Bass offers comparative case studies of war crimes trials, including successes and failures. There are separate chapters on the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, the trials at Leipzig following World War I, the trials at Constantinople after the massacre of Armenians, Nuremberg, and the Hague Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia. Along the way Bass makes points about other trials, such as the Rwanda tribunal and the Tokyo tribunals after World War II. These chapters are sandwiched between first and last chapters that offer propositions and arguments about war crimes trials.

This is a contribution to international relations that acknowledges extensive reliance on a work in political theory, Judith Shklar's Legalism (1986). As Shklar argues about Nuremberg, Bass claims that legalism, or “due process across borders” (p. 20), makes a difference. It has not made for perfect solutions, but it is preferable to the alternative, vengeance. It is the “least awful alternative” (p. 304). Furthermore, Bass's argument is important with respect to three related divisions in the study of world politics. His words will not be the last about these divisions, but they are eloquent and well supported by evidence.

First is the idealist-realist distinction. Bass belongs to the former group, although he is careful to point out that legalism is a product of liberalism, not democracy. Indeed, it may work at its best when it operates to limit democratic decisions. Bass also is careful not to claim too much for the tribunals; he is anything but a utopian. Even the great success at Nuremberg, he remind us, was achieved at great odds and was not unblemished. His work reminds me of psychologist William James's distinction in Pragmatism (1907) between the “Tough-Minded” and “Tender-Minded.” When Bass offers countering opinions to those of Henry Kissinger in A World Restored (1957), for example, he is careful to provide plenty of evidence. For this section it comes from extensive documentary research; in contemporary cases, such as the chapter on the Hague (Yugoslavia) tribunal, Bass includes interviews with many of the principals.

Bass argues that tribunals may offer punishment that vengeance cannot. He describes the legalist rationale: “For public attitudes to shift, criminal leaders must be tried—their aura of mystery shattered by showing their weaknesses and stupidities” (p. 288).

Although I suggested in the first paragraph that this book is essential reading for those interested in international law, Bass specifically states this is one of three subjects he does not cover. The other two are domestic transitions to democracy and international institutions (p. 34). His concern is international war crimes proceedings. Although Bass does not get mired in abstract discussion of how states ought to behave according to international lawyers, he does describe how they have behaved, and how rules can and have affected this.

The second distinction is between traditional and descriptive approaches to international relations as opposed to more scientific and quantitative ones. Bass's work exemplifies the strength of the former approaches. The book is comparative history at its best and is very readable. There is some conceptual discussion (useful terminology to some readers, needless jargon to others) in the footnotes at the end of chapters.

Bass's argument is easy to follow owing to effective use of headings and subheadings. Figures or tables would have been useful; I found myself constructing some to clarify the attributes of some tribunals but not others. Bass acknowledges that he does not offer precise typologies of liberal and illiberal states and that there is great variety within the categories he writes about, but he points out that for his case studies a simple dichotomy is sufficient.

Finally there is the distinction, about which Bass convincingly argues that many analysts have been much too rigid, between international relations before and after World War II. He points out that the phrase “crimes against humanity” was used by Soviet Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov to describe the massacre of Armenians and by others to describe conditions during the 1910s.

Most of my quibbles concern the book that might have been written. Bass could have said more about Rwanda and the Tokyo trials, particularly about Justice Pal's lengthy dissent. (Bass easily discredits self-serving Soviet statements at Nuremberg; Pal's Tokyo dissent would have made interesting fodder for refutation.) Although Bass acknowledges that liberal states have shown lots of self-interest, he convincingly argues that they are the only ones to have created war crimes tribunals. They also have a record of human rights atrocity, including slaughter of indigenous populations, slavery, forced relocation, and investment strategies that induce dependency (in many accounts linked to war crimes). Bass argues the merits of a universalistic worldview (p. 23); critics of Western states' policies charge that such a worldview has brought disastrous consequences to those who do not fit it. Bass comments on the new International Criminal Court (ICC) but could have offered more. His thoughts include: “If there is to be, despite American objections, a serious permanent war crimes tribunal—the ICC—then liberal governments will have to make a far stronger commitment to international justice than they have in the 1990s” (p. 282).

By offering comparative case studies, this book fills a void. Other recent works are comparable in some ways but not others. Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams (Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (2d ed., 2001), provide many useful points of comparison but do not offer the historical breadth of Bass's book. That is important because, as Bass reminds us, “the Leipzig war trials were a disaster” (p. 80). As he observes, it will be to our peril if we remember Nuremberg but forget about Leipzig and other precedents in designing policies toward war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. By placing the Nuremberg tribunal in the context of others, Bass allows for more accurate appreciation of that tribunal. The book contains telling anecdotes about U.S. foreign policymakers (including Henry Stimson, Madeline Albright, and William Cohen). It is suitable for course use and is accessible to upper division undergraduates and graduate students.