
Psychiatric diagnosis underwent a radical change in 1980 with the publication of DSM III. This was in response to what was described around that time as a ‘crisis of reliability’ in diagnosis. To improve reliability, diagnoses were defined by the presence of a specified range of symptoms and signs.
The downsides of this approach were neglect of nuance, causation, context and the quality of patients’ experiences, and an overall dumbing down of conceptual thinking in relation to diagnosis. These problems continue to the present day.
Gloria Sibson Ayob’s book is an attempt to address this problem in relation to emotional disorders. She proposes that these disorders should not be regarded simply as unpleasant experiences that require some form of fix such as medication or cognitive–behavioural therapy.
Instead, they should be analysed in terms of five ‘basic evaluative dimensions’: emotional rationality, existential significance, affective valence, volitional and agential efficacy, and interpersonal functioning.
Emotional experiences, even unpleasant ones, can be an important driver of rational agency. They can also have existential significance in pointing to a life that is not being lived in accordance with a person’s moral values. The distress that they cause has to be balanced against gains in other evaluative dimensions.
In trying to help people with emotional disorders, the aim should be more than getting them to feel better. Gloria Sibson Ayob argues that therapy should be informed by an Aristotelian concept of flourishing, anchored in the question ‘How ought I to live?’ If symptoms are merely alleviated or removed, important information and drivers for change may be lost.
One issue that is not discussed is suicide, and it would be very interesting to have the author’s thoughts on how this would be dealt with in her model. One example that she uses in relation to existential significance is a patient who became depressed and guilt-ridden about something he had done many years before when on active military service. She argues that his guilt could be seen as a marker of moral development and flourishing, rather than a symptom of illness. If these guilty feelings were accompanied by suicidal impulses, would these also be construed as a worthy attempt to atone for past misdeeds?
This book sets out complex ideas and requires sustained attention. The presentation of the arguments is thorough and meticulous. The writing is razor-sharp and always clear and succinct. (The book is worth reading for this reason alone.)
It proffers a concept of emotional disorders that is cogent and original, and which makes an important contribution to thinking about psychiatric diagnosis. It made me think more carefully and deeply about emotional disorders. I have spent more than four decades in psychiatry, so I consider this to be a very considerable achievement! I would recommend it to any clinician who wishes to bring more breadth and depth to their clinical thinking and practice.

eLetters
No eLetters have been published for this article.