There has been resurgent interest in the psychological underpinnings of political ideology in recent years, with a welcome growth in research on its biological correlates as is made clear by Hibbing et al.'s comprehensive and concise review. They and their collaborators have contributed significantly to this literature by deepening our understanding of the genetic, biological, and physiological bases of political attitudes. In addition to providing a succinct account of extant research on the correlates of liberal-conservative ideology, Hibbing et al. advance a parsimonious account of political ideology. Parsimony is a laudable goal in scientific research, but not if it fails to account well for existing patterns of empirical evidence. We take issue with two core aspects of their argument: (1) that political ideology is best presented as a single dimension of political beliefs and attitudes, and (2) that it can be explained by differential reactions to negative stimuli.
Hibbing et al.'s target article is based on the underlying assumption that political ideology can be represented by a single dimension labeled left-right or liberal-conservative. This is a common starting point for much recent research on the psychological bases of ideology but there is abundant evidence that a unidimensional conceptualization of political ideology is incomplete (Feldman Reference Feldman, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013). Research in psychology and political science demonstrates the existence of at least two dimensions of ideology: an economic dimension linked to views on the distribution of societal resources, influencing attitudes on social welfare, taxation, and other economic policies, and a social/moral dimension conveying a preference for tradition and order, affecting positions on gay marriage, race relations, and legal abortion. Hibbing et al. acknowledge the existence but downplay the importance of these two dimensions, whereas we regard the multidimensional nature of political ideology as a more fundamental issue. Although some researchers believe the two dimensions correlate strongly enough to be subsumed by a single left-right continuum, the empirical evidence clearly suggests the opposite. Correlations between economic and social dimensions of ideology are low to non-existent in samples from numerous countries (Cochrane Reference Cochrane2010). More important, the two ideological dimensions have very different psychological correlates, suggesting that they arise from different underlying processes (Feldman Reference Feldman, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013).
To underscore the psychological bases of a two-dimensional approach to ideology consider two central constructs in contemporary social psychology: right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) (Duckitt Reference Duckitt2001). There are clear parallels between RWA and SDO and social and economic dimensions of ideology: RWA correlates highly with social conservatism and SDO with economic conservatism (Duckitt & Sibley Reference Duckitt and Sibley2010). In addition, RWA is associated with a view of the world as a dangerous place, akin to Hibbing et al.'s concept of sensitivity to negative stimuli, and SDO is related to a competitive world view with clear implications for inequality and the societal distribution of economic resources. RWA is strongly correlated with a lack of openness to experience and need for cognitive closure, consistent with extant literature on the personality basis of conservatism cited by Hibbing et al., whereas SDO is correlated with a lack of empathy (Duckitt & Sibley Reference Duckitt and Sibley2010; Feldman Reference Feldman, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013). RWA is also linked to valuing conservation more than openness to change, whereas SDO is related to the value of self-enhancement as opposed to self-transcendence, and a limited pro-social orientation. In some ways it is ironic that the current emphasis on social conservatism as the key psychological facet of political ideology, including in Hibbing et al.'s essay, fails to account for the historically more powerful and politically consequential ideological divide over the distribution of economic resources.
Substantively large differences in the nature of economic and social ideology make it difficult to attach clear meaning to the labels liberal and conservative in the manner that Hibbing et al. and others use them. Research also shows that self-identified liberals and conservatives are internally heterogeneous (Feldman & Johnston Reference Feldman and Johnston2014). In the U.S., Ellis and Stimson (Reference Ellis and Stimson2012) demonstrate that many people who label themselves conservative actually have liberal preferences on specific policy issues. Other research identifies a significant number of people who are best described as libertarian – conservative on economic issues but liberal on social issues – within the conservative label (Swedlow & Wyckoff Reference Swedlow and Wyckoff2009).We have comparable concerns with Hibbing et al.'s grounding of liberal-conservative ideology in habitual reactions to negative stimuli. To make their case, Hibbing et al. summarize a great deal of research on a diverse array of attitudinal and physiological correlates of liberal-conservative ideology, ranging from self-reported values to the size of the amygdala. They view the pattern of findings across this diverse research as consistent with a model of ideology based on individual differences in sensitivity to negative stimuli. But there is little or no research to connect those disparate findings. Can we reliably equate a larger amygdala, reduced activity in the anterior cingular cortex, heightened electrodermal activity, or difficulty in suppressing a learned Go response in the Go/No-Go task with habitual sensitivity to negative stimuli? There might be a single basis for these diverse states but the connections remain elusive.
Moreover, the documented personality correlates of political ideology argue against Hibbing et al.'s position. In the personality literature, neuroticism typically captures individual differences in sensitivity to negative outcomes (DeYoung & Gray Reference DeYoung and Gray2009). Yet there is no evidence that neuroticism is associated with conservatism. Indeed, Gerber et al. (Reference Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling and Ha2010) report that conservatives score lower than liberals on neuroticism. Hibbing et al. argue that a heightened sensitivity to threat leads to lower openness to experience and greater conscientiousness, the strongest personality correlates of ideology. But this claim is contradicted by correlations among personality dimensions in the Big 5 Framework. Conscientiousness is associated with lower, not higher, levels of neuroticism, and openness and neuroticism are simply unrelated (DeYoung Reference DeYoung2006).
In conclusion, we urge for greater research attention to at least two distinct dimensions of political ideology as captured by social and economic ideology. In addition, we see as fruitful more granular research devoted to the psychological and biological origins of ideology in lower-level, proximate psychological factors such as empathy, egalitarianism, and cooperation in the economic realm and anxiety, need for security, cognitive closure, religiosity, and other factors in the social arena.
There has been resurgent interest in the psychological underpinnings of political ideology in recent years, with a welcome growth in research on its biological correlates as is made clear by Hibbing et al.'s comprehensive and concise review. They and their collaborators have contributed significantly to this literature by deepening our understanding of the genetic, biological, and physiological bases of political attitudes. In addition to providing a succinct account of extant research on the correlates of liberal-conservative ideology, Hibbing et al. advance a parsimonious account of political ideology. Parsimony is a laudable goal in scientific research, but not if it fails to account well for existing patterns of empirical evidence. We take issue with two core aspects of their argument: (1) that political ideology is best presented as a single dimension of political beliefs and attitudes, and (2) that it can be explained by differential reactions to negative stimuli.
Hibbing et al.'s target article is based on the underlying assumption that political ideology can be represented by a single dimension labeled left-right or liberal-conservative. This is a common starting point for much recent research on the psychological bases of ideology but there is abundant evidence that a unidimensional conceptualization of political ideology is incomplete (Feldman Reference Feldman, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013). Research in psychology and political science demonstrates the existence of at least two dimensions of ideology: an economic dimension linked to views on the distribution of societal resources, influencing attitudes on social welfare, taxation, and other economic policies, and a social/moral dimension conveying a preference for tradition and order, affecting positions on gay marriage, race relations, and legal abortion. Hibbing et al. acknowledge the existence but downplay the importance of these two dimensions, whereas we regard the multidimensional nature of political ideology as a more fundamental issue. Although some researchers believe the two dimensions correlate strongly enough to be subsumed by a single left-right continuum, the empirical evidence clearly suggests the opposite. Correlations between economic and social dimensions of ideology are low to non-existent in samples from numerous countries (Cochrane Reference Cochrane2010). More important, the two ideological dimensions have very different psychological correlates, suggesting that they arise from different underlying processes (Feldman Reference Feldman, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013).
To underscore the psychological bases of a two-dimensional approach to ideology consider two central constructs in contemporary social psychology: right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) (Duckitt Reference Duckitt2001). There are clear parallels between RWA and SDO and social and economic dimensions of ideology: RWA correlates highly with social conservatism and SDO with economic conservatism (Duckitt & Sibley Reference Duckitt and Sibley2010). In addition, RWA is associated with a view of the world as a dangerous place, akin to Hibbing et al.'s concept of sensitivity to negative stimuli, and SDO is related to a competitive world view with clear implications for inequality and the societal distribution of economic resources. RWA is strongly correlated with a lack of openness to experience and need for cognitive closure, consistent with extant literature on the personality basis of conservatism cited by Hibbing et al., whereas SDO is correlated with a lack of empathy (Duckitt & Sibley Reference Duckitt and Sibley2010; Feldman Reference Feldman, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013). RWA is also linked to valuing conservation more than openness to change, whereas SDO is related to the value of self-enhancement as opposed to self-transcendence, and a limited pro-social orientation. In some ways it is ironic that the current emphasis on social conservatism as the key psychological facet of political ideology, including in Hibbing et al.'s essay, fails to account for the historically more powerful and politically consequential ideological divide over the distribution of economic resources.
Substantively large differences in the nature of economic and social ideology make it difficult to attach clear meaning to the labels liberal and conservative in the manner that Hibbing et al. and others use them. Research also shows that self-identified liberals and conservatives are internally heterogeneous (Feldman & Johnston Reference Feldman and Johnston2014). In the U.S., Ellis and Stimson (Reference Ellis and Stimson2012) demonstrate that many people who label themselves conservative actually have liberal preferences on specific policy issues. Other research identifies a significant number of people who are best described as libertarian – conservative on economic issues but liberal on social issues – within the conservative label (Swedlow & Wyckoff Reference Swedlow and Wyckoff2009).We have comparable concerns with Hibbing et al.'s grounding of liberal-conservative ideology in habitual reactions to negative stimuli. To make their case, Hibbing et al. summarize a great deal of research on a diverse array of attitudinal and physiological correlates of liberal-conservative ideology, ranging from self-reported values to the size of the amygdala. They view the pattern of findings across this diverse research as consistent with a model of ideology based on individual differences in sensitivity to negative stimuli. But there is little or no research to connect those disparate findings. Can we reliably equate a larger amygdala, reduced activity in the anterior cingular cortex, heightened electrodermal activity, or difficulty in suppressing a learned Go response in the Go/No-Go task with habitual sensitivity to negative stimuli? There might be a single basis for these diverse states but the connections remain elusive.
Moreover, the documented personality correlates of political ideology argue against Hibbing et al.'s position. In the personality literature, neuroticism typically captures individual differences in sensitivity to negative outcomes (DeYoung & Gray Reference DeYoung and Gray2009). Yet there is no evidence that neuroticism is associated with conservatism. Indeed, Gerber et al. (Reference Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling and Ha2010) report that conservatives score lower than liberals on neuroticism. Hibbing et al. argue that a heightened sensitivity to threat leads to lower openness to experience and greater conscientiousness, the strongest personality correlates of ideology. But this claim is contradicted by correlations among personality dimensions in the Big 5 Framework. Conscientiousness is associated with lower, not higher, levels of neuroticism, and openness and neuroticism are simply unrelated (DeYoung Reference DeYoung2006).
In conclusion, we urge for greater research attention to at least two distinct dimensions of political ideology as captured by social and economic ideology. In addition, we see as fruitful more granular research devoted to the psychological and biological origins of ideology in lower-level, proximate psychological factors such as empathy, egalitarianism, and cooperation in the economic realm and anxiety, need for security, cognitive closure, religiosity, and other factors in the social arena.