Introduction
At the start of this century, Judge Richard Posner observed that the animal rights movement is “gathering steam.” Footnote 1 There is little indication of it losing steam anytime soon. One of the movement’s “pistons” Footnote 2 is American attorney and legal scholar Steven M. Wise. Along with his organisation, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP), Wise has been campaigning for the recognition of legal rights for nonhuman animals.
Litigation by the NhRP has culminated in the application of habeas corpus petitions challenging the imprisonment of four chimpanzees in New York State. The contention is that the chimpanzees should be recognised as legal persons entitled to the basic liberty rights protected by this writ. Footnote 3 On 4 December 2014, the Third Judicial Department of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court delivered its judgment in a case brought by the NhRP on behalf of one chimpanzee (“Tommy”). Footnote 4 The Court found that a chimpanzee is not “a ‘person’ entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus.” Footnote 5 The decisive factor was that chimpanzees are incapable of holding both rights and duties within a political community. Footnote 6 In a subsequent hearing, before Jaffe J. of the New York Supreme Court, a grant of habeas corpus was denied in regard to another pair of chimpanzees in New York State (“Hercules” and “Leo”); the judge considering herself bound by the Tommy decision. Footnote 7 Most recently, on 8 June 2017, the First Judicial Department of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ruled on a joint hearing on the cases of Tommy and Kiko (another client chimpanzee). Footnote 8 Again, the Court declined to grant habeas corpus, affirming the Third Judicial Department’s opinion that the inability to hold both rights and duties within a political community was decisive. Footnote 9
The Court rejected the NhRP’s argument that its newly submitted evidence about the social, cognitive, and linguistic capabilities of chimpanzees translated into the ability to bear duties. Footnote 10 The Court also rejected the argument that the capacity to acknowledge legal duties should not determine a chimpanzee’s entitlement to legal rights because there are certain humans, such as infants and those in comas, who possess rights despite lacking this capacity. Footnote 11 This was because, unlike chimpanzees, such humans are still ‘members of the human community’. Footnote 12
In his books Rattling the Cage Footnote 13 and Unlocking the Cage, Footnote 14 Wise argues that there are fundamental (if inchoate) rights to liberty and bodily integrity at common law which rationally should be extended to certain nonhuman species. This is true given that these species possess a cognitive capacity supporting desires, intentional action, and a sense of self. These characteristics of ‘practical’ autonomy give rise to moral considerations protected by a common law right of non-interference. Courts of the common law should extend these rights to those species where the level of cognitive ability demonstrates an interest in self-determination by way of autonomy.
Wise makes a related argument based on equality. Footnote 15 This is because (i) the rights to liberty and bodily integrity protect the interest in self-determination and (ii) as other animals possess this interest, it violates equality at common law to deny the rights to other animals. In short, the rational extension of a fundamental liberty right is both morally correct and legally feasible within existing common law structures.
Wise’s body of work is interesting for several reasons. First, it furthers legal and philosophical efforts to identify the relevant considerations for determining equality. Second, in the vein of such seminal works as “Should Trees Have Standing?” Footnote 16 it identifies moral considerations for extending legal personhood. In other words, Wise advocates emancipating other species by recognising them as rights-holders instead of the more paternalistic approach of regulating human conduct through anti-cruelty statutes. Lastly, Wise takes the view that this broadening of legal personhood is achievable through the extension of common law fundamental rights in a manner consistent with existing principles of adjudication. Given the initial rulings, now seems an appropriate time to discuss the merits of a common law basis for nonhuman rights. This issue is also timely in light of the recent 40th anniversary of Peter Singer’s iconic book Animal Liberation, Footnote 17 the ongoing screenings of a documentary about the NhRP’s litigation, Footnote 18 and the widely reported release by way of habeas corpus of a chimpanzee from a zoo in Argentina on 3 November 2016. Footnote 19
The first part of this article will discuss why certain animal advocates prefer the emancipatory approach of recognising nonhumans as rights-holders to the paternalistic approach of bolstering animal welfare legislation, and then examine Wise’s specific argument for rationally extending common law rights to certain nonhumans. The second part will analyse the arguments from reciprocity and community membership made by the New York courts in the 2014 Tommy decision and the 2017 Tommy & Kiko decision, concluding that neither argument, nor the social contract in general, provides a philosophically sound basis for denying nonhuman rights.
Although our discussion in this article draws examples from multiple common law jurisdictions, it is not a comparative law piece. Rather, it is an enquiry into the nature of common law rights and whether any can be rationally extended to other animals. In other words, this article explores the extent to which the common law has the general, implicit capacity to extend existing rights to nonhumans. Nevertheless, we appreciate the additional obstacles to rights-expansion which come with a judge’s institutional role, as well as the profound differences in legal culture between the system to which we belong, viz., of England and Wales, and the American system in which Wise is conducting his litigation. These differences make Wise’s precise approach less likely to succeed in other common law jurisdictions, even if the common law possesses the implicit capacity to extend rights to other species. For this reason, we will briefly consider alternative means of implementing legal rights for nonhumans.
1. A Common Law Route to Animal Rights?
It is important to address the background issue of animals’ traditional status as property; this is because it informs much of the debate about the moral and legal position of animals. The various historical reasons for the property status of animals have been thoroughly examined elsewhere, so we will avoid a detailed overview here. Footnote 20 In summary, the status of animals as property arose from ancient philosophical and religious beliefs that animals are a mere means to human ends. Footnote 21
Given this history, it has been easy to rationalise the exploitation of other animals for human gain, since labelling animals as property allows them to be treated ‘instrumentally’. Footnote 22 Advancements in science have revealed much of the intelligence, sentience and autonomy possessed by other species. There are strong reasons to cast doubt on the traditional status of nonhumans as property with which we may do as we please. Singer famously considers the view that animal interests are inherently unequal to our own as a morally indefensible form of discrimination akin to racism or sexism, which he terms ‘speciesism.’ Footnote 23 Similarly, Wendy Adams argues that such works as Darwin’s Origin of Species demonstrate how the difference between human and nonhuman animals is one of degree rather than kind, making legal separation based on species alone unjustified. Footnote 24
Whilst the modern animal advocacy movement believes in reforming our moral and legal views of nonhumans, there remain significant disagreements about how this reform should come about. Although this terminology is far from consistent, there are two main ideological currents in animal law: animal rights and animal welfare. Rights theorists prefer the emancipatory solution of recognising other species as rights-holders, viewing the removal of animals’ property status as necessary for protecting their interests. Welfare theorists, on the other hand, advocate the more paternalistic solution of regulating the use of animals. Whilst it is true that some welfare theorists regard regulation simply as a necessary step towards the ultimate goal of ending all forms of animal exploitation, others do not believe that animals should have any rights whatsoever. Footnote 25
Another way to understand the difference between these schools of thought is that welfare theorists favour an anthropocentric approach which accepts humans’ entitlement to use other animals, albeit with constraints. Contrastingly, rights theorists favour an anthropomorphic approach that grants nonhumans personhood. As the general debate between welfare and rights approaches, and the question whether one can transcend this traditional dichotomy in animal advocacy, are worthy of a thesis in their own right, there will be no attempt here to decide the matter conclusively. Nonetheless, one can understand why the NhRP opted to push for the recognition of animal rights rather than the expansion of existing welfare regimes. As for Wise’s arguments for extending common law rights to nonhumans, it is essential to establish his precise standpoint and underlying rationale. More specifically, we must understand the particular rights he is proposing we extend to other species and how he believes this to be both morally correct and legally feasible. This will feed into an overview and critical analysis of the Third Judicial Department’s Tommy decision, and the First Judicial Department’s Tommy & Kiko decision. Footnote 26
The argument from rational extension presented here is not the only possible interpretation of Wise’s common law argument. After all, it is possible to extend legal doctrine for policy reasons that are not necessarily rational. We have chosen to focus on the ‘rational extension’ interpretation of the argument because the possibility arises of a model for animal rights that is applicable across multiple jurisdictions, using the classic common law method of identifying the underlying purpose of a doctrine and demonstrating why it applies to certain animals in a given case. Additionally, identifying a doctrine’s purpose makes it easier to add moral force to the legal argument. It is also worth repeating that this section examines the argument for rational extension from a general, common law perspective rather than the specific version presented to the New York courts by the NhRP.
Within his work, Wise describes the rights he has in mind as fundamental rights at common law, identifying two as the right to liberty and the right to bodily integrity. Footnote 27 The general concept of common law fundamental rights has been explored in both literature and case law. For instance, libertarian scholars such as Randy Barnett have interpreted the Ninth Amendment to the US Constitution, which refers to rights “retained by the people,” as protecting the people’s open-ended liberties, which have traditionally been conceptualised as “natural rights.” Footnote 28 If such rights have legal authority in the absence of statutory or constitutional text, they would necessarily have force at common law.
In England and Wales, judges have sporadically identified particular common law rights as fundamental in the administrative law context. Footnote 29 For example, Lord Bridge in Bugdacay v. Secretary of State for the Home Department recognised the right to life as so integral that it “must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny” of any administrative decision that may interfere with it. Footnote 30 Similarly, in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p McQuillan Sedley J. recognised freedom of movement as “a fundamental value to the common law.” Footnote 31 In addition to the identification of particular rights, there has been a trend in English administrative law towards what is termed the “principle of legality.” This is the concept that, as far as it is reasonably possible to do so, a court must interpret statutes in a manner that avoids violating fundamental common law principles, “even in the absence of an ambiguity.” Footnote 32 As explained by Lord Steyn in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Pierson, “Parliament legislates for a European liberal democracy founded on the principles and traditions of the common law and the courts may approach legislation on this initial assumption.” Footnote 33
As for the notion that there are general rights to liberty and bodily integrity at common law, one area Wise considers is the jurisprudence on habeas corpus. Footnote 34 This well-established action allows a court to review the legality of one’s detention. In the famous case of Somerset v. Stewart, a habeas corpus writ was used to challenge the detention of an African slave purchased in Massachusetts. Footnote 35 Lord Mansfield in the English Court of King’s Bench had to consider whether English common law recognised slavery, even if slavery was practised in the British colonies. In an iconic judgment, His Lordship held that the nature of slavery is such “that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law.” Footnote 36 In other words, the common law itself cannot support slavery: only express statutory language can introduce it. Whilst this was in many respects a restrained judgment, since it did not expressly affirm a right upon which claimants could rely throughout the British Empire, Footnote 37 it strongly suggests that the common law has an inherent, interpretive presumption in favour of personal liberty. One can interpret this presumption as evidence of general, if inchoate, rights to physical liberty and bodily integrity at common law. Courts have expressly acknowledged such an interpretive presumption in other common law jurisdictions, including New York State. Footnote 38
Additionally, American judges have expressly identified general rights relating to physical liberty and integrity, which are rooted in neither statutory nor constitutional text. For example, in Union Pacific Railway Co v. Botsford the US Supreme Court found that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person.” Footnote 39 Similarly, in Custody of Vaughn the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts described the ‘right to live in physical security’ as “the most basic human right.” Footnote 40 As for the law of New York, in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital Cardozo J. famously stated that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.” Footnote 41 This is why performing an operation without a patient’s consent constitutes trespass to the person. Footnote 42 In Rivers v. Katz it was further acknowledged that, in a system of free government, one must ensure the greatest possible protection to a person’s “autonomy and freedom from unwanted interference with his own desires.” Footnote 43 Accordingly, even a committed mental patient enjoys “the fundamental right to make decisions concerning one’s own body.” Footnote 44
Overall, there is strong support for fundamental rights at common law. Moreover, one can identify two such rights as those to liberty and bodily integrity, although these are inchoate as far as the general common law is concerned. The question remains of why, as a matter of both law and ethics, it would be correct to extend these rights to other species. Wise recommends that rights for nonhumans be determined by reference to “practical autonomy.” Footnote 45 It should be made clear that by practical autonomy, Wise does not mean autonomy in the Kantian sense of having moral responsibility for one’s own actions as a result of one’s freedom to reach decisions through practical reasoning. Footnote 46 Rather, he means the autonomy possessed by “[a]ny being who can want, who can intentionally act to get what she wants, and who has a sense of self that allows her to know it is she who wants and she who is acting to get what she wants.” Footnote 47 In simple terms, practical autonomy is the capacity for desire, intentional action and sense of self. In this respect, practical autonomy closely resembles what the now sadly deceased Tom Regan termed “preference autonomy”: the view that “individuals are autonomous if they have preferences and have the ability to initiate action with a view to satisfying them.” Footnote 48
The moral significance of practical autonomy comes from its connections with the ideals of liberty and equality. All beings who are highly autonomous in the practical sense share and possess an interest in the ability to plan their lives and act accordingly: a quality that can broadly be termed “self-determination.” When an autonomous individual’s liberty and bodily integrity are interfered with, it diminishes his or her ability to live according to how he or she has planned. This moral significance translates into legal significance because the common law has a general presumption in favour of personal liberty, which is based on respect for one’s interest in self-determination. This can be seen from both the interpretive practice in habeas corpus cases, such as Somerset, Footnote 49 and the specific instances where a common law court has acknowledged the need to protect the freedom to pursue one’s desires, as in Rivers. Footnote 50 Accordingly, if the demonstrated cognitive ability of another species supports an interest in self-determination, a court should grant that species the common law rights to liberty and bodily integrity as a matter of rational extension.
At this point, it is worth acknowledging that practical autonomy in Wise’s sense would cover more than autonomy in the stronger, self-determining sense. After all, it is possible to possess sufficient agency for intentional action in accordance with desire and with a sense of self without being able to plan one’s life in advance. Indeed, the capacity for self-determination that comes with a higher level of practical autonomy seems closer to autonomy in its more established sense within political philosophy: that is to say, the capacity to change one’s desires through reason and reflection in relation to one’s conception of the good. Footnote 51 However, within the context of chimpanzee rights, the fact that practical autonomy covers both self-determining autonomy and desire-based agency is not especially crucial since, although there will always be questions of evidence, Footnote 52 “there is certainly a reasonable possibility that the great apes and cetaceans are autonomous agents” in the stronger, self-determining sense. Footnote 53 Accordingly, it is easier to argue that they “possess an intrinsic interest in liberty as such,” Footnote 54 so this discussion will continue to focus on the self-determination aspect of the argument for rationally extending common law rights.
An alternative manner in which the moral significance of self-determination translates into legal significance is through the argument from equality. It is a common law principle that one cannot discriminate through unreasonable means or towards unjust ends, on which basis courts adopt a “liberal policy favoring equality and condemning discrimination.” Footnote 55 In the American context, this approach to common law equality is informed by the separate, but related, federal guarantee of “the equal protection of the laws” under the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution. This guarantee also exists within various state constitutions, including Article 1, Section 11 of the New York Constitution. The federal approach to equal protection, which informs the state approach at common law, calls for a rational relationship between the law in question and a legitimate interest: the law cannot simply identify individuals “by a single trait and then [deny] them protection across the board.” Footnote 56
As the common law rights to liberty and bodily integrity are based upon respect for one’s interest in self-determination, it violates equality at common law for humans to enjoy these rights, but not other species that possess an interest in self-determination. To do so would be to use a single characteristic (species) as a justification for the complete deprivation of legal rights. Moreover, as the purpose of this unequal enjoyment of rights is the perpetuation of an autonomous being’s status as property, discrimination based on species alone serves an illegitimate end, which the common law cannot permit. In summary, self-determination is a morally and legally relevant consideration to determining the achievement of equality. A mere difference in species is not. Although they are related, the argument from liberty and the argument from equality are different insofar as the latter necessarily relies on a direct comparison between the law’s protection of human interests and that of nonhuman interests. As such, it is a more overt argument against speciesism. Contrastingly, the argument from liberty focuses on the reasoning behind a common law doctrine and explains why it applies to certain animals in the instant case.
One of the main strengths of a common law conferral of legal rights is how, in contrast to a complete legislative code such as those in the civil law tradition, one does not require a pre-existing, comprehensive definition of legal personhood: rather, personhood is assumed. In other words, a common law court can extend personhood simply by applying doctrine. As for why Wise proposes we begin with chimpanzees and bonobos, it is because these animals are taxonomically closest to humans: we share the closest common ancestor and have strikingly similar neurological make-up. Footnote 57 From the existing wealth of scientific research, Wise concludes that chimpanzees and bonobos not only possess the ability to feel pain and to suffer, but also, to some degree, possess complex cognitive abilities of “mental representation, self-conception, logical and mathematical abilities, tool use, the knowledge that minds exist, and nonsymbolic and symbolic communication, including language.” Footnote 58 In Wise’s view, such attributes demonstrate a high degree of practical autonomy.
It therefore appears that there is force behind the argument for rationally extending common law rights to nonhumans. This is because practically autonomous species have the capacity for self-determination and there are fundamental rights at common law with the purpose of protecting self-determination, even if these rights are inchoate. Furthermore, with the principle of legality and comparable doctrines of statutory interpretation, common law fundamental rights could provide nonhumans with some degree of protection from government action, as courts would strive to interpret any relevant statutes in a manner that avoids violating the identified rights.
2. The New York Court Decisions
(a) The Arguments from Reciprocity and Community Membership
Turning to the chimpanzee cases themselves, Footnote 59 in Tommy Wise and the NhRP tailored their general common law argument to the state law of New York. They relied on an understanding of autonomy approximate to that outlined in previous case law, which indicates a level of cognition short of Kantian autonomy, but evidencing a fair understanding of the situation in respect of oneself. Footnote 60 Nonetheless, the Court declined to enlarge the definition of a person at common law to include a chimpanzee, stressing how “the ascription of rights has historically been connected with the imposition of societal obligations and duties.” Footnote 61 This reciprocity “stems from principles of social contract,” which provide the basis for governmental systems of liberal democracy, such as that of the US. Footnote 62 Since “chimpanzees cannot bear any legal duties, submit to societal responsibilities or be held legally accountable for their actions,” they cannot enjoy the legal rights afforded to humans. Footnote 63
In Tommy & Kiko, the First Judicial Department rejected the argument that chimpanzees are indeed capable of bearing duties, despite the submission of evidence by such experts as the famed primatologist Jane Goodall. Footnote 64 Nor did the Court accept the argument that, because certain humans still possess rights without being able to bear duties, the ability to bear to duties should not determine a chimpanzee’s entitlement to legal rights. In the Court’s view, this argument “ignores the fact that these are still human beings, members of the human community”. Footnote 65
The two New York court decisions therefore hinge on two separate, but related, arguments. First, there is the argument from reciprocity that the ability to enjoy rights requires the ability to possess duties. Second, there is the argument from community membership that the enjoyment of rights arises from membership in a political society. Prevailing schools of political thought often bring these points together to explain the nature of legal rights: by forming a political community, we enjoy certain entitlements, but accept limitations on our conduct. Therefore, legal rights are associated with the reciprocal relationships citizens have with the government and with each other. By accepting the arguments from reciprocity and community membership, the Court has introduced a formal, legal authority that uses traditional political theory to deny nonhuman rights. Consequently, the common law case for animal rights must go beyond pure legal doctrine and come to grips with the deeper philosophical questions raised by the notion of animal personhood. The 2014 Tommy decision will be the focus of analysis, since it engages with these questions more explicitly than the 2017 Tommy & Kiko decision.
This becomes more pressing when one considers how scholarly arguments against animal rights frequently invoke reciprocity and community membership. Richard Epstein, for instance, notes that arguing for the extension of rights to nonhumans by analogy with historical movements towards human equality is problematic because, in those situations, one could create full parity in respect of the rights needed in a co-ordinated, liberal society. Footnote 66 The rights Epstein has in mind include those “to make and enforce contracts,” and “to participate in political life.” Footnote 67 Unlike the emancipation of human slaves, any move to emancipate nonhumans cannot achieve full parity, since “the natural cognitive and emotional limitations of […] even the higher animals” render this impossible. Footnote 68 Similarly, Posner considers legal rights to be “instruments for securing the liberties” necessary for “a workable framework for social order and prosperity” in democratic systems. Footnote 69 This is why “[t]he conventional rights bearers are with minor exceptions actual and potential voters and economic actors.” Footnote 70 In short, because nonhumans cannot partake in the frameworks of social interaction required in liberal societies, they cannot be rights-holders according to liberal justifications.
Starting with the argument from reciprocity, one line of defence for animal rights is the (unfortunately named) argument from marginal cases, which points to how we confer rights upon humans with equivalent or lesser cognitive abilities than certain nonhumans. For example, a human born with severe mental disabilities possesses what Hohfeld termed an immunity right, which (in contrast to a claim right) imposes no correlative duty on the rights-holder; rather, it means that others have their powers disabled, preventing them from interfering with the rights-holder. Footnote 71 The common law rights to liberty and bodily integrity are both immunities. Footnote 72 Although the Tommy decision acknowledged that “some humans are less able to bear legal duties or responsibilities than others,” this was limited to a single footnote with no substantial justification of why humans who could never bear duties can still enjoy immunities, whilst nonhumans cannot. Footnote 73
Although the Court failed to substantiate its reasons, one can draw possible justifications from the relevant ethical literature. For instance, Carl Cohen argues that, even if individual humans lack rational capacity, the difference remains that animals “are not beings of a kind capable of exercising or responding to moral claims,” whereas humans are. Footnote 74 Comparably, Roger Scruton argues that “[i]nfants and imbeciles belong to the same kind as you or me: the kind whose normal instances are also moral beings.” Footnote 75 Putting aside the serious conceptual difficulty in delineating a “kind,” Footnote 76 one can imagine a common law court similarly justifying the conferral of legal rights on humans who cannot bear duties and the denial of such rights to nonhumans. Whilst individual humans may be incapable of bearing duties, such individuals are still of a kind that ordinarily possesses this ability. This reasoning is highly questionable. In response to Cohen’s argument, Nathan Nobis uses the following example to demonstrate its fundamental logical flaw:
…you are a student … in a class who has failed the exams and done none of the homework so, on your merits, you are failing. However, fortunately for you, the rest of the students have the properties of “passing the exams and done well on the homework” … and, on that basis, have the property [of] “passing the course.” If Cohen’s principle were true, you too would have the property of passing the class … because you are a member of the kind … “students taking this class” and the properties from the majority transfer to you. Footnote 77
In other words, the flaw in reasoning from ‘kind’ membership lies in its underlying principle that a group member can gain a property by association. Moreover, this underlying principle could just as easily premise an argument that animals have rights or that humans do not have rights. After all, as Nobis observes, there are ‘kinds’ to which both humans with moral agency and animals without such moral agency belong, such as “sentient being” or “conscious being.” Footnote 78 As such, if one were to apply the above principle of gaining a property by association within the argument from ‘kind’ membership, one could argue that “animals are also of a kind that possesses moral capacities and, therefore, they have rights.” Footnote 79 For the same reason, one could argue that there are various objects that do not possess moral capacity, but are of a common ‘kind’ with humans: “thing on Earth,” “earthly specimen,” and so forth. Footnote 80 As most members of these kinds lack moral capacity and “humans are members of these kinds,” it would seem to follow from the premise in question that “humans do not have rights.” Footnote 81 This apparent support for opposite conclusions throws the argument from ‘kind’ membership’s plausibility into serious doubt.
To avoid the logical problems of invoking ‘kind’ membership, one could drop the argument from reciprocity altogether. In other words, even if reciprocity does not account for all “marginal cases,” we can still regard such humans as members of the political community. One way to do this is by focussing on relational ties rather than the active participation referred to by Epstein and Posner. Footnote 82 In other words, whilst not all humans can partake in social ordering, being born into a political community places oneself within a set of relationships that create unique duties, such as the provision of collective goods to those within the group. As Elizabeth Anderson puts it, “only social membership could vindicate these rights, by specifying who has the obligation to provide the necessaries of life to which individuals.” Footnote 83 One could therefore argue that, even if some humans cannot bear duties, all humans gain “automatic inclusion in human society” by being born into it and enjoy the resulting moral entitlements. Footnote 84 Indeed, this seems to be the implicit basis for the Court’s statement in Tommy & Kiko that infants and non-autonomous adults are still ‘members of the human community’. Footnote 85
Although this argument seems promising, one can challenge it both within and without the community membership framework. Starting within the framework, as Anderson herself points out, some animals are integrated into human society, which could morally entitle them to certain rights. Footnote 86 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka have examined this through citizenship theory. Footnote 87 Their basic position is that we can conceptualise our relationships with and moral obligations to other animals as follows. First, domesticated animals, such as animal companions, are both closely interdependent with humans and incorporated into our polities, entitling them to a form of citizenship. Footnote 88 Second, liminal animals that opportunistically move into areas inhabited by humans are entitled to a form of denizenship, with rights analogous to visitors or migrant workers. Footnote 89 Third, wild animals that live in their own territories should be seen as possessing a form of sovereignty, thereby limiting permissible human interference. Footnote 90
Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that, although citizenship is often associated with democratic political agency, this is only one dimension of the concept. Footnote 91 There are also the dimensions of having “the right to reside in, and return to, the territory of the state,” and of having “the right to have [one’s] interests counted in determining the public good or in the delivery of public services.” Footnote 92 Whilst nonhumans cannot be democratic agents, this does not preclude them from enjoying rights under the other dimensions of citizenship. Footnote 93 As Donaldson and Kymlicka note, through a mutual process of interaction and accommodation, some animals can learn and abide by human social norms, whilst making their own preferences known to humans. Footnote 94 For example, studies of dog behaviour show that dogs will quickly learn to exercise self-restraint whilst going for walks, such as by not lunging at passing dogs, and humans reciprocate by allowing the dogs to satisfy certain interests, such as engaging in play. Footnote 95
Whilst the communal participation of such animals falls significantly short of democratic action, their level of integration and interactivity with humans is still sufficient for us to be aware of their preferences and willing to accommodate them when making legal rules, thereby counting the animals’ interests within the public good. Accordingly, we can count the animals as citizens. In this respect, one can draw inspiration from recent efforts to find “new ways of engaging with the subjectivity” of “both young children and people with severe cognitive disabilities,” Footnote 96 shifting away from the articulation of propositions and towards being attentive to their “varied modes of doing, saying and being.” Footnote 97 This direction is significant for two reasons. First, it alerts us to how we are already committed to “building new models and relations of citizenship” that are more inclusive towards the diverse levels of capability in human communities. Footnote 98 Second, it provides a response to the perceived risk that focussing on the equivalent capabilities of ‘marginal’ humans and those of certain nonhumans will lead us to deny rights to the former. Footnote 99 This is because it illustrates how, whilst the cognitive abilities of particular community members can give rise to particular morally significant interests, community members that lack such abilities can still possess interests which society ought to take into account when deciding how to govern itself.
Applying this reasoning to the chimpanzee cases, whilst captive chimpanzees are not integrated into our day-to-day affairs in the same manner as dogs, by bringing them into human territories and breeding them, we have left the chimpanzees dependent upon us, with reintroduction to the wild being onerous or impossible. Moreover, through human-chimpanzee interactions, we can discern certain key interests held by them, such as that in self-determination. With these factors in mind, we can view captive chimpanzees as citizens whose interest in self-determination we can accommodate by recognising their right to exercise their bodily freedom and allowing them to enjoy meaningful interaction with fellow chimpanzees. In this regard, the best solution appears to be sanctuaries where the chimpanzees can enjoy conditions as close to their natural habitat as reasonably possible. This accommodates their preferences when determining the public good, but prevents them from causing harm to human life and property. As such, the argument from community membership need not deny all rights to chimpanzees.
This brings us to the challenge without the community membership framework. Whilst an approach based on citizenship theory could apply to chimpanzees kept and bred in captivity, it is difficult to apply to chimpanzees newly brought into the jurisdiction because they lack the pre-existing integration and dependency on which to base community membership. However, one can still accept such chimpanzees as rights-holders. After all, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s framework is intended to extend, not replace, the theory that animals are universally entitled to basic rights. Footnote 100 In their view, any conscious being with a subjective experience is entitled to a minimal set of non-interference rights, such as those not to be tortured, killed or imprisoned. Footnote 101 This echoes strongly with Regan’s view that beings with individual selves have inherent value as the subject of a life. Footnote 102 To Regan, moral agents and moral patients enjoy the moral right to respectful treatment equally, moral patients being those who cannot freely choose to act morally, Footnote 103 including sentient wild animals. This view of rights-entitlement captures the broad range of recognised human rights-holders without the logical incoherence or arbitrariness of resorting to ‘kind’ membership.
It is true that Wise advocates conferring legal rights by reference to practical autonomy rather than consciousness. Footnote 104 Whilst practically autonomous nonhumans are also conscious, the comparative categorical narrowness has caused some to observe that Wise’s framework would exclude many sentient beings and could even reinforce an anthropocentric hierarchy favouring those animals closest to human levels of cognition. Footnote 105 However, one must bear two points in mind. First, Wise is working within existing common law structures. Whilst one can identify existing legal doctrines protecting self-determination, it is difficult to do likewise with sentience or consciousness. Footnote 106 Second, Wise considers the possession of practical autonomy to be sufficient for basic non-interference rights, not necessary. Footnote 107 This is consistent with the observations above that arguing from marginal cases need not lead us to deny rights to certain humans, as it allows for alternative bases for rights-conferral in both the human and nonhuman contexts.
(b) Animal Rights and the Social Contract
Having addressed the arguments from reciprocity and community membership specifically, we now turn our attention to the deeper question whether conceptualising rights and duties in terms of social contract necessarily prevents nonhuman emancipation. Footnote 108 After all, Rawls took the view that, although “the capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life of which animals are capable clearly imposes duties of compassion and humanity in their case…it does seem we are not required to give strict justice anyway to creatures lacking [the capacity for a sense of justice].” Footnote 109 To Rawls, such beliefs were “outside the scope of a theory of justice, and it does not seem possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to include them in a natural way.” Footnote 110 It thus seems that the Court in the Tommy Footnote 111 case can take some comfort in how their exclusion of nonhumans from the social contract echoes that of the most influential social contractarian in recent decades. Nevertheless, we submit that such exclusion rests on two highly questionable interpretations of the social contract. First, there is the assumption that nonhumans cannot be counted amongst the framers of the social contract, even with Rawls’ modifications to social contract theory. Second, and more fundamentally, there is the conflation between being a framer of the social contract and being a beneficiary under the social contract.
In respect of the first questionable interpretation, as Rawls famously argued, justice should be established by considerations that exclude factors that are “irrelevant from the standpoint of justice,” such as one’s social position upon birth. Footnote 112 Rawls proposed that we consider what would have been agreed in the “original position”—in other words, how we would organise society if we were unaware of the characteristics we would possess and whether these characteristics would advantage or disadvantage us. Footnote 113 Rawls suggested that from behind this figurative “veil of ignorance,” we would agree that society should be organised according to the following principles. First, that there is “equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties” (the liberty principle); second, that any social or economic inequalities will only be justified where they benefit everyone, particularly “the least advantaged members of society” (the difference principle). Footnote 114 From a Rawlsian perspective, nonhuman emancipation seems to turn on the following question: are nonhumans included in the original position? In other words, could the disembodied ‘consciousness’ of a being behind the veil of ignorance, unaware of the characteristics he or she will possess, be ‘incarnated’ in a nonhuman after the veil is lifted? Footnote 115
Whilst Rawls himself excluded nonhumans from the original position, as Regan observes, this exclusion is problematic. Footnote 116 First, it is not enough to argue that “[m]etaphysically, a dog or a chimpanzee just can’t be the same individual as one who once occupied a place in the original position.” Footnote 117 This is because Rawls’ thought experiment does not seem to exclude the possibility of an original contractor being ‘incarnated’ as a human who lacks mental capacity for moral agency whilst remaining identifiable as the same individual. This would mean that “the possession of the central characteristic definitive of moral personality (a sense of justice) cannot be a criterion of personal identity.” Footnote 118 Second, assuming that those in the original position simply know the species to which they will belong after the veil is lifted does not actually resolve the problem, since “the question at issue is how animals can be nonarbitrarily excluded from those who are owed duties of justice.” Footnote 119
Moreover, one significant point about the social contract that Rawls’ account brings out is that it is a fiction. This is why, through the original position, we are invited to consider what the hypothetical rational person would agree to rather than what any existing person has agreed to in fact. If we already accept that the social contract is fictional and that this gives us cause to consider the hypothetical perspective of “the rational human being,” is it truly a stretch to consider the perspective of “the rational chimpanzee”? Footnote 120 As absurd as this suggestion may sound, it is not evident why this is any less inherently ridiculous than imagining oneself as a non-autonomous human or a human who does not presently exist. As Brian Barry provocatively put it:
It may seem a little bizarre to imagine the negotiations taking place aboard Noah’s Ark, with the species of the participants concealed from them, but it is it really much more farfetched that the parties are […] all people who have ever lived or ever will live or (as others have suggested) all people who might live? Footnote 121
This point takes on greater significance when one bears in mind that one of Rawls’ fundamental modifications to social contract theory was the notion that natural talents and capacities are morally arbitrary, as we have no more control over this than the socio-economic conditions into which we are born. As Rawls himself put it, we choose the principles of justice from behind the veil of ignorance ‘to ensure that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances’. Footnote 122 This why someone in the original position cannot ‘know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like’. Footnote 123 In other words, ‘[n]o one deserves to be born athletically gifted, stunningly handsome or with an IQ of 153, any more than they deserve to born into a certain class or sex or race’. Footnote 124 This characterisation of natural attributes as morally arbitrary is important because, as Mark Rowlands observes, this would seem to make the properties of being human and being a rational agent morally arbitrary in the Rawlsian sense because they are also things ‘over which we have no control’. Footnote 125
In other words, the advantageous position one enjoys from being born a rational human being is no more deserved than the advantageous position one enjoys from being born more socially or physically privileged than other human beings. Footnote 126 Moreover, a variation of the view that we ought to consider the perspective of ‘the rational chimpanzee’ implicitly underlies the NhRP’s argument that the chimpanzees be located to the organisation’s advocated sanctuary. In other words, the NhRP argues that, at the sanctuary in question, the chimpanzees would enjoy natural or better than natural conditions that satisfy their basic social and physical needs, allowing them to flourish individually. Footnote 127 As the chimpanzees themselves cannot actually choose this habitat, the NhRP’s argument for relocation seems to hinge on the (justified) assumption that, if one could present a normal chimpanzee with a choice between the sanctuary and their current conditions, the chimpanzee would choose the sanctuary.
This brings us to the second questionable use of the social contract; namely, the conflation between the contract’s framers and the contract’s beneficiaries. The view that social contractarianism cannot support nonhuman rights rests on the explicit or implicit assumption that one can only have entitlements under the social contract if one could agree to the contract in the first place. The problem is that this overlooks how a contract can exist for the benefit of people other than the contracting parties. Whilst, in the real world, the extent to which a third party who receives an intended benefit under a contract can have the contract enforced depends on the specific jurisdiction’s rules on privity of contract, Footnote 128 the point remains that it is perfectly normal for the drafters of a contract to confer such intended benefits upon third parties. The significance of this is that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that ‘the framers of the contract must be conceived of as rational agents’, it does not necessarily follow that ‘the recipients of the contract, that is, the individuals protected by the principles of morality embodied in the contract, must be rational agents’. Footnote 129
Indeed, far from being only peripherally important to how we evaluate our ethical conduct, those incapable of moral personhood ‘are just the sort of individuals that are typically used, and appropriately so, to test the mettle of one’s moral suggestions’. Footnote 130 Indeed, we often intuitively regard attitudes towards and treatment of moral patients as key indicators of one’s ethical character. Whilst not themselves determinative, such strong moral intuitions should not be discounted too readily within a social contract framework. After all, one key component of Rawls’ theory is reflective equilibrium: the process of ‘going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to principle’, until our description of the original position ‘both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted’. Footnote 131 In other words, through mutual adjustment between particular judgements and general principles, we strive for a coherent set of beliefs in our moral deliberations. This is why Mark Bernstein advocates an altruistic version of social contractarianism in which ‘those in the initial situation are motivated not by self-interest but by the interests of others’, granting moral membership ‘to all those who have interests that can be either positively or negatively affected by the actions of others’. Footnote 132
Such a view can be brought in line with a Rawlsian understanding of the social contract by ‘[having] us identify morality with those principles that are derived from a setting of fairness to serve our altruistic motivations’. Footnote 133 Recognising such moral patients as potential beneficiaries under the social contract is significant because it can add a further layer of explanation to the rights of nonhumans both within and without the framework of community membership. It allows us to conceptualise those in the original position as aware of both the general vulnerability of nonhuman interests and the way in which certain nonhumans can meaningfully integrate into human communal life. This in turn allows us to understand how the original contractors could frame the contract in a way that attempts to incorporate our intuitions about nonhumans and other moral patients via the process of reflective equilibrium, even if the original contractors at no point suppose that they themselves could be incarnated as nonhumans.
To be clear, we are not arguing that the Rawlsian model is the best version of social contractarianism, though this discussion does highlight how the original position can force one to consider those in other social positions to empathic effect, which could include those in the position of nonhumans. Nor are we arguing that extending a social contract theory to include nonhumans is the best way to conceptualise rights enjoyed by and duties owed to nonhumans. The salient point is that, even within the social contract framework the Court adopted, there remained ways of extending the fundamental rights in question to chimpanzees. In summary, neither the argument from reciprocity nor the argument from community membership provides a philosophically sound denial of animal rights. Nor does conceptualizing rights and duties in terms of the social contract necessarily preclude nonhuman emancipation. The New York courts’ rulings against the very possibility of extending common law rights to nonhumans are therefore deeply unfortunate, even if predictable.
(c) Further Institutional Considerations
Now, with the Third Judicial Department’s arguments disposed of, there remains a sound rationale for the extension of certain common law rights to at least some other animals. That said, we concede that there are additional institutional hurdles to such judicial extension, even if this is both morally correct and legally feasible. We also concede that aspects of Wise’s legal argument are problematic, even if they need not be fatal to his position. Due to their office, appellate judges must consider how their decisions will determine normative positions far beyond those of the parties to the instant case. In the context of extending fundamental rights, their decisions will demarcate an outer boundary to the legal community, even if this boundary is subject to subsequent modification. One can thus understand why Posner, for example, criticises Wise for failing to suggest how courts can “proceed incrementally, building on existing cases and legal concepts, toward his goal of radically enhanced legal protection for animals.” Footnote 134 After all, in the common law orthodoxy, “judges asked to step onto a new path of doctrinal growth” should “have some idea of where the path leads, even if it would be unreasonable to insist that the destination be clearly seen.” Footnote 135
It is respectfully submitted that, although such concerns are understandable, one should not see them as an insurmountable barrier to recognising nonhuman rights. As Jerome Frank observed, whilst “present problems will be clarified by reference to future ends,” such ends “must obtain their significance in present consequences, otherwise those ends lose their significance.” Footnote 136 In his words, “[t]o give too much attention to the future is to ignore the problem which is demanding solution today.” Footnote 137 However desirable it is for judges to consider long-term ramifications, the danger arises of failing to recognise how an emancipatory approach could address real problems that exist at this moment, as well as how decisions on rights-issues often unearth deeper implications about the morality of our accepted practices, which need to be confronted directly, even if the implications are unsettling.
As for how one draws and justifies the outer boundary of membership in the legal community, the social contract provides a possible answer: just not the answer the Third Judicial Department believed it to provide. This is because the limits of justice are “determined by what occupants of the original position should rationally care about.” Footnote 138 Whilst it would be difficult to extend existing common law rights on the grounds of sentience, Footnote 139 if one accepts that chimpanzees and similarly autonomous nonhumans possess the characteristics that implicate an interest in self-determination, this itself is something that one should rationally care about when framing the social contract. This remains true whether based on the possibility of finding oneself ‘incarnated’ as a nonhuman when the veil of ignorance is lifted or through the incorporation of altruistic considerations via reflective equilibrium. Indeed, Wise himself has anticipated the questions that would arise as to drawing the line with nonhuman rights. Footnote 140 This is why on the basis of ‘practical autonomy’ and the moral considerations to which this connects, he has recommended what Robert Verchick describes as a standard founded upon levels of consciousness “that will evolve along with the rest of the common law.” Footnote 141
This brings us to the other problematic aspects of Wise’s legal argument, which mainly arise from the distinct qualities of the American legal system. Common law fundamental rights, particularly in England and Wales, remain controversial, despite the recognition given by high profile judges and academics. Controversy exists because of significant disagreement over the scope and nature of such rights, with fears expressed “about the opportunity [such an approach] provides for judicial creativity” at the expense of respecting the legislative process. Footnote 142 Additionally, because the UK follows a system of Parliamentary sovereignty, the principle of legality is generally understood to create only a strong, interpretative presumption in favour of fundamental rights: Parliament therefore retains the power to “compromise common law fundamental rights if it uses sufficiently clear and express language.” Footnote 143 Moreover, the handful of English cases that have openly identified common law fundamental rights have been in the context of administrative law. As such, even if such rights create a public cause of action, thereby allowing one to bring proceedings for judicial review of an administrative decision, they do not necessarily create a private cause of action against defendants who are not public bodies.
At this stage, it is worth making a further important point about the profound differences between the UK and the US in terms of institutional structure and legal culture. Footnote 144 First, the production of law and policy in the US is extraordinarily fragmented. Not only does there exist a division between state and federal law, but each state and the District of Columbia has its own court system and jurisprudence, meaning that “a single case might involve more than one body of law” Footnote 145 to an extent that an English case would probably not without a supranational or international dimension. Second, as observed by Robert Kagan, due to the combination of this fragmented authority and the American cultural distrust of centralised power, formal legal contestation and litigant activism play uniquely central roles in US policymaking and dispute resolution. Footnote 146
The result of this more uncertain and party-driven approach to law is that American appellate judges are more likely to regard doctrine as malleable and to intervene in the political and administrative processes, “[seeing] themselves not merely as legal technicians, but as social problem-solvers.” Footnote 147 This is bolstered by the efforts of what Marc Galanter terms “repeat players”: in other words, parties who are frequently involved in litigation and “play for rules” of long-term benefit rather than one-off courtroom victories. Footnote 148
In other words, American legal culture is distinctly embracing of pressure groups willing to produce changes in law and policy through litigant activism by strategically selecting cases that “place their claims in the most attractive light” and using the appeals process to set favourable precedents. Footnote 149 The NhRP’s approach of establishing nonhuman rights through coordinated litigation, with the assistance of working groups who compile data on judges and gauge the chances of successful claims, Footnote 150 is therefore far less likely to succeed in jurisdictions outside of the US, even if the common law in general has some implicit capacity to recognise these rights. Footnote 151 When this barrier created by differences in legal culture is coupled with the aforementioned problems of the lack of consensus on common law fundamental rights and, adding, how Parliamentary sovereignty allows such rights to be overridden by express statutory language, what was already a challenging approach in the American context becomes even more difficult in the UK context.
With this in mind, so far as the UK is concerned at least, it may be preferable for Wise’s ideas to provide a template for statutory action, thereby functionally achieving Wise’s vision of equality without the difficulties of an approach based on the identification and extension of fundamental rights at common law. Indeed, a statutory solution could also deal with the problem noted above of the public and private divide by outlining causes of action against both governmental and non-governmental actors, with the former providing a basis for judicial review in the English Administrative Court and the latter allowing for claims against private parties in ordinary civil proceedings. One should not take this as a firm conviction that legislative action is an ideal route to the creation of animal rights. After all, abandoning Wise’s common law solution means foregoing the notable two strengths of this approach. These are (i) how a judge engaged in the creation of legal doctrine can avoid political barriers to change and (ii) how personhood can be assumed from the mere extension of legal doctrine.
Indeed, there are many powerful interest groups in society, such as the agricultural industry, who would be disadvantaged by further legal protection for nonhumans and would use their influence to impede Parliamentary reform. The sober reality is that no available route towards legal change is perfect and animal advocates must consider the relative strengths of each route within their particular jurisdiction. Since the ideal of instigating legal change through litigant activism has not taken root in UK culture the way it has in American culture, it appears beneficial to at least remain open to a Parliamentary solution, even if it is ultimately true that both the legislative and judicial routes to animal rights have their share of significant obstacles.
Conclusion
To conclude, contrary to the 2014 decision in Tommy and the 2017 decision in Tommy & Kiko, Footnote 152 an emancipatory solution to animal exploitation based on the rational extension of common law rights is both morally defensible and legally feasible. This is because there are other species whose level of autonomy is such that they possess the interest in self-determination protected by the inchoate common law rights to liberty and bodily integrity, thereby justifying as rational the extension of these rights. Neither the argument from reciprocity nor the argument from community membership precludes such extension. This is because—as seen in the human context—one can enjoy immunity to the power of others without being able to bear duties oneself, and one can recognize that restricting this entitlement to humans by arguing from ‘kind’ membership is both logically flawed and morally arbitrary. Additionally, certain animals, including captive chimpanzees, can be considered members of the political community because we have brought them onto human territories and made them dependent upon us. Lastly, conceptualizing rights and duties in terms of social contract need not preclude nonhuman emancipation.
There admittedly remains a question of why this article’s title affirms enthusiastically “Full Steam Ahead.” After all, we admit that Wise’s reliance upon common law fundamental rights is problematic and that, for reasons of legal and political culture, the judicial extension of common law rights to nonhumans is significantly less feasible outside of the US. One must be encouraged because, even if Wise’s approach has its drawbacks, the very fact he has found any meritorious argument to present before a court of law speaks volumes about how far modern animal advocacy has come since Animal Liberation Footnote 153 set its wheels in motion four decades ago.
Although the debate on animal rights will certainly not end with Wise’s work, one can only hope that his proposals continue to generate steam. After all, there is finally some tangible sense of an impending change in our moral outlook on the natural world. Indeed, whilst Jaffe J. ultimately declined to grant habeas corpus in Hercules & Leo, she acknowledged the empathy inspired by chimpanzees’ similarities to humans and considered it possible that efforts to extend rights to chimpanzees will someday succeed, describing herself as bound by the Tommy precedent only “for now.” Footnote 154
