William Rugh's Front Line Public Diplomacy is an extremely well-researched study of the concept, history, institutions, and current practice of public diplomacy. As someone who directed the United States Information Agency's (USIA) Near East Bureau, and later held Ambassadorships to Yemen and the United Arab Emirates, he is highly qualified to speak to such matters. The book is a perfect text to be included in the study of American foreign policy or diplomacy, especially in the Middle East. It is a must-read for any incoming Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and/or Public Affairs, not to mention high-level military commanders in the field who have been running their own public diplomacy operations.
Rugh traces the concept of public diplomacy back to the Declaration of Independence and the founding fathers’ awareness of the need to explain to the rest of the world what was happening in the American colonies and why. Thus the conscious effort to reflect the spirit of the American Revolution and the values of the nation in speech and action came very early in the American experience and has persisted, at least in effort, to this day. Despite the deep roots of the concept, however, Rugh finds that the practice of public diplomacy has been sporadic, with varying degrees of commitment from policy makers, depending on leadership both in the White House and at the Department of State.
Not atypical of Foreign Service officers (FSOs) who rose through the ranks of the now defunct USIA, Rugh laments the demise of the agency via the merger that took effect in 1999 under the Clinton administration. The merger, according to Rugh, deprived the agency of the funding and autonomy it needed to perform the wide range of functions it had previously undertaken. True enough on the funding issue. Cultual affairs officers who valued and prioritized cultural and educational exchange programs also resented the efforts of the department to bend those programs to more directly support foreign policy goals—believing that cultural exchanges, untainted by political direction, build longer lasting friendships around the world. Some merger advocates, however, saw cultural and informational programs as tools to serve foreign policy goals. For them, the merger was a logical path towards cutting bureaucratic red tape and creating a smoother blend of public diplomacy and policy.
The author is also critical of the reduced numbers of Public Diplomacy (PD) officers, down to only one-tenth of the number of FSOs employed by the department, but does not compare that figure to other “cones” or specialties within the Foreign Service. Do political, economic, consular, administrative, and security functions employ twice that number each or, if there is a prioritization, who sets the priorities and how can that process be influenced and changed? In the end, diplomacy itself, public or otherwise, may not be funded adequately to do the job needed in an increasingly dangerous international environment.
The information revolution receives its due in terms of the author's attention. The section on social media is an excellent one, delving into challenges to public diplomacy and the introduction of new interactive electronic means—most, it must be said, introduced after the merger—intended to meet the demands of the new information age. Hence, the Digital Outreach Team (DOT), media hubs, Facebook pages, and websites reflect, albeit in an underfunded fashion, the department's response to the new information revolution. The DOT's heroic, although understaffed, efforts represent the department's direct engagement of the critics of US policy.
The author also gives credit where credit is due to the wise leadership of Karen Hughs, Bush's under secretary for public diplomacy, for encouraging all FSOs to be proactive in interacting with media and audiences, promising to back them up if they slipped. The story of Alberto Fernandez, a PD specialist, who described the US effort in Iraq as “stupid and arrogant” is a classic. Hughes stood by him and supported him against those who wanted to have his hide over the incident. As the writer of this review recalls, Fernandez, soon after the incident, received a standard superior performance award amounting to $15,000. Al Kamen quipped, in one of his columns, “I suppose this was $5000 for saying U.S. policy was stupid, $5000 for describing it as arrogant, and another $5000 for saying it all on al-Jazeera!” Rugh correctly puts this controversy in its proper context, quoting Marc Lynch on the need to show US ability to self-criticize, something we do not see often in the public diplomacy of other nations.
Overall, Rugh's effort is as valuable to the practitioner of diplomacy as it is for the history archives. Two main criticisms, however, are in order: first, the book offers precious little by way of the stories that breathe life into the concept and practice of public diplomacy. Second, the absence of two-way diplomacy scarcely receives mention in the book.
The experiences of PD officers working side by side with their political and military colleagues are rich with anecdotes the recounting of which would liven up this book and enhance its credibility. During the first Gulf War, for example, USIA officers visited the front lines to interview soldiers from various coalition countries, talked to Kuwaitis fleeing Saddam Hussein's army after the occupation of Kuwait, and worked with military information specialists on efforts to reach audiences inside Iraq. In 2003, PD officers stood side by side with military public affairs officers at the information center at Centcom in Doha and were shot at and bombed along with their military colleagues in Baghdad after the war. The debates with US critics on al-Jazeera were often emotionally charged and difficult, but represented the substance of the war of ideas and the challenges faced by PD officers on the front lines in defense of their country.
Finally, the concept of two-way public diplomacy has largely been observed in the breach rather than in the practice, both before and after the merger. Political analyses offered by PD officers in the field are among the best political reports available, and yet this fact is rarely acknowledged in Washington. Under secretaries of public diplomacy have rarely sat around the same table with policy makers to offer feedback from the field on US policy, and suggest, therefore, how it might be amended to avoid the hostility faced by US diplomats and private citizens alike.
In conclusion, William Rugh renders a valuable service to the students and practitioners of public diplomacy in his thoroughly researched facts and meticulous depiction of the institutions that carry out America's cultural, educational, and informational exchanges. This effort, however, would gain much wider general readership with more personal anecdotes from the field, particularly those that shed light on the substance of US foreign policy and the controversial issues with which our diplomats in all specialties have to grapple.
