The Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York (1905), which invalidated a New York statute limiting the hours of work in bakeries as a violation of the liberty of individuals to make contracts, is one of the most controversial and reviled cases in the court's history. For decades, the Progressives and their progeny treated Lochner as the bête noir of American constitutionalism. Anxious to promote governmental control of the economy, they attributed a host of evils to the ruling, and pictured the decision as a poster child of judicial activism in support of business interests. Curiously, Lochner has continued to serve as a convenient punching bag for contemporary constitutional theorists of various viewpoints, who attack the decision from both the political left and right albeit for different reasons. This development has further contributed to its dire reputation.
Recently, however, some scholars have called for a fresh look at Lochner, and have defended the decision as a vindication of individual rights. This trend has reached flood stage with the publication of David E. Bernstein's outstanding account of Lochner. Mincing no words, Bernstein dismisses the “standard account of the rise, fall, and influence of the liberty of contract doctrine” as “inaccurate, unfair, and anachronistic” (p. 6). He convincingly dismantles stubborn myths that have long clouded our understanding of this important case.
Bernstein starts his assault on the conventional Lochner narrative by stressing the deep roots of contractual freedom in Anglo-American law, and tracing the emergence of constitutional protection for liberty of contract in the nineteenth century. He then examines the Lochner litigation. Bernstein points out that the hours legislation at issue was prompted by the bakery union in part “to drive small bakeshops that employed recent immigrants out of the industry.” (p. 23). The law was challenged by these family-owned bakeries which relied on flexible work schedules. Finding numerous inaccuracies in the standard accounts of Lochner, Bernstein notes that the Court majority relied on statistical evidence regarding the health of bakers, not on formalistic arguments drawn from abstract principles. He sharply attacks the once fashionable, but now largely discredited, view that the Court was influenced by Social Darwinism. Further, he demonstrates that, contrary to the often-repeated claims by some scholars, much of the contemporary press reaction was supportive of the ruling in Lochner. Moreover, Bernstein stresses that eight of the nine justices expressed backing for the principle of freedom of contract, differing only over its application to the facts of the case. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes alone denied that liberty of contract was a constitutional norm.
Bernstein is especially effective in contrasting the libertarian premises of Lochner with the statist ideology espoused by the Progressives in the early twentieth century. Legal scholars and judges associated with the Progressive movement favored an activist government to implement their vision of the public good, and were hostile to claims of individual right and traditional notions of limited government. They rejected a jurisprudence based on natural rights, saw a vast scope for the exercise of the state police power, and were instinctively opposed to any judicial decisions which curtailed governmental authority. They also had great faith in administrative agencies and governance by experts. Accordingly, Progressives called for judicial deference to legislative and administrative decisions, and urged a narrow reading of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confined to procedural matters. In this intellectual climate, the Progressives fashioned Lochner into a sort of simplistic morality play of good versus evil in order to advance their political agenda.
Bernstein carefully explores the legacy of Lochner to the present. He maintains that the Supreme Court‘s post-World War II emphasis on civil right and civil liberties owes an unacknowledged debt to the libertarian values implicit in the liberty of contract doctrine. This new attitude reflected a partial abandonment by the Court of the Progressive insistence upon deference to legislatures once the New Deal liberals gained ascendency. As Bernstein perceptively observes, “judicial restraint always looks better when your side doesn't control the courts” (p. 105). Thus, the New Deal Court contrived a distinction, not mentioned in the Constitution, between economic rights and other individual rights. In effect, the post-World War II liberal justices simply revamped the due-process decisions of the earlier period and employed them to achieve their own ideological ends. Bernstein succinctly asserts that in so doing “the court eventually out-Lochnered Lochner” (p. 110). Oceans of ink have been spilt trying to explain why the due process clause does not protect economic interests but justifies aggressive judicial defense of both enumerated and unenumerated individual rights.
Bernstein's nuanced evaluation of Lochner is revisionist scholarship of the highest order. This volume sweeps away decades of misleading and politically inspired assessments of this landmark decision. The book should be required reading for anyone interested in American constitutional history.
