This article will be divided into two parts. First, I will demonstrate the importance of comparative law and legal culture by highlighting the “great principles of French public law”. I will then explore some of these major principles, based on the French and German conceptions of law, justice, the State, and democracy.
I. The importance of law and comparative legal culture for understanding the relevance of “great principles of public law”.
A discussion of the existence of major principles of French public law requires some preliminary methodological remarks. I think that it is important to remember that law is also a cultural phenomenon, which must be placed in the political and constitutional history of States.
A. Legal culture
1. An Approach Which May Cause Confusion
As Frédéric Audren and Jean-Louis Halpérin point out in their book on French legal culture, “Anglo-American literature began using the expression ‘legal cultures’ a few years ago to account for the variety [of] discourses [of doctrine] and the practices that are more or less explicitly associated with it”.Footnote 2 Although the expression is not new in France, it is often difficult to grasp. This is explained firstly by the confusion created, especially when the discourse is linked to the theme of the French exception—and therefore to an old defensive and nationalist temptation.Footnote 3 It is also explained by the difficulty encountered by all those who seek to determine the precise contours of the concept of “legal culture”: because of its inherent questions and problems with shifting boundaries.Footnote 4 Finally, it can be explained by certain reservations, similar to those expressed on work on “legal families”Footnote 5: standard critiques of modelling and typologies, a reductive focus on Western law (as forged by the traditions of liberalism),Footnote 6 or warnings against oversimplifications that encourage the dissemination of a “mythological” “vulgate”.Footnote 7
It should be remembered that there is no unity, no single legal culture, no single idea of the law, of law, of rights, of democracy and of the State. This is obviously true for France as it is for other States. However, this does not prevent a certain continuity or importance of “major principles”, which shed light on national legal and political conceptions that may be shared by, or may differentiate, certain national or regional “cultures”.
2. A decisive approach
However, the imprecise nature of the concept of legal culture does not negate its interest. The confusion it sometimes causes is explained by the wealth of fields it covers—legal thought, history, political culture, sociology, even anthropology. Considering law and justice as cultural phenomena means legal reflection can be extended beyond the positive law created by statutes and case law. It is a matter of incorporating the “cultural” background of law, the idea of a legal identity, derived from national habits, representations, and practices: these are all factors that make it possible to understand the conception and practice of abstract rules and institutions, and which invite us to consider the semantic struggles and conceptual issues that underlie the terminology chosen to translate legal representations. Michael Stolleis said: “By the term ‘legal culture’ I mean mentalities developed over large spaces of time, or more precisely: the context of the expectations that people associate with the law and non-law complex, courts and lawyers, law and judgment. They are difficult to grasp, but we can at least describe what their political and legal conditions looked like.Footnote 8
The correlative importance of history leads to an inescapable proximity between reflections on traditions (traditions of thought (Denktradition), legal traditions) and those on legal culture(s).Footnote 9 However, the latter are distinguished by their dynamic character, open to evolution and hybridization.
B. Comparative Law in Time and Space
1. Legal Culture, History, and Comparative Law in Public Law
The above considerations have already given a glimpse of the relationship between legal culture(s), history (comparative law “in time”) and comparative law (in the more standard sense, as considered “in space”).
In France, the interest in comparative public law is by no means new. Remember that Esmein enlarged his study of Elements of Constitutional Law (1896) to French and comparative law. There are many pioneering works in this field, constantly enriched by new researchFootnote 10 and new perspectives, including European.Footnote 11 There is no need to develop them here. At most, we can stress the close links between the comparative method and legal culture,Footnote 12 and the importance of history when examining “public law” cultures, and especially constitutional cultures, which mobilize constitutional history and comparative institutional analysis.Footnote 13
2. France/Germany
Esmein is far away and there is no longer any reason to exclude Germany from the study of comparative law due to its constitution which did not have “political freedom as its direct purpose”Footnote 14—he added significantly “that is why I, who owe so much to German science, have not used it. Instead, I have drawn extensively on the literature of England and the United States.Footnote 15 Today, besides the continued appeal of German legal science,Footnote 16 comparative research is of particular interest to comparative studies of French and German law and institutions. Beyond the points of convergence which are far from being non-existent, there are “different legal conceptions,”Footnote 17 specific “ideas” of the State and the law,Footnote 18 which reveal “two different legal cultures.”Footnote 19
II. Some Examples of the “Main Principles” of Law and State
Comparing “Germany, the country of origin of the State of law” and “France, the country of origin of (modern) democracy”Footnote 20 has interesting consequences for the conception of the “great principles of public law”. This is shown firstly by the different approaches to law and judges (A) and secondly to the state and democracy (B).
A. Law(s) and Judge(s)
1. In Germany
One answer to the question of how it was possible, after more than twelve years of Nazi horror (1933–1945), to establish a justice system to be the guarantor of the State of law, despite the personal continuity of a large part of the German judiciary, lies in the “quality of the basic ideology of the German constitutional state”.Footnote 21 The concepts of fundamental rights and the State of law are at the heart of the German public law culture, which has its roots in the Holy Roman Empire and was shaped during the 19th century. Like federalism, another fundamental feature of German political and legal culture, these two concepts also carry with them the limitation of power.
This is above all the case with the State of law (Rechtsstaat), beyond the diversity of meanings and concretizations developed during the nineteenth century.Footnote 22 As Article 20 (3) of the Basic Law of 1949 reminds us, the law has never been confused with statute.Footnote 23 Conversely, it is quickly identified with the role of the judge, the surrounding trust being established around the protection of the law and the individual sphere.Footnote 24 In this respect, I underline the importance of the “dogmatic figure” of subjective public rights, as conceptualised at the end of the nineteenth century by Georg JellinekFootnote 25 and closely associated with the individual legal claim (Anspruch) to guarantee them, notably through public law remedies.Footnote 26 Also remember that the history of these “subjective public” rights overlaps and intersects with the history of the “fundamental rights” (Grundrechte), which were developed as early as 1848/1849.Footnote 27 These rights were admittedly overshadowed after 1866, but they marked the constitutional law of Weimar (1919-1933) and especially the Basic Law of 1949. The latter opens with the “inalienable” nature of human dignity (Article 1 para. 1 of the Basic Law) and is the framework for an unprecedented guarantee of rights, for which a complete protection, “without loopholes”, is sought.
This objective is closely linked to the existence of a powerful constitutional court. Here too, “the idea of a legal resolution of constitutional questions […] by an independent court”Footnote 28 is long established idea in Germany, illustrating the association of the Federal Constitutional Court with German legal culture.Footnote 29 Without mentioning the other functions of constitutional law, the control of the constitutionality of the law by the courts, accessible to individuals who consider their rights to have been violated, and deranging specific conceptions of powers, standards, and rights.
Limiting rather than establishing power;Footnote 30 providing less support for the political participation of citizens than the legal protection of their rights: these are, in the final analysis, determinants that are deeply rooted in German legal thought. And the further development of the State of law principle and the theory of basic rights by public law writers in conjunction with the Federal Constitutional Court remains a German specificity that is often noted, even from a European and international comparative perspective.
2. In France
It is interesting to recall the words of Michel Debré during the 1958 constitutional debates to highlight the contrast with France: “it is neither in the spirit of the parliamentary system, nor in the French tradition to give each individual the right to examine the value of the law.”Footnote 31 The reference to the “spirit” and “French tradition” is significant. To identify a “constitutional democracy”, the recognition of the “right” of the “individual litigant […] to challenge the constitutionality of a law” is of primary importance.Footnote 32 However, “French culture” differs strongly with “German culture” on this point.
There are certain platitudes which help to understand this, whilst of course bearing in mind the “myth”Footnote 33 associated with them. There is a French history of fear of the “government of judges”, which can be analyzed in the light of the long history of the “State of justice” and of the judiciary.Footnote 34 We also know that France was the first nation to proclaim the rights and freedoms of man and citizen after the United States.Footnote 35 However, this protection was above all associated with the centrality of the law, as the “expression of the general will,” according to Article 6 of the Declaration of 1789, in a formulation that reflects the heritage of constitutional thought influenced by the theories of Rousseau and Montesquieu.Footnote 36 It is also in this light that the theories of the great jurists of the Third Republic such as Carré de MalbergFootnote 37 and the very French concept of “public freedoms” are analyzed.Footnote 38
It is therefore not surprising that, unlike the German conception, the introduction of a judicial review of the law was so late and timid, despite the long-standing discussions on the subject. The structural reasons for the limited role of the Constitutional Council when it was created in 1958, are therefore obvious. The constitutional protection of individual rights and freedoms dates from 1971 (Freedom of Association decision); the development of a concrete review from 2008/2010 (Article 61-1 and the organic law of 10 December 2009 introducing the “priority question of constitutionality (QPC)” procedure).Footnote 39
However, the importance of the Conseil d'EtatFootnote 40 and the Cour de cassation remains crucial. The Civil Code of 1804, the result of Napoleon's codification, as the first “[civil] constitution” which is even consiered a French “shrine’Footnote 41 has long been an indicator of the statization of the law in response to the desire to “stabilize the social relations resulting from the revolution."Footnote 42 This last quotation illustrates the close link between the respective conceptions of rights and the State, which is a central concept of public law.
B. Nation, State, Republic
There is no detailed analysis here because the field is far too vast. However, a few words allow us to extend the idea, presented above,Footnote 43 of distinguishing between “Germany, the country of origin of the State of law” and “France, the country of origin of (modern) democracy”.
1. In Germany
German public law doctrine generally agrees on the comparatively lesser importance of the State—even more so if it is a ‘sovereign’ or ‘nation'. The late construction of national unity explains Pufendorf's characterization of the Holy Roman Empire as a “monster,”Footnote 44 the composite structure of “Germany” until 1806. If there is indeed a tradition of state doctrine and law (Staatsrechtslehre), it tends above all to fill a limited statehood, at least until the unification of 1866/1871; and the conceptions developed there tend to embody a separation between State and society (and its representatives), in contrast with the French tradition.
In this context, the concept of sovereignty as theorized in France by Bodin, as early as the 17th century, raises obvious difficulties;Footnote 45 a “retarded nation” has even been evoked;Footnote 46 not to mention the consequences of the trauma of Nazism, which has led to the disqualification of classical forms of patriotism, particularly those associated with the nation and the state. We can therefore understand the posterity of the expression “constitutional patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus), popularized by Jürgen Habermas,Footnote 47 this new kind of patriotism associated with the constitution.Footnote 48
To this quickly sketched picture we must add the more uncertain tradition of democratic culture, which is also burdened by “historical and ideological handicaps.”Footnote 49 In the framework of the limited monarchies of the nineteenth century,Footnote 50 sovereignty belonged to the monarchs, and the role of parliaments (and the field of law) was reduced to the private sphere, the sphere of “freedom and property” (Freiheit und Eigentum), left to civil society. The bureaucratic (Anstaltstaat) and authoritarian (Obrigkeitsstaat) state of the nineteenth century wasFootnote 51 thus for a long time distinct from democracy. If we add the anti-democratic thinking of WeimarFootnote 52 and the Nazi dictatorship, it is easy to see why, in 1945, “there were not only institutions to be rebuilt, but a democratic culture was missing.Footnote 53 The system of the Basic Law will undoubtedly modify this assessment profoundly. But, it was then a matter of rebuilding democracy “through law”, based on a legal theory of democracy, “constitutional principle.”Footnote 54 And the old theories “of the State” still mark the debates.Footnote 55
2. In France
On all these points, the contrast with France is important, allowing precisely, in return, to highlight the singularity of certain major principles of French public law. France is notably marked by the centralization of the State, in some respects initiated under the Ancien Régime, and at the same time shaken up and perpetuated by the revolutionary tradition.Footnote 56 The “constitutive” character of the State,Footnote 57 the unifying function attributed to the State power of the French Republic,Footnote 58 and a “Jacobin” discourse of democracy based on the fiction of the nation and of political and social unityFootnote 59 followed.
The main concepts of French public law are consequently imbued with the principles of “sovereignty” (Title I of the 1958 Constitution)—which goes hand in hand with a more political theory of democracy (especially if compared with Germany)—and of “general will.”Footnote 60 The nation and the state are never far away, often associated in the quest for a republican unity—which also makes it more difficult to underpin social plurality and diversity.
It is obvious that, in France as in Germany, these broad outlines need to be refined. Moreover, it is undeniable that the evolution of democracy and the law of the State have since brought about profound changes in the balance of power and in intellectual representations. The influence of the transformations of constitutionalism in the twentieth century are important to consider in this respect: the “time of normative constitutionalism or the State of law”Footnote 61 characterized by the increased power of the law, basic rights, and the judge, particularly the constitutional judge, brings together the major principles of German and French public law, including in relation to the European perspective. However, the imprint of the long term remains important.
