The commitment of North-West Frontier Province Pakhtun religious politics towards the quest for a society and state governed by religious leaders was directed through the colonial period, and into the national period, predominantly by the ulama known as Deobandis. These ulama took their title from the madrasa Darul Ulum Deoband in the United Provinces in north-India and came to prominence through championing Muslim interests in colonial NWFP. After the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the United Provinces remained in India, separating Pakistani scholars trained in Deoband from Indian Deobandi theologians, and indeed from the school itself. But these ulama continued to call themselves Deobandis and were central to the successful demand for the constitutional declaration of Pakistan as an Islamic state; and brought Islam to bear on national and provincial legislation from positions in parliament. Increasingly well-organised and well-funded, NWFP Deobandi ulama established madrasas and mosques in the province, strengthening the preserve of religion and their own authority. When the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation began in 1978, a section of the resistance organisation working in exile in Peshawar gravitated towards these Deobandi institutions, drawing the Deobandi ulama of the NWFP into the jihad. Sustaining links to the Afghan fighters even after the withdrawal of the Soviets, the NWFP Deobandis contributed to and encouraged the emerging organisation of the Taliban, becoming champions of their reactionary brand of Islam.
The history of the rise of the Deobandis in the NWFP is marked by two contradictory realities: that the Deobandis have never been able to dominate parliamentary politics on their own strength; and that Deobandi Islam has come to define the politics and public life of the NWFP more than any other political or social movement. Tracing this progression demonstrates the extent to which Deobandi successes in the political realm have relied on compacts with other political groups while maintaining close connections within the ‘Deobandi’ community.
‘Deobandis’ and the early politics of the Pakhtun north-west
The Darul Ulum Deoband madrasa was established in the United Provinces in north India, in the late nineteenth century. The founders of Deoband were concerned with how study of the hadith and the Quran should be used towards reforming practice of the Muslim faith. The roots of the Deobandi pedagogy lay in the writings and teachings of Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi, the seventeenth-century Sufi who urged the reform of Sufi religious practices and came to be known as Mujaddid Alf Sani. Sirhindi's ideas, which formed the basis of the Mujaddidiyya shaakh or branch of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi philosophy, were developed by Shah Wali Ullah, the greatest South Asian Islamic thinker of the eighteenth century, who argued for the re-introduction of the Quran and hadith into Sufi tariqa. Shah Wali Ullah's thought evolved in two ways – his teaching was taken to the Pakhtun regions north of Punjab and into Afghanistan in the 1820s by his grandson Shah Ismail and Sayyid Ahmed of Rai Bareilly; and later it was incorporated into the programme of study, known as the dars-i nizami, which was taught at the Darul Ulum Deoband by others of Walli Ullah's spiritual and methodological successors.
While the Deobandi curriculum abandoned the Sufi premise for the prescriptions of Sirhindi and Shah Wali Ullah, and focused entirely on imparting knowledge in relation to the hadith, Quran and interpretative method, one Sufi tradition did remain discreetly in place within the institution: the use of the bait (pledge or oath) between teachers or murshids and their students. The bait was not a standard device used between all students and teachers at the school, nor did use of the bait suggest that the Sufi tariqa was being taught at the school in addition to the standard curriculum. It was an important symbol however, which maintained the link between the school and the Sufi legacy of Shah Wali Ullah. This device – which was a private and emotional act selectively practiced between students and teachers at the Darul Ulum – allowed the ulama of Deoband to reach out into the distant locale of Pakhtun Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya practice to draw religious leaders there into the Darul Ulum Deoband programme of study. Some Pakhtun religious leaders, most notably Haji Turangzai, a mulla from Charsadda, professed to have taken the bait at the hands of prominent Deobandis. Many others were drawn to the institution on the basis of their shared commitment to the Sufi philosophy of Shah Wali Ullah without necessarily taking the bait.Footnote 2 These connections, bolstered strongly by the Darul Ulum Deoband's reputation, led to scores of Pakhtuns from the NWFP seeking an education at that institution from around the end of the nineteenth century.Footnote 3
Political organisation in the Pakhtun regions was delayed by the late creation of the NWFP province in 1901 and limited by the small number of publications, the use of the foreign Urdu and English languages by the existing newspapers, and low literacy rates. Nevertheless, a complex of religious, ethno-linguistic and anti-colonial concerns came to constitute an urban arena of public political action in the NWFP by the 1920s. In an effort to hold a concerted anti-colonial stance, organisations with differing, disparate objectives supported each other against organisations and parties opposed to the principles of non-cooperation and civil disobedience.Footnote 4 The new mechanisms of the public – public debate, party organisation and print technology – subsumed the relatively small number of anti-colonial activists without regard for the subtle variations in their agendas. The few venues for public meetings drew a mixed urban audience constituted by those who could be reached through newspapers, the distribution of pamphlets and posters, and word of mouth.Footnote 5 Furthermore, the NWFP had a majority of Muslims and was without a significant non-Muslim population outside the cities of Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan. Hence, although inspired by a number of different (often contradictory) discourses of anti-colonial, religious, left-wing and nationalist politics, the small number of actors in the province were forced to band together on the basis of a single shared objective of gaining native political rights and representation. Early public political meetings were held in the major Peshawar mosques – Masjid Mahabat Khan and Masjid Qasim Ali Khan – and included religious personalities, but these venues were not overtly intended to restrict political participation to those who were religiously inclined, as participants were from a variety of backgrounds.Footnote 6 A mix of western-educated students, businessmen, tradesmen, scholars of religion, and a religious elite coming out of a Sufi tradition, was drawn to these gatherings and into large public demonstrations as avenues for asserting social and political agendas.
The first major instance of direct Deobandi engagement in the politics of the North-West Frontier was in the period 1914–1919. Maulana Mahmudul Hasan, the then chancellor of Darul Ulum Deoband, wanted to contribute to the anti-colonial and pan-Islamic effort by inviting a Turkish attack on British India on its north-western frontier. These initial relations between Deoband and the Pakhtun north-west were conceived loosely on the almost mythical model of Sayyid Ahmed of Rai Bareili's ‘jihad’ against the Sikhs in the 1830s and intended to reclaim a space and dignity for the practice of the Muslim faith by militant means.Footnote 7 However Mahmudul Hasan's scheme was discovered and ended with the incarceration of its primary organisers. As the movement coincided with the beginnings of local political mobilisations in the North-West Frontier Province, many local participants moved effortlessly into the provincial staging of the India-wide ‘khilafat’ mobilisation of Muslims to demand the protection of the Turkish caliphate and the integrity of the Ottoman lands in the aftermath of the First World War and the beginning of Pakhtun nationalist organisation.Footnote 8
This transition is best represented in the career of one Peshawar-based Deobandi, Maulana Abdur Rahim Popalzai, a Pakhtun from Peshawar descended from a line of Sufi pirs.Footnote 9 In addition to his regional pre-eminence as a pir, he was accorded status of alim as he studied the dars at Darul Ulum Deoband and returned to establish a madrasa at Peshawar. Popalzai maintained contact and gave support to the Deobandis in the Tribal Areas, he also began to be drawn to the khilafat-non-cooperation movement's drama of public demonstrations and speeches.Footnote 10 During the same period, Popalzai became acquainted with left-leaning Pakhtun intellectuals and political activists of the Bharat Naujawan Sahaba, a Marxist student group, and the Mazdoor Kissan Party, a movement for peasant emancipation.Footnote 11 In 1927 Popalzai launched the short-lived Sarfarosh newspaper which publicised the concerns of the Marxist student organisation the Bharat Naujawan Sahaba. These years also marked the beginnings of the Khudai Khidmatgar movement, a Pakhtun nationalist non-violent movement of civil resistance and political reorganisation, started by Abdul Ghaffar Khan.Footnote 12 Popalzai joined the movement, spent time in jail for his public speeches against the government, and then threw his support behind a new movement – a peasant uprising in Bannu, for which he was jailed again.Footnote 13 He was being deeply influenced by Congress and leftist politics in the province, which had introduced an Urdu press in the province, and tentatively introduced Pashtu journalism as well.Footnote 14
While his primary commitments were well removed from anything that was tangibly a religious politics, Popalzai continued to attend and speak at meetings of ulama in his father's mosque, Qasim Ali Khan.Footnote 15 In 1929, along with other ‘Khilafatists’,Footnote 16 he participated in a deputation of Peshawar ulama and Tribal Areas mullas to AfghanistanFootnote 17 to try and rally support for the deposed Amir Amanullah Khan, a great patron of the Deobandis in Afghanistan.Footnote 18 But without party organisation Popalzai floundered; like many other political activists who were inclined towards an exclusively Muslim political identity, until the entrenchment of a provincial wing of the Deobandi party.
The Jamiyatul Ulama Sarhad: consolidating a provincial Deobandi position
With the establishment of political representation through separate electorates for the Muslims and Hindus by 1916, Muslim public political activity in the NWFP was, as in the rest of India, tending towards the representation of religious identity.Footnote 19 This was what David Gilmartin has termed ‘particularism’ – public participation circumscribed by the politics of communal identities.Footnote 20 Although left-leaning organisations like Bharat Naujawan Sahaba of the NWFP and nationalist groups like the Zalmai Pakhtun tried to articulate a provincial position that included the large urban Hindu and Sikh populations of Peshawar and D. I. Khan, Islam-centric political symbols such as the Ottoman Caliphate and protection of mosques dominated in the majority-Muslim province. As the organisation of the Muslim electorate and the public articulation of the community's legislative concerns began in the province, Deobandis used their public social authority over Muslims to claim a part of that political representation.
The political wing of the Darul Ulum Deoband, the Jamiyatul Ulama Hind [JUH], had been established in 1919. The JUH had entered Indian politics on the back of the khilafat movement, but then, motivated by both a concern for mobilising the Muslims of India, and the greater anti-colonial Indian nationalist cause, the Jamiyatul Ulama Hind sought to secure Muslim presence in the emerging political space and devolution of powers within India. Ulama of the JUH took up communal issues and proposed the ulama as leaders and political representatives of the Muslims of Hind. They also spoke strongly in favour of maintaining separate electorates for Muslims and Hindus (seats reserved for Muslims and Hindus in proportion to population in legislative assemblies), and a system of legal adjudication under ‘customary law’ which privileged the ulama as spokesmen for the principles of the faith. These efforts were inherently a means of circumscribing the Muslim community of India and establishing the authority of the ulama over it.
When a JUH committee was established just outside Peshawar in 1924, the one-time khilafat activists, who had been unfocused after the failure of the khilafat movement, were drawn by the new agenda they popularised.Footnote 21 Together, the old khilafat activists and the new JUH committee popularised both the agendas of civil disobedience and the importance and autonomy of Muslim customary law. Their influence was limited until 1927 when the revived NWFP khilafat-JUH activists invited the JUH central committee to hold its annual meeting in Peshawar. The JUH leadership was strongly committed to the province for its large Muslim majority and was eager to see political reforms introduced there on the same lines as in the rest of India, and readily agreed. At the conference, the president went on to announce the establishment of a formal JUH presence and concern in the NWFP in the form of the Jamiyatul Ulama Sarhad or JUS.Footnote 22
The JUS organised the first major local articulation of the JUH national political objectives in the NWFP, leading a demonstration in opposition to the Sarda Act which set a minimum age for marriage, on the grounds that this was interference in customary practice.Footnote 23 There was a compact between the JUH and the All India National Congress (AINC), the Hindu-majority nationalist party led by Gandhi, at the centre. Hence the Jamiyatul Ulama Sarhad was expected to support the Khudai Khidmatgars, the NWFP branch of the AINC, in political programmes such as resisting taxation and calling for a boycott on highly taxed commodities such as alcohol; and refer to Gandhi's authority and leadership. But the JUS leadership began also to highlight exclusively Muslim interests in the province. They called for the disbanding of the government appointed charitable trusts on the grounds that “the charitable trusts of the Muslims of the frontier are purely religious trusts, therefore their right of management falls to the Muslims and any sort of interference from the Government cannot be tolerated”. The JUS ulama also voiced general concerns about the level of agricultural tax as it affected the predominantly Muslim land owners.Footnote 24 In public statements by the JUS, Gandhi and the ulama were equated as political leaders, and the creation of respect for the ulama in this authoritative capacity was encouraged through public campaigns. This concern was reiterated the following year in response to political reforms in the NWFP that created a legislative council for the province. Resolutions passed by the JUS, publicised in posters around the city, declared that the reforms would be accepted on the grounds that sufficient representation was granted to the JUS and that provincial law would be based on the shari'a.
All political and non-political organisations should not transgress the shari'a and should consult the central Jamiyatul Ulama Sarhad in all important matters. . . the ulama should keep watch over matters of shari'a.Footnote 25
The JUS further resolved to send a deputation of ulama to the Chief Commissioner NWFP to discuss conditions in the province.Footnote 26
Establishment of the Deobandi-dominated JUS was the beginning of the process by which Deobandi ulama of the NWFP began to rationalise and regularise their authority as a natural political leadership in the province, urging that Muslim religious life and public participation could not be separated. In 1928 the JUS called for a majlis-i shura, or assembly of representatives, to bring the NWFP Muslim groups into one single formation under the authority of the ulama.Footnote 27 A number of district-level committees were set up under the supervision of the JUS in Bannu, Hazara, Charsadda, Nowshera, Tappa Mohmand, Barzai, Swabi and Swat. In 1931 the JUS invited all the ulama of the NWFP to a meeting at a Peshawar mosque to “settle the disputes of people according to shari'a”.Footnote 28 After the meeting it was claimed by the JUS that they had a petition, signed by ten thousand people, calling for the application of shari'a in the NWFP.Footnote 29 In pursuit of this objective, some JUS district committees began to serve as informal courts in order to establish shari'a-based dispute resolution systems at the local level. Residents were encouraged to come to the ulama of the JUS for settlements rather than turning to the state-run courts for justice or taking matters into their own hands.Footnote 30 Despite not having a direct access to the legislative assembly, the ulama managed to represent their agenda to that body through personal supporters. A Peshawar member of legislative council questioned the government's sanction of the sale of alcohol in the province, given the moral values of the province's Muslims. He argued that ‘public opinion’ had confirmed the JUS's opposition to the sale of alcohol and picketing of shops:
The inhabitants of Peshawar, [as well as] Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara have contributed towards this noble cause. As far as public opinion is concerned, it is sure to resent things which are against religion and morality.Footnote 31
The JUS provincial committee and district committees created a new brand of political-religious leaders in the province. Ghulam Ghaus of Hazara, who will be discussed in greater detail below, made his debut into frontier politics through the district committee JUS Hazara. Maulana Shakirullah of Bannu, who presided over the inaugural session of the Frontier Province Muslim League in 1937, also entered the arena of public politics through a district JUS committee,Footnote 32 as did Maulana Muhammad Shoaib who later became president of the Frontier Province Muslim League.Footnote 33
Popular Politics 1927–1947
During the two decades leading up to independence and partition, the place of the religious elite trained in, or sympathetic to, a reformist discourse and practice in the arena of public political activity and social direction was confirmed. Increasing popularity of the ulama was as much a function of the expression their politics took as it was an endorsement of their ideological position.
The relevance of the ulama to the public debate and the strength of their demands were deeply dependent on their use of print technology. They sought to publicly reiterate their role and importance in political mobilisations using this mediumFootnote 34 well before the issues were raised at the level of the legislative assembly.Footnote 35 Use of print technology by the ulama of north India has received careful and subtle analysis in the work of Francis Robinson and Qasim Zaman. Their writings establish that a more popular and accessible application of religion emerged through the technologies of print and the ‘Muslim landscape’ described in it. This landscape was constituted by both a world of Islam – images and news of other Muslim peoples and concernsFootnote 36 – and by a north-Indian, Urdu-reading audience, which could be accessed through mass-printed commentaries.Footnote 37 Print technology, largely in Urdu, provided the platform on which the interpretative authority of the ulama could be publicly asserted and developed in the NWFP. Posters advertising meetings and the resolutions reached in congresses of ulama were distributed through the mosques and bazaars of the cities.Footnote 38 Early Peshawar newspapers reported the political concerns and demands of the khilafat committees and the JUS.
Urdu was the language of Muslim north India, and the language within which a Muslim political thought developed. While Pashtu was the most popular spoken language in the NWFP, public discourse, particularly in print, was dominated by Urdu, even through the early years of Pashtun linguistic and ethnic nationalism as nurtured by Ghaffar Khan. Newspapers were predominantly published in Urdu, although some began to print pages in Pashtu to supplement the Urdu.Footnote 39 Preference for Urdu as the language of public political debate was a result of both the better development of Urdu as a written language through the education system, and the preference of the Muslim elite for the language for its suggestion of a common identity and concerns, tying the Muslims of India together as a coherent community.Footnote 40 Of the few books published with official sanction in the NWFP in the 1930s and 40s, all were either in English or Urdu.Footnote 41 Mastery of Urdu was in itself a mark of distinction, and Deobandi ulama were well placed to contribute to a public debate in Urdu in the NWFP, as the madrasa encouraged the use of Urdu as a medium of interpretation and commentary on religious text.Footnote 42
The fact that Pashtu was the language predominantly spoken in the NWFP, compounded with the fact that literacy was very limited, meant that access to written language itself, let alone the printed Urdu language, was very limited. Any understanding of the subtleties of debate represented in printed Urdu would have been restricted to a very small male elite, one that was probably already dominant in the public sphere, whether through religious leadership, political activism, or material prosperity. The ulama’s interpretative commentaries and injunctions were made accessible to a wider audience in a simplified form through repetition by rich merchants and traders in bazaars, by imams in mosques, and by activists in loud public demonstrations.Footnote 43 While the actual relevance of the ulama’s religious interpretative and textual authority to regional religious practice is questionable, the public visibility afforded them by print culture was real and determined.Footnote 44
The increasing involvement of the ulama in the public and political sphere led to a rise in competition between the ulama and the avowedly secular Khudai Khidmatgars who were organising a province-wide political presence and strategy. Although deeply invested in Muslim politics and the safeguarding of political participatory structures, the Jamiyatul Ulama never contested an election in undivided India. The stance of the central JUH was pro-Congress, and accordingly the JUS supported the Congressite Khudai Khidmatgars through to the elections of 1937.Footnote 45 However the secular stance of Ghaffar Khan, leader of the Khudai Khidmatgars, disparaging the role of religion in government and social leadership, was driving a wedge between the ulama of the JUS and the Khudai Khidmatgars, irrespective of the commitments of mutual support between the JUH and Congress leaderships.
In trying to highlight the separateness and vulnerability of Muslims in a religiously diverse public space, the directives of the NWFP ulama began to veer away from simple religious injunction to take on a communalist tone. The ulama highlighted ‘threats’ posed by Hindus to Muslims in the province. Accusations of improper behaviour and molestation of Muslim women were levelled against ‘Hindu shopkeepers’ in Nowshera.Footnote 46 Sermons given by two JUS-connected maulvis in Nowshera declared the Hindus the ‘enemies’ of Islam and Muslims.Footnote 47 Posters were distributed in the city warning Muslims not to buy or consume foods prepared and sold by Hindus in the bazaars.Footnote 48 In 1936, a Hindu girl was abducted by a Muslim in Bannu and then married to him. The government demanded the girl's return, but popular Muslim opinion, supported by a resolution passed by the Jamiyatul Ulama Bannu, demanded that she stay, stating that she had come of her free will, had converted to Islam, and was now lawfully married and had to remain with her husband.Footnote 49 Government efforts to retrieve the girl led to accusations of the government being anti-Muslim and of encouraging apostasy, and so stirred up strong anti-Hindu sentiment across the majority Muslim NWFP.
Increasingly obsessed with the definition of the Muslim, some members of the JUS began to take up sectarian issues. Most notable among these was Maulana Ghulam Ghaus of Hazara, later to become secretary of the Jamiyatul Ulama Islam in Pakistan. Maulana Ghulam Ghaus had received part of the dars at Deoband, and was one of the ‘authentic’ Deobandi influences in the JUS. He was deeply influenced by the Ahrars, a vocal and militant Muslim movement concerned with the propagation of Islam, but more concerned with the creation of an independent India within which religion, culture and government would be freed from the control of the British.Footnote 50 Although the Ahrars were technically pro-Congress, their local politics and rhetoric were focused on creating a space for an Islamic government and maintaining a Sunni orthodox ideological unity within the community. They took up a personal battle against the Ahmedi community; the followers of the teachings of the nineteenth-century Mirza Ghulam Ahmed of Qadiyan, who claimed to be a prophet continuing and extending the teachings of Muhammad.Footnote 51 Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi took control of the Ahrars and the Anti-Ahmedi movement in NWFP, devoting many of his sermons to disparaging the current Mirza and the Ahmedi community for the heresy of rejecting the finality of the Prophet Muhammad.Footnote 52 He solicited and received support for the anti-Ahmedi movement from other district committees of the JUS.
Ghulam Ghaus ultimately joined and became an office holder within the Ahrar party established in the NWFP in 1935. This commitment overrode his commitment even to the unity of the JUS, and he openly declared himself opposed to Maulana Shakirullah, president of the JUS in 1937, because Shakirullah supported the Ahrars' competitor group, the Khaksars.Footnote 53 The Ahrar-Khaksar split dominated the activities and concerns of the ulama of the NWFP over the next years. Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi declared the leader of the Khaksars, Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi, a heretic,Footnote 54 eliciting strong condemnation from Maulana Zafar Ali Khan in Lahore.Footnote 55 The confrontation was brought to a head at a public gathering at a mosque in the small town of Akora Khattak, north of Peshawar where both Ghulam Ghaus and Maulana Marwat of the Khaksars were invited to represent their opinions about the accusations of heresy. All ulama of the NWFP were informed about and invited to the debate. Significant amongst these were Maulana Abdul Haq of Akora Khattak, recently returned from teaching at the Darul Ulum Deoband, who was asked to chair the debate; and Maulana Shakirullah.Footnote 56 Ghulam Ghaus reiterated his accusation of heresy against Inayatullah Mashriqi, adding that Mashriqi had declared in his published commentaries on the Quran that the English were pious and virtuous people and would join the Muslims in heaven.Footnote 57 In the ensuing debate, Marwat, as spokesperson for the Khaksars, defended Inayatullah Mashriqi on the grounds that the latter was a good, practising Muslim. However, when the meeting turned to the chair for a decision, Abdul Haq supported Ghulam Ghaus's judgement.Footnote 58 Following the decision, all Khaksars were declared non-Muslim by the Ahrars. Ahrar-supporting ‘imams’, the leaders of prayers in mosques, refused to perform death rites for Khaksars,Footnote 59 and Ahrars would refuse to read prayers in a congregation led by a Khaksar imam.Footnote 60
The inherently militaristic bent of Ahrar politics caused tensions to spiral in the province. Public demonstrations became violent, and Ghulam Ghaus invoked the tragedy of Karbala, asking all Muslims to wear red badges to commemorate the historic martyrdom of the Prophet's grandson, and to prepare for jihad against British.Footnote 61 Jamiyatul Ulama members influenced by Ahrar rhetoric called for the public denunciation of and removal of Ahmedis in the tribal belt, and for an armed tribal uprising to punish the government for its involvement in the Islam Bibi case.Footnote 62 The awareness of the central committee of the JUH and influential Deobandis, such as Maulana Madni and Mufti Kifyatullah, of what was going on remains a matter for speculation. It was however argued that Mufti Kifayatullah had communicated with members of the JUS over anti-government action while Madni was reported to hold meetings and consultations with members of the JUS into the 1940s, including one occasion on which Madni and Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi gave sermons together at a mosque in Hazara.Footnote 63 It seems fair to estimate that the JUH central leadership kept ties with the JUS's district ulama in place and did not try to contain their increasingly militant sectarian bent, but it is without doubt that they had little control over the nature of religious interpretation, social directive and the political programme issued by the NWFP ulama.
JUS politics became confused by the venomous opposition between the Khaksars and Ahrars over the Ahmedi issue, and further masked by the rise of Muslim League-Congress opposition and the demand for the creation of a Muslim state of Pakistan. Some JUS members chose to join the Frontier Province Muslim League when it was established in 1937, won over by Jinnah and Allama Iqbal's descriptions of Muslim nationhood and the popularisation of sectarian and communalist politics by the Ahrars.Footnote 64 The fragmentation of a definitively ‘Deobandi’ political position was furthered when the Muslim League supported a breakaway faction of the JUH into creation as the Jamiyatul Ulama Islam in 1945. Involvement of the Deobandi ulama in public political activity and in the negotiation of a Muslim identity in the NWFP appeared in no way to rely upon a wider consensus of Indian Deobandis. The NWFP Deobandi position was rather determined by local political affiliations to the Muslim League and Ahrars, social tensions, and individual personalities such as Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi. By 1947 the majority of NWFP ulama supported the Muslim League idea of Pakistan. Because of the now long-standing relations between JUS ulama and the Muslim League, and the strong communalist tone in the NWFP, the move away from the pro-Congress and anti-Pakistan party line of the central JUH to interest and participation in the creation of Pakistan by the NWFP Deobandis was not a dramatic one. Early in 1947, when the Ahrar party publicly severed ties with the AINC and cast its lot with the Muslim League, this merely assuaged the collective conscience of the NWFP ulama for not opposing the Muslim League rise to prominence in the NWFP.
Through the 1930s and 1940s, the activities of the NWFP ulama were generally focused on the consolidation of the Muslim community, if not of India, then at least of the NWFP, on stringent lines. Not only did they seek to define Muslim interests as opposed to Hindu ones, they sought to narrow the sources of moral and religious authority the Muslim community could access. More and more the organised Deobandi scholars in the NWFP refined their hold on Islamic politics; through control of the mosques and application of principles of shari'a in community-level arbitrations and through creation of the JUS and alliances with other political groups. From these positions they also emphasised their own understanding of Islam to be the only legitimate one. All AINC affiliation was naturally terminated with the inclusion of the NWFP in Pakistan in 1947 and many ulama who remained in Pakistan effortlessly turned to the project of Pakistani nation building. They were now presented with an opportunity to rationalise a place for Islam not only within legislation, but as the constitutional basis for the very existence of the state.
Deoband in the Pakistani NWFP: Maulana Abdul Haq, Mufti Mahmud and the national project
There is an argument to be made that the ‘Deobandi’ religious politics inherited by Pakistan in 1947 were not Deobandi at all. Many politically active ulama professing to be Deobandi had only trained at Deoband for a short time, and some not at all.Footnote 65 On the other hand, while the Darul Ulum Deoband had remained a significant draw for young Pakhtun students of religion, not all of these alumni became involved in NWFP politics. Scrutiny of ‘Deobandis’ and their politics establishes that, in the NWFP at least, the title ‘Deobandi’ was not reserved for full alumni of the institution. It was rather a transferable and inheritable title, conferred and assumed on and by any scholar or would-be scholar that aligned himself with another Deobandi, or, after 1920, with the JUH.Footnote 66 By 1947 the Deobandi platform was occupied by ulama now some steps removed from the actual pedagogy of the institution. Moreover the title of ‘Deobandi’ did not denote a fixed religious and political position. Rather it conferred membership in a developing consortium of religious-nationalist authorities whose political agenda changed to keep up with issues of the day. Hence ‘Deobandi’ did not refer to a pedagogy but to a system of allies mutually descended from an increasingly distant institution with which they maintained as close a relationship as they could.
As the debates over the constitutional identity of Pakistan began in 1948, the Deobandi ulama across the country began working to strengthen the interior domain of Islam and that from which their authority derived – the madrasas and mosques. They began to assert a jealous guard over the interpretation of religion, demanding that religious commentators should not only have received a course of religious study, but should have been educated in the particular dars-i nizami of Deoband. At this early stage however, directed by certain influential personalities in Karachi and Lahore, the ulama expressed themselves in a closely guarded domain that did little to access the state controlled organs of public opinion and national organisation – the newspapers, universities and governmental institutions. Ulama authority retreated back within mosques and madrasas to consolidate a political position and produce individuals and organisations who could claim part of the new Pakistani political sphere.
By 1953, the Pakistani Deobandi ulama had emerged as a closely-organised group seeking to influence the writing of the constitution and the definition of the Pakistani citizen. They cut their teeth on a nationwide movement called the ‘Tehrik-i Khatam-i Nabuwwat’ – the ‘movement to assert the finality of the Prophet’. The Karachi-based Deobandi Muhammad Yusuf Banori was the primary scholarly commentator on the ‘heresy’ of Ghulam Ahmed Qadiyan's claim to be a prophet, and wrote interpretative tracts establishing this point, while members of the old pre-partition Ahrar party, re-invented and newly inspired in Pakistan, led a public movement in support of his theological position.Footnote 67 The Ahmedi issue transformed from occupying a relatively minor position in the larger schemes of pre-partition Muslim politics to becoming the central point of definition of Islam in Pakistan.Footnote 68 A large-scale movement of public agitation was launched against the government to force the legal categorisation of Ahmedis as non-Muslim.Footnote 69
The ‘Direct Action’ began on 27 February 1953, and led to wide-scale rioting and strike calls, primarily in Lahore and Sialkot, but also in Karachi, Multan and Rawalpindi.Footnote 70 By 5 March, the army had been called out to control the situation in Sialkot.Footnote 71 Prominent religious personalities in the NWFP openly supported the objectives of the movement in sermons at mosques to try to put pressure on the government to declare the Ahmediyya community heretical, despite stringent government measures to curb the movement including pre-emptive arrests and strict press censorship.Footnote 72 Abdul Haq, who will be discussed in greater detail below, publicly condemned Ahmedis at a Friday khutba,Footnote 73 while Mufti Mahmud, who will also be discussed in greater detail, Muhammad Sarfaraz Khan Safdar of the Jamiyatul Ulama Islam, and Abdul Qayyum Popalzai, descended from Abdur Rahim Popalzai, called for public demonstrations and nation-wide strikes. But, as the government conveyed in a communiqué, it was “not to be coerced”,Footnote 74 and the anti-Ahmediyya agitation was denounced in the findings of a Supreme Court enquiry.Footnote 75 It was not until the 1960s that a more circumspect Pakistani ulama became visible and a political force with which to be contended at a national level. This process was played out in the NWFP through the careers of the two Deobandis who had already risen to national prominence during the anti-Ahmedi movement: Maulana Abdul Haq and Mufti Mahmud.
Abdul Haq was a Pakhtun from the Peshawar region, son of a village mulla descended within a piri-muridi line influenced by the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya tariqa, who had participated in the Tribal Areas-based movement of 1914–16.Footnote 76 He spent five years at the Darul Ulum studying the dars-i nizami, then began to teach there, and only returned to his home town of Akora Khattak when the security situation deteriorated in Delhi at the time of partition and his father insisted that he came back.Footnote 77 Despite many exhortations that he return to Deoband after partition, Abdul Haq decisively separated his fortune from that of the Darul Ulum Deoband and became committed to a teaching and practice of Islam confined, by needs, within the new borders of Pakistan.
Abdul Haq established a madrasa called Darul Ulum Haqqaniyya in his father's mosque in Akora Khattak to make it possible for local students to receive a Deoband-style religious education as it was no longer possible for them to attend any of the established madrasas in India. Abdul Haq said he was following in the footsteps of Maulana Nanotwi who had established the Darul Ulum Deoband in the aftermath of 1857 when the British had destroyed many of the centres of religious learning fostered by the old Muslim nobility.Footnote 78 Financially, Haqqaniyya was made possible by the generosity of patrons from greater Nowshera and Peshawar, inspired, organised and motivated by Abdul Haq.Footnote 79 Haq's letter to a local soap merchant who made a donation to the madrasa suggests that while his madrasa and mosque were established in service to the local community, he felt from the outset that he was contributing to the politics and religion of Pakistan.
Sir: it is you [and others like you] who are fulfilling the obligations of living in the Darul Islam. In this age of materialism, God has provoked some consciences with the desire to protect religion . . . and to pledge some of their property toward religious work.
Respected sir: the love of religion exists in the heart of every Muslim. But this is being tested by the lords of [this] country . . . In Pakistan today, it is required that Muslims spread the religion, and it is evident that the preaching of faith without an established [institutional] centre of the faith is difficult . . . The sincere cooperation of those such as yourself has made it possible for us to raise our confidence and ambitions and improve our work in God's name.Footnote 80
Haq's letter, written during a time of overbearing control by an unelected government and internal dissent over how to write the constitution, indicated the rising concern of the ulama to create not only a centre for religious thought and study, but for political organisation. Abdul Haq built on connections with ulama now on the Pakistani side of the border.Footnote 81 Along with other ulama of the NWFP, he was drawn into an early nexus of Pakistan ulama which roughly corresponded to the membership of the All Muslim Parties Conference established in Lahore in 1952.Footnote 82 This network was dominated by Deobandis residing in cities across Pakistan. He also joined the organisation Wafaqul Madaris, which was established to reinforce the teaching of the dars-i nizami across Pakistan.Footnote 83 The schools supported by this organisation included those which taught the complete dars and were referred to as darul ulums, as well as a large number of institutions, many supported into existence by the Wafaqul Madaris itself, which offered only part training in the religious sciences and were referred to as deeni madrasas.Footnote 84 The utility of the latter institutions which graduated thousands of young men through the 1970s and 1980s was explained as the founding of a society which would ‘safeguard religious education’.Footnote 85
Mufti Mahmud, a son of a well-known pir in Dera Ismail Khan, received his religious education from a variety of local and north-Indian sources before spending a year at Deoband. Like many other ‘Deobandis’, his intellectual affiliation with the institution was more self-identification than a result of having received the full course of study there. After some years in the United Provinces, during which time he joined the Jamiyatul Ulama Hind, he returned to teach in Northern Punjab, then won a prestigious post to teach at the renowned madrasa Qasimul Ulum in Multan. Mufti Mahmud established the Wafaqul Madaris in 1958 as a consortium of religious scholars of West Pakistan, ‘whose way of thinking was affiliated to the mother of knowledge, Darul Ulum Deoband’, and organised annual conventions to bring these ulama together.Footnote 86 Occupying the post of General Secretary of the Wafaqul Madaris in perpetuity, Mufti Mahmud was strongly committed to the consolidation of the authority of the dominant Deobandi ulama in Pakistan.Footnote 87 Mufti Mahmud also contested the 1958 elections to the provincial assembly as an independent candidate from Dera Ismail Khan. He won a seat in the 1962 elections; and when the Jamiyatul Ulama Islam was registered as a political party later that year, he assumed presidency of the party as a sitting member of parliament.Footnote 88 From his position in parliament, Mufti Mahmud asked that body to make a special budgetary allocation for madrasas in East and West Pakistan which taught the dars-i nizami. This, he said, was in the national interest as it would promote understanding and codification of Islamic law.Footnote 89 But Mufti Mahmud's contributions to the national debate during the 1960s, while of great significance in Pakistani-Deobandi literature, did not appear to have greatly affected national public opinion. Newspaper reports in the national English daily Dawn, on the proceedings of the national assembly, barely noted Mufti Mahmud's eloquent contributions to the debates.Footnote 90 Ayub Khan's recognition of the ulama and creation of a Council of Islamic Ideology dominated by Deobandis, and his referral of the question of interest-based finance to it, appears to have been far more an experiment with eliciting moral legitimacy than a serious concession to national pressure to involve the ulama in issues of state and governance.Footnote 91
It was not until 1970 that the efforts of the Pakistani ulama, and specifically those of Maulana Mufti Mahmud and Maulana Abdul Haq, were to have real implication on a national stage. The Jamiyatul Ulama Islam participated in the country's first general election – an election which sparked Pakistan's gravest national crisis when the military regime and its political allies refused to accept the East Pakistan party, the Awami League's, national parliamentary majority. In these elections, in which the Awami League won the vast majority of the national assembly seats followed distantly by the Pakistan People's Party or PPP with a vote base in Sindh and Punjab, the JUI won the largest number of national assembly seats from the NWFP, and the second largest number in Balochistan. (Both Mufti Mahmud and Abdul Haq had contested the national assembly election and won their seats.)Footnote 92 After the election results were announced, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as chairman of the PPP was asked by the military president to form government; an act which sparked a civil war between East and West Pakistan. When East Pakistan separated into Bangladesh and left PPP the majority party, Mufti Mahmud, as president of the JUI, negotiated and executed a well timed and important coalition with the Pakhtun nationalist National Awami Party [NAP], led by Wali Khan, which had a small number of national assembly seats. The alliance made the coalition group the strongest national opposition party after the PPP, and after the secession of East Pakistan and the creation of a PPP government, the primary opposition party in the now reduced Pakistan. It also had the effect of bringing the Jamiyatul Ulama into provincial government in the NWFP on the back of NAP's overwhelming provincial parliamentary majority despite the fact that JUI had almost no support from within the provincial electorate.
In 1970, Maulana Abdul Haq participated in and moderated discussions between differing factions of ulama to resolve a ‘religious’ position on issues such as socialism and support to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Mufti Mahmud and Wali Khan entered into talks with Bhutto to discuss the timetable and plans for the reinstatement of the national and provincial assemblies.Footnote 93 With a larger proportion of the national assembly votes, Mufti Mahmud superseded Wali Khan as the Chief Minister in the NWFP, and took up his responsibilities with the end of martial law in May 1972.Footnote 94 The passionate and weighty theological discourse of the Deobandis was now brought to the fore. Preparation began for what would become the 1973 constitution of Pakistan, with the ulama positioned to contribute their vision in parliament. Abdul Haq and Mufti Mahmud made grand and eloquent speeches in support of key ‘Islamic’ issues: notably, the point that Pakistan was an ‘Islamic republic’ and a permanent council of ulama should be constituted within the Senate and all legislation referred to it.
Concurrently with the preparation of the constitution, the anti-Ahmedi campaign was restarted. Mufti Mahmud made a speech to the annual Katam-i Nabuwwat conference in Lahore in 1972.Footnote 95 He highlighted the ambiguity of Pakistan's national principles and emphasised that the constitution would have to institutionalise Pakistan's Islam in order to effectively bar non-Muslims from the position of head of state and make ‘apostasy’, in this case renunciation of orthodox Sunni principles of the faith, a capital offence. Mahmud also proposed that the Ahmediyya be declared non-Muslim and that members of the community be compulsorily registered by the state in order to cut their beliefs out of the mainstream of Pakistan's Islam.Footnote 96 Unlike the 1953 agitations during which politicians differentiated the will of the ulama from the will of the people,Footnote 97 the movement started afresh in 1972 was represented by the ulama as a political imperative which Abdul Haq grandiosely referred to as the consensus of the Muslim umma.Footnote 98
From their position of political power, the ulama were finally able to effect lasting and considerable recognition of ulama authority. Pakistan was declared an Islamic Republic and a Council of Islamic Ideology was created by constitutional decree. By these provisions, the laws of state had to be in accordance with religious injunction. Opinion on how to do this was to be provided by the council of ulama, which itself had no direct control over legislation, but provided religious interpretation and opinion, both solicited and unsolicited, to the national assembly.Footnote 99 In 1974 the anti-Ahmediyya provisions were accommodated and the constitution was amended to declare the Ahmediyyas non-Muslim and hence a minority community. These provisions were not only symbols but a recognition by the state of both the independent authority of Deobandi scholars like Mufti Mahmud and Abdul Haq, and the relevance of the Deobandi position and authority over the Pakistani state. The constitution of 1973, unlike those of 1956 and 1962, would remain the basis for the Pakistani state (although for the greater part in abeyance under military governments).Footnote 100 Islam became inextricably bound to affairs of society and state, and hence to politics.Footnote 101 While cultivation of this relationship through the promulgation of ‘Islamic’ legislation would not begin until General Zia-ul Haq's coup in 1977 and his ‘Hudood Ordinance’, the relationship between legislation, national ideology, the Pakistani Muslim (and non-Muslim) and the ulama was formalised.
While it would take many years for the consequences of the constitutional provisions to be felt, the ulama party's position in the NWFP allowed it to immediately apply Islamic legislation. Wali Khan's alliance with the JUI, which had been engineered to give him power at a national level, had led him to grant the position of chief minister of the province and dominance over the otherwise Pakhtun nationalist-majority provincial governing body to the JUI president. Hence the JUI's national ambitions came to have their greatest consequences for the NWFP where their popularity was, at best, limited.
Mufti Mahmud's religious nationalism and the NWFP
On the anniversary of Pakistan's independence in 1972, the new Chief Minister of the NWFP, Mufti Mahmud, gave a speech broadcast on Radio Pakistan, articulating his national objective and the manner in which this applied to the province:
Our objective is national unity and the welfare of the state, and we will pay any price to protect this. . . . The most important issue at hand is to order our personal lives in accordance with the code of Islamic conduct. We will not be able to regularise an Islamic way of life throughout the country until such a time that an Islamic system is instituted. . . As far as the NWFP is concerned, we have begun the work of bringing the NWFP's laws in line with Islamic law. . . We want that [such an] Islamic system should become prevalent not only in our own province, but throughout the country.Footnote 102
The national religious agenda that Mufti Mahmud had articulated over the course of his political career was first to be applied in the NWFP. Mufti Mahmud sought to make the province a model of how the nation should be made to adhere to Islamic codes of conduct, and how to apply Islamic law. The NAP president Wali Khan deferred to his political partner on the issue of religion and affairs of state. In a response to his more secular-minded Pakhtun nationalist supporters in 1972, Wali Khan said that ‘his party had accepted the leadership of the Jamiyatul Ulama Islam in the Frontier Province to allow the JUI the opportunity to introduce an Islamic system’.Footnote 103
Mufti Mahmud proposed and created a committee of ulama and ‘authorities’ to review all existing provincial laws to bring these into line with Quranic principles.Footnote 104 Its first act was to propose and oversee the passing of legislation that prohibited the sale and consumption of liquor in the province.Footnote 105 In his 14 August speech, Mufti Mahmud outlined all his other ambitions for religious reform in the province:
Efforts are being made to end the cursed practice of gambling, [the giving of ] dowry is being prohibited, and we have proposed to the central government that government offices be closed on Fridays instead of Sundays.Footnote 106
He subsequently proposed and passed legislation enforcing public observance of the fast during the holy month of Ramadan and forcing women to be in purdah when appearing in public. He banned the charging of interest, made knowledge of the Quran and prayer necessary for entry into college or university, and introduced an initiative to have the Quran taught in 191 of the province's schools.Footnote 107 While no serious arrangements were made for enforcement of these laws, Mufti Mahmud used concern over public morality and religious prescription to restrict politics and all public expression in the province. Although a Pakhtun nationalist lobby, represented politically by the NAP, continued to generate literature, poetry, music, and a vision of an historic and definable ‘Pakhtunistan’, it had, in the interests of representation at national level, conceded its secular position.Footnote 108 Wali Khan made a public statement claiming that secularism had failed, and that he would not press for secularism in the province.Footnote 109 Under pressure from the ulama faction, the NAP had also conceded its championing of Pashtu as the official language of the province.Footnote 110 Further legislation was passed forbidding music and dancing girls, significant aspects of a Pakhtun cultural scene, even at private gatherings. Religious texts, some published by Haqqaniyya's own press but also produced by other presses, dominated the local Urdu literary scene,Footnote 111 disseminating a religious message and defining the ‘important’ and the ‘glorious’ personalities of the province – religious authorities, both from local pirimuridi traditions, and from Deoband.Footnote 112
The course of provincial politics was deeply affected by the start of an armed uprising in Baluchistan when Mufti Mahmud resigned his position as chief minister in solidarity with the NAP government of Baluchistan in 1973.Footnote 113 However the Deobandi ulama remained a force to be contended with. The ulama of the JUI in the NWFP now had the authority to ‘speak’ for the province on a national platform, claiming a religious bent of mind among Pakhtuns as a whole. When the democratically-elected president Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was removed in a coup and then executed in 1979, the ulama were hopeful about the possibilities opened up by the new religiously-inclined military dictator of Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq but, in the absence of a political process, understood their interests as best being served through their social and interpretative authority and local leadership. There was a concerted effort to consolidate interpretative control among those ulama trained in the Deobandi tradition and to strengthen Deobandi control over the interior domain of Islam and the base of religious authority, the madrasas and mosques, to amplify the power of these institutions and of the ulama over civil society. Darul Ulums and deeni madrasas began to induct and train thousands of students from around the province. This process was underway in the NWFP (and in Baluchistan) as the Afghan jihad began, and underlay the involvement of institutions of religious learning and congregation in anti-Soviet organisation and the post-Soviet reconstruction of Afghanistan.
The Afghan Jihad
At least two religious trends had connected politics, religious thought and practice, and militarisation amongst the eastern Pakhtuns through the twentieth century without regard for the Indo-Afghan border intersecting them. These were a reformed Sufi fraternity which had initiated its mission of the “prevention of vice and the promotion of virtue” (amr bil ma'ruf wa nahi anal munkir) in the late nineteenth century into the middle of the twentieth century; and the religious revivalist influences originating from the madrasa darul ulum deoband, which had been patronised by the Afghan courts of Habibullah Khan, Amanullah Khan, and Zahir Shah between 1901 and 1950 as they tried to institutionalise Islam into the state system.Footnote 114 After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, as both influences crystallised within the domain of institutionalised Islam in the North-West Frontier Province, Afghans became naturally involved in this domain of organisation and practice.Footnote 115 Abdul Haq, who was able to invoke both the Sufi and the reformed religious traditions,Footnote 116 succeeded in attracting a large number of eastern Pakhtun students to Haqqaniyya and graduating at least 370 Afghan students between 1945 and 1978, in addition to local Pakhtuns and non-Pakhtun Pakistanis.Footnote 117 The Afghans were mostly from Kandahar, Jalalabad, Ningrahar, Kabul, Khost, Ghazni, Loghman, and Parwan, the traditional enclaves of mullas of the reformed Sufi line.
As Afghan resistance groups began to patch together a unity in exile in Iran and Pakistan, using a language of religious purpose and militancy to organise the uprisings within the country and the politics of the refugees into a jihad, Haqqaniyya Madrasa and its Deobandi ideology came to play a significant role in organisation of anti-Soviet opposition. Political exiles and military resistance fighters from among the large number of displaced southern and eastern Pakhtuns, influenced by the long-standing reputation of Haqqaniyya in their home towns, gravitated towards Haqqaniyya as a centre in which to meet, solicit funds and seek counsel.
By 1981, as Pakhtun migrants into Pakistan started to politically organise a resistance, Abdul Haq encouraged those of his old students involved in the jihad to develop Madrasa Haqqaniyya as an organisational and networking base,Footnote 118 and began to publish news and accounts of the jihad and Haqqaniyya alumni in the madrasa's monthly journal. Abdul Haq's concern over the progress of the jihad was second only to his institutional commitment to the Wafaqul Madaris, and these commitments came together when the Wafaqul Madaris issued a public statement committing support to the mujahidin and declaring the Afghan jihad an issue of concern to the entire Muslim umma.Footnote 119 Abdul Haq used this opportunity to write personally to the seven mujahidin leaders in Peshawar, stating that the jihad of Muslim against the non-believer communists was of great importance to him, and urging a resolution of differences between the groups.Footnote 120
Abdul Haq had a significant personal agency in subsequently maintaining Pakistani Deobandi interest and commitment to the Afghan jihad. He invited an old alim of the Darul Ulum Deoband in India, Maulana Aziz Gul, who had been involved in the 1914–1917 movement in the Tribal Areas, to the annual conference of the Wafaqul Madaris in 1982, asking him to speak about jihad, its relevance to the congregation, and the significance of the North-West Frontier as a location for armed organisation in historical defence of the Muslims of India, and as a fortress set within the mountains of the north-west.Footnote 121 Over the next six years, he spoke repeatedly about the need for the ulama of Pakistan to support the mujahidin materially and morally.Footnote 122 Then, in a speech to the conference of an anti-Shia organisation, the Tehrik-i Nifaz-i Shariat-i Muhammadi, Abdul Haq suggested that the simultaneous efforts of Madrasa Haqqaniyya to encourage the establishment of more religious schools across the region and the waging of jihad by many of his graduates were in fact a single imperative.Footnote 123
Haq combined his simultaneous commitments to his old students and to the Wafaqul Madaris by personally encouraging the establishment of reformist-oriented madrasas, as well as encouraging the leadership at these madrasas to organise in support of the Afghan jihad. He invoked traditional Sufi ties to the mulla Badshah Gul and his son Fazal Manan, in Mohmand to increase their involvement in the jihad.Footnote 124 In Swat, Maulana Sufi Muhammad began to organise Pakhtuns, through his pedagogic authority, to participate in the Afghan jihad while drawing on ideological and institutional connections to the Deobandis. The heads from a number of Tribal Areas madrasas simultaneously swore their commitment to the Tehrik-i Nifaz-i Shariat-i Muhammadi (TNSM) and their commitment to the Afghan resistance at the ‘hand of’ Abdul Haq, using the traditional Sufi device of the oath or bait.Footnote 125 These religious leaders of the Pakistan-side tribal regions were both influenced by the revivalist ideology of the Deobandi ulama of Pakistan and deeply invested in the politics and practices of Pakhtun tribal-living. They mediated in feuds, oversaw the payment of blood money, and directed religious rituals within communities whose communications, marital ties, intellectual and social influences and economies were circumscribed by clan and tribe land holding patterns and the borders which separated them from administered, enfranchised, policed Pakistan. Abdul Haq encouraged their involvement in the jihad, reinforcing the efforts of the Afghan mujahidin leaders who used their own connections here to set up forward bases and supply lines, and recruit amongst the local populations in this crucial border zone.
At first Haqqaniyya served only as informal meeting and networking point for certain of the mujahidin and the Pakistani mullas and ulama, to communicate news of human losses and military successes, and to solicit funds.Footnote 126 When Abdul Haq established the importance of his ‘hujra’Footnote 127 as a meeting space and its potential as a mediating ground, his madrasa was, on at least one occasion, used to channel funds, provided by both the Pakistani government, and international donors to the jihad,Footnote 128 to the mujahidin.Footnote 129 At the same time Haqqaniyya developed and extended its own ideological and institutional connections with the Afghan resistance, inducting and graduating as many new Afghan students in the nine years of the war as it had trained in the thirty years preceding the war.
Immediately after the Soviet withdrawal, ulama on the Pakistan-side, including those at Haqqaniyya, sustained and developed ideological links with the emerging regime in Afghanistan; while many mullas from the more remote madrasas continued to organise military and logistical support for, and encourage Pakistani youth conscription in, the militias of those of the mujahidin who had formed connections with them.Footnote 130 Between 1992 and 1996, a group of Pakhtun Afghan mullas from Kandahar and its surrounds, calling themselves the Taliban, took control across most of Afghanistan. Many of these mullas were ex-mujahidin, and the ulama of Haqqaniyya claimed that up to seventy five percent of the religious leaders who became the Taliban had pedagogic ties with their madrasa. But Abdul Haq had died in 1988 and Haqqaniyya withdrew from direct involvement in Afghanistan's political affairs as they garnered support and commitment from a new quarter – a group of Arab militants who had come to be based in Afghanistan during the period of the jihad. The Taliban, under strong influence from these ideological and financial patrons, fashioned their own political and religious objectives which drew on tribal practices more than on the pedagogy of Deobandi Islam. The Taliban modelled their government as a basic and replicable system of Islamic organisation, in which the directives of the ulama and the mullas, rooted in Quranic precept, were paramount.Footnote 131 The establishment of the Taliban regime led the direction of religious ideological patronage across the Pak-Afghan border to be reversed as the Taliban became sponsors and incubators of a reactionary, militaristic religious imperative in Pakistan.
The Taliban and the Arab-led Islamists in Afghanistan invited madrasa students and religious idealists from around the world to participate in their spiritual-military programme for the reorganisation of Afghanistan. As the Pakistan-side Tribal Areas continued to shelter close to a million Afghan refugees, many local madrasas and ulama felt compelled to choose sides in the ongoing struggle for power in Afghanistan. Madrasa students and mullas, largely from the Tribal Areas but also from as far away as Karachi, were encouraged to enter full service as soldiers and then military commanders for the Taliban.Footnote 132 Connections between the two sides inspired imitation vigilante Taliban style movements in the deeni madrasas in the Pakistani Tribal Areas, and many of the Deobandi ulama of Pakistan, themselves hoping for increased social and judicial authority, touted the Taliban's system of complete religious leadership and religiously derived law as a model system.Footnote 133
After the consolidation of control in Afghanistan by the Taliban, the religious militancy developed and enunciated during the jihad years was a lasting legacy for Pakistan. Separating the politics of religious and political organisation after twenty years of the shared industry and leadership of war became impossible.
Conclusion
Politicisation of the Deobandi ulama of the NWFP, effected gradually over the twentieth century by party-based alliances with the AINC, Ahrars and Muslim League in the pre-partition period, and with the NAP once Pakistan had been created, was reinforced by increasingly skilful use of print, sermons and religious directives which allowed the Deobandi ulama to develop their authority beyond that of elaborating scripture and leading prayer. Because of the particular junctures at which they were able to gain momentum and visibility – the communalism of the pre-partition period, the anti-Ahmedi campaign of the 1950s, and the Afghan jihad – militarism has become an indelible aspect of the NWFP Deobandi political history and has given these ulama a lasting notoriety. And while the Deobandi ulama of the NWFP are careful not to threaten future violence, their continued connections to overtly militaristic groups influenced by Deobandi thought, such as TNSM and Lashkar-i Tayyaba, and to jihadis in the Tribal Areas, suggest that they remain unconvinced by the current system of state and are indulgent of those that need to operate outside its laws.
Despite the fact that the politics and philosophy of the Deobandis have come under attack since 2001 for sustained links to the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the Deobandi ulama of the NWFP have maintained their authority to articulate and represent the faith. This has been largely because of the popularity of Mufti Mahmud and Abdul Haq's successors: Fazlur Rahman and Samiul Haq. These ulama once again executed shrewd and well-timed alliances with other religious groups and articulated a new Pakistani ‘nationalism’, based in anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism, and were able to form a government in the NWFP in the elections of 2002 and once again assume the position of the country's primary national opposition party.
Generations of Deobandi leaders in the NWFP have led the group in political, intellectual and organisational exercises to present some semblance of unanimity, varied and fragmented though they have been among themselves. From the position of strength and authority that such concerted organisation has created, these leaders have, time and again, been able to create unlikely compacts with political groups and actors motivated by radically different agendas to their own – from anti-colonial to nationalist, sectarian, cultural and militant in turn. Shrewdly-executed successive unions of the ulama’s social access and authority with parliamentary strength have increased their visibility, and their provincial and national relevance to a level far greater than what would be supposed, given their numbers and the generally lukewarm reaction that has always met their particular concern with Islamic governance. Hence, although distance from the Darul Ulum Deoband has increased both in space and time, Deobandi thought in Pakistan and the NWFP is organic and thriving. A ‘classic’ interpretation of Islam has evolved into an energetic and responsive stance, its proponents deeply concerned with maintaining the relevance of the ulama and Islam within the national and international politics of the day.
