The centrality of the Gulf in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, to current American interests makes this an especially appropriate time for the publication of Nathan Citino's study of the antecedents of contemporary U.S. foreign policymaking for the region. Concentrating on the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Citino charts the evolution of American policy in this seminal period. Although the focus is on Saudi Arabia, light is also shed on Anglo-American relations, as well as U.S. decision making for the Middle Eastern region as a whole. Summing up the essence of his work, Citino emphasizes that “This account of U.S.–Saudi relations during the Eisenhower era is largely the story of how both Americans and Saudis sought to defend their stake in the post-war petroleum order, and how an informal American empire gradually replaced a more formal British one” (p. 17).
The fundamental inconsistencies of U.S. policymaking under Eisenhower are a recurring theme in Citino's study. On the one hand, the United States “worked through private oil companies to forge a relationship American officials believed could accommodate Arab nationalism” (p. 20). On the other hand, “the U.S. remained bound in equal measure to a partnership with Britain to sustain economic reconstruction and security in postwar Europe” (p. 61). The near impossibility of simultaneously riding these two horses lies at the heart of Citino's analysis.
Britain's approach to the region differed markedly from that of the United States: “While the Eisenhower administration relied on private diplomacy to pacify oil-producing governments, Great Britain reinforced its colonial relationships in the Gulf and resorted to collusion and war to defend its economic interests” (p. 110). In consequence, Britain and the United States were frequently at loggerheads, not least over the vexed question of Buraymi, a patch of desert on the Arabian peninsula.
Supported by the American Arabian Oil Company, Saudi Arabia claimed Buraymi in the face of opposition from the British-backed client states of Abu Dhabi and Oman. In Citino's estimation, “Buraymi was far from an Anglo-American proxy war for oil resources, as some have portrayed it.” Rather, “the conflict reflected the contrasting approaches employed by the United States and Britain to secure oil resources in the age of Arab nationalism” (p. 37). The U.S. failure to provide the support desired, and even expected, by the British produced strains in the Anglo-American relationship. Referring to the U.S. secretary of state, Prime Minister Churchill complained that “it was slightly irritating that Dulles, in his globe-trotting progress, should be taking pains at every point to sympathise with those who were trying to kick out or do down the British” (p. 50). For his part, Secretary Dulles told Eisenhower that the United States “suffered from being linked with British and French imperialism” (p. 50).
The 1956 Suez Crisis in many ways represented the high watermark of Anglo-American tension in the Middle East. As Citino notes, the crisis epitomized the dilemma the Americans had been facing in pursuit of their Middle East oil diplomacy since 1945, namely, “how to preserve access to the petroleum resources necessary for Europe while avoiding association with the colonial powers” (p. 108). Nevertheless, even the unprecedented breach in Anglo-American relations at the time of Suez belied expectations that U.S. policy would be set on a decisively different path. “When the crisis subsided,” observes Citino, “… the U.S. had failed to resolve the essential contradiction in its policy between collaboration with Britain and a desire for improved relations with the Arab states” (p. 88). Justifying this contention, Citino argues that, “Although the U.S. would refrain from joining the Baghdad Pact and would independently pursue bilateral relations with friendly states, Anglo-American cooperation remained the foundation of the postwar petroleum order” (pp. 120–21). Taking this analysis further, he asserts that the “transfer of power from London to Washington was a cooperative process because a common conception of the postwar European economy determined the nature of Anglo-American relations in the Middle East” (p. 161). This insistence on a transfer of power, with Eisenhower assuming the “responsibility from Britain as guardian of the region's oil” (p. 162), is one of the weaker aspects of an otherwise well-conceived analysis. Indeed, it takes insufficient account of the degree to which Britain not merely defended its remaining oil assets, even after the Suez debacle, but also that the United States acquiesced in, and even encouraged, this tendency as a means of bolstering Western interests in the region. Indeed, it was not until the end of 1971 that Britain departed from the Gulf, a development that was strongly resisted by the United States.
In sum, Citino is to be congratulated for producing a readable account of an important episode in postwar U.S. policymaking toward the Middle East. The book is impressively well researched, with material being drawn from a number of archives, including the Eisenhower Presidential Library, the United States National Archives, and the Public Record Office. By placing the case study of U.S.–Saudi relations in the wider context of American policymaking toward the Middle East as a whole, Citino has succeeded in broadening the scope of his subject. Indeed, his work will be of interest to anyone working on postwar U.S. relations with the region. It is only to be hoped that the author will now extend his analysis to the 1960s and beyond.
