I

When the Second World War ended in May 1945, relations between Germany and the Nordic states were at an all-time low. Norway and Denmark had been under occupation for five years, and this was lodged in the collective memory as an oppressive and humiliating experience. In Norway anti-German sentiment was further intensified by bitterness over the widespread havoc wrought by the Wehrmacht in its ‘scorched earth’ retreat from the Finnmark region in 1944.Footnote ¹ It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the political relationship of the three western German occupation zones that in 1949 became West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany, FRG) with Denmark, and still more Norway, after 1945 was overshadowed by the distant, not to say hostile, attitude of both peoples towards anything and everything German.

This article examines the remodelling of West Germany's relationship with Denmark and Norway and central themes of political dialogue during the period in question. It shall not be considering representations of West Germany in northern Europe, for that subject would transcend traditional diplomatic history to include both classic international relationships and the whole nexus of cultural and economic relations among both political and non-political actors, and with regard to northern Europe we still lack a basic, well-supported study of this theme.Footnote ² This article can offer only an overview. An exhaustive, broadly based study of the development and formation of West German relations with Norway and Denmark from the immediate postwar period up to the 1970s is something we urgently need.

Up to the 1970s the relationship went through a number of clearly distinguished phases; phase shifts were marked by general political developments arising from the East–West split and the ever more confrontational attitudes engendered by the Cold War.Footnote ³

Between the unconditional surrender of Hitler's Germany, when the reins of government were grasped by the four victorious Allied powers, and the foundation of the FRG in May 1949 Germany had no official foreign policy and therefore no diplomatic representation. Thereafter the FRG was not allowed to form its own foreign policy until the revision of the occupation statute in 1951. However, it did of course maintain a kind of informal representation of its interests abroad, because despite the total military defeat, the collapse of Germany as a state and the limitation of its sovereignty, German interests continued to exist, including those involving the Scandinavian countries. However, these interests had to be administered through the agency of the victorious powers.

Phase 2 lasted from the foundation of the two new German states (1949) to their integration into the two antagonistic military blocs (1955/56). At this time the FRG's position vis-à-vis northern Europe was essentially that of a reliable democratic partner of the Western alliance in the ever intensifying Cold War; apart from questions of culture and economic policy, the bilateral settlement of problems left over from the war years was of central importance. Also relevant was discussion of a possible military contribution by West Germany and its ultimate entry into the defensive Atlantic alliance. Whether the rearmament of (West) Germany should be countenanced was a hotly debated issue both inside the FRG and in its neighbouring states.Footnote ⁴

The stages in the development of the FRG's foreign policy during this period are well known. The agreeing of the Marshall Plan or ERP (European Recovery Program) with the United States on 15 December 1949 strengthened West Germany's political bond with the United States and greatly restricted its freedom of manoeuvre. Before the Second World War Germany had been at the heart of Europe; after the war the western half of Germany found itself on a globally significant frontier and in view of the increasing tensions between the two power blocs, where foreign policy was concerned its leaders had no option but to play the US card.

The FRG's first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, acknowledged this state of affairs from the outset and set his foreign policy priorities accordingly. West Germany was now the eastern march of the Pax Americana, and its policy had to take account of that fact. Adenauer's chosen course, inspired by his unswerving commitment to the West, introduced a completely new element into German foreign policy. It meant abandoning the ‘special path’ or Sonderweg which Germany had traced through central European politics from 1871 to 1945. The impact of this on West Germany's relations with the Nordic countries was, in the last analysis, positive. The latter nourished some fears of a resurgent (West) German Sonderweg, but cautious Norwegian or Danish politicians could always soothe them by pointing to the FRG's close involvement with the Western alliance.Footnote ⁵

In this connection the FRG's political relationship with the smaller Western states was of some importance. The Nordic region was a permanent concern of the Bonn government, as can be seen from Adenauer's first official pronouncement to the Bundestag on 20 September 1949, in which he outlined the country's future foreign policy, stressing the importance of ‘good relations with the Benelux countries, France, Italy, England and the northern European states’.Footnote ⁶

After the signing of the Petersberg Agreement in November 1949 the constraints on West Germany's foreign policy were relaxed to allow consular representation. This led to West German consulates being set up in Sweden, Norway and Denmark among other countries. Their main, but not sole, purpose was to act as a channel for economic interests. Because its freedom to make foreign policy decisions was still somewhat restricted, the Bonn Chancery considered it very important that the consulates, as the sole representation of the West German government abroad, should be taken seriously and accepted as ranking, in protocol, equally with the high commissions of the three Western allies which had hitherto represented the FRG.

The revision of the occupation statute in March 1951, and the ‘German treaty’ signed on 26 May 1953 with the three Western powers (the United States, France and Britain) officially ended the occupation of West Germany and granted it national sovereignty, although this was restricted by extensive special rights retained by the Allies. Nonetheless it was now possible to pursue an independent foreign policy and to constitute official diplomatic representation abroad. Once again, Norway and Denmark were two of the first countries to receive a West German embassy.

The first report of the first West German envoy (after 1955, ambassador) in Oslo, Georg von Broich-Oppert, to the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Ministry) in Bonn concerned his first meeting with the Norwegian foreign minister, Halvard Lange, in August 1951, when they discussed a subject of major importance which was to be central to the security policies of both countries over the next few years, namely whether the FRG should contribute to defence initiatives.Footnote ⁷ Lange was one of the most enthusiastic Norwegian advocates of transatlantic military co-operation and was an early proponent of the full integration of West Germany into Western security structures. The exclusively Scandinavian defence alliance which had been discussed in 1948–9 had foundered on the disagreement between Norway, which called for close co-operation with the United States and Canada, and Sweden, which was pledged to neutrality.Footnote ⁸ As far back as 1950 Lange had spoken in the Norwegian parliament in favour of a reassessment of relations with the FRG, seeing it as a potential ally rather than erstwhile enemy.Footnote ⁹ The outbreak of the Korean War in July 1950, which sharply aggravated the Cold War, had provoked intense discussion in both Danish and Norwegian government circles about potential military co-operation with the FRG. However, the question of whether the FRG should be included in the Western defence alliance had never been directly discussed between Bonn, Copenhagen and Oslo, far less made the subject of bilateral or trilateral negotiations. Decisions on German rearmament were taken in London, Paris or Washington. In September 1950, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the United States proposed that West Germany should contribute to West European military structures. In December 1950 the Council officially resolved to allow a defence contribution from the FRG.

It is important to bear in mind that West German rearmament was no distant abstraction to the Danish or Norwegian governments, because the participation of their troops in occupation and defence work in the British zone of north Germany had made both Nordic states increasingly aware of the importance of including West German economic and political resources in the overall defence strategy against the East. Since 1948 a Danish brigade had been stationed in Holstein, and a Norwegian one in German Schleswig.Footnote ¹⁰

Despite their involvement in the occupation of Germany, the smaller West European NATO members could only react in the matter of German rearmament; they could not act. After West Germany's admission to the Alliance had been decided, even Norway and Denmark had no option but to agree or to be isolated within NATO.Footnote ¹¹ The NATO constitution gave every member a veto over new membership proposals, but it would have been surprising had the two Nordic parliaments refused to endorse FRG membership of NATO in autumn 1954 since they had already agreed to it in principle in 1950.

The implementation of the Paris treaties on 5 May 1955, together with West Germany's accession to NATO, marked the final stage of recognition of the FRG as a fully sovereign state before 1990. The phase which ended in 1955 was politically inseparable from East–West opposition and the ‘Hallstein Doctrine’ invoked by the Adenauer government to guard against international recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). The Doctrine, formulated by Secretary of State Walter Hallstein, declared that the federal government would regard it as an ‘unfriendly act’ if any state with which the FRG had diplomatic relations also entered into full diplomatic relations with the GDR. Any such state, threatened the Bonn government, would be subjected to sanctions. But this defensive manoeuvre was in no way confined to northern Europe: it applied to all countries with which the FRG had diplomatic relations. It became even more significant once the two Germanys had been tightly bound into their respective military blocs.Footnote ¹² Six years earlier, a fortnight after the foundation of the GDR, Adenauer had told the Bundestag on 21 October 1949 that his government aspired to represent the entire German people.Footnote ¹³ This was the basis of the Federal ‘claim to exclusive representation’. Because of its economic strength, and the support of the Western powers, the FRG was able to enforce this claim in northern Europe, particularly in the two neutral states, Sweden and Finland, which were prime targets of East Germany's foreign policy.Footnote ¹⁴

The phase shift of 1955 is not solely due to the FRG's accession to NATO. In the same year it diplomatic relations were opened with Moscow – that is with a government which also had diplomatic relations with, and formally recognised, the GDR. Thereafter the presence of the GDR in Scandinavia became steadily more insistent, due in particular to its cultural activities. In response, West Germany shook off previous restraints on its ‘public diplomacy’ and redoubled its efforts to present itself to the Scandinavian public as the only democratic German alternative. The FRG also saw it as a duty to warn the Nordic countries of the danger from the Soviet Union and its satellites.Footnote ¹⁵ Hence, according to a memo from the Auswärtiges Amt, one of the purposes of the first visit to Oslo and Copenhagen by a leading West German politician, the Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano, in May 1956 was ‘to strengthen the impression in Denmark and Norway that the Federal Republic is not just a friend but also a secure and loyal ally’ with whom they could ‘co-operate with confidence in every way . . . despite the bitter experiences of the war’. It was also important to ‘strengthen NATO awareness’.Footnote ¹⁶

II

For Denmark, as for Norway, the integration of West Germany into the security systems centring on the transatlantic alliance was a red-hot political question that was the subject of intense domestic debate.Footnote ¹⁷ In the immediate postwar period it was further complicated by another, very particular problem: the discussion and final settlement of the question of frontiers and the minorities living on each side of them. As soon as the war ended, and before any sort of mutual political interests could be forged between Germany and Denmark, the old national oppositions arose to confront German and Danish political actors. Only the balance of power had shifted. The Danish Prime Minister, Vilhelm Buhl, told the Folketing on 9 May 1945 that Denmark's frontier with Germany would remain where it had been put by the plebiscites of 1920 and that his government had no intention of retreating from this democratic decision. However, he thought that the future status of minorities north and south of the border would require some reconsideration depending on events.Footnote ¹⁸

This of course gave the Germans the impression that not all Danish politicians agreed that the frontier question really had been finally settled. This was confirmed by the first postwar Danish general election in autumn 1945, which returned a liberal (Venstre) government after sixteen years of social democracy. When on 21 November 1945 the new Prime Minister, Knud Kristensen, ushered in the new term by proclaiming the right to national self-determination,Footnote ¹⁹ he caused considerable irritation south of the border, among both German politicians and the British occupation authorities.Footnote ²⁰ His words also aroused expectations among the Danish minority in Schleswig-Holstein, which miraculously increased in numbers from 2,500 to over 70,000 over the next few months;Footnote ²¹ and these expectations swiftly engendered their own political dynamic as Danish nationalists hastened to back demands for frontier revisions being made by the enlarged Danish minority.

There is no room here to examine how far this was a defensive reaction to the large numbers – some 1.2 million – of refugees and exiles from the Polish and Soviet-occupied eastern German territories that were currently flooding into Schleswig-Holstein, which turned many of the local people, temporarily at least, into nationalistic Danes conscious of their minority status.Footnote ²² It is, however, a fact that this Danish minority spawned a sort of irredentist movement which forced the occupying power to bring political pressure on Denmark. In September 1946 the British government suggested that the frontier should be moved southwards or alternatively that there should be an exchange of populations. As the British had almost certainly expected, Copenhagen reacted with horror and immediately distanced itself from any such proposal.Footnote ²³ The idea of moving the frontiers disappeared from the agenda, but there still remained the problem of settling the rights of the national minorities on both sides of the border in a manner that would be acceptable to all concerned.

The wisdom of the British occupation policy soon became apparent as constructive negotiations between the Schleswig-Holstein regional government (installed by the British in early 1946), a delegation representing the Danish minority and the government in Copenhagen were set in motion. The British priority was to establish a positive relationship between the new West German state and the Western powers; the Danes were not to put a spoke in this wheel. Therefore the British pointedly expressed their hope that the Danish government would exercise a calming influence over the Danish minority in southern Schleswig.

It was this minority question that restored political dialogue between Danes and Germans, or at least Schleswig-Holsteiners, although there was still a fair amount of strain and irritation.Footnote ²⁴ Eventually, in September 1949, statements were made in Kiel and Copenhagen concerning the rights and protection of the Danish minority in southern Schleswig and the German minority in southern Jutland (= northern Schleswig) which came to be regarded as milestones in the protection of minority rights in Europe. The basis of the settlement was the principle of self-identification, whereby each individual declared his own choice of nationality, which would not be disputed or verified by the authorities. Rules were also devised for the political representation of minority interests. Over the next few years, however, the way in which these principles were applied in the Schleswig-Holstein policies of successive conservative governments provoked a good deal of conflict and constant complaints from the Danish minority about bureaucratic chicanery. The problem was solved by the ‘Bonn–Copenhagen Declarations’ of March 1955 under the auspices of the Western powers, in connection with the debate over the FRG's accession to NATO. Before the Danes would ratify the accession treaty they insisted on a binding declaration from the federal government of the rights of the Danish minority. The Declarations did not accord any additional rights, but confirmed, reintroduced and/or strengthened the privileges and protection laid down in the 1949 Kiel declaration.

III

Apart from the question of security and Danish/German minority rights, which were only a side issue of West Germany's foreign policy, two other items bulked large in its 1950s agenda for dealings with Denmark and, especially, Norway. The first was the hampering of trade by the confiscation of the value of German goods at the end of the war, and the second (which was not unconnected with the first) was compensation for those Danes and Norwegians who had suffered damage and persecution during the German occupation.

When the war ended the Danish and Norwegian governments promptly confiscated all German assets in their countries and handed them over to a specially constituted authority for valuation.Footnote ²⁵ These authorities were given full rights to dispose of all such former German property for the benefit of the Danish or Norwegian state, and in particular to sell it to third parties. The proceeds would go to settle the first claims for reparations. By the end of 1952 the Norwegian ‘Enemy Assets Directorate’ had realised the sum of 314 million Norwegian kroner, and estimated that the balance would not exceed some 20 million kroner.Footnote ²⁶ By 1951 the Danish authority had liquidated some 140 million Danish kroners’ worth of German assets and paid the moneys to the Danish government.Footnote ²⁷

These confiscated German assets included not just capital but also fixed assets and intellectual property rights, that is the patents and trademarks registered as at 9 May 1945 in Norway or Denmark in the names of German subjects or companies. Trademarks were of particular economic importance but also constituted the main problem. They brought in the biggest profit, but also caused headaches once bilateral trade was re-established, because their German owners could no longer use their own trademarks on goods intended for export to Denmark or Norway unless they wanted them promptly to be seized by the Enemy Assets Directorate. They could of course have marketed the goods in Denmark and Norway under a different name from that used elsewhere, but this seldom made economic sense because the two countries represented only a small slice of the whole German export market. On the other hand, if the old name was used the product could not, in practice, be sold in Norway or Denmark.

When in 1948 bilateral trade agreements were signed between both countries and the economically integrated US, French and British occupation zones which were to become West Germany in 1949, the regulated conduct of trade was severely hampered by this treatment of ‘enemy assets’, because it became impossible to offset Danish and Norwegian exports against West German products. To understand this it is necessary to know that at that time, bilateral trade was pursued on a compensatory basis. For example, the agreed trade volume with Norway for 1950 was US$44 million; Norway exported its full quota, but the Germans could supply goods worth only US$28 million, because any bearing the fatal trademarks were automatically seized by customs as soon as they crossed the Norwegian border, and so could not be sold on the Norwegian market although there was a brisk demand for them.

In course of preparing for the opening of the West German embassy in Oslo in 1951, the Auswärtiges Amt in Bonn reviewed the problems which would need to be discussed in political negotiations with Norway, prominent among them the trade restrictions. Negotiations for a new trade agreement were on the agenda for summer 1951. A memo from the federal Finance Ministry made it quite clear that the unfavourable imbalance of trade with Norway had to be rectified. Two alternatives were to be put to the Norwegians: either Norwegian exports to Germany had to be correspondingly curbed – which was in neither party's commercial interest – or German exports had to be stepped up by removing the impediments, that is restoring ownership of the trademarks.Footnote ²⁸

One powerful argument in support of the West German proposals related to a key requirement of the OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Co-operation), set up in 1948 to organise and supervise aid under the Marshall Plan. All member states were pledged to remove all impediments to international trade. Both Norway and the FRG were of course members of the OEEC, and the former considered that the enemy assets directive was precisely such an impediment.Footnote ²⁹ This controversial matter was first formally discussed in 1952–3. In January 1953 the Norwegian Foreign Ministry gave a verbal assurance that Norway was in principle willing to restore the German trademarks. On this basis a settlement was reached in December 1953 whereby any trademarks that had not yet been sold off could be repurchased by their original German owners.Footnote ³⁰

The question of German assets and their restoration was also discussed in Denmark, but had been dealt with pragmatically there since 1951. However, no final bilateral settlement was reached until the FRG was recognised as ‘fully sovereign’ in 1955.Footnote ³¹

IV

One problem that bore particularly heavily on FRG–Norway relations in the late 1950s was the payment of compensation to erstwhile Norwegian concentration and internment camp inmates and victims of German reprisals under the Nazi occupation. Norway had received a share of German reparations in accordance with the distribution key in the Paris Reparations Agreement, and these reparations were intended to cover both individual and official compensation claims. Hence the Norwegian government considered that Norway had to compensate the victims of the German occupation, and the Norwegian parliament (Storting) had passed a suitable ‘national compensation act’.Footnote ³² In 1955 Norwegian victims of the Nazis founded a ‘compensation council’ which demanded that the government should press for Norwegians to be entitled to make claims under a proposed new ‘compensation act’ currently being debated in the FRG, since the Norwegian compensation programme had been wound up. The council's legal justification referred to agreements made in 1952 and 1953 between the FRG and, respectively, the Western powers and the Jewish Claims Conference, in which the FRG had acknowledged in principle that it had a duty to compensate foreigners for Nazi injustices.Footnote ³³ The Norwegian council succeeded in mobilising not only the Norwegian political establishment but also Norwegian public opinion, forcing the Auswärtiges Amt to make its attitude clear, especially as the debate over Norwegian compensation had since spread to other NATO countries (and therefore official allies of the FRG), including Denmark. Eventually these countries presented a united front which Bonn, despite earlier energetic refutation of the claims, was unable to resist. At the beginning of 1959 negotiations with the relevant countries began, with Norway spearheading the claim.

The negotiations continued for months, with the FRG plainly dragging its feet despite asseverations to the contrary by Brentano. At an early stage he signified a willingness to pay a lump sum, but this was resolutely opposed by the West German Finance Minister. The West Germans found it very difficult to agree what categories of claimant should be admitted. Bonn was particularly reluctant to include erstwhile members of the Norwegian resistance, fearing that this would create a precedent for very much larger claims from other formerly occupied countries. In the end it was left to the Norwegian authorities to decide who should receive compensation payments, and on what basis. The breakthrough in the negotiations came during an unofficial visit to Norway by Theodor Oberländer, Minister for Refugees, in December 1958, during which he talked with Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen. Under the ensuing compensation agreement, signed in August 1959, the FRG was to make Norway a lump-sum payment of DM 60 million (100 million Norwegian kroner) in three equal annual instalments ending in 1961.Footnote ³⁴ In point of fact this was only a fraction of the 735 million kroner originally demanded by the compensation council.

The finalising of the compensation agreement removed a major political stumbling block: no further controversial questions stood in the way of developing a bilateral relationship. The priority now was to improve the atmosphere and normalise relations. For the West Germans this meant building confidence by demonstrating that the FRG's was a reliable, solidly democratic political system. That this was eventually achieved is due in no small measure to the efforts of Willy Brandt, Foreign Minister from 1966, who had had close connections with Norway since his time of exile there. Political contacts between the FRG and Norway were also stimulated in the course of Norway's second application for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1967. This was voted down by the Norwegian people in a referendum in 1972, but in the following year Norway did sign a free trade agreement with the EEC. Throughout this period talks between Norwegian and West German representatives turned almost entirely on the European question.Footnote ³⁵ Brandt was disappointed that all his personal efforts had not sufficed to convince the Norwegians of the advantages of EEC membership.Footnote ³⁶

V

Until the mid-1950s Denmark and Norway remained a side-show for West German diplomacy. This changed after the FRG joined NATO, as the Bonn government became interested in closer political and military co-operation. Many sceptical voices were raised against such collaboration, particularly in Norway, where they penetrated to the highest government levels. When the West German ambassador in Norway, von Broich-Oppert, was recalled in May 1956 he reviewed the development of Norwegian–West German relations in a lengthy report to the Auswärtiges Amt, in which he acknowledged the widespread scepticism but emphasised a positive trend towards closer collaboration, particularly with regard to economics and security. Sheer common sense had prevented the Norwegians from rejecting this closer relationship with Germany. Nevertheless the outgoing ambassador concluded that, at present, ‘We cannot yet count on a sympathetic, let alone a friendly, attitude among the population at large.’Footnote ³⁷

In the meantime, collaboration with West German armed forces (the Bundeswehr) was highly important to Norway, as its government fully acknowledged. It was solely thanks to the inclusion of the Bundeswehr in Norway's overall defence strategy that it was possible to redeploy Norwegian troops in the northernmost parts of the country, along the border with the Soviet Union.Footnote ³⁸ But the proposal to introduce West German officers into NATO's northern headquarters in Kolsås (near Oslo) had political as well as military implications and was fiercely contested in Norway. A majority of the population, and a substantial number of parliamentarians, had stridently opposed the rearmament of Germany. Now that the latter was a fait accompli, there was still opposition to closer integration. However, since the authority of the command structure in Kolsås stretched as far south as the Elbe, Bundeswehr officers had to be stationed there regardless. Visits from high-ranking West German officers and Defence Ministry officials were greeted by big hostile demonstrations, for example in 1957 against a visit from Hans Speidel, a former Wehrmacht general now holding a high command in NATO's central region, and in 1961 against a visit from the federal Defence Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, who had intended to visit Oslo in 1957 but changed his mind for fear of protests.Footnote ³⁹ The crisis-hit Norwegian armaments industry hoped that Strauss's visit would bring in some lucrative orders from the FRG, which was the industry's only European customer at the time. A successful deal was in fact struck which brought the Norwegians a handsome profit. It also produced a solid gain to the West German armaments industry, drawing Norwegian attention to the excellent reputation of West German submarines, of which Norway eventually bought fifteen.

Despite the public protests, and some political false notes, the military collaboration between Norway and the FRG rapidly intensified – thanks in part to co-operation in the armaments industry – prompting the West German ambassador, Dr Oppler, to note with surprise in 1959:

This had not been affected by the protests against Speidel's visit to Oslo in autumn 1957, which had been greatly exaggerated by certain sections of the German and Norwegian press. Oppler warned, however, that

Successful efforts along these lines were made, not least through the cultural agreement of 1956, which extended cultural and social relations. Oppler remarked in his 1959 report that the cultural agreement had served as a basis for intensive exchange visits by scientists and journalists, which had contributed decisively to creating a more positive image of Germany (meaning the FRG) in the Norwegian mind. He attached particular importance to the 1,000 or so Norwegian students who constitute one of the largest foreign contingents in German universities.Footnote ⁴²

No similar cultural agreement was made with Denmark, because the Danes’ historical experiences with their neighbours to the south engendered an understandably suspicious attitude towards the threat of a cultural and political offensive. Hence as late as 1963 the Auswärtiges Amt instructed the federal ambassador in Copenhagen, Dr F. Buch, to undertake no initiatives in this area. In fact he was told that cultural relations between the FRG and Denmark were already so good that a cultural agreement would do scarcely anything to improve them.Footnote ⁴³

VI

All in all it must be said that unlike the GDR, which had a definite policy for northern Europe,Footnote ⁴⁴ West Germany had no specific policy for that region. Apart from clearing up the aftermath of war, the political and diplomatic initiatives that the federal government directed towards the Nordic countries – specifically Denmark and Norway – were part of an overall strategy aimed at integrating the FRG into the Western security structure as a reliable partner. For the rest, it was mostly a matter of economic politics.

We still have a great deal to learn about the way in which the FRG affected Denmark's and Norway's applications to join the EEC. It must also be borne in mind that there was a good deal of unofficial contact between the FRG and the Nordic countries during the period we have examined, in the spheres of culture, sport and, not least, private business. Nor should we forget the special relationship between the West German social democrats and the corresponding parties in Scandinavia. Very often it was in these domains that political dialogue was first initiated. These relationships, beyond the remit of official diplomacy, would repay further study. It may turn out that such networks contributed at least as much to rapprochement, to exorcising the past and to re-establishing constructive bilateral relationships, as did official diplomacy.