finds this claim convincing, one might question the thesis that Hayek’s utopian constitution, with his doctrine of the rule of law, are the most effective means of securing freedom to experiment.Footnote 92 Another interesting topic could be to investigate the meta-conditions that are required for the emergence of a constitution itself.Footnote 93 We have restricted the focus of our paper to the internal consistency of one specific aspect of Hayek’s social thought so as to prove by textual analysis that, contrary to what is often asserted, Hayek’s desire for deliberate construction does not constitute the negation of his own argument against constructivist rationalism.
