Renton's excellent new book clearly and concisely explodes many myths surrounding the Balfour Declaration of 1917. The work is based on his doctorate with Michael Berkowitz in the department of Hebrew and Jewish studies at University College, London. Renton exposes some mistaken and exaggerated notions that British officials held about the uniformity and power of world Jewry, which the British thought they should manipulate for war purposes, a questionable assumption that London Zionists encouraged. Renton has command of extant publications about the Balfour Declaration and, along with his brilliant analysis, has come up with new material about the propaganda campaign in 1918, particularly as directed at American Jews, and in his treatment of the Zionist Commission in Palestine. Providing rational explanation for the irrational views of the individuals in London who were most involved, Renton provides a convincing account of why the British and the Zionists formed their wartime alliance. All this not only explains how the “masquerade” played out in 1918 but also anticipates some of the problems it caused for the British Mandate in Palestine and for Israel.
Because Sir Mark Sykes often appears in Renton's book, this reviewer should state that he published Mark Sykes: Portrait of an Amateur (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975), which describes Sykes's unusual life and travels, along with a military and political career that ended in 1919, when he died at the Paris Peace Conference at age thirty-nine. The book considers Sykes's prewar anti-Semitism and wartime support of Zionism to counter Jewish hatred of the tsar. As Renton's first chapter makes clear, Sykes's views of Jews and Zionism were not exceptional because others in London were no less patronizing and cynical.
In his next chapter, Renton shows how the British exaggerated Germany's influence over minorities in the United States, particularly Irish Americans, Polish Americans, and Jewish Americans. With the latter, the British thought they could counter German influence by backing Zionism but failed to realize that Zionism did not then appeal to upper- and middle-class assimilated Jewish Americans nor even to most lower-class Jews from Eastern Europe. This reviewer learned less from Renton's third chapter, except about some lesser known Zionists who made the case for propaganda getting American Jews on board even before Chaim Weizmann became the leading Zionist spokesman in London. His role has been covered in great detail but is treated only briefly in Renton's fourth chapter.
What Renton does with the last three chapters is very valuable. He reveals how London Zionists had printed only 1,000 pamphlets on their own by the beginning of 1918, but with the huge British propaganda budget, over a million pamphlets had been published by mid-1918. There was also the distribution of British war propaganda. News and images of Zionism suddenly filled Jewish public spaces all over the world but not in Russia, owing to the breakdown in communications following the Bolshevik Revolution and German presence. Renton also analyzes the “historicization” of the Balfour Declaration within the Zionist framework of Jewish history, based on a Zionist teleology of the past, with Zionism leading Jews to the redemptive point of national return. Renton reviews the propaganda spectacle surrounding the British capture of Jerusalem in 1917, the contrast emphasized between backward Ottoman Palestine and the Anglo-Zionist promise of a national transformation to replace effete urban Jewry with manly Jewish farmers and soldiers, as can be seen in the published photographs from London's Imperial War Museum. Performing the rebirth of the Jewish nation in Palestine, especially for American Jews in 1918, led to a small U.S. Zionist medical unit going to London and Jerusalem, lots of U.S. publicity about the Zionist Commission's tour of Palestine, and the incorporation of British Jews in the 38th, American Jews in the 39th, and Palestinian Jews in the 40th Royal Fusiliers, which caused problems over command, flags, and medals, especially for the U.S. government, which had never declared war against the Turks.
In his conclusion, Renton recapitulates how London's Anglo-Zionist masquerade misrepresented world Jewry. The Jews of America, like other peoples, were not a race with innate characteristics that could easily be mobilized by the British to win the war. Zionism gained critical support from the British in the latter part of the war, but that did not translate afterward into much British official support for Zionism once London began to learn how few Jews, including the Orthodox of Jerusalem, embraced the Anglo-Zionist masquerade. The consequences for Palestine soon became obvious to the British on the spot who saw the resentments of the local Jewish populations and the suspicions of Arabs that Zionists, with Britain's backing, would take over. Renton contends that, without this wartime masquerade, the history of the Palestine Mandate and the state of Israel would have been different.
Renton's scholarship is impeccable. His short book provides forty-eight pages of notes, with precise references to all the relevant primary sources, including archival sources and contemporary newspapers and periodicals used in the British Isles, Israel, and the United States. He should be commended for citing all the relevant secondary works, including recent monographs, and for discussing topics that now concern scholarly historians.
Finally, Renton deserves praise for putting scholarship ahead of partisanship, an all too rare achievement in the all too tortured historiography of the modern Middle East.
