International organizations (IOs) have been delegated a wide variety of tasks. They are part of the global attempt to find and adopt effective means against climate change, they command armed troops to protect civilians in fragile states, they assist nation-states in solving humanitarian and refugee crises, and they administer the world financial system. Considering the growing relevance of IOs in developing and applying global public policies, there has been increasing interest in their performance. Remarkably, however, our understanding remains limited as to why some IOs outperform others or why IOs that were once successful begin to falter over time.

Making International Institutions Work: The Politics of Performance by Ranjit Lall fills this lacuna, presenting a compelling new theory on the functioning and failure of IOs. Contrary to popular views, Lall contends that the most substantial impediment to their effectiveness is not rogue behavior within the IOs’ bureaucracies. Rather, he identifies the principal challenge as opportunistic interference from individual states or coalitions of states that aim to advance their specific agendas. Drawing on Lall’s own metaphor, he argues that the main obstacles to optimal performance are not institutional “Frankensteins” that were poorly designed from the outset but “Jekyll and Hyde” states that reveal their disruptive or self-serving nature only after the IO is established (18). Lall substantiates his theory through rigorous analysis, using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies. This holistic approach represents a notable departure from traditional studies and offers fresh insights into the performance of IOs that have important implications for both international relations and political science scholarship.

Chapter 2 sets out the book’s broader theoretical framework. It starts with the observation that IOs’ creation naturally involves a high level of complexity and uncertainty. Countries might thus not perfectly “pre-program” IOs. Over time, powerful member states try to find (unilateral) ways of influencing IOs and their bureaucracies. In consequence, the pivotal question is how well the IO can maintain its functional de facto autonomy; that is, “the ability of international bureaucrats to determine which mandate-related problems institutions focus on and what measures they take to address such issues in the absence of interference from states” (37). Lall posits that this ability hinges on two key characteristics: a robust and diversified network of alliances and governance tasks that are difficult for states to monitor. Partners can enhance an institution’s de facto policy autonomy in three ways. First, by raising the political costs, they can reduce the overall incentives for states to capture or control an IO. Second, partners can furnish bureaucrats with valuable information and expertise, thereby bolstering their ability to set the agenda. Third, through financial contributions and payments for products and services, partners can prevent governments from monopolizing an IO’s funding sources.

In addition to the role of partners, the nature of governance tasks also has implications for de facto IO autonomy. Specifically, differing monitoring costs related to these tasks affect the extent to which states can exert control. When monitoring costs are high, states are less likely to acquire comprehensive information about the institution’s operational activities. This increases the realm of actions that bureaucrats can take without direct state oversight and intervention. Overall, Lall does not assume a unidirectional relationship between operational alliances, governance, and de facto policy autonomy, on the one hand, and IO performance, on the other. Instead, he argues that performance and de facto autonomy mutually reinforce each other: better-performing IOs are more likely to attract alliances, granting them greater policy autonomy, which positively influences institutional performance.

Chapter 3 rigorously examines the theory’s macrolevel implications by combining descriptive and multivariate regression analyses. To assess varying levels of IOs’ performance, the book thoughtfully combines data from six distinct donor performance evaluators to analyze a diverse sample of 54 IOs. The data on de facto policy autonomy come from a multiyear survey of high-level IO bureaucrats in these organizations. The remaining variables, specifically, de jure autonomy and operational alliances, are constructed using information gleaned from official institutional websites, annual reports, work programs, and other policy documents. A key asset of this quantitative approach is its comprehensive scrutiny of the data, addressing not only their strengths but also their inherent limitations.

Chapters 4 and 5 offer insightful and well-crafted qualitative examinations of “most-similar” IOs operating in the arenas of international food security (FAO, WFP, IFAD) and global health policy (WHO, UNAIDS, Gavi, GFATM). Both chapters demonstrate how variations in de facto, as opposed to de jure, policy autonomy can account for disparate performance pathways. These insights again underscore the importance of operational alliances and governance tasks. Chapter 6 challenges the notion that there is necessarily a trade-off between the accountability and performance of IOs, a conclusion one might reach based on the preceding chapters. The book argues that so-called second wave accountability (SWA) mechanisms can effectively supplant traditional state oversight and control mechanisms. These SWAs may not directly alter the range of actions available to bureaucrats, but they still enhance accountability through added layers of transparency, evaluation, investigation, and participatory mechanisms.

Although this book offers a robust theoretical framework and compelling empirical analysis, there are areas that warrant further research and scrutiny. Notably, despite the generally positive portrayal of bureaucrats, they (surprisingly) remain outside the focus of the empirical analysis. Ultimately, it is these bureaucrats who play an active role in establishing organizational alliances, thereby shaping the IOs’ de facto autonomy. Recent research on both international and national public administration, however, has revealed that bureaucracies do vary significantly in their ambitions to make a difference and to actively engage in policy matters (J. Ege, M.W. Bauer, and N. Wagner, “Improving Generalizability in Transnational Bureaucratic Influence Research: A (Modest) Proposal,” International Studies Review, 22(3), 2020). L. Bayerlein, C. Knill, and Y. Steinebach (A Matter of Style: Organizational Agency in Global Public Policy, 2020), for instance, show that bureaucracies develop different administrative routines (styles) that vary in the degree to which they involve outside actors in support mobilization or policy promotion. The appearance of these diverse approaches appears to be influenced by factors intrinsic to the bureaucracy, such as bureaucratic capacity (M. Heinzel and A. Liese, “Managing Performance and Winning Trust: How World Bank Staff Shape Recipient Performance,” Review of International Organizations, 16, 2021) and the presence or absence of a strong organizational identity and esprit de corps (A. E. Juncos and K. Pomorska, “Manufacturing Esprit de Corps: The Case of the European External Action Service,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 52, 2014). So, there could be more going on than saying states mess things up while bureaucrats keep things running smoothly. An even more “complete” approach would involve investigating why some IO bureaucracies are more proactive in defending their autonomy, whereas others are more prone to be resigned to their fate. Additionally, it is noteworthy that IOs can exhibit considerable variations in institutional performance even when operating under similar levels of de facto autonomy (87). This observation aligns well with the earlier point about heterogeneity in bureaucratic ambitions and actions. The crucial question, therefore, is what enables certain bureaucracies to effectively leverage their de facto autonomy for improved performance, whereas others fail to do so. Understanding these nuances could provide deeper insights into the complexities of organizational performance and the role of both states and IOs’ bureaucracies therein.

To conclude, the book offers a very compelling analysis of “the performance puzzle” (5) of IOs that is outstanding in its theoretical and empirical components. Scholars, students, and general readers alike will highly appreciate this theory-guided empirical research. Furthermore, the book lays the groundwork for new ways of thinking and understanding institutional performance, thereby introducing new research domains, some of which I outlined here.