Undergraduates and interested general readers are likely to find this volume a stimulating, informative and enjoyable read. The work covers the careers of eight generals over seven chapters. Each general is associated with a particular trait, such as magnetism, cunning or adaptability. The chapters cover the main politico-military events of the generals’ careers with emphasis on the strengths and weaknesses of the generals’ techniques and responses to challenges. The introduction explains that the generals are ‘leaders in their field, [whom R. finds] particularly interesting and illustrative’ (p. 3). Moderns have ‘much to learn’ from them, but the focus falls on evaluating them within their own contexts. The position taken on hoplite warfare is described as ‘orthodox’ (p. 14), arguing for the adoption in the sixth century of full hoplite equipment at 23–30 kg and describing the hoplite phalanx as a ‘wall of overlapping shields’. Nonetheless, these traditional views do not significantly influence the main lines of argument, and as the reader is informed that they are controversial, they are equipped to explore them further if they so choose. Some may find the defining traits theme somewhat forced, but it adds a structuring device that encourages the reader to reflect and evaluate. There are good-quality maps, images of artefacts and modern illustrations. A ‘Main Ancient Sources’ section provides an introduction to each. When the text refers to ‘scholars’’ views, examples are given in the footnotes.
‘Leonidas of Sparta: The Lion at the Gates’ begins by describing Spartan society, particularly the roles of militarism and helots. The Spartan mirage is explained, cautioning the reader. The narrative moves from the Ionian Revolt to Xerxes without mention of Marathon. To readers familiar with the Persian Wars this seems quite startling, but it is perhaps understandable given the pace of the narrative and the focus on Leonidas. The protagonist-focused approach gives us ‘Leonidas’ plans’ for Thermopylae and Leonidas’ negotiating skills and diplomacy. Contra Herodotus, it is argued that Leonidas could not have compelled other groups to fight, making the decision of some to stay evidence of Leonidas’ ability to form bonds and his ‘strong personal leadership’. In short, we find Leonidas’ personal touch where sources typically have ‘Spartans’. It is concluded that while Leonidas led by personal magnetism, his efforts could be seen as a failure as he could not motivate his allies sufficiently when it counted. Nonetheless, it is argued, Leonidas achieved ultimate victory by inspiring others.
‘Themistocles of Athens: The Clever Counselor’ stresses Themistocles’ ‘courage, gumption, and intelligence’ (p. 99), argues that his political skill overshadows his able generalship, and ultimately concludes that his competitiveness and self-confidence were problematic. With pleasing openness, R. notes (p. 67 n. 13) that he has changed his mind about the Themistocles Decree since publishing Ancient Greece from Homer to Alexander: the Evidence (2011). There is an informative section on why the Persian fleet would be reluctant to fight in open seas rather than straits. Some might hope for more guidance on handling ancient sources; Themistocles is described as having behaved as an ‘avaricious bully’ (p. 93) after Salamis, but there is no guidance on the role of this trope within Herodotus, for example. Nonetheless, the reader receives an extensive guide to Themistocles and an opportunity to assess his leadership.
‘Pericles of Athens: The Magisterial Commander’ provides an effective account of politico-military events of the Classical period, offering a broad context in which to consider Pericles’ career. It is argued that Pericles met some challenges better than others and that, ultimately, his military career was successful until the Peloponnesian War. It is noted that this contradicts Thucydides, but R. challenges Pericles’ main strategies one by one, providing sensible explanations for his critical view. R. includes the devastation of Euboea, and political and military developments on Samos are clearly explained. There is extensive discussion of Pericles’ knowledge of military engineering and logistics.
‘Demosthenes of Athens: The Master of Surprise’ opens with Thucydides’ account of the Corinthian description of Athenian character, noting that Demosthenes was far less tenacious than the stereotype. A summary of the opening years of the Peloponnesian War takes us up to the beginning of Demosthenes’ generalship. There is an accessible account of the allegiances in Western Greece, something likely to be helpful to the student reader. Demosthenes’ failures in Ambracia are discussed. It is noted that, by contrast, Demosthenes was daring and cautious at the right times during the Pylos campaign, as well as – crucially – lucky. The surprise attack on Megara is commended, but R. rightly criticises the decision to avoid engaging the Peloponnesian army that was heading north. Of the Delium campaign, R. argues that the campaign was over-complicated and abandoned too soon. Likewise, Demosthenes is ‘largely to blame’ for the Sicilian disaster. Demosthenes’ differences from Pericles are explored, and it is argued that while Demosthenes’ use of surprise and good planning were effective, his preference for a ‘quick solution’ led to some outright disasters.
In ‘Lysander of Sparta: The Lion and the Fox’, the Spartan is introduced as having been more political and more involved in naval warfare than Demosthenes. This is typical of the thread of comparison running through the book, reminding the reader to contrast the figures with each other. Success in obtaining money from Cyrus is offered as evidence of Lysander's diplomatic ability. It is noted that he was not a teamplayer, but he is praised for his canny insights, good preparations (including the use of military intelligence) and his ability to control his men. It is argued that Lysander was probably not as dishonest as his reputation suggests; he is only known to have used deception on a few occasions, albeit significant ones. Lysander is criticised for his cruelty and lack of coherent imperial policy.
‘Dionysius of Syracuse: The Evolution of a General’ deliberately takes the action beyond mainland Greece. It is argued that while Dionysius did not have a perfect military record, he combined many of the strengths demonstrated by other generals in the book and consciously learned from them. It is concluded that he was ‘arguably the best of all the generals discussed in this volume’ (p. 230). There is emphasis on the gains reaped from increasing mercenary pay and on the success of enabling mercenaries and recruits from varied regions to fight with the equipment they were best with. It is noted that while the Sicilian Greeks were more likely than their mainland counterparts to destroy defeated cities, Dionysius achieved success through sacking selectively; Dionysius’ arrangements lasted longer than Lysander's as a result of acting less ruthlessly. Other positives picked out include skills in urban warfare, ship building and overall organisational ability. It is noted that ‘sources provide undated tales about his repeatedly looking for new taxes and ways of cheating his subjects out of their money’ (p. 245). While this is fair, it might have been constructive to spare a moment more to discuss the increased use of plunder from sacred sites which Dionysius oversaw, a military innovation with profound impact on Classical culture.
The final chapter, ‘Epaminondas and Pelopidas: The Double-Edged Returns of Daring’, is the longest, dealing as it does with two generals. The chapter provides a thorough account of the political and military situations facing Boeotia during the early fourth century. It is also good on the sort of tropes that frequently accompany accounts of these generals’ actions. There is discussion of the Battle of Tegyra and its significance in building Theban confidence. There is a detailed analysis of the Battle of Leuctra. The sections on the invasions of the Peloponnese do a thorough job of explaining complex developments as well as analysing Epaminondas’ strategy and tactics. A section on ‘Pelopidas’ Missteps in Thessaly’ follows. The generals’ final battles complete the chapter.
A conclusion helps the reader to draw the strands of the work together and to evaluate the generals overall.
