This volume on the intellectual foundations of Marshall’s economics evaluates the philosophical and historical studies undertaken by Marshall during the decade and a half following his completion of the Mathematical Tripos in 1865. It almost totally neglects Marshall’s early economic studies. This signals a lack of economic knowledge on Cook’s part, implied in the “acknowledgements” (pp. xiii–xiv) of previous teachers, and no formal education in the history of economics. Cook’s background informs the quality of this book, which, on his own account (p. 3), is deficient as a history of economic thought study. When, a quarter of a century ago, I commenced my serious Marshall studies with a biography in mind, I trod most of the territory covered by Cook, but paid far greater attention to Marshall’s early economic studies in chapters 5 and 6 of my Marshall biography.
Cook’s study is divided into three parts, prefaced by an introduction and ending with an epilogue. Part I provides the context of Marshall’s “apprenticeship,” consisting of two chapters respectively entitled “Continuity and Consensus; the State of Long-term Memories” and “A Liberal Education.” Part II, “Dualist Moral Science (1867–1871)” has three chapters: “Mental Crisis” (chapter 3), “The Way of All Flesh” (chapter 4) and “Political Economy” (chapter 5). Chapter 5 very appropriately concentrates on J.S. Mill’s political economy, “the wages [fund] question,” and “advanced political economy,” and evaluates Marshall’s early essays on value and wages. Its section on advanced political economy (pp. 159–176) introduces economists other than Mill who were influential on the young Marshall, but does so in a very incomplete way. There is no mention of Cournot and Von Thünen, let alone of Roscher, Mangoldt, and Rau (the last two significant in the context of ‘curves’ in economic analysis). Part III, “Neo-Hegelian Political Economy 1872–1873,” contains two chapters: “A Philosophical History” (chapter 6) and “Missing Links: The Education of the Working Class” (chapter 7). The epilogue and conclusion highlights “the rounded globe of knowledge” Marshall had become by the early 1870s, with its implications for “social philosophy and economic science.” It also portrays “the genesis of ‘organisation”’ as a particularly useful and novel concept developed by Marshall for explaining aspects of contemporary production and distribution theory.
Two conclusions are drawn from this study. The first, and more controversial one, is that Marshall retained a strong belief in idealist philosophy, particularly that of Hegel, for the whole of his life, and that this influenced his economics sufficiently to describe Marshall as a “neo-Hegelian.” Secondly, Cook suggests that Marshall’s active support for working-class improvement started at the time of his shift towards the moral sciences, and stayed with him for the whole of his life. I add that it was also a major motivating force for his initial studies in economics.
My critical reservations on this book arise partly from the manner in which its argument is conducted, partly from rejecting its conclusion that Marshall was a staunch “neo-Hegelian” all his life. Some other weaknesses of the book can be partly illustrated from poor bibliographical practice.
As I have argued elsewhere (Groenewegen Reference Groenewegen1990), Marshall’s studies and use of Hegel were actually quite limited.Footnote 1 First, Marshall ignored work by Hegel other than his Philosophy of History. Secondly, Marshall’s use of Hegel illustrates the manner in which he often used texts, altering their meaning to make them conform more to what he himself wanted to believe on the issue in question. Thirdly, although specific use of Hegel by Marshall featured especially in work from the second half of the 1870s, and some of it occurred in the Principles of Economics, the influence of Hegel was somewhat loose and invariably minor. As Talcott Parsons suggested, there is only “a superficial likeness” between Hegel’s opinions and Marshall’s.
Cook (p. 150, n. 1) claims that Marshall’s “encounter with Hegel’s Philosophy of History” was instrumental in “finally determining the course of his life” on the basis of Keynes’ authority in a note (Keynes Reference Keynes and Pigou1925, p. 11, n. 1). When Keynes’ text is examined, the note actually states that at Keynes’ meeting with Marshall two weeks before Marshall’s death, Marshall “dwelt especially on Hegel’s Philosophy of History and [on] the friendly action of Dr Bateson as finally determining the course of his life.” This “friendly action of Dr Bateson” was giving Marshall a John’s College Lectureship in the Moral Sciences in 1868 (see Groenewegen Reference Groenewegen1995, pp. 100, 267, which also explains the very generous nature of this act on Bateson’s part). Unfortunately, Keynes’ dangling prepositional phrase makes his meaning technically ambiguous. Did Keynes mean to include Hegel’s Philosophy of History as determining the course of Marshall’s life together with Dr Bateson’s offer of a lectureship? I suspect not, but at a minimum this is a weak foundation on which to base a thesis of Marshall’s “neo-Hegelianism.”
Cook’s treatment of Turgot provides another illustration of his casual scholarship and incomplete bibliography. To indicate the importance of Turgot in Cook’s study, his name attracts no less than six page references in the index (as compared to only two for Raffaelli, a leading scholar in the work of the ‘young’ Marshall and Marshallian studies more generally). Turgot was studied quite early by Marshall and his Réflexions were cited in the opening pages of Marshall’s “Essay on Value,” examined by Cook at the end of chapter 5. Cook (p. 164) mentions Turgot’s Réflexions in a 1774 edition (not in his bibliography). Unfortunately for Cook, this edition does not exist. The only eighteenth-century versions of Turgot’s Réflexions are the original text completed by November 1766, one published in serial form in the Ephémérides (1769–70) with Du Pont de Nemours’ emasculated text, the corrected copy constructed therefrom for Turgot’s own use, and the posthumous edition of 1788. Marshall, it may be noted, used the 1844 Daire edition of Turgot’s works, the then-standard edition, of which he owned a copy (included in the 1927 Marshall Library Catalogue).
Apart from Cook’s errors of commission and omission on Turgot, there are peculiar references in his book (pp. 232, 260) to an “ancient pagan mode of expression” that, according to Cook, Smith had inherited from Turgot and the Physiocrats, and that was also visible in the writings of “Ricardo and even J.S. Mill.” How far, and how lasting, was the impact of this French practice on English thought? In addition, Cook provides no evidence to support these statements, no examples from the classical literature are provided, nor does Cook explain the meaning of his innovative term, “ancient pagan modes of expression.” Physiocratic texts are completely absent from Cook’s bibliography. Cook’s awareness of these “pagan” proclivities in French economics seems to have fallen like manna from heaven.
Several other examples of Cook’s unscholarly practices may be mentioned. His declaration of differences with Tiziano Raffaelli (p. xiv), without disclosing them, is one. Cook’s erroneous documentation (p. 216, n. 73) of the nature of Marshall’s religious childhood from my biography is another. His treatment of Marshall’s early economic studies is generally weak. Much of Cook’s argument is speculative and unsubstantiated (for example, pp. 48, 117–118, 231–232, 256–257). Moreover, to reiterate my earlier comment on Cook’s two major conclusions, the view that Marshall was a “neo-Hegelian” for the whole of his life is incorrect, and relies fundamentally on weak evidence. Cook’s view that Marshall’s social philosophy and policy for the moral, and economic, improvement of the working class rested on a wide range of principles is a well-known proposition to Marshall scholars, and generally accepted by them. This cannot be described as a worthwhile book.
