In early 2023 Kellie-Jay Keen-Minshull—also known as Posie Parker—took her “Let Women Speak” tour throughout Australasia. One of those rallies made international headlines due to the attendance of a small group of neo-Nazis (members of the National Socialist Network) who proceeded to perform Nazi salutes on the steps of Parliament House and on the surrounding streets. At that very same rally an academic philosopher, Holly Lawford-Smith, gave a speech in support of gender-critical feminism. This paper is my attempt to make sense of that moment, through critical engagement with Lawford-Smith’s book Gender-Critical Feminism. Since Lawford-Smith positions her book as a philosophical foundation for the gender-critical movement, my primary goal is to show that this philosophical foundation is both metaphysically and politically flawed. My secondary goal is to consider whether, and if so how, enactment of the philosophical views developed in that book would move us closer to the oppressive world neo-Nazis are trying to bring about.

In most areas of philosophy, the typical paper is written impersonally, as if its author occupied what Henry Sidgwick calls “the point of view of the universe” or what Thomas Nagel calls “the view from nowhere” or what Donna Haraway (more skeptically) calls the “god’s-eye view.” In critical social traditions, however—feminist philosophy, philosophy of disability, philosophy of race—personal writing is widely embraced. I argue that there is more at stake here than mere style, and that we have good reasons, both political and epistemic, to abandon the “view from nowhere” pretense and write more openly about the ways in which our lived experiences inform our work. In the words of Eva Kittay, the personal is philosophical.

Green/blue wellbeing is increasingly a focus of mental and physical healthcare in the United Kingdom, with green/blue space “prescribing” touted as providing a range of benefits. Attempts to explore the “how” and “why” of potential mental health improvements through these activities to date are primarily quantitative, and/or utilize medical/individualized models. Such approaches are situated within and can reinscribe a humanist, extractivist, one-way relationship with the natural world. Here, we draw on ecofeminist approaches to care to explore findings from our fieldwork with two wild swimming communities in Scotland, enabling us to consider human–nature interactions as relational. The wild swimming focus groups presented a complex picture in which the mental health benefits of swimming are entangled with relationships between group members, and embodied, sensory experiences of and relationships with blue spaces. By conceptualizing these groups as “ecologies of care,” we seek to embrace that intricacy, considering how wild swimming is a political act engaged with through deviant bodies or in deviant temporal/weather conditions, and how care is engendered through mutuality, space, and cold water. In conjunction with this complexity, the emergent nature of these groups has transformative implications for futurity, justice-to-come, and hyper-local ways of living within and alongside blue spaces.

Sylvia Wynter’s sociogenic principle, Chiara Bottici’s feminist mythology, and Denise Ferreira da Silva’s Black feminist praxis of hacking, all underscore the importance of working through the myths, codes, and origin stories that discursively form our world. We identify the biblical story of Solomon’s judgment as an origin story which constitutes an understanding of justice in matters of reproduction that is still hegemonic today, and that must be subverted to realize the Black feminist aim of reproductive justice. Through Solomon’s judgment, justice in reproduction got established as what Édouard Glissant terms, an “obsession with the chain of affiliation” inscribed with the “tragedy of miscegenation,” capturing the maternal in the arché-form of the future subject. We differentiate between the patriarchal configuration of “justice in reproduction” and the feminist concept “reproductive justice,” which is a popular, strong, and important activist concept. To arrive at reproductive justice, a “hack” of the patriarchal configuration of justice in Solomon’s judgment is orchestrated: through a radical affirmation of the events of both abortion and birth, we aim to “explode” the narrative code that constitutes the hegemonic patriarchal understanding of justice, in order to liberate the captive maternal and reimagine reproductive justice within a true feminist mythology.

I provide an analysis of incel ideology which contributes to philosophical reflection on this distinctive form of online misogyny. The analysis complements extant feminist interpretations by illustrating some moral psychological limitations of popular objectification and entitlement frameworks. After emphasizing the central role of self-loathing in the incel worldview, I offer a partial explanation of the roots of this self-loathing by appealing to the underappreciated significance of masculine warrior ideals.

This paper explores the political significance of intuitive eating as a self-care practice in the context of healing from anorexia and bulimia. Feminist philosophers have described how eating disorders emerge in socio-cultural contexts marked by an idealization of thinness, especially in women. Besides this, philosophers and sociologists have spoken about the connections between fatphobia, diet culture, racism, and sexism. Given these claims, I will argue that healing from these disorders can be framed as acts of political resistance. First, I present the notion of self-care and touch on its evolution from an ethical to a political ideal. Second, I describe the socio-cultural origins of the thinness ideal and of fatphobia to show they fuel eating disorders such as anorexia and bulimia. Third, I introduce Kate Manne’s conception of “bodily imperatives” and describe Audre Lorde’s framing of her struggles with cancer as acts of political resistance. This discussion supports the claim that the self-care practices anorectics and bulimics engage in to recover from disordered eating can be political in nature. Fourth, I entertain and respond to three objections to my view. I conclude that healing from disordered eating is not merely an individual act, but one full of political potential.

Conceptual innovation is highly prized in Western Anglophone philosophy. Yet it often stems from a relatively narrow tradition that takes little account of contributions from other cultures and philosophical practices. We illustrate this point using the example of work done by Dalit feminists on identifying and addressing hermeneutical injustice. Despite their relevance, Dalit feminist contributions are virtually unknown and remain unrecognized in Anglophone philosophical discussions of hermeneutical injustice. This article aims to investigate the reasons for this neglect. One potential reason is the generally low status accorded to experiential knowledge in epistemology, which is pivotal to Dalit feminist accounts. Another reason concerns systematic bias against non-Western philosophy, which may reflect prejudicial stereotypes and the privileging of existing disciplinary norms. We argue that these reasons may explain the exclusion of Dalit feminists’ scholarship. In light of this, we offer two modest suggestions. First, philosophers should cultivate greater openness to citing texts by non-philosophers where these texts are relevant to the topic at hand. Second, we argue that a more embedded and extensive practice of cross-cultural philosophy or comparative philosophy is needed. These two suggestions may reduce neglect of philosophically rich traditions such as Dalit feminism.

I develop a strategy of resisting oppression that is directed toward expanding the agency of other oppressed agents and is thus unhampered by some forms of internalized oppression. Using Simone de Beauvoir’s argument that freedom is intersubjective, I motivate intersubjective agency expansion which holds that even if internalized oppression has compromised the ability to resist for one’s own sake, oppressed agents can still marshal resistant agency on behalf of others. A secondary upshot of this strategy is that it may help repair some harms of internalized oppression. On this view, both resistance and repair are not solitary acts, but collective efforts. I first motivate the concept of ambiguous agency based on Beauvoir’s discussion of ambiguity and Qrescent Mali Mason’s concept of intersectional ambiguity. Specifically, I argue for the ambiguity between self-regarding and other-regarding forms of agency and hold that internalized oppression may harm the former but not necessarily the latter. I then develop the strategy of intersubjective agency expansion and its two forms: symbolic and direct agency expansion. Finally, I argue that a secondary upshot of this strategy is the repair of internalized oppression, and that this ought to count as a form of resistance to oppression.

Taking a feminist critical approach, this paper employs Levinas’s thinking on sensibility and time in Otherwise than being to develop a concept of the body as an original intercorporeality through the fact of having been born which, I argue, provides material depth to his critique of the sovereign subject. Contra Guenther’s (2006) development of a maternal ethics based on Levinas’s assertion that the ethical relation of substitution is “like a maternal body,” I argue that modeling a Levinasian conception of ethics upon the maternal body risks perpetuating normative ideas surrounding motherhood and reproduction. Yet I argue that, apart from a Levinasian conception of ethics, the notion of substitution evokes the situation of pregnancy in which the mother breathes for the fetus. Finally, I conceptualize Levinas’s notion of the oneself as descriptive of all (human) bodies which retain a trace from the body from which they were born. Reading Levinas and Irigaray (2017) together, I argue that the notion of the oneself marks a move from the abstract concept of the subject to the concrete notion of the body as an original intercorporeality whose capacity to breathe autonomously rests upon an immemorial “inspiration” by the body from which it was born.

A despairing agent might object to climate obligations by framing them as too demanding to be morally required because they give rise to burdensome consequences of despair, like depression. This objection can be refuted on the grounds that it is morally wrong. However, when it is understood as symptomatic of moral injury, an alternative response prioritizing moral repair is illuminated. I consider how the virtue of epistemic humility can promote tasks for repair, like attentiveness to symptoms of moral injury. I see this virtue as a basis for an active form of care for others and the self that resists temptations to refer to this objection.

Precision medicine (PM) encompasses various emerging, data-intensive healthcare and biomedical research initiatives aimed at tailoring care to individual patient characteristics. While “precision” primarily denotes an epistemological shift in how biomedical research is approached and care delivered, the conviction that PM empowers patients in clinical decision-making is central to its vision as it is taken up across policy contexts. In this paper, I critically assess these promises by drawing on recent engagements in agential epistemic injustice (Lackey 2020; Medina 2022). I suggest that the social, cultural, and epistemological conditions in which the epistemic practice of precision care unfolds are conducive to epistemic injustice. Despite PM’s explicit aims to address longstanding criticisms regarding the disease-centric nature of contemporary biomedical care practices by including person-centered, non-biomedical features in clinical consideration, exploring its underlying logic suggests its epistemic economy is stacked against patients’ epistemic interests. As such, despite its laudable aim of patient empowerment, the exacerbated risk of epistemic injustice might truncate patients’ (epistemic) agency, further disempowering them in clinical decision-making. To conclude, I suggest that the reliance on “empowerment”- and “person-centered care”-rhetoric dominating PM discourse is a case of epistemic appropriation (Davis 2018), further discouraging engagement with social, experiential, and phenomenological dimensions of illness, defanging critics of raising those concerns, and impeding the realization of epistemic justice in healthcare.

Feminist theorists have critiqued the twenty-first-century turn towards self-care as neoliberal, arguing that personal wellness masks the welfare state’s destruction. I clarify an ambiguity in the argument against self-care’s purported neoliberalism, distinguishing three strands of critique: that self-care is too individual, that self-care is too commercial, and that self-care involves a shift in who is responsible for the reproduction of subjects, from the state to the individual. It is in the Foucauldian critique of self-care as responsibilizing that arguments against self-care’s purported neoliberalism are sharpest. Yet, care for the self is more ambivalent than these arguments admit. Self-care has remained important to Black feminists, feminist scholars of disability, and decolonial feminists, including many explicitly critical of neoliberalism. Attending to the particular contexts from which calls for self-care emerge demonstrate how self-care is compatible with a critique of neoliberalism and can serve as a critique of neoliberalism itself. Neoliberalism is borne disproportionately by Black women, disabled people, and the Indigenous. Members of these groups have historical reasons to distrust the state’s claim to care. They have also been tasked with caring for others instead of for themselves. Finally, care for the self can articulate a refusal of optimization that neoliberalism demands.

Through the colonial period in Sāmoa, Christian morality was embedded into Samoan culture. This transformed gender relations, introducing a new, well-disciplined figure of the Samoan woman. Because of this shift, we argue for the need to develop Samoan feminist thought, which is as much a development of new thinking as it is a return to and restoration of Samoan feminist thought already in existence within Indigenous Samoan cosmologies. We contextualize this thinking within a coalition of Pacific, Indigenous, Black, and women of color feminist thinkers. As feminist scholars have established, feminism doesn’t resonate or work with a simple copy and paste to culture and context. Rather, feminisms are contextual and subjective. It is thus imperative that those from within various contexts continue to broaden understandings and conceptualizations of feminism/s, which work toward demarcating spaces for feminist thought that illuminates multiple, diverse, and intersecting subjectivities and positionalities. As such, the task for us as Samoan women, people, and communities is to develop a feminist space that encompasses and fosters a by-us, for-us, with-us approach that challenges coloniality in Sāmoa and articulates feminist possibilities and futures.

Regret risk is not consistently part of information sharing within informed consent. Yet two kinds of decisions that often invoke concerns about future regret, abortion and sterilization, raise considerations for the role of regret in clinical decision-making and informed consent, particularly regarding decisions about potentially transformative experiences. We distinguish between first-personal and second-personal anticipatory regret and argue that first-personal anticipatory regret can play a productive role, but second-personal anticipatory regret can function in ways that are pernicious. Introducing second-personal anticipatory regret into medical informed consent processes is, we argue, not only not required for informed medical decision-making, but impermissible within the clinical encounter. This view has broader implications for medical decision-making about potentially transformative experiences, and for empirical research on regret regarding healthcare decisions.

In this musing, I reflect on care ethics as they relate to the material contours of everyday life. Drawing on my own queercrip life writing, I explore my experiences of participating in virtual disability support groups. Calling these meetings crip care assemblages, I note how ethical commitments, norms, and expectations relate to the material specifics in different support group configurations. In examining these configurations, I consider how access and participation are emergent phenomena, grounded in each entangled encounter, and the implications of this contingency for organizing collective care practices.

The realities of the Anthropocene, from climate change to pandemics to plastics, necessitate substantially different ways of understanding what it means to act in the world today. In response, feminist scholars within the field of new materialism have attempted to rethink the nature of agency and action. This article focuses on two unresolved challenges with their framework: first, it lacks a way to make distinctions or draw boundaries between different entities and actors and, second, it simplifies the relationship between ontology and ethics, implying that an ontological transformation will lead to more ethical and just relationships with the more-than-human world. I argue that to address these challenges new materialism should look to ecofeminism, particularly the philosophy of Val Plumwood; this pairing is especially pertinent considering the often overlooked or downplayed genealogical connections between them. I also argue, however, that new materialism has something to offer Plumwood: its reconceptualization of agency better responds to contemporary circumstances in ways foreclosed by Plumwood’s more limited account. I conclude that a coalition between new materialism and ecofeminism—a new materialism supplemented and modified by aspects of Plumwood’s account—provides valuable conceptual tools with which to respond to the Anthropocene condition.

This paper examines central themes in Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time from the perspective of María Lugones’s account of world-traveling. By thus reading Heidegger through Lugones rather than vice versa—a methodology I call “centering the margins”—I challenge a tendency in comparative work to approach historically undervalued work through a more canonical voice. I argue that doing so has interpretive consequences that tend to be occluded on a standard comparative approach: (i) a critique of the indexed nature of Dasein and the broader Eurocentrism of Heidegger’s project; (ii) a more nuanced account of the methodological value of lived experience; and (iii) a problematization of the early Heidegger’s recapitulation to a unified account of the self. Rather than ameliorate canonical philosophy by offering specifications to insufficiently differentiated philosophical accounts, turning to the margins on this methodology allows us to see where a canonical philosopher resorts to traditional motifs—the dangers of what Lugones calls “ossification in the homeplaces.” The epistemic advantages of marginalization notwithstanding, centering the margins is self-destructive in that the final aim is the dissolution of that dichotomy and the freeing up of new epistemological terrain.

The inclusion problem for theories of gender arises when those theories inappropriately fail to include certain individuals in the gender categories to which they ought to belong. The inclusion problem affects both of the most influential traditions in feminist theorizing about gender: social-position accounts and identity accounts. I argue that the inclusion problem can be solved by adopting a structured theory of gender, which incorporates aspects of both social-position accounts and identity accounts. According to the theory I favor, an individual’s gender is determined by their gender identity if they have one; otherwise, it is determined by their social position. My structured theory of gender offers a more direct solution to the gender inclusion problem than alternatives recently advocated by Barnes (2020), Jenkins (2023), and others. It also points the way to a simple solution to inclusion problems that arise at the level of gendered language.

Using a comparative reading of Antigone and Iphigenia, the paper illuminates how differing modes of finality within a political moment can be construed along gender lines. For feminine characters whose political life never experiences a birth while ensconced in the Athenian apparatus of male political oppression, understanding how Antigone and Iphigenia both become politically born by entering a mode of finality aids in pinpointing one of the very few agentic methods available to women in ancient Athens. Through a careful understanding of Greek tragedy, the place of women in Ancient Athens, and a discussion of views of gender during the time, the paper offers a multi-disciplinary view, understanding the text for what it is within a contemporary reading of gender. What does Antigone’s suicide imply about gendered power inside a political situation and what does Iphigenia’s sacrifice take away? Antigone’s suicide effectively makes her a masculine actor in the eyes of an Ancient Athenian spectator while Iphigenia’s sacrifice is uniquely feminine. This paper also represents preliminary work into the importance and significance of persons who are politically cornered but have open to them an intentional mode of finality.