The battle over the interpretation of the Second World War and Japanese colonialism is not yet over. Northeast Asia's Difficult Past, a volume edited by Mikyoung Kim and Barry Schwartz, illustrates the ongoing conflicts between China, Japan and South Korea in this area. It also shows how different interest groups struggle to create collective memory within their own societies. The essays are mostly written by scholars of East Asian origin who are based at Anglo-American universities. In the introduction, Kim and Schwartz argue that while previous books on the topic have focused on the what of the memory problem, this volume is concerned with why and how collective memory is produced. East Asia's conflicts about memory are presented as unique, in the sense that they still have a strong impact on diplomacy, commerce and international relations (p. 21), while Westerners find their past less relevant. The editors see the major differences rooted in the distinction between an Eastern “culture of honor” and a Western “culture of dignity.” In the framework of Japanese honour culture, an apology is considered as a formality to restore harmony but difficult to make because of the fear of a possible rejection by the other. According to the editors, in Western dignity cultures it is allegedly easier for the former aggressors to assume guilt, and victims are more willing to accept apologies. In contrast to East Asia, feelings of shame are peripheral to the memory culture which is heavily influenced by the Holocaust. Kim and Schwartz even argue: “Jewish survivors of the Holocaust do not condemn Germany for humiliating them” (p. 6). In order to establish a Western/Eastern dichotomy of memory, Kim and Schwartz have a tendency to stereotype cultures; in reality “Western” memory cultures are more complex. For example, the acceptance of German reparations by Ben Gurion's government faced widespread opposition in Israeli society in the 1950s. The current conflicts between Russia and Ukraine about the Soviet famine of 1933, or the deep division of public opinion in the states of former Yugoslavia regarding the question of how to deal with war crimes and the role of the international tribunal in The Hague, show that emotional debates about the past are not unique to East Asia.
The chapters in this volume provide many new and interesting studies. For example, in her chapter “Japanese pacifism: problematic memory,” Mikyoung Kim illustrates the difficulties of integrating the Korean victims of the atomic bombing into the narrative of the popular Hiroshima Peace Museum. According to Kim, for decades the museum itself and Japanese pacifism in general have focused on the victimization of Hiroshima but have had difficulties integrating the suffering of other Asian countries under Japanese militarism into their narrative. In the chapter on memory of the Nanjing Massacre from 1937 to 1979, Xiaohong Xu and Lyn Spillman point out that the Chinese Communist government also made use of the atomic bombing for their own purposes. In the 1950s and 1960s, the CCP strongly supported the Japanese anti-nuclear movement and addressed Hiroshima and Nagasaki as symbols of American aggression. At that time, China faced a nuclear threat from the US. The Nanjing Massacre played no central role in the official narrative. Memories of the anti-Japanese war were used to question the idea that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were real Chinese patriots. The chapter on the movement for reparations for victims of Japanese aggression in PRC that developed in the 1990s provides other interesting insights. Bin Xu and Gary Fine argue that this grassroots movement was not very successful in gaining support from the central government in Beijing, but it developed when it started to address local governments and acted in the “low-risk area” of Chinese peripheral politics. In the second part of the book, the focus on memory of the Second World War disappears. More particularly, the section on South Korea focuses on experiences of colonialism and the Choson Monarchy as well as territorial conflicts with Japan about the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. Memory landscapes in North Korea and Taiwan are not part of the book.
In the last chapter, Jae-Jung Suh raises the question of how Northeast Asia can overcome the conflicts of the past. Referring to the theory of discourse by Jürgen Habermas, Suh argues that a post-nationalist order does not require an agreement on all issues. In a regional public sphere, speakers and listeners should recognize each other as legitimate participants in a common discourse. However, one could argue that for the members of the former victimized countries it is difficult to accept an equal status with the descendants of the perpetrators. The question remains of how the Japanese can express regrets for war crimes in such a way that their apologies can be taken seriously by the Chinese and the Koreans.
All in all, Northeast Asia's Difficult Past is a welcome contribution to debates on collective memory and can be used as a textbook in classes on East Asian history. Some of the editors' arguments may not be entirely convincing, but they are useful to spark an important debate on different memory cultures in a global context.
