‘This is a time to be optimistic about the possibility of reducing corruption’, declared World Bank Director Moisés Naím in his 1995 article ‘The Corruption Eruption’.Footnote 1 Like many experts working in international finance – business journalists as well as leading economists – he observed that, in the early 1990s, ‘corruption scandals in every region of the world, regardless of cultural background or gross national product’ had started to become a main issue of political dispute. Moreover, Naím was positive about combating the ‘cancer’ of corruption effectively as he finally perceived a general preference for free-market remedies: privatisation and the demise of governmental interventionism would now eliminate ‘the years of hidden day-to-day corruption prevalent in state-owned companies’.Footnote 2 But there seemed to be even more ground for optimism. Even Italy, a Western society which, according to Naím, ‘traditionally tolerated corruption at the highest levels’, had been facing an unprecedented judicial investigation into political corruption in 1992 and was now following the apparently successful path of ‘economic liberalisation’ and ‘marketisation’.Footnote 3
This article demonstrates that the emergence of intense national debates on corruption and the heyday of neoliberal thinking in Europe were not merely concurrent trends. Using Italy’s long-standing controversy over corruption as a case study, I show that, in the early 1990s, the specific reception of neoliberal ideas contributed both to the sanctioning of moral misconduct of public officials and to a pathologisation of state institutions. This article therefore examines Italian discourses on corruption surrounding the most extensive judicial inquiry that led to the collapse of the country’s post-war party system. I argue that distinct national actors sought to legitimise neoliberal reform initiatives by strategically leveraging the corruption debate. These key protagonists included the employers’ association Confindustria, leading economists and, not least, the newly founded right-wing party Forza Italia under Silvio Berlusconi. In essence, Italian interest groups and political actors used the corruption debate as a ‘lock pick’ – a metaphor also employed by a leading Italian economist who advocated privatisation – to advance their specific, yet highly divergent, agendas. Within the panorama of concurrent global corruption scandals during the 1990s, Italy offers a particularly revealing case; Ioannis Androulakis characterised it even as the most instructive one.Footnote 4 Likewise, Philip Ther and Jonathan Hopkin referred to Italy as a prime example of European market liberalisations and novel forms of anti-politics, which is too often described in terms of anomalies.Footnote 5 This article demonstrates that, in Italy, the idea of drastically reducing state interventionism as an effective remedy for corruption was neither superimposed from abroad nor did national actors merely advocate neoliberal policies as technical responses to supranational ‘constraints’, as an influential national narrative suggested.Footnote 6 Instead, by analysing how actors justified privatisation and liberalisation policies in the leading national media, I reveal the discursive strategies that helped reframe corruption as primarily a problem of distorted economic incentives. While the flaws of the anti-interventionist approach have been widely discussed in recent anti-corruption research, this article shows why, in Italy, this approach’s inherent scepticism towards public institutions corresponded to conclusions that actors drew from domestic experiences.Footnote 7 Overall, by analysing the shift in corruption discourses in Italy, this article confirms the idea that neoliberalism emerged primarily in response to context-specific national conditions. At the same time, however, it shows that the ideology’s consolidation and its translation in policy reform agendas could only gain momentum within the broader transnational discursive context in which these reforms were embedded. In this regard, this article also contributes to contextualising Italy’s debates on politics and society beyond national narratives.Footnote 8
In the scholarly debate on the implementation of neoliberal reform policies in Europe, the idea of anti-corruption campaigns serving as vehicles for market liberalisation is not new. Building on Jonathan Hopkin’s thesis of an ‘economic turn’ in anti-corruption research, scholars of different disciplines have demonstrated how, during the 1990s, leading economists associated with the IMF or World Bank advocated for deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation policies as most effective remedies to corruption.Footnote 9 However, while notions of Washington Consensus institutions as drivers of a neoliberal ‘silent revolution’ are increasingly questioned in the field, most studies which analyse anti-corruption in its link to neoliberal realignments implicitly assume an internationalisation of neoliberal belief systems.Footnote 10 In such a perspective, the impact of the usual suspects appears paramount; scholars working on the internationalisation of foreign bribery legislation such as Hartmut Berghoff have emphasised US administrations’ decisive role in exerting pressure on governments for implementing liberalisation policies.Footnote 11 Similarly, a third strand of research emphasised how NGOs such as Transparency International, most notably through rating instruments such as the Corruption Perceptions Index introduced in 1995, spread neoliberal forms of performance assessment.Footnote 12 However, as most of these studies assume that international factors started to shape national debates, as Jens-Ivo Engels argued for West Germany, they adopt the perspective of a neoliberal export–import model, which was criticised by Quinn Slobodian and Dieter Plehwe for neglecting domestic roads to neoliberalism.Footnote 13 Similar arguments of neoliberal institutions’ ‘interventions’ have also been inherent in case studies such as on Albania by Blendi Kajsiu and on Italy by Vincenzo Scaglia, which particularly reproduced older normative preoccupations of global players’ interest in fighting corruption.Footnote 14 Overall, these approaches do neither sufficiently explain the specific domestic appeal of neoliberal anti-corruption policies nor can they provide insight into possible national origins of these ideas.
By highlighting local agency, this article advances research on the varieties of neoliberalism within Europe, as well as on its ‘mutations’ and surprising alliances. It explores the apparent contradiction of how Silvio Berlusconi’s right-wing party, Forza Italia, was founded and impacted by neoliberal economists, a detail that monolithic approaches to the history of neoliberalism, which distinguish between conventional policies and rhetoric, have not given much importance to.Footnote 15 Therefore, this article builds on research which has convincingly suggested examining the ideology’s entanglements and appropriations rather than as its defining characteristic – a perspective that was itself stimulated by the ‘strange’ neoliberal metamorphoses of our present.Footnote 16 While the editors of Nine Lives of Neoliberalism pointed to the Italian right-wing party as an example, the convergence of neoliberalism, anticommunism and populist rhetoric in Berlusconi’s party has remained a footnote.Footnote 17 Similarly, scholars have largely focused on certain sectors on which neoliberal thought had a strong impact, such as on national economic policies or on welfare, while Philip Ther and the authors of Mutant Neoliberalism have suggested to analyse how actors helped advance neoliberalism as a communicative phenomenon, particularly with regard to the explanation of its policies in mass media.Footnote 18 Accordingly, Philip Ther suggested to frame Italy’s extensive privatisation of state-run companies as an example of ‘situational neoliberalism’.Footnote 19 However, such a technical explanation is based solely on the most widely accepted contemporary justification for privatisations: the need to reduce substantial public debt in order to meet EU convergence criteria. Focusing on the Italian corruption debate helps clarify why, in Italy, a specific neoliberal approach to combating corruption went hand in hand with contesting the established parties, as well as with anticommunism. In this way, this article contributes to further questioning the powerful national narrative according to which an unruly Italian electorate and parties otherwise critical to free market forces were, under the guidance of technocratic elites, disciplined by ‘external constraints’ (vincolo esterno).Footnote 20
Methodologically, this article combines discourse analysis, history of concepts and critical media analysis to examine the transformation of the Italian debate on corruption in its link to neoliberal reform projects. Since scholarship on anti-corruption and Italy has highlighted national media’s crucial role in scandalising deviant behaviour and mobilising a critical ‘public’ opinion, a media-centred approach is essential for analysing the shifting perception of the issue.Footnote 21 Beyond earlier research’s focus on scandalisation, this article examines what Pier Paolo Giglioli, by contrast, termed print media’s ‘technical’ discourse, that is, the coverage of corruption in its economic policy implications.Footnote 22 The discourse-analytical dimension allows me to historicise the explanations and remedies of corruption that different political and business actors proposed. Moreover, the combination of these methodological dimensions reveals how these actors deliberately used media outlets as platforms to promote their economic agendas, particularly in the run-up to major political decisions. Given both the profound crisis of legitimacy affecting Italy’s political élites at the beginning of the 1990s and the broad range of positions voiced in the leading media, newspapers constituted a principal arena in which emerging political, economic and civil-society actors competed to shape public understandings of corruption. As such, they provide the most stable and accessible text-based corpus for analysing the discursive patterns within the national public sphere.
The empirical analysis therefore focuses on Italy’s four leading newspapers (Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa and the business daily Il Sole 24 Ore) selected for their circulation, their prominence in shaping public opinion and orientation towards a broad readership rather than a single-party constituency. Together, these newspapers encompass perspectives ranging from the centre-right to the reform-oriented left, with La Repubblica serving as a forum for diverse currents within the latter, while Il Sole 24 Ore provides access to business- and employer-oriented positions. L’Unità, although included in the corpus, is consulted at the most critical junctures of economic policy debate, where reconstructing the positions of the (post-)communist left is particularly relevant.Footnote 23 Likewise, parliamentary and television debates – however crucial for analysing Italy’s broader transformation in this period – are drawn upon only very selectively, for the reasons outlined above.Footnote 24 Within the empirical limits of this article, I examine a limited number of key governmental speeches that further illuminate the political implications of these developments. To capture the international framing of Italy’s economic transformation, this article draws sparingly on The Economist, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Financial Times as leading business-related newspapers in Europe, whose influence extended well beyond their national readerships.
The structure of the article reflects major shifts in the Italian controversy on corruption. To carve out its neoliberal turn during the 1990s, the first section provides insight into the debate’s historical characteristics in the preceding decades, focusing on why corruption became increasingly scandalised in the late 1970s. The neoliberal reconfiguration of the controversy frames the subsequent sections, which examine 1992–6 as a critical juncture when the scandalisation of systemic corruption transformed the Italian political landscape. As Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci argued, this period represented a largely unrealised window of opportunity for sustainable exit from political corruption, making it crucial to understand the then prevailing economic policy discourse.Footnote 25 The second section demonstrates the qualitative shift in discourse of leading business-oriented media, where corruption coverage became closely tied to economic restructuring. The following two sections examine why different actors – from economic pressure groups to novel political entrepreneurs – employed and hence reinforced neoliberal anti-corruption discourse. The third section analyses the reasons why the employers’ association Confindustria and leading economists leveraged the corruption controversy. The final section examines the discourse through which Silvio Berlusconi and his economic advisors launched their party Forza Italia. While scholars such as Jonathan Hopkin argued that Italy’s post-1992 technocrat and centre-left governments broadly embraced scepticism towards state interventionism, it may surprise that Berlusconi’s then novel political project – commonly seen as emblematic of Italy’s political chaos – began as an anti-corruption and neoliberal party.Footnote 26 This case proves particularly instructive because of the party’s inherent contradictions, revealing neoliberal ideology’s outstanding adaptability both across the political spectrum and to national experiences.
The Salience of Corruption Scandals in Italy Since the Late 1970s
The idea that corruption in Italy flourished as the result of excessive state interventionism did not emerge suddenly. This section shows why corruption debates in Italy, despite their long history in political culture, gained significant momentum during the 1970s. While their shift arguably produced the discursive configurations which enabled neoliberal reformers to capitalise on the issue during the 1990s, the trajectory of this transformation was far from being predetermined. Criticism of the largest public sector within a Western democracy was, for a long time, largely absent from Italian political and media discourse.
For understanding the debate’s transformation in the 1990s, it is crucial to note at the outset that although corruption may well be portrayed as a timeless phenomenon, neither its scandalisation nor its meanings ever were.Footnote 27 The historicity of corruption becomes evident through the long-standing lack of electoral account and in the very problem of definition.Footnote 28 Recent scholarship emphasised how today’s dominant understandings of the phenomenon were formulated in the 1990s precisely by those actors – the World Bank and Transparency International – who themselves transformed public perceptions of the issue.Footnote 29 However, the clarity of their definitions and their emphasis on the culpability of public officials stands also in sharp contrast to the long-standing ambiguity of ‘corruzione’ in Italian media and political discourse. Well into the 1970s, the local news pages employed the term to denote general moral or sexual depravity rather than the bribery of political, administrative or business elites.Footnote 30 Even when applied to cases of political corruption reported in the front pages, media accusations of ‘corruzione’ conveyed a diffuse moral outrage, which, borrowing from those broader connotations, exceeded the bounds of legally defined offences established in the Penal Code since 1889.Footnote 31 This should not, however, obscure the fact that episodes of bribery of public officials did receive significant public attention during Italy’s post-war decades.
The Italian debate on political corruption has a long history, which is particularly marked by its entanglement with discussions of an allegedly defective national character. In this respect, Italy’s trajectory differs from most Western European societies after 1945, where corruption – cases of bribery notwithstanding – was not considered a national problem.Footnote 32 While a comprehensive historical account of Italian corruption remains a desideratum, there is little doubt that, as Paul Ginsborg argued, widespread clientelism provided the breeding ground in which collusion could flourish. This nexus runs from the corruption debates of Liberal Italy through fascism and into the republican era.Footnote 33 In the postwar period, corruption was even further enabled by a mutual dependency between a bureaucracy that had emerged from fascism, morally delegitimised and in need of cover, and a political class reliant on bureaucratic cooperation.Footnote 34 Even if most local politicians and administrators may not have engaged in systematic corrupt practices, a ‘clan mentality’ often linked some of them with business actors in networks where family or political interests prevailed over those of the state, forming the substratum on which criminal activity could thrive.Footnote 35
Whatever structural its causes, both foreign observers and Italians themselves recurrently drew on arguably national vices when accounting for corruption in ‘Il Belpaese’. All too familiar is the scathing irony of foreign commentary, reflected for instance by a Financial Times article on Italy’s 1990s crisis titled ‘when honesty means sharing your bribes’.Footnote 36 Even foreign coverage of Italy’s scandals in the 1970s had suggested that bribery had ever since been part of ‘politics Italian style’.Footnote 37 Yet, already at this time such interpretations were feeding into a vehement anti-italianismo within Italian society itself. According to Silvana Patriarca, this critical attitude towards national identity, often voiced through tropes of deficiency, originated in the nation-building process. It was, however, the cultural productions of the post-war era which, playfully but nonetheless formatively, consolidated defective collective imaginaries. In this way, the popular commedia all’italiana portrayed the willingness to climb the social ladder at any cost (arrivismo) or the allegedly eternal political opportunism (trasformismo, e.g. of former fascists turned Catholic conservatives) as defining traits of Italianness.Footnote 38 With regard to corruption, this negative collective imaginary is evident in the coverage of the weekly magazine L’Espresso of corruption in the 1950s, which titled its investigation into Roman real-estate speculation ‘Corrupt Capital – Infected Nation’.Footnote 39 By the end of the 1970s, leading exponents of anti-italianismo – among them journalists Indro Montanelli and Giorgio Bocca – increasingly tied this sentiment to the issue of corruption, while a new genre of popular police-thrillers reinforced the narrative of an inherently corrupt Italian state.Footnote 40
However, this issue also gained importance due to discursive logics linked to the Cold War conflict within Italy, as both Italian communists and Christian Democrats leveraged corruption as a delegitimisation strategy directed against the ideological opponent. At the same time, all major parties used this topic to distance the new democratic order from the fascist regime, in which bribery among public officials had increased even compared with the liberal period. When Alcide De Gasperi (Christian Democrats) formed his government in 1953, La Stampa stressed that, by combating ‘corruzione’, he had taken on the most ‘explosive issues in daily political controversy’.Footnote 41 As party leaders and newspapers repeatedly observed, it would take time ‘to heal a country that had been subjected to twenty years of dictatorial immorality’.Footnote 42 From their perspective, corruption appeared as a deeply rooted societal problem, and the major parties and a national press closely aligned with them assumed the pedagogical responsibility for initiating a process of moral and institutional ‘healing’. Such a reading of corruption became particularly challenged when this specific post-war model of democracy came into crisis from the 1970s on.
It was during this period that the corruption discourse narrowed onto the parties’ illicit financing as well as on their exploitation of state resources. Paradoxically, the opaque ways through which Italian parties financed their costly organisational machines even intensified when the Italian parliament, in line with other Western European countries between the late 1960s and 1980s, introduced a public funding model in 1974.Footnote 43 Since legal options then proved to be insufficient, the parties primarily benefited from transactions involving the large state-controlled enterprise sector. In the 1980s, particularly the Socialist Party under Bettino Craxi translated these conventions into a highly centralised system of corruption.Footnote 44 It was nourished by an increasingly perverted system of local government contracting, in which a new generation of political personnel became what Alessandro Pizzorno termed ‘business politicians’, entering office to exploit its economic potential for personal enrichment and career advancement.Footnote 45 Similarly, when awarding public contracts, companies usually paid a kind of party bonus, from which almost all parties benefited. This logic of ‘lottizzazione’ also played a crucial role whenever positions were assigned based on party affiliation, as it was customary for the appointees to pay part of their salary to their respective party as a kind of tax. Specifically, the Communist Party rewarded loyal supporters by helping them to find employment in the civil service, thereby providing them with an income that the party organisation could not secure.Footnote 46 While illegal party financing was by no means unique to Italy, its scale and the opportunities for enrichment in a large public sector were exceptional.Footnote 47 According to leading experts, Italian political parties received around 3,400 billion lire per year in illegal funding – over 10 times their official 1989 income – with some single public and private companies contributing up to 800 billion lire annually (413 million euros, adjusted to inflation).Footnote 48 Scholarship also explained the prominence of these issues as a result of parties generally becoming more dependent on state subsidies since the 1970s, while they increasingly detached from their roots in civil society.Footnote 49
The rising prominence of the corruption issue did not unfold in isolation, a fact often obscured by the dominant preoccupations of the national debate. This became most evident in the Lockheed bribery affair, whose exposure by a US congressional committee in 1976 triggered significant political repercussions, most notably in Japan, the Netherlands and Italy. As Ronald Kroeze and others argued, the scandal surrounding the aerospace multinational’s corrupt pursuit of market influence marked a decisive step towards a global, US-led anti-corruption movement ultimately culminating in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.Footnote 50 Notably, this shift was less driven by an overarching foreign trade agenda than by a post-Watergate domestic climate of political distrust. In Italy, the Lockheed scandal crystallised in the affair surrounding State President Giovanni Leone, which Simona Colarizi identifies as the beginning of a series of widely resonating corruption scandals that eroded the legitimacy of governing parties.Footnote 51 Although the accusations against Leone were, according to all available evidence, unfounded, the progressive press portrayed the Neapolitan president as the archetypal corrupt politician, seemingly embodying a range of national problems: beyond party financing and tax avoidance among the wealthy, this debate centred on clientelism and perceived political-cultural distinctiveness of the country’s South.Footnote 52 This again fuelled debates which, in the early 1990s, enabled the separatist Northern League to capitalise on the idea that Italianness and corruption were synonymous.Footnote 53
Most importantly, however, minor opposition parties and progressive media outlets used the affair strategically to delegitimise Italy’s leading parties ahead of a crucial referendum – a pattern which would prove central for later debates. Press coverage on Leone reached its peak in both intensity and volume during the weeks preceding the June 1978 referendum on the abolition of state funding for political parties – a referendum promoted by minor parties such as the leftist Radical Party and, for very different political ends, supported by the neo-fascist party. Their rhetoric converged in branding the country’s leading parties as a corrupt elite whilst attempting, through this Manichean discourse, to mobilise the electorate as ‘popolo’ (the people).Footnote 54 Although the referendum narrowly failed, it represented a vote of no confidence in the country’s leading parties, prompting Giovanni Leone to resign just days later.
Yet, in terms of economic policies, the primary lesson that most public commentators and politicians drew from the bribery scandals of the late 1970s was the need to expand, rather than curtail, the state’s capacity to exercise control. In contrast to the 1990s, political and media actors did not challenge the public sector itself, but framed the improvement of public and political morality as society’s most urgent need.Footnote 55 Most prominently, Enrico Berlinguer and the Communist Party articulated this through the questione morale (moral question) – a discourse through which the national secretary sought to reposition the Italian communists as the ‘party of the honest’ after the failure of his parliamentary cooperation with the Christian Democrats (the so called compromesso storico).Footnote 56 This vague principle of moral improvement reverberated throughout editorials during the 1980s, entailing proposals for strengthening institutional control mechanisms and regulatory frameworks. As legal philosopher Norberto Bobbio characteristically formulated it, only enhanced ‘controllability of those exercising power at all times’ could combat corruption and thereby improve ‘public morality’.Footnote 57 Such convictions found expression in government proposals across the political spectrum to adopt more severe penalties for corrupt public officials and to transfer investigative instruments such as leniency programmes that the judiciary had developed in combating mafia and political terrorism.Footnote 58 Similarly, in 1986, a renowned public-law seminar urged the government to confront ‘rampant corruption among public administrators’ by revising the Penal Code and pursuing more targeted action against public officials, whilst explicitly rejecting any blanket condemnation of the state sector.Footnote 59
Nonetheless, this period also opened a space for home-grown neoliberal critiques of Italy’s state-centred economic model. Fabio Masini argued that impulses from Italian neoliberals – though largely absent from politics before the 1990s – increasingly informed pressure groups seeking to realign economic policies.Footnote 60 This is partly reflected by Confindustria, the main association of Italian enterprises which Masini characterises as a voice of more radical defence of the market.Footnote 61 At the height of the corruption scandals, Guido Carli, at the time president of Confindustria, presented a blueprint for reorganising state involvement in economic management which diverged sharply from calls for tighter state control. According to Carli, administrative discretion with ‘political prices’ set below production costs had become a major driver of corruption: as long as the scope of state intervention remained opaque, such practices no longer served social needs but contributed to Italy’s ‘society of uncertainty’ in which corruption could thrive.Footnote 62 The critique gained further weight in 1983 when Confindustria presented a study summarised by a former Minister of Budget and Economic Planning Giorgio La Malfa – the very official who had overseen state planning – who now argued that Italy’s system of ‘financing industrial activities through the state’ had significantly increased inefficiency and political corruption.Footnote 63 However, while Carli’s proposals were fiercely rejected by his colleagues, Confindustria’s main proposals still suggested, in 1985, improving the quality rather than questioning the existence of governmental control, calling, for example, for greater publicity of legal regulations.Footnote 64
Italy’s export-led buoyancy in the mid-1980s may have limited the appeal of such plans for realigning the economic order. Although achieved under conditions of massive public debt and, as Donatella Della Porta and Alberto Vannucci noted, increasingly systemic political corruption, these conditions may explain why such measures remained largely confined to pressure groups.Footnote 65 Within Confindustria, however, a discursive linkage of privatisation as key solution to corruption became visible only by the late 1980s. This is reflected in how Corriere della Sera characterised the organisation’s priorities under Sergio Pininfarina’s presidency as centred on privatisation, which it apostrophised as essential ‘to make the Italian economic system efficient and competitive’ and ‘to break once and for all the “perverse entanglements” between politics and business’.Footnote 66 However, as the following section demonstrates, these positions only gained substantial influence in the early 1990s.
The Transformation of Italian Media’s Economic Policy Conclusions During the Tangentopoli Scandal (c. 1992–6)
Starting with the arrest of local socialist politician Mario Chiesa, who, in February 1992, was caught accepting a bribe in a Milan retirement home, a local investigation into political corruption expanded into the nationwide scandal soon known as Tangentopoli. Scholars agree that Mani pulite investigations’ societal and political impact – leading within the next two years to over 4,525 arrests and involving more than 1,000 politicians – was partly due to a transformed, scandalising media framing of corruption, as Pier Paolo Giglioli and Paolo Mancini have highlighted.Footnote 67 To assess, however, whether this controversy also became a vehicle for advancing Italy’s most significant attempt at economic reform requires examining an aspect to which Giglioli devoted little attention: the media’s ostensibly ‘technical discourse’.Footnote 68 Far from being merely descriptive and ‘rational’, particularly conservative and business-oriented newspapers translated corruption revelations into calls for a ‘slim state’ as the solution to Italy’s political and economic crisis.
In this period, most prominently Il Corriere della Sera and the business daily Il Sole 24 Ore intensified calls for ending state interventionism and, consequently, corruption, which they bolstered through international investment expertise. The reception of the 1993 Morgan Stanley country report exemplified this logic, as it portrayed Italy as offering ‘an attractive picture’ for foreign investors, undergoing ‘a double revolution – political and economic – as profound as perestroika in Russia, but much more promising’. The report urged the privatisation of large parts of the public sector and argued that restoring the country’s credibility required eliminating corruption as well as other market distortions such as massive state subsidies, particularly to the South.Footnote 69 The country’s most widely read newspaper even invited the report’s authors to contribute a guest article in which they expressed the hope that corrupt politicians had instilled in Italians a ‘healthy and long-lasting aversion to state-interventionism’.Footnote 70 Also, Il Sole 24 Ore’s reading of OECD recommendations suggested that privatisations could achieve both aims simultaneously: reducing Italy’s massive public debt while restoring ‘the credibility of numerous institutions’.Footnote 71 While Il Sole 24 Ore was traditionally close to the economic policy positions of its main financier, the employers’ association Confindustria, it is crucial to note that such calls were not limited to conservative or business-oriented press.
Important voices of the left-leaning press also embraced elements of this interpretation, albeit with significant qualifications. La Repubblica, for instance, argued in its April 1993 business supplement that ‘delinquent Keynesianism’ had widened the gap between Italy and the ‘rest of civil Europe’ and presented privatisations as one way to consign the most extreme forms of collusion to the past.Footnote 72 Even L’Unità, aligned with the former Italian Communist Party and, from 1991, the PDS, did not fundamentally reject privatisation as a means of combating corruption. While its editorials framed the scandal primarily as evidence of a country ‘damaged from above’, by Craxi and a Christian Democratic establishment implicated in collusion, its economic commentary was largely informed by Alfredo Reichlin.Footnote 73 The PDS politician argued that privatisation could strengthen the country’s productive forces and promote growth only if it challenged the narrow oligarchy that had come to dominate both state and market; his disagreement thus concerned less the principle than its implementation.Footnote 74 Like Italy’s leading administrative lawyer, Sabino Cassese, he rejected the assumption that privatisation would in itself reduce corruption, dismissing this as a facile yet dominant interpretation, or, in Cassese’s words, as ‘hypocritical’ and ‘superficial’, with no direct effect on the reduction of corruption.Footnote 75 However, from 1992 onwards precisely such reasoning was reinforced by prominent Italian intellectuals such as Ernesto Galli della Loggia and other academics publishing in the conservative and business press, who portrayed the entrepreneurial state as a prerequisite for ‘illegality and corruption’ – a logic exemplified by political scientist Angelo Panebianco.Footnote 76
Thus, the only remaining option is the road of privatisations. […] You don’t want to privatise? You think we must keep […] the public railways, the state telephone system, etc. and all the other countless things that could easily be entrusted to the market and thereby gain in efficiency? Well then, resign yourself to corruption. To expect to have both statism and, on the same time, a decrease of corruption is a contradiction in terms.Footnote 77
While the scale of the judicial revelations seemed to have made broad contestation of Italy’s dirigiste state inevitable, media comments effectively set the terms and direction of this public outrage. This is evident in the so-called Pharmaceutical Scandal, which stands out as emblematic among the myriad discoveries made during the Mani Pulite operation.Footnote 78 Newspapers largely personified this scandal by focusing on Duilio Poggiolini, dubbed the ‘King Midas of Medical Malpractice’. As director of the National Health Service, he had overseen the distribution of most pharmaceuticals in Italian healthcare and was later convicted for having amassed parts of his fortune through bribes.Footnote 79 Moreover, public healthcare officials had accepted the purchase of inferior products and continued to distribute blood reserves despite the lack of quality controls, first in Italy, later abroad.Footnote 80 As more than 3,000 Italians became infected during blood transfusions in the relevant period, most of them with hepatitis C and also with HIV, Poggiolini and the former Minister of Health were accused of bearing responsibility for over 400 resulting deaths.Footnote 81 While national media framed the damage inflicted above all in personalised stories of guilt and decline – a moral coverage which Paolo Mancini identifies as typical of corruption scandalsFootnote 82 – commentators also invoked this scandal to argue that only privatisations could end ‘statism’ that enabled such corruption.Footnote 83
Media outlets thus played an active role in the broad rethink on the economic pillars of Italian democracy. This became particularly evident in the discussions surrounding the abolition of the so-called Ministry of State Shareholdings – hailed as a ‘farewell to the owner state’.Footnote 84 Among the crucial institutional questions of the April 1993 referendum, Italian voters were asked to decide whether to abolish this Ministry, whose primary task was to govern the complex network of state-owned enterprises. Established in 1956 as a powerful instrument to stimulate growth in depressed areas, leading parties still in the 1980s, when the Ministry faced profound criticism, had cheered the institution as indispensable.Footnote 85 By 1993, however, none of the major parties actively campaigned for the Ministry’s continuation. The short-lived government of Socialist Prime Minister Giuliano Amato had already curtailed its responsibilities several months prior to the referendum, and in the end, 90.1 per cent of voters supported its abolition. Remarkably, this issue was among the least politicised in an otherwise tense campaign, during which all parties with the sole exception of the Communist Refoundation Party advocated the abolition.Footnote 86 Although the Amato government presented this primarily as a measure to reduce Italy’s substantial national debt through privatisations, newspapers emphasised the Ministry’s long-standing reputation as a symbol of political corruption, amplifying the anti-establishment positions of a referendum movement which, though unable to translate its success into parliamentary representation, had dedicated itself explicitly to the Ministry’s abolition.Footnote 87
The conservative and business-oriented press both reflected and drove the qualitative transformation of the controversy; this, however, raises the question of which actors beyond, or more precisely through the media, actively leveraged the corruption debate to pursue privatisations and, more broadly, the dismantling of the entrepreneurial state.
Corruption Scandals as the ‘Lock Pick for Privatisations’
Employer groups and influential economists exploited the corruption scandal to build popular support for drastic economic measures, particularly privatisation. While Rome’s privatisation efforts had begun in the late 1980s, such policies massively accelerated beginning with the Amato government in 1992. Scholarship attributes this primarily to economic pressure both due to the massive public debt crisis and the need to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria.Footnote 88 This section demonstrates how the corruption discourse complemented narratives of ‘external constraints’ (‘vincoli esterni’) through ‘Europe’, which Oddný Helgadóttir and others have already proven to build the pretext for, in fact, very ‘interni’ economic policy conclusions.Footnote 89 The corruption controversy’s allegedly catalysing effect for privatisations was contemporaneously reflected by the most popular newspaper, which described Tangentopoli as ‘the lock pick for privatisations’, echoing former Treasury Minister Guido Carli’s assertion that ‘without the investigations, not a single public enterprise would have been sold’.Footnote 90 Although contestable, this perception reflects the catalysing effect which various actors attributed to the scandal in its economic policy dimension.
The repositioning of the employers’ association Confindustria provides a prime example of how interest groups intensified their calls for the state to ‘withdraw’ from the economy following the Tangentopoli scandal and before the landmark April 1993 referendums. In a television show during the run-up to the plebiscite, chairman Luigi Abete claimed that Confindustria had ‘always advocated for privatisation’, framing this as the association’s long-standing commitment to tackling corrupt exchanges between business and politics.Footnote 91 However, while the association’s position papers as late as 1991 had carefully rejected the notion that ‘inefficiency’ was inherent to a state-led economy like Italy’s, this stance also contradicted the association’s more dialogical approach in the 1970s (see ‘The salience of corruption scandals in Italy since the late 1970s’ section). As the investigations unfolded, Confindustria’s interventions abandoned such nuanced distinctions, merging its critique of dirigiste economic policies and political corruption into a compelling narrative.Footnote 92 ‘Privatising everything’ and creating ‘a much slimmer state’, as a scholar put it in the association’s newspaper Il Sole 24 Ore, would eliminate Italy’s ‘various bribevilles’.Footnote 93 Most importantly, Confindustria’s discourse centred on the notion that promoting ‘competitiveness’ across every sector of the economy and society would overcome overarching national deficits, of which corruption was merely one manifestation.Footnote 94
The distinctly neoliberal character of this position became further evident as Italian employers and politically influential scholars adopted an ideological tone which echoed an economic civilising mission. At a 1993 event at Bocconi University, Abete claimed that Italy’s traditional ‘vices’ stemmed from its propensity for political and economic collusion, arguing that ‘statism’ had enabled the ‘convenient principle of clientelism’. By contrast, Confindustria’s leaders proposed reshaping national mentalities through the reconfiguration of the economic fabric, describing their commitment as ‘eradicating […] the logic of abuse, collusion and blackmail from the country’s cultural vocabulary’.Footnote 95 Similarly, Mario Monti, then Bocconi rector and future EU commissioner, argued that once the culture of collusion was overcome, a culture of competition would emerge.Footnote 96
Corruption as the result of Italy’s state-run economy offered a compelling structural explanation in a country where respective cultural scapegoating had long resonated widely – and was specifically revived during this period. The portrayal of corruption as a manifestation of Southern backwardness, of mafia and of Rome as a parasitic capital thwarting the ‘productive North’ had long traditions, but the then separatist Northern League Party specifically capitalised on these stereotypes during Italy’s political transformation, entering government for the first time in 1994.Footnote 97 By contrast, the systemic diagnosis presented by the employers’ association and influential economists furthermore aligned with the emerging economic scholarship on anti-corruption.
This ‘economic turn’ in the international academic study of corruption from the late 1980s requires brief explanation, as one of its key intellectual origins was precisely its corrective to long-dominant cultural explanations of the phenomenon. Deriving from academic engagement with corruption in developing countries, political economists such as Robert Klitgaard presented cross-regional economic criteria applicable regardless of cultural background. This intellectual orientation was later shared by civil society movements like Transparency International (founded 1993), which likewise emerged from development aid experiences. At the same time, key elements of this approach, rooted in public choice theory, interpreted politicians and public officials as self-interested actors and government intervention as inherently vulnerable to corruption.Footnote 98 Some Chicago School exponents like Nobel laureate Gary Becker expressed this position most bluntly, arguing that curtailing governments’ economic role was ‘the only way to reduce corruption permanently’ – a logic he captured in his often-quoted, provocative claim: ‘If we abolish the state, we abolish corruption.’Footnote 99 But even less dogmatic exponents in international financial institutions dismissed faith in efficient, corruption-free government as ‘romanticism’ – a view exemplified by Italian IMF fiscal expert Vito Tanzi in the mid-1990s.Footnote 100 While critics such as Anwar Shah later challenged these ‘one-size-fits-all approaches’, arguing that they inverted causality by treating public spending as corruption’s source rather than its context, they nevertheless shaped international policy recommendations until the mid-2000s.Footnote 101
In arguments aligned with the emerging neoliberal anti-corruption discourse, politically ambitious Italian economists positioned themselves as progressive reformers distinctly separate from the discredited parties. Campaigning in 1994, non-partisan Treasury Minister Piero Barucci recalled how parties had unanimously blocked his efforts to ‘slim down the state’: ‘Every time I tried to implement that project, the parties resisted unanimously.’ Moreover, he hailed privatisation alongside Maastricht as ‘the key to everything’, a means ‘to rid the Italian economy and society of all that had prevented the realisation of a sound market economy’.Footnote 102 Such technocratic positioning through corruption was reinforced through external perceptions. Although The Economist cheered Socialist Prime Minister Amato’s privatisation of the ‘largest state sector in the western world’, it emphasised that only ‘a completely new system’ could solve the ‘Italian tangle’ – Italian politicians, it argued, could not ‘be trusted to put Italy’s house in order’.Footnote 103 Notably, the Italian press portrayed the Bocconi school as a legitimate training ground for new political elites, referring to an institution which, according to Jonathan Hopkin, epitomised deeply rooted pro-market currents within Italian economic thought.Footnote 104 Bocconi professor Fabrizio Onida, for instance, claimed that state-owned bureaucracies and their ‘self-referential culture’ were both ‘the cause and the effect’ of corruption, echoing Chicago School Nobel laureate Merton Miller, who had encouraged Italian privatisers since there was ‘no reason to maintain such a large public sector, which is also a factor in corruption’.Footnote 105 Most importantly, such arguments were vividly voiced in the programmatic line of the technocratic government formed by Carlo Azeglio Ciampi in 1993, which linked ‘the crucial chapter on privatisations’ to a wide-ranging reform agenda.Footnote 106 These initiatives breathed, as Paul Ginsborg observed, the conviction that ‘the productivity, efficiency and culture of the private firm’ could be transferred onto state structures.Footnote 107
For parts of the Italian employer camp, however, the narrative of Tangentopoli as ‘liberation from statism’ may have served as a red herring, as it deflected from the fact that private businesses had long thrived within the very system they now condemned. Particularly, Donatella della Porta and Alberto Vannucci demonstrated entrepreneurs’ active role in securing favourable business conditions.Footnote 108 Against this backdrop, the appeal of this reasoning as part of argumentative flexibility is particularly evident in discourses of prominent entrepreneurs later accused or convicted of corruption, who conspicuously hailed privatisation for its positive effect on Italian mentalities or, as in the case of Silvio Berlusconi’s brother Paolo, denounced economic ‘constraints’ of paying bribes to parties.Footnote 109
Beyond facile opportunism, however, this ‘liberation’ discourse proved essential for projecting Italian business’ competitiveness amid Europe’s economic transformation. At a meeting in Bonn prior to the Maastricht Treaty coming into force, Prime Minister Carlo Azeglio Ciampi claimed that Tangentopoli would liberate Italy’s private business potential, since ‘the large sums previously paid as bribes could now be used for new entrepreneurial initiatives’.Footnote 110 Similarly, Confindustria alluded to the model of American multinationals when emphasising that it had introduced an ethical code ‘already prior to the explosion of the political scandals’, obliging its members to broadly defined criteria of transparency.Footnote 111 Yet in 1993, Confindustria officials harshly attacked the Mani Pulite investigations that increasingly exposed private industry’s active role and denounced ‘judicial instrumentalisation’ which ‘seeks to put the Italian industrial system as a whole in the dock’ and risked deteriorating Italy’s economic woes.Footnote 112 This aggressive response suggests that, fundamentally, the association’s anti-corruption resulted from a defensive logic. In this way, Confindustria’s positioning bore striking similarities to German employers, who, as Hartmut Berghoff argued, introduced ethical codes in the mid-1990s to position themselves as leaders of the novel anti-corruption movement rather than becoming its targets.Footnote 113
Neoliberalism as Anticommunism – The Case of Forza Italia
The 1994 parliamentary election of Milan billionaire Silvio Berlusconi marked a transformation of the Italian political landscape. Berlusconi’s first office, however, was overshadowed by judicial investigations into his conglomerate, representing the starting point of the institutional conflict with the judiciary which came to characterise his tenures. Paradoxically, the party tailored around an entrepreneur who would later face numerous convictions, including corruption, initially campaigned as an anti-corruption party. Moreover, Forza Italia did so by deliberately drawing on neoliberal anti-corruption discourse, weaving it into an emotionally resonant political message.
That Berlusconi appropriated neoliberal rhetoric during his first political steps also becomes evident in his initial discourse on corruption.Footnote 114 Already facing corruption investigations against his brother Paolo, Berlusconi declared slimming down the state a logical necessity during his first office, as private initiatives tended to ‘reduce the opportunities for corruption’.Footnote 115 Furthermore, Berlusconi’s promise of delivering an example of ‘buongoverno’ (literally, ‘good government’) blended into the party’s narrative of businesspeople opposing corrupt party elites, with the term serving as the title of his electoral alliance with the postfascist party. More specifically, ‘buongoverno’ encapsulated in his speeches a peculiar blend of international business management approaches based on good governance theory and a highly opportunistic embrace of the dominant anti-corruption discourse guided by investigating judges.Footnote 116 In Berlusconi’s inaugural address to the two chambers, his ‘dream of making this house perfectly transparent’ built on a discourse of the ‘end of assistenzialismo’ (i.e. clientelistic welfare dependency culture) with privatisations offered as part of the remedy.Footnote 117 In this vein, combating corruption appeared as a by-product in his rhetoric, relegated to sub-clauses, as in the promise of a ‘new Italian miracle’, in which he pledged new jobs together ‘with a maximum of determination against crime, corruption, drugs’, resulting in ‘more order, more efficiency’.Footnote 118
In retrospective, Berlusconi’s actual governance further seemed to expose his neoliberal buzzwords as lacking substance. As scholars extensively demonstrated, Berlusconi-led governments perpetuated clientelist practices through targeted tax incentives and, under the guise of economic liberalism, displayed affinity towards nationalist protectionism.Footnote 119 Berlusconi had been a major beneficiary of the largely unregulated liberalisation of television broadcasting starting in the late 1970s, succeeding not least due to his then close ties to Bettino Craxi.Footnote 120 Most tellingly, the Mani pulite investigations first into Berlusconi’s brother and then into the prime minister himself – the investigating judges issued the formal notice of investigation when he hosted a European conference on crime prevention – suggested that his political ambitions had aimed at shielding him from judicial scrutiny.Footnote 121 Ultimately, the 1994 government began to crumble when Forza Italia attempted to pass a decree effectively pardoning politicians and businesspeople arrested for corruption. As Elisabetta Gualmini and Vivien Schmidt concluded, Berlusconi ‘seemed mostly committed to passing laws to solve his own personal judicial problems’.Footnote 122
Yet dismissing the neoliberal aspects of Forza Italia as mere opportunism fails to capture both the party’s specific orientation in this period as well as its transposing of neoliberal tenets into a polarised national debate. Viewed through the lens of corruption, it becomes evident that Berlusconi, and more importantly his party strategists, leveraged this controversy for casting neoliberal key aspects into a clear political message: the party’s fight against communism. Whilst Berlusconi’s anticommunist rhetoric seems anachronistic after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Berlusconi could stir up anxieties about Italian communists’ paradoxical final victory after the 1993 regional elections had recorded strong support for its successor party, Partito Democratico della Sinistra. Moreover, Berlusconi’s anticommunism, its paradoxes notwithstanding, had a clear economic dimension and targeted, as Giovanni Orsina highlighted, the left’s allegedly ‘idolatry of state’ – in Berlusconi’s words: ‘a State which does everything, which controls everything, the professor state, the doctor state, the teacher state’.Footnote 123 However, an exclusive focus on Berlusconi, who from late 1994 used that term for discrediting the investigating judges as ‘red robes’, is misleading. Within Italy’s emerging right-wing parties, even the separatist Northern League mobilised arguments for reducing state intervention as a means of combating corruption, including in widely received television talk shows in 1993.Footnote 124 More specifically, even within Forza Italia itself, attention on Berlusconi’s controversial public persona obscures how less visible economists behind the newly established party leveraged the corruption debate for anticommunism.
By framing corruption as a symptom of excessive statism, Forza Italia’s architects strategically deployed the issue to delegitimise the established parties, the left and, importantly, an economic system dismissed as ‘Sovietism’.Footnote 125 Among the party’s economic ‘gurus’, as leading newspapers described them, Giuliano Urbani left a decisive imprint on the party’s programmatic orientation.Footnote 126 In 1993, the political scientist of Bocconi University founded Forza Italia’s regional offices and released a book which newspapers characterised as the party’s programmatic manifesto.Footnote 127 Like Confindustria, Urbani described Tangentopoli as stemming from decades of economic thinking aligned both with Keynesian interventionism and the Communist Party’s belief in economic planning, which had eroded Italy’s competitiveness.Footnote 128 His critique thus targeted the interventionist consensus that had united Catholic ‘tempered capitalism’, socialist redistributionism and top-down liberalism – all bound by faith in strong state direction. Urbani, who later held key positions in three Berlusconi-led cabinets, described a state confined to its essential functions as a remedy for restoring economic vitality and curbing corruption, similar to the approaches of Nobel laureates Merton and Miller. This Chicago School approach found a prominent proponent in economist Antonio Martino, former president of the Mont Pelerin Society and later minister in Berlusconi’s cabinet, who argued that Italy’s ‘acquisitive democracy’ had led to massive waste of public funds. Building on such widely shared diagnoses, the academic proposed measures aligned with neoliberal economic thinking: cutting public spending, limiting welfare benefits and reducing the tax burden to a single standard rate.Footnote 129 As party-adviser Carlo Scognamiglio, later FI-president of the Senate, put it, only this structural transformation would end ‘Italy’s high degree of Sovietism’, which was the essential ‘source of corruption and malfeasance’.Footnote 130
In addition to this shared economic diagnosis, Forza Italia appropriated neoliberal rhetoric to reframe moral critiques of corruption as something inherently leftist that undermined pride in being Italian. Berlusconi’s party conspicuously rejected ‘moralising’ on the issue, instead claiming that free market culture and – according to Giuliano Ferrara, later spokesperson of Berlusconi’s government – a less hypocritical ‘American-style’ approach to corruption would foster proper conduct. People inevitably paid bribes, as Ferrara explained, but treating this as another form of lobbying could reduce the phenomenon to a ‘minor and marginal variable in politics’.Footnote 131 During almost daily revelations on bribe-payers and corruption trials, such a reading was fiercely directed against those intellectuals who continued to lament on ‘Italian style in corruption’ or against those who wished for a moral renovation of the existing parties.Footnote 132 Those ‘leftists’, as Berlusconi subsumed them in his central campaign speech, ‘no longer believe in anything’: ‘They like to turn the country into a screaming, shouting, ranting, condemning square.’Footnote 133 Conversely, with regard to the Communist Party, the Corriere della Sera already in 1992 had evidenced ‘hard times for moralisers’, as the investigations also revealed how Berlinguer’s successors, scornfully derided as ‘free lecturers of honesty, transparency and administrative fairness’, had taken part in political corruption.Footnote 134 Under the umbrella term ‘communists’, Forza Italia’s corruption discourse interwove several aspects: Italian communists’ unsuccessful late 1970s attempt to politicise the issue, intellectuals’ long-standing cultural critiques of a corrupt ‘Italietta’ and, finally, the contemporary ubiquity of corruption trials led by the Milan magistrates that challenged established business practices. This discourse formed part of the party’s overarching attempt to tap into feelings of wounded – or, as the case of the then separatist Lega Nord underscored – even questioned national identity. Embodied in the party name itself, the popular football chant ‘Go Italy’, this nationalist emphasis obscured the party’s appropriation of neoliberal remedies.
Conclusion
If a defining feature of neoliberal ideology lies in its adaptability to both national contexts and historical circumstances, this is strikingly reflected in the variety of metaphors through which its different advocates have illustrated the need for realigning economic policies. While today’s proponents of institutional downsizing perform their vision through martial exhibitions of axes and chainsaws, the Italian 1990s metaphor of ‘il grimaldello’ – the lock pick as a tiny, sophisticated tool enabling the stealthy opening of locked doors – illuminates the transformation this article scrutinises: the ascendance of neoliberal ideology through Italian media’s economic anti-corruption discourse. Focusing on Italy’s long-standing controversy, this article has demonstrated how the debate during 1992–6 was leveraged by different actors to challenge the interventionist welfare state. Yet their motives diverged starkly.
The article first traced why Italy’s corruption controversy channelled mistrust towards the leading parties from the late 1970s onwards, thereby explaining its crucial role in rendering neoliberal remedies plausible in the 1990s. While demands for reducing state interventionism remained largely absent from media discourse on corruption during the 1970s, this fundamentally changed during the Tangentopoli scandal of 1992–6. The shift towards free-market remedies became evident in conservative and business-oriented media coverage, which derived concrete policy measures from anti-corruption arguments. These remedies’ proponents, however, were driven by divergent motives: politically ambitious economists used the corruption debate to articulate long-held scepticism towards the interventionist state whilst distancing themselves from the declining parties. Segments of the employer camp similarly framed corruption as a consequence of state interventionism’s wrong incentives, though here the narrative also deflected attention from business complicity in systemic corruption and positioned Italian enterprises as corruption-free and competitive. For both groups, this framing offered a complementary justification for economic reform: while the ‘external constraints’ discourse presented European integration policies and particularly ‘Maastricht’ as imposing change, the corruption narrative emphasised domestic agency and positioned them as legitimate architects of reform. Most strikingly, examining the Forza Italia party’s first political steps reveals how Silvio Berlusconi and his advisors leveraged anti-corruption rhetoric as anticommunist identity politics, reframing neoliberal remedies as patriotic resistance to leftist moralism. The article demonstrates how neoliberal approaches to economic policies were reinforced despite inherent contradictions. This further strengthens a perspective which takes neoliberal ideology’s mutations and appropriations as a defining feature rather than dismissing them as manifestations of national exceptionalism. Overall, this article demonstrates how neoliberalism developed as a nationally specific ideology through actors’ strategic interpretation of domestic experiences.
Acknowledgements
I am especially grateful to Mattia Ravano and Grace Ballor for their valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank the participants at several conferences and workshops where I discussed this research in 2025: the Privit Conference in Rome, organised by Grace Ballor, Antonio Bonatesta and Giuliano Garavini; the KFG workshop on Universalism and Particularism at LMU Munich; and the CMY Junior Scholar Seminar at Yale, organised by Jennifer Allen, Kiran Klaus Patel and Pedro Ramos Pinto. Finally, I thank the journal’s editors and the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.
Christian Dengg is a doctoral researcher at LMU Munich. His dissertation explores how Italians’ perceptions of themselves as a nation and a people changed in the latter third of the twentieth century. In addition to the contemporary history of Italy and corruption, his research interests encompass the history of immigration, nationalism, and European integration. Following several research stays at the German Historical Institute in Rome, he is currently a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley.
