Even as the mid-twentieth-century rapprochement between modern liberalism and Catholicism was being achieved, the social and political foundations of the settlement were eroding with increasing rapidity. For a growing cadre of scholars, this erosion was inevitable, following, the argument goes, from the philosophical pathologies endemic to liberalism. It was only the Christian foundations of Western civilization that made a reconciliation appear possible, but now the philosophical seeds of liberalism—radical individual autonomy and unbridled capitalism—have borne the predictable fruit of rampant vice, social isolation, crumbling institutions, and self-indulgent leadership. It seems like a quaint hope in the twenty-first-century post-Christian West that modern liberalism could accommodate the concern for human flourishing and the common good that has animated Catholic Social Thought (CST) and the Western political tradition more broadly.
Against this diagnosis, Oxford scholar and Jesuit, Patrick Riordan seeks to rescue the common good from the post-liberals and to “demonstrate that it is both intellectually coherent and defensible to be liberal in one’s politics and a Catholic believer” (224). His first strategy to effect such a reconciliation is to highlight the scope and ambiguity of the common good. Although in its core meaning the common good has historically referred to the teleological fulfillment of human persons in community, it also refers to real—if less complete—goods like the shared pursuit of justice and the peaceful negotiation of conflict. In addition, Riordan argues, the common good is only a heuristic—something “aimed at that is not fully comprehended.” Thus, “Our life together is like a conversation we engage in but cannot say in advance where it will lead” (17–18).
Given the vagueness of the common good—and indeed of human flourishing more broadly—Riordan finds that the modifications suggested by modern liberal political theory, especially that of John Rawls, yield a helpful “reconstruction” of classical Aristotelianism (chapter 2). Although the reality of political conflict belies the classical assumption of a unified view of the good, Aristotle himself recognized that “even imperfect and defective systems will exhibit cooperation for goods in common” (37). And even if modern thought eschews the classical preoccupation with cultivating virtue through law, Riordan argues (drawing on Aquinas) that it does at least intend their goodness relative to the regime (39). Likewise, if modern liberal thought privileges rights protection over human fulfillment, nevertheless “rights are used as shorthand for identifying important human goods as aspects of well-being and flourishing” (40). This point is especially important to Riordan’s position: while following Rawls in rejecting religious or other comprehensive doctrines as the official position of the state, he rejects Rawls’s notion of public reason by allowing citizens to incorporate religious or otherwise comprehensive arguments into their political speech (25, 41, 63). Thus, a liberal restructuring of Aristotle yields a politics with genuine—if diminished and somewhat indirect—connection to the common good and human flourishing.
It would be a mistake to understand this modified political common good as a mere capitulation to liberalism, and Riordan is intent in the following chapters to demonstrate the rootedness of his theory in Western, especially Catholic, political thought. Drawing on Augustine and his interpreters, he argues that liberal polities “face toward” God when they pursue real (objective) goods and allow for religiously informed political discourse (chapter 3). The fourth chapter grounds his expanded concept of common goods in the “analogical” theory of Thomas Aquinas. In chapter 5 we reach the “heart of the argument,” in which Riordan draws on CST—especially the writings of Pope Benedict XVI—to argue that “securing of human rights [is] a core element of the common good and … human flourishing” (105). Freedom oriented toward the pursuit of truth is not the enemy of the common good, but essential to it. This goal, however, is immediately qualified by a discussion of politics as conflict management (chapter 6), grounded in Rawls’s insistence on “reasonable plurality as setting the context for politics” (130). Again, the end point for Riordan is appreciating the process of conflict negotiation as an essential part of the political common good.
This back and forth between objective human goodness and truth, on the one hand, and the epistemological and practical barriers to them, on the other, permeates the rest of Riordan’s argument. In a discussion of paternalism, for example, he relies on the CST principles of solidarity and subsidiarity to evaluate the content of the common good (chapter 9). In an ontological sense, solidarity requires that no human person be excluded from the common good, and subsidiarity forbids any exclusion or denigration of a genuine human good. However, practically speaking, imposition of such judgments threatens to run afoul of the autonomy that the principle of subsidiarity itself requires (159). The solution Riordan proposes is to extend “an invitation to relevant people to recognize where their interests lie and to undertake relevant action” (163). In other words, even though fundamental principles of the common good require objective judgments about the nature and goodness of human personhood, practical considerations necessitate that these judgments be proffered to citizens for their own independent acceptance or refusal.
Given Riordan’s attempt to blend Rawlsian theory and Catholic Social Thought, it is a wonder that the work of Jacques Maritain barely receives mention. Many scholars recognize in Maritain’s Man and the State (University of Chicago Press, 1951) a theory of democratic pluralism that anticipates Rawls’s overlapping consensus by two decades. Riordan’s blend of Rawls and Rome often seems quite like Maritain’s treatment of the same problems. Yet, this raises a still deeper difficulty.
More than seventy years on from Man and the State and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (on which Maritain consulted), it appears that overlapping consensus about the meaning of fundamental rights can only be achieved among comprehensive doctrines that themselves share significant features—as, for example, the real existence of human nature or even a sexual binary in the species. Many of our present disputes about human rights and dignity turn on issues of this kind, and specifying the content of rights appears to require that the state adopt ontological positions previously taken for granted. There are some things so fundamental that, where there is disagreement, the divided house cannot stand. At least the past decade has plunged Western democracies into a number of such potentially house-dividing issues insofar as they lay bare fundamental philosophical divides with profound practical consequences. This raises significant doubt as to whether a Rawlsian-inspired political theory like Riordan’s is a workable one.
