I. INTRODUCTION
The history of economics, properly read, is very much a history of economics in the public sphere. Sir William Petty developed his most important insights in the process of providing advice on taxation to the monarch. Adam Smith wrote with a view to influencing the habits of thought of both the educated layman and policy makers. Jane Marcet and Harriet Martineau brought early classical political economy to the masses. David Ricardo formulated foundational elements of the nineteenth-century classical system writing policy pamphlets and then entered Parliament with a view to putting policy making on a solid economic footing. Karl Marx’s intended audience was anything but the practitioners of the emerging science of political economy. Alfred Marshall buried his technical analysis in appendices to maximize the exposure of his work. John Maynard Keynes’s influence can be ascribed, without too much injustice, as much to his effectiveness outside the walls of Cambridge as within them and to the use by others of his ideas in that same public realm. Yet, despite this lengthy history of economists’ engagements with various publics, including those pulling the levers of policy, those writing on the history of economics have focused far more intently on the history of theory and the implications for the construction of a body of thought known as “economic analysis” than on the interplay among economists, economic ideas, and the public realm. It is as if the economic conversation went on solely within the space of academic departments of economics, even though those spaces are very recent creations.
One implication of this rather narrow focus is the tendency to lose sight of the role played by the audience in the process though which economic ideas are created, diffused, and come to pass as knowledge—or as the rationales for policy. A second is that it creates, or reinforces, a particularly narrow definition of what economics is and has been, of what it means to be an economist, and thus of who is an economist—with corresponding implications for the scope of inquiry into the history of economics. It is here, more than anywhere else, that Bill Barber made his mark on the study of the history of economics—indeed, moved the field—through his two path-breaking studies of the role of the economist as policy advisor in the interwar period and during the Second World War: From New Era to New Deal: Herbert Hoover, the Economists, and American Economic Policy, 1921–1933 (1985) and Designs within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–45 (1996). Taken together, these books helped to chart a new course for the historiography of economics, both through their analysis of the activities of the economist in the public sphere and through their focus on American economics and that which made it distinctive.Footnote 1 The latter is noteworthy as, until the late 1990s, historians of economics largely dismissed the study of the history of American economics on the grounds that there was not any innovative American economics—that it was simply a derivative of European economics.Footnote 2 Barber, though, anticipated the push for an analysis of the history of American economics, particularly in the twentieth century, for which much stimulus was subsequently provided by the 1996 History of Economics Society meetings (Rutherford Reference Rutherford1998) and by a HOPE conference on this subject held at Duke University in 1998 (Morgan and Rutherford Reference Morgan and Rutherford1998).Footnote 3 Our focus here, however, will be on Barber’s former contribution—the study of the economist in the public sphere—the influence of which is only beginning to take hold in our field.
II. INVESTIGATING THE ECONOMIST AS POLICY ADVISOR
Though economists, broadly defined, have whispered into the ears of princes and policy makers for centuries, our histories are largely empty on the details of those interactions. With From New Era to New Deal and Designs within Disorder, Barber begins to fill that lacuna for the US experience. The former volume evaluates President Hoover and his administration against the background of transformations in American economics in the 1920s and early 1930s, a rich period during which individuals with approaches and agendas as diverse as those of the institutionalist and the founders of the Econometric Society offered competing visions for economic organization. But the star here is Hoover himself, no economic ignoramus, who is sifting through contending theories and opinions in the process of formulating responses to the economic challenges of the 1920s and, eventually, the near-collapse of the financial system and the onset of the Great Depression.
Ironically, From New Era to New Deal had its genesis in Barber’s attempt to write the opening chapter of Designs within Disorder, a chapter that would tell the story up to Franklin Roosevelt’s election and so set the stage for what was to come. In wading into that “introductory” material, Barber discovered that a proper treatment of this earlier period would require its own book—a happy accident of which we all are the beneficiaries.
Designs within Disorder, published in 1996, picks up where its predecessor left off, providing us with a rich history of the interactions between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his economic advisors during a period when both America and American economics were in flux and obvious responses were in short supply. The Great Depression was upon us, with all of its ravages. Economists seemed to have no ready answers—a fact that is not surprising given that they also lacked a convincing explanation for what had transpired. All of this suggested the need for some fundamental changes in economic analysis. But at the same time, change was underway. If pluralism was a—and perhaps the—distinguishing feature of American economics during the interwar period, the back half of that period saw the first strands of a coalescing around ideas and methods that were to become dominant in the post-WWII period, including a greatly enhanced faith in the prospects for government management of certain areas of economic activity and a mathematically and quantitatively infused orthodoxy.
Barber’s narrative in Designs within Disorder points us to the important role that the Roosevelt administration, and especially Roosevelt himself, played in this transformation. Indeed, it is the portrayal of Roosevelt that can be seen as the axis on which Barber’s story turns and which gets to the heart of perhaps his most important contribution to the study of the economist as policy advisor. In Barber’s hands, Roosevelt is anything but a vessel into which economic knowledge is poured, only to be repoured, in its original form, into the policy machine. Barber’s Roosevelt is a “consumer” of economic ideas, not a producer of them, and his habit was to dine at a buffet, surrounding himself with a large and diverse body of economic thinkers and ideas—one part of the “disorder” to which the book’s title refers.
It is often said that economics is not a laboratory science, but the reality is that the government has often served as the economist’s laboratory, and increasingly so over the last century. Designs within Disorder offers us a close view of this laboratory in a time of successive (and very different) crises, and of the messy work of doing science within it. The policy-making process during the Great Depression and the Second World War was one of driving without a map, of argumentation and sifting, groping toward an appropriate path for responding to the problems at hand—whether the large-scale unemployment of the 1930s or the wartime planning of the 1940s—and then packaging the underlying economic justification for the chosen path into something palatable to an oft-skeptical Congress and citizenry.
What makes the Roosevelt character so important here is the historiographic message that emerges from this narrative: the centrality of the audience for the economist’s advice and the role played by this audience—in the present instance, the president of the United States—in the diffusion of ideas. Barber’s narrative brings this to the fore in two ways. First, it shows how the economist shapes the advice for, and transmits this advice to, the audience, as well as how contextual factors influence this process. Second, and crucially, it shows the active role played by the president in the transference of that advice—including reshaping, communicating, and persuading—to still other audiences, whether Congress, government agencies, or the broader public. This is not to minimize the importance of the economist—indeed, far from it. But as Barber’s work neatly demonstrates, the processes through which economic ideas become economic knowledge often have only weak connections to the ideas found in the latest scholarly treatise or the contents of the American Economic Review. Indeed, it is difficult to read Designs within Disorder without drawing the conclusion that those seeing in Depression-era policy a validation of John Maynard Keynes’s insights have things rather backward, and that the later solidification of important elements of Keynes’s thinking in the economists’ mind was in part a product of the results generated within Roosevelt’s laboratory.
The message, then, is that the work of the economist often cannot be properly understood unless contextualized against the audience to which he is preaching and that this audience—whether other scholars in the field, a president, prime minister, bureaucrat, legislative body, student, or reader of popular press—can, and often does, play a role in the lessons taken from that preaching. We need look no farther than terms such as “invisible hand,” “Keynesian revolution,” and “Coase theorem” to see the very interesting interface—and it is an interface, not a path—between economist and audience. As historians of economics increasingly turn their attention to this interface (e.g., Mata and Medema Reference Mata and Medema2013), our understanding of the history of economics becomes deeper and richer, as it has through Barber’s scholarship.
III. LESSONS LEARNED
One of the several virtues of Barber’s analysis in From New Era to New Deal and Designs within Disorder is its dispassionate nature. We must bear in mind that the context of these two books coincides with the gravest periods—in some sense, one long period—in post-Civil War US history: the Great Depression and the Second World War. In each case, the stakes were high and, no matter what one’s perspective, it is difficult to conclude other than that there were right and wrong turns made along the way—the only difference being how one judges which turn falls into which category. Barber, who was born in 1925, was himself a child of the former period and a young adult of the latter, one who spent the last year of the Second World War and its immediate aftermath in the European theater, sustaining severe injuries to his feet that affected him for the remainder of his life. In short, Barber had a good deal of personal baggage that he could have brought to the analysis of these periods. But he was a scholar first and chose to check these things at the door.
One is struck when reading Barber’s books by the “micro” level at which he conducts his analysis. Historians refer to this period in American economics as one of pluralism, but that term has the connotation of a group of people having different perspectives living in peaceful coexistence. There is some measure of truth to that, but only some measure. Scholars of differing views were competing for influence and supremacy, both in the profession and in the policy realm. But these groups of scholars were themselves by no means homogeneous. Those on whom we hang the label “institutionalist” defy any easy categorization. Chicago economists ranging from Henry Simons to Paul Douglas—but not, notably, Jacob Viner—lined up behind a radical Depression-era banking reform proposal alongside characters as diverse as Irving Fisher, Lauchlin Currie, Gardiner Means, and James W. Angell (Phillips Reference Phillips1995). The economist characters in Barber’s history, then, came from a variety of backgrounds and pushed upon Roosevelt and his administration competing economic world views and associated agendas. They did so, however, with individual views and in alliances that are at times apt to surprise, particularly if one’s preferred mode of writing history stresses the collective rather than the individual, the macro instead of the micro.
The latter way of writing history, of course, requires hard digging, incredible attention to detail, and a dispassionate analysis of what is dug up. Who were these individuals? What did they say and write, and how did they come to hold the views that they did? And who did they become when they entered the nitty-gritty world of policy making, a world where, in these cases, the fate of a nation was on the line? It is easy to read (or write) the history of this period as one of proto-Keynesians and advocates of planning working their magic—or sowing the seeds of serfdom—bringing their increasingly scientific (or pseudo-scientific, depending on one’s perspective) attitudes to bear on calamitous problems. This approach to writing history has its counterpart in recent histories of neoliberal thought collectives seeking to subvert Western economies to the bidding of business interests. Like the bodice-rippers written according to formula, these make for convenient and, for those of a certain turn of mind, engaging stories, even if we always know how the story will end. But they are, at best, history done in the twilight, where detail is obscured and even imperceptible, where nuance takes a holiday. One of the beauties of Designs within Disorder is that it invites us into that detail and nuance—indeed, clubs us over the head with it.
It hardly needs stating, of course, that the policy realm is only one of vehicles for the transmission of economic ideas beyond the ivory tower, a single facet of the “public” with which the economist is often engaged. Read as books about this transmission, From New Era to New Deal and Designs within Disorder invite us to contemplate other means by which economists engage with the larger public audience and so shape understandings of and attitudes toward particular categories of economic policy, the market-government interface, and even, in light of economists’ forays into all manner of aspects of individual and social life, matters of everyday living. The source materials here range across the textbooks through which millions receive their exposure to economic principles, the magazines and newspapers for which economists write (and which economists are accorded that privilege), popular books promulgating the economist’s view of the world or purporting to explain the latest economic crisis, and even television.
Consider, for example, the case of emissions trading, now at the forefront of the economic approach to pollution control and one of the tools used by policy makers to deal with pollution issues. The seeds of emissions trading are found in the academic writings of Thomas Crocker (Reference Crocker and Wolozin1966), John H. Dales (Reference Dales1968), and David Montgomery (Reference Montgomery1972), though economists are fond of ascribing the origins to Ronald Coase (Reference Coase1960). When the prospect of introducing emissions trading was floated in the 1970s, the response ranged from dismissal to outrage. The mere thought of introducing the market process into the control of pollution was written off as a right-wing idea promulgated by those who had visions of markets everywhere and were only too happy to let business interests dictate pollution. With time, however, emissions trading came to feature prominently in economics textbooks—in no small part, one could argue, because of the increasing professional influence of Coase’s somewhat related 1960 analysis—and we witnessed a gradual acceptance of emissions trading as a useful policy tool.
But the last decade or so has witnessed a pivot. Emissions trading has come to be known, in policy discussions, as “cap and trade.” Its US proponents, oddly enough, are the Democrats, with the Republicans deriding it as just so much additional government intervention in the marketplace and sparing no effort to prevent its further implementation. How is it that this idea, once the darling of the right, came to be both rejected by that group and clasped close to the bosom of those on the left? Even if one wishes to conjecture a turn on the right to the rejection of almost any additional forms of pollution control policy—and this may or may not withstand close scrutiny—it remains to explain how it is that those on the left moved from opposition to embrace of the use of the market process here. Understanding how and why economic ideas do or do not translate into policy outcomes, then, requires a close examination of the economist–audience relationship, the various means through which economists operate in the public realm, and how larger contextual factors influence both transmission and reception.Footnote 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Bill Barber likely would object to much of what is written in this symposium, and even to its basic premise. No, he would not be quibbling with the interpretations of his work, but with the very idea that he has affected our field in the ways being described here or was, in any way other than his height, a giant in our field. But those of us who knew him, know better. Indeed, we know that his capabilities as a scholar, which were immense, were exceeded by his capabilities as a human being—his personal graciousness, his warmth, and his humility. For this, as much as for his scholarship, his presence among us will be sorely missed.
