It has been a long time since serious doubts have been raised about the moral appropriateness of living donation as such. By now, with just a few exceptions, we discuss only the relative justifiability of particular forms of living donation: anonymous (“Samaritan”) donation, both directed and nondirected; the use of anonymous donation to create a cascade; paired and list exchanges of organs; and, of course, rewarded donation. But in such discussions it is important to keep in mind why living donation in general is supposed to be acceptable, for it is not obvious. From the point of view of the professional morality of doctors, it can seem objectionable at first sight.
Taking away one of a healthy person’s kidneys may not present great risks for that person, either during the operation or in the long term. But it is a significant invasion of the body that can impose substantial burdens. In about 10 percent of the cases there are unexpected medical complications that require additional treatment, sometimes for a long period.Footnote 1 The donor is subject to some form of monitoring for the rest of his life. If he also develops kidney disease, he will more quickly run out of his reserve capacity and hence more quickly be in need of dialysis and transplantation. So it seems clear that the explantation of living organs harms the donor; it is a medical intervention that does not turn a patient into a healthy person, but rather turns a healthy person into a patient. Of course it also benefits the recipient, and the total benefits normally clearly outweigh the total harms. But doctors are traditionally not supposed to put any individual in harm’s way in order to generate a greater overall good: primum non nocere.Footnote 2 Patients should be able to trust their doctors to act in their best interests.Footnote 3
The obvious reply is that for the removal of someone’s organs we do require the voluntary and well-considered consent of the donor, and it would be a form of paternalism in the face of his consent to go on insisting that he should not be harmed.Footnote 4
Surely the consent of the donor is necessary to justify the nephrectomy. But is it really sufficient? Imagine yourself a member of a medical ethics committee that has to assess a medical experiment that involves a similar set of invasive procedures, risks, and burdens for its participants. Even if the therapy to be tested could save people’s lives, would you approve the experiment? I have put that question to some members of such committees, and their answer is that their committee would almost certainly reject it.Footnote 5
It could be objected that the attitude of the committee members even in that case is unduly paternalistic. In what follows I identify the special kind of paternalism involved (first section), argue that it is an essential part of the professional morality of doctors (second section), and show that it is not open to the usual objections we have to paternalism (third section). But if the consent of the donor is not sufficient, which other considerations do we need in order to justify living donation (fourth section)?
I do not dispute that, in determining whether consent is sufficient to justify medical actions that harm the patient, living donation is a borderline case on which reasonable people may come to different conclusions or may not hold any firm view at all. But even such people will welcome an additional justification—all the more if it is not kidney but liver or lung transplantation they are considering, for in these cases both the risks and the burdens are more substantial. And even people who would consider consent also sufficient in these cases might well hesitate at some point, such as at the donation of a second kidney.Footnote 6
Indirect Paternalism
If only for the sake of argument, let us presuppose that direct hard paternalism can never be justified.Footnote 7 But if we refuse to permit doctors to cause harm to consenting patients, this would be indirect, rather than direct, paternalism. The question I wish to raise is whether indirect paternalism is open to the same objections as are usually brought forward against the direct form.Footnote 8
The distinction between direct and indirect paternalism we largely owe to Joel Feinberg.Footnote 9 Direct paternalism is a two-place relation: A interferes in the execution of B’s plans in order to prevent harm to B. Indirect paternalism, on the other hand, is a three-place relation: A interferes in the execution of B’s plans in order to prevent harm to C, even though C has validly consented to B’s actions. According to Feinberg, paternalistic considerations can never be a good reason for the state to criminalize any action, and in his view this is as true for indirect as for direct paternalism.Footnote 10 This is explained, or at least asserted, by the volenti maxim: volenti non fit iniuria, that is, if you have consented to an action, you cannot be wronged by it. You can, of course, be harmed by it, but in that case you have nothing to complain about and no one to blame but (perhaps) yourself. On Feinberg’s view the volenti principle should be accepted, without any restrictions, not only in criminal law but also in tort law.Footnote 11 The issue that I want to discuss can be reformulated as the question of whether the volenti maxim applies to medical actions in general, and the removal of organs from living donors in particular.
That the volenti principle applies in all criminal and tort cases does not imply that consent should always be accepted as a defense against criminal charges or even tort claims. That would be a stronger thesis, for the reason not to accept consent as a defense need not be paternalistic. The law may, for example, as John Stuart Mill already observed, forbid employees to waive their legal rights to a working day of x (in Mill’s case, 9) hours or to certain security measures, for otherwise they could be tempted to use such waivings as a bargaining advantage and thereby exert pressure on others to follow their example in the competition for scarce jobs.Footnote 12
Or take any of the basic human rights that are normally considered to be inalienable—for example, the right to personal liberty.Footnote 13 If you take someone captive in your cellar, you cannot escape conviction for violating that right by producing a document by means of which that person has given you permission to hold her captive, and two witnesses testifying that she did so of her own free will. But the reason for not accepting that defense might be not that the person has been harmed by your actions but rather that we consider slavery to violate human dignity. Similarly, the almost-universal prohibition of euthanasia and assisted suicide seems primarily to be motivated by the sanctity of human life, even though some opponents also hold, implausibly, that it is always good to be alive. Speaking generally, limitations on accepting consent as a defense can be inspired both by moralistic and by paternalistic considerations, to use Feinberg’s terminology again.Footnote 14 When, in the English Spanner case, people were given sentences for up to four and a half years for having indulged, with full consent, in some admittedly rather heavy sadomasochistic practices, it is clear that the courts were not primarily concerned about those persons’ own good, although parts of their judgments suggest they were.Footnote 15 That the reasons were moralistic ones is also shown by the fact that similar or worse injuries would have been condoned if they had resulted from voluntarily engaging in what the law habitually calls “manly diversions.”Footnote 16
But even if it is not always clear whether it is for paternalistic or moralistic reasons that consent is rejected as a defense, it is undeniable that paternalistic reasons at least play a role. This seems obvious when some of those manly diversions are banned because of the extreme risks of injury they involve. Boxing has been legally forbidden by some countries, and a similar prohibition has been advocated by medical organizations in other countries.Footnote 17 More generally, there is a clear tendency in all Western European legal systems to restrict the scope of volenti. If you voluntarily decide to ride along with a drunken driver and get injured as a result, fifty years ago you would have had no claim for compensation at all, but nowadays your claim will only be reduced by, say, 25 percent.Footnote 18
I want to set aside the issue of moralism and to focus entirely on paternalistic reasons for restricting the validity of the defense of consent. In the second section my discussion focuses on the domain of the professional morality of doctors. Although doctors nowadays tend to be somewhat uncertain and confused about it, the rejection of volenti is still deeply rooted in their professional morality. In the third section I address the basic issue: what are our main objections to paternalism, and do they hold with equal force for indirect paternalism? My answer is that they don’t. In the fourth section I discuss the relevance of this result for the justification of living donation, and for some contested problems in that area, in particular Samaritan donation, both directed and nondirected. I suggest that the primary justification for the removal of a living organ is provided by the nature of the relation between donor and recipient.
The Indirect Paternalism of Medical Professional Morality
By “the professional morality of doctors” I understand a set of mutual expectations doctors have about their own behavior that coincide with the expectations that others, patients and the society at large, may legitimately have of them. These norms are partly codified, albeit often not in a very systematic way, and they have a quasi-legal status. They may be appealed to in disciplinary proceedings, whether or not they have been codified.
That the professional morality of doctors is characterized by indirect paternalism can be seen in many contexts. (If an inhabitant of the Netherlands wants to have a total body scan, for instance, he has to travel over the German border, to Cleves.) Let me pick out just one example. During the nineties, a new law was introduced in the Netherlands, in order to identify the rights and duties of doctors and patients vis-à-vis each other. It was, revealingly, called the Law on the Medical Treatment Contract (WGBO). The lawyers who designed that law tried to make this particular contract look as much like every other market agreement as possible, and therefore to incorporate volenti. But the doctors’ organization, the Royal Dutch Society of Medicine, objected, and in the end won the day. So the law, on the one hand, insists that no treatment proposal can be acted on without the consent of the patient, as long as he is competent to make that decision. Without such consent, medical treatment is considered assault or battery. Direct paternalism is thereby excluded. But on the other hand, the law also states that the doctor should provide the care appropriate for a good caregiver, acting in accordance with professional standards. And this means that volenti is rejected: the doctor should always be personally convinced on reasonable grounds that he is acting in the best interests of the patient. The aim of any medical intervention is not merely to provide a service but to further the interests of the patient, even though his consent is still required as long as he is capable of giving it.
What could be the rationale for rejecting direct but accepting indirect paternalism in the medical domain? In medical decisionmaking the parties have very asymmetrical positions. On the one hand, many medical decisions, such as treatment decisions at the end of life, are highly dependent on the basic value orientation of the individual patient, which the doctor might not share. On the other hand, in judging the possible outcome of alternative treatment (and nontreatment) options, doctors, by virtue of training and experience, have an advantage that cannot be outweighed by any amount of information provided to the patient, who is often not even in a position to calibrate his own judgment. Given those facts, the distribution of decisional authority should aim at minimizing two kinds of errors at the same time: disregarding the personal perspective of the patient on his life and leaving him to shoulder the costs, however high, of his mistaken errors of judgment. Rejecting direct but accepting indirect paternalism can be seen as a reasonable compromise solution for this classical conflict. Both the requirement of informed consent and the professional duty not to harm can be considered to belong to a moral division of labor that on the whole best promotes the relevant values, including the intrinsic value of self-governance.
Whether this rationale is defensible, however, depends on the issue I wish to discuss: whether there are any morally relevant differences between direct and indirect paternalism to begin with. For that rationale assumes that indirect paternalism is at least a less severe infringement of patients’ responsibility for their own lives than its direct counterpart.
Why Indirect Paternalism Is Different
What is basically wrong with paternalism? Feinberg is at his rhetorical best in replying: If people are treated paternalistically, “their grievance is not simply that they have been unnecessarily inconvenienced or ‘irked,’ but rather they have been violated, invaded, belittled. They have experienced something analogous to the invasion of their property or the violation of their privacy.”Footnote 19 That paternalism is insulting is an important point, and certainly the point that people care most about, for nothing is as important to people as their social status. But as the analogy with property and privacy shows, it must depend on other considerations. For why should people believe that their status vis-à-vis one another depends on the extent to which they are left alone to govern their own actions, unless they would already attribute great value to this authority? And Feinberg, indeed, elsewhere gives a second reason to reject paternalism: “The life that a person threatens by his own rashness is after all his life; it belongs to him and to no one else.”Footnote 20
If we want to get clear about the moral defensibility of indirect paternalism, including the indirect paternalism of the professional morality of physicians, we should ask the following: are these reasons for objecting to paternalism—the intrinsic value of self-governing authority, and the status conferred to people by having this power—at stake in indirect paternalism as well?
First, consider the value of self-governance. It is important to see that the question of whether indirect and direct paternalism are different with respect to that value is not identical to the old question about negative and positive liberty. I fully agree with Locke against many so-called Lockeans that to let an innocent person starve when you can feed him is equivalent to murder.Footnote 21 So let us presuppose a tolerably just system of property rights and of claims on resources. With this background in place, my claim is that the value of self-governance is given its full due when competent people are allowed to set their own aims and strive for the realization of these aims with their own resources, within the limits set by the harm and the offense principle and, perhaps, legitimate moralism, if that isn’t an oxymoron. It is irrelevant whether or not they succeed in this enterprise. Whether such success is valuable is entirely a matter of the relevant values, including people’s own real interests: if the enterprise is misguided, we should hope that they do not succeed. So nothing is wrong if other people refuse to help them because they believe such help would only harm them. Whereas if they do provide requested “help” out of indifference for the helped person’s fate, they are morally criticizable. If for some reason others are not allowed to provide such help, that doesn’t compromise the value of self-governance either.
This view would be reinforced if Joseph Raz is right in believing that autonomy is a satiable concept: if you are allowed to strive for your own aims with your own resources, and your resources at least reach the relevant threshold, you are as self-governing as you can possibly be.Footnote 22 But even if we do not think in that way about the value of self-governance, we should do so about the right to self-governance, or, rather, the set of rights that protect that value. Perhaps you would be more autonomous if other people were allowed to help you, but it doesn’t follow that the prohibition on help from others violates any of your rights to make your own choices. It doesn’t corrode your position as the primary agent of your own affairs.
Because you do hold that position of primary agent, to engage in direct paternalism is always a very risky business, even if it would not be ruled out completely. If the paternalist doesn’t get it right, his mistake is much weightier than a mistake about his own interests.Footnote 23 But the person who refuses to help you because of your mistake about your own real interests is not burdened by this special moral hazard, nor is the person who blocks the provision of such help.
Second, there is the question of status. If other people are prevented from providing help to you, is this insulting to you? Of course, it means that some people believe that your beliefs about your own interest are wrong, that you are set on a course on which you will cause a setback to those interests. But that is not an insulting belief. In fact it may be entirely right. Is it insulting that you are prevented from receiving aid on those grounds? For example, if you are not allowed to take your own life for some reason you find compelling, you may feel insulted because you are no longer “your own person.” But if other people are prohibited from helping you do so, unless they are convinced on reasonable grounds that it is in your best interests to die, is this equally belittling? I don’t think so. The basic difference here is that direct paternalism by its very nature creates an asymmetry between the two people involved, A and B. A is prevented from acting on his own judgment about his own interest, because B uses his power to act on his contrary judgment of that same interest. But in the case of indirect paternalism, A and B are both allowed to use their own resources in symmetrical ways. They share the responsibility for the harm they create, both to themselves and to the other party.
The absolute rejection of indirect paternalism suggests that the consenting person lends his persona to the actor who now acts under the full responsibility of the other. But consent should rather be seen as extending the sphere of responsibility to include the consenter. It initiates a form of cooperation in which responsibility is shared.Footnote 24
Certainly, on many occasions indirect paternalism would show lack of proper respect. If we make a perfectly valid contract, and you are prevented from performing your part of the agreement by a third person who thinks you are harming me, that is insulting to me. But that is, I suggest, because the contract actually is to be considered a valid one on independent grounds, so I already have a right to expect your performance. That right is already part of my moral assets. That is why the action of this third person in such a case is analogous to the invasion of my property or the violation of my privacy. (That doesn’t rule out the possibility that certain categories of harmful consequences are sufficient to invalidate having made the contract to begin with.)
What the example suggests is that the volenti principle is related to the principle of respect for autonomy only in an indirect way. To begin with, the purpose of volenti is to protect legitimate expectations arising from consenting acts. If a person in good faith performs his part of an agreement, he should not normally be held responsible for any harm befalling his partner to the agreement as a result of that. So the volenti principle does not primarily serve to protect the autonomy of the consenting party but rather is designed to shield the other party from liability. Only if it is already established on independent grounds that my consent is sufficient for justifying your action, even if the action harms me, is the interference of a third person disrespectful to me. The volenti principle doesn’t help us to define the boundaries of the domain of agent sovereignty, because its validity is itself limited to that domain.
Justifying Living Organ Donation
Living donation is prima facie problematic because it harms the donor, possibly even on balance. And it is at least debatable whether it can be justified by the donor’s consent. Such doubts could be put aside if indirect paternalism were shown not to be defensible, but we have seen that its moral credentials are much better than is often habitually assumed. But if not in this way, how else could living organ donation be justified?
In his book Transplantation Ethics Robert Veatch suggests that the informed consent of a competent adult is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for the permissibility of accepting him as a donor. He goes on, however, to discuss the possibility of “donation” by incompetents, in particular young children. He believes that in a case in which a sibling can be greatly helped by some action that creates only minor risks and burdens to the child, that child may be required to provide the help. An example would be using a nine-month old infant as a source of bone marrow for a brother suffering from leukemia. Whether the donation of a kidney belongs in this category is in his view open to reasonable dispute.Footnote 25
But if this is at least a possibility, then consent need not be as important for justifying the donation as Veatch suggests it is. For it seems reasonable to suppose that, other things being equal, it is the duty of a parent to donate a kidney to her child if the child is in need of it and the parent an eligible donor.Footnote 26 After all, she is responsible for the very existence of the child and therefore has a much stronger moral reason to care than a mere brother or sister. I do not claim that it is an enforceable duty; consent should remain a necessary condition. But even if consent is a necessary condition, the parent’s duty of care may be the additional element we are looking for that helps to justify accepting the donation.
For other relatives and acquaintances no such relation of special concern can be assumed in advance. It is up to the parties affected to define or redefine their relationship.Footnote 27 But that means that it is also an option for them to declare that a relation of special concern and special responsibility exists that would justify the medical team to go on with the nephrectomy, in spite of the fact that they would thereby harm the donor. In many cases this declaration will be initially plausible enough; in others, some kind of confirmation may be necessary. So for every candidate donor we have two questions to ask. First, does she have standing as a donor, meaning, does she have a relation to the recipient that understandably may make the interest of the recipient a matter of special concern to her? This may be the case if she is a partner, a close relative, or a friend. (Intimacy is required, not kinship.Footnote 28) The second question is, Does she give her free and well-informed consent?
What about the anonymous stranger donor, the Samaritan? My analysis shows that our original hesitations to accept such offers were not completely unfounded, even if they normally have been rationalized in the wrong way.Footnote 29 (This is one of the many paradoxes of our usual way of thinking about organ donation; it should always be motivated by “altruism,” shouldn’t it? Well, here comes a person who can hardly be motivated by any other concern, and we think he must be mad.) If we refuse to rely on the volenti principle, it is not obvious that the Samaritan donor has any standing for donation. You cannot at will take up special responsibilities for any person by appealing to a “relation” that person isn’t even aware of.
But could not the Samaritan donor claim that, even if he doesn’t owe it to any recipient in particular to donate his organs, he has an “imperfect” duty of beneficence to help people in extreme need? Our usual conception of Samaritan duties does not imply a duty to donate: we are not entitled to expect one another to make such sacrifices.Footnote 30 However, if someone makes it his personal concern to do his part to meet an existing need, we may perhaps consider him to have an unusual sense of personal responsibility that entitles him to have his offer accepted, even if this responsibility does not result from an antecedent relation. This view may be all the more plausible when the need is a pressing one, as for instance in countries confronted with an extreme scarcity of organs, where people are dying on the waiting lists.
This argument, I suggest, cannot be extended from nondirected to directed donation, for example, to a person who has, whether or not on his own initiative, attracted media attention. That this particular recipient is singled out for help cannot be justified either by an antecedent special responsibility of care or by a general responsibility that is a possible response in a situation of urgent need. For even if the recipient is needy, he isn’t needier than others. Helping this particular person therefore can only be understood as a personal project, and the decision motivated by that project as mere consent, not as a response to a state of affairs that calls for it. In such cases we should stick to the criteria adopted for just allocation within a general scheme. To deviate from that scheme would be a form of formal injustice (jumping the list), because it entails giving in, not only to partiality but to unmotivated partiality.Footnote 31
Lying between donations to the waiting list and donations to a particular person is the case of donations to particular classes of persons. Whether these should be seen as responses to antecedent special relations or general concerns, or as mere personal projects, can be hard to decide, and even if that discrimination could be made, it can be too subtle to be taken into account in the necessarily coarse-grained instrument of a legal regulation.
If it is only a proper special or general concern of the donor that can override the duty of the doctor not to cause harm, the motivating concern should be all the greater if the harm is greater. For this reason we should perhaps only allow parents, partners, and very close friends to make liver donations, and exclude Samaritan donors in such cases.Footnote 32 And we should certainly not accept the donation of a second kidney, even by parents.Footnote 33
