Media reports and scholarly works on the Supreme Court often emphasize cases where the justices are divided, especially 5–4 decisions. The Puzzle of Unanimity reminds us that unanimous decisions are significant too and that studying them teaches us something important about Court decision-making. Pamela Corley, Amy Steigerwalt, and Artemus Ward combine three tasks into one volume, explaining the rise of concurrences and dissents, why the justices still agree at high levels today, and why they accept cases where their opinions are unanimous. The authors ultimately demonstrate that the justices do not base their decisions solely on attitudes or strategic considerations or the law: Instead, they base them on all of these factors, as well as case-specific ones.
Since 1953, a majority of the Court’s decisions have had no more than one dissenter, and approximately one-third have been unanimous. Still, there are more divided decisions now than was once the case. In Chapter one, the authors’ first task is to explain how the old Court norm of consensus (where dissents and concurrences were rare) was replaced by one of “dissensus” during the Roosevelt Court, due to external and internal factors. Externally, Congress had recently expanded the Court’s discretionary jurisdiction, the legal realism movement encouraged using the law as a vehicle for social change, and President Franklin Roosevelt appointed nine new justices; internally, expanded conference discussions, delays in opinion circulation, more rearguments of cases, and the academic style of Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone permitted justices to increasingly express individual beliefs (p. 47). Although this territory has been covered before (dating back to C. Herman Pritchett’s seminal book, The Roosevelt Court, 1948), and it is probably not necessary to set up the impressive work that follows, the authors take this step to demonstrate that there is less Court consensus now than in the past.
Nevertheless, in many cases today the justices do agree. What explains this? In Chapter two, the authors move onto their primary task, outlining a comprehensive model of consensus. Although some adherents of Court decision-making models, especially the attitudinal model, might argue that they have found the key explanatory factor, the authors here argue for a more nuanced approach, in which relative explanatory power of factors varies. They analogize ideology in Court decision-making to an object moving through a vice, with the vice representing the law: The tighter the jaws (legal considerations) are, the more they shape the object (decision), but the looser the jaws are, the more likely that object will be shaped instead by ideology. In other words, the clearer the law is, the more likely that ideologically divergent justices will agree. The authors operationalize legal clarity in five ways: case complexity, amicus participation, lack of lower court conflicts, lack of legal dissensus in the court below, and if the case involves statutory versus constitutional interpretation (p. 70–76).
One could quibble with their operationalization of law. For instance, another recent study looked at “legal importance” as a measure for legal considerations, operationalizing it with intermediate appellate court opinion publication, decision coverage in U.S. Law Week, and amicus activity (Ryan C. Black and Ryan J. Owens, “Agenda Setting on the Supreme Court,” Journal of Politics 2009). However, as the authors state, “[a]lthough our index is admittedly an imperfect proxy for the law’s influence, it is important for scholars to attempt to measure concepts such as legal certainty in order to advance our understanding of the influence of law on the Court” (p. 129). They are correct. Their effort to quantitatively and comprehensively measure how law influences Court decision-making is an important step forward in the field and one that more scholars should emulate. They also operationalize attitudes, strategy, institutional factors, and case-specific factors (p. 76–93).
Chapter three examines 1953–2004 votes on the merits, explaining why some cases are unanimous or highly consensual (i.e.: no more than one dissenting justice). Unanimous and highly consensual decisions are more likely if there is greater legal certainty, less saliency (operationalized as being reported on the front page of The New York Times), an opinion by the chief justice (strategically using power to force greater consensus), or a non-civil liberties issue presented (p. 103–09). This last category is especially significant, because it demonstrates that not all cases are equal in Supreme Court decision-making. Indeed, some issue areas invite more dissent than others because their controversial nature encourages attitudes to predominate. This is another key contribution of the book.
In Chapter four, the authors study consensus in opinion writing because concurring opinions may reveal important disagreements in unanimous cases. From 1953 to 2004, opinion unanimity (no concurrences) and highly consensual opinions (no more than one concurrence) were more likely if the case involved legal clarity, less salience, a non-civil liberties issue, justices who were ideologically close, or was decided toward the end of term (desire to break for summer recess discourages concurrences). Thus, the authors conclude that in addition to attitudes, “consensus on the modern Court is also a reflection of legal, strategic, and case-specific forces. And while these forces are often discussed as competing explanations, we suggest that they work simultaneously to influence the justices’ decisions, many times in a complex, interactive fashion” (p. 162). The authors’ multifaceted approach, using numerous variables to represent multiple factors, helps us understand Court decision-making on a level unseen in much of the relevant literature on Court decision-making.
The authors undertake one final task: explaining why a court with discretionary jurisdiction agrees to hear so many cases that are decided unanimously on the merits. Here, they examine cert pool memos from the Court’s 1989 term. Their research shows that unanimity tends to occur when the justices thought it was imperative to clarify the law and issue a final, national ruling on a matter of great importance (p. 159). Although this chapter’s analysis is the shortest one in the book, it works toward tying up an interesting loose end.
Like any other social science research, there are ways this study could be refined or expanded. For instance, the authors inspect the papers of two Roosevelt Court justices (Justice William Douglas and Chief Justice Stone) to explore how changes at that time altered the norm of consensus to one of dissensus. Would a qualitative examination from other eras yield equally revealing findings? Likewise, their analysis of cert pool memos from the 1989 term is illuminating but brief. Would a comparable examination from other Court terms bear out the same results? These critiques, though, do not take away from the overall excellent quality of the book.
The Puzzle of Unanimity engages in qualitative and quantitative analyses to present a refreshing perspective on Supreme Court decision-making. The authors move away from the rigidity and territoriality that can sometimes prevail in these debates, instead arguing that the relative predominance of attitudes, strategic considerations, and the law varies from case to case. This demonstrates a full understanding of the complex factors that justices consider. Scholars of the Court would be well-advised to read this book and ponder the implications of its conclusions.
