Vincent Bakpetu Thompson paints a detailed history of the perennial dispute between Somalia and Kenya over the territory of Kenya's North Eastern Province, focusing on the period from the closing years of colonial administration through the aftermath of the 1977–78 Ethio-Somali War. The entry point for the study is a short history of the growth of a Somali ‘national consciousness’ that ‘only attained maturity in 1960 when Somalia acceded to nationhood’ (p. 53). Drawing on early works of researchers such as E. R. Turton and I. M. Lewis, and garnering a wealth of data from news broadcasts, government reports and official speeches (largely from the 1960s and 1970s), Thompson contextualises the Shifta wars of the 1960s and Kenya's role in the Ethio-Somali War in light of the Somali government's imaginary of a ‘Greater Somalia’ and support for secessionism among ethnic Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia. For Somalia's successive governments, border conflicts were territorial disputes over self-determination for ethnic Somalis. For Kenya, insecurity and secessionism were problems entailing the infiltration of ideas, weapons and humans across the border.
The central claim of the work is that the crux of ‘the problem of the Horn generally’ can be found in ‘the survival of Somalia's territorial claim expressed as the quest for the missing lands and the right to self-determination for Somalis everywhere in the region’ – and in Kenya's and Ethiopia's opposition to Somali irredentism (p. 231). The detailed history of the dispute provides a valuable contribution to borderland studies literature and studies of state consolidation by outlining the role that border conflicts and discourses about territorial integrity played in state-building in Kenya and Somalia, two distinct cases of state formation. Furthermore, Thompson's work develops an historicised understanding of relations between inter-state and intra-state conflicts, focusing on the dynamics surrounding the Shifta wars of the 1960s and the Ethio-Somali War of 1977–78. As most works on the 1977–78 war focus on Ethiopia, the analysis of Kenya's role in the war is a welcome addition to historical perspectives on the Horn. By offering port facilities, enforcing its border against Somali forces en route to Ethiopia, and attempting to prevent Kenyan Somalis from joining the conflict, Kenya contributed significantly to the Ethiopian victory in 1978, a point that is frequently overlooked in the focus on Soviet and Cuban military assistance to Ethiopia.
The subtitle of this volume unfortunately implies that it adequately covers events along the border through 2014, yet the conflict has morphed in some startling ways since the bulk of this work was written. By 2011 Kenya's defence of its territory against al-Shabaab began to take a more interventionist tact. Kenyan forces initially pursued kidnappers across the border, but soon became involved in the African Union Mission in Somalia, and supported aspirations for an autonomous Jubaland state in southern Somalia. Episodes such as Kenyan troops’ support for the Ras Kamboni Brigades in Kismayo during clashes between militias in 2013 add a new layer of dynamics that complicates Thompson's assertion near the end of the book that the ‘entire’ border issue ‘has translated itself into urban terrorism’ (p. 279). The inconsistent and in some cases inaccurate updating of material since its original writing (e.g. incorrectly dating the Westgate attack to August 2013) detracts rather than adds to the force of Thompson's analysis of a critical historical period of state formation in the Horn.
Thompson frames conflict in north-eastern Kenya as an exceptional case, distinguishing it from other conflicts and tensions within the country by emphasising the historical origins of conflict in Somali nationalism and border infiltration without examining the intersection of other grievances and conflicts in Kenya's margins. In the concluding chapter, Thompson cites several sources published during the 1960s to 1980s to suggest that “former coastal advocates of regional autonomy or even secession from Kenya had now made an ‘irrevocable’ commitment to a Kenyan destiny” while ‘for Kenyan-Somalis this has yet to be finally decided’ (p. 290). The 2008 post-election violence in Kenya, growing tensions surrounding secessionist claims and violence around Mombasa, and the increasing recruitment of non-Somalis into al-Shabaab, all indicate that more is at work in the Horn than simply Somali ethno-national secessionism.
Recent episodes highlight the interplay of other factors with Somali nationalism in generating conflict along the Kenya–Somalia border. After a US drone strike killed al-Shabaab leader Adnan Garaar in mid-March 2015, intelligence warned of an imminent al-Shabaab attack, potentially targeting a Kenyan educational institution. The lack of preparedness in Garissa town and its local university reinforced perceptions of Kenya's disinterest in protecting its north-eastern border areas. Pan-Somali ideologies have blended and blurred with different issues, such as political and economic marginalisation and global religious movements, that traverse ethnic and national borders and work at multiple tiers within and beyond the Horn. In short, Thompson's reduction of the border problem to a case of identity conflict and emphasis on the continuity of dynamics from 1941–2014 fail to capture the conjuncture of ideologies and grievances at multiple scales that influence current conflicts in the Horn of Africa.
