China and Russia have now been identified by the United States as the two primary challengers to the existing world order. Accordingly, Chinese foreign policy and Russian foreign policy attract a lot of attention within both the scholarly community and broader policy circles. Given these two countries’ vast sizes and their increasingly close relationship and cooperation on a range of international issues, it seems appropriate and instructive to juxtapose and examine Chinese and Russian foreign policy side by side. This book by two political scientists—Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko—seeks to explain long-term parallel trends in Chinese and Russian foreign policy by adopting a historical perspective. In this process, the authors also advance a theoretical framework that they hope could be widely applicable in studies of international relations.

The book's main argument is implied by its title, Quest for Status. It suggests that the pursuit of international status has been the common fundamental driver behind the foreign policies of China and Russia since centuries ago. The authors adopt Social Identity Theory (SIT), which argues that “social groups strive to achieve a positively distinctive identity” (2), to develop a typology of strategies of emulation, competition, and creativity, which were employed by the two states at different points of time in history to raise their statuses and validate their identities. In their analysis, the authors focus on a series of major “turning points” in the two countries’ histories, including the end of the imperial era, the communist era, the end of communism, and post-Cold War transformations. They reach a pragmatic conclusion that accommodation and acceptance, instead of isolation and exclusion, facilitate more cooperation with the west by these countries.

This book's achievements are three-fold. First of all, the comparison between China and Russia is illuminating as there are solid grounds for such comparisons. Both used to be powerful yet predominantly peasant countries and hence late-developers as they entered the modern era. Both went through long periods of frustrating and even humiliating interactions with the west, which constituted their common “Other.” Both used to see communism as an alternative modernizing path that would enable them to catch up and surpass the capitalist west. Both are now firmly non-liberal and non-democratic states continuing to challenge the west. Comparing them allows us to see the parallels and differences in their long-term foreign policy trajectories. Second, the long-term historical perspective that the authors employ is urgently needed in the studies of contemporary Chinese and Russian foreign policies as such perspective remains depressingly rare within the mainstream field of International Relations (IR). Both countries’ foreign policies are profoundly shaped by historical experiences, as the authors demonstrate convincingly. Third, the analytical framework of SIT is refreshing in today's IR field. In particular, this is a perspective that allows readers to see Chinese foreign policy and Russian foreign policy in their respective contexts, rather than just through the conventional lens of power competition. What it implies is that to truly understand what motivates these regimes today, one ought to pay attention to these countries’ historical memories and their long-term worldviews.

At the same time, some key differences in the two countries’ foreign policies might warrant more attention. For example, as the authors note, whereas China was the regional hegemon in history (other than having to contend with various nomadic forces), Russia historically had always been a late developer relative to the west. There is also the issue that Russia has a much more complicated ethnic, religious, and linguistic make-up when compared to China. Consequently, China has enjoyed a more coherent and uncontroversial civilizational/national identity since the communist era and is now focused on national “rejuvenation” that would restore China's “natural” place in the world. In contrast, Russian national identity has remained ambiguous and Russia's relationship with the west is more fraught with contradictions and a sense of resentment. In addition, recent Chinese foreign policy seems to have become more strident than described in the book as the Sino-American relationship rapidly deteriorates. It is unclear whether the Chinese leadership still thinks competition with the United States as “futile,” or whether the US is still willing to validate China's “social creativity efforts” (231).

In sum, some questions and quibbles aside, this is an original and thought-provoking contribution to the studies of Chinese and Russian foreign policy. Any scholars or policy-makers interested in these two countries’ domestic and international politics would benefit from a close read.