Introduction
Nowadays, with the ascent to power of the Trump administration, the USA seems to be drawing back from globalization and liberal values, and the EU can no longer entirely count on its main traditional partner. Moreover, the crisis of 2008, followed by the economic and political sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 and, finally, the Brexit referendum in 2016, have combined to seriously challenge the EU’s economic stability and internal unity. In such a situation, it is important for the EU to have support from other key players to promote common values and interests and to occupy a more important position on the international stage. In this regard, the concept of strategic partnership becomes very relevant due to its stated goal and implicit mandate of constructively uniting its own potential with that of other ‘agents’.
The application of the EU’s concept of strategic partnership started with the European Security Strategy of 2003, where strategic partnership was defined as a tool for achieving effective multilateralism, and wherein, subsequently, the status of strategic partner was awarded to ten countries: Canada, Japan, USA, Brazil, China, India, Russia, Mexico, South Korea and South Africa. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the EU has continuously tried to maintain and develop what has proved to be a very difficult relationship with other key players and also to promote a strategic partnership with regional and interregional organizations, always having to manage the dilemma that emanates from numerous sources, including disagreements about democracy, human rights, the rule of law, the ongoing dependence on various ‘carbon’ generated resources, and the will to obtain maximal commercial benefits from bilateral and multilateral relationships.
The present contribution aims at analysing the EU’s strategic partners by using both theoretical and empirical approaches. Within the theoretical framework of our research (in the next section) the diversity of the EU’s strategic partners – traditional partners, new partners in a new multipolar World Order, and regional and interregional organizations – was investigated. In the third section, the level of institutionalization of the EU’s official strategic partnership is analysed. In the fourth section, the different approaches that the EU the USA, Russia and China, apply toward the concept of strategic partnership are compared.
Within the empirical framework (the fifth section), on the basis of three principal components (obtained by Principal Component Analysis), a cluster analysis is applied, which allows us, first, to show which of the EU’s official strategic partners are really strategic and which are not; second, to point out regional groups that represent strategic interest for the EU; third, to identify the EU’s best potential strategic partners; and finally to confirm the heterogeneity of the EU’s strategic partners and the difficulty of rendering an efficient collective response to multilateralism.
Heterogeneity of the European Union’s Strategic Partners
The EU has developed a strategic partnership, first of all, with the traditional post-Second World War Western powers (Canada, Japan, the USA); second, with regional and interregional organizations (SAARC, NATO, African Union and others); finally, with individual special partners in a multi-polar, bilateral world order (BRICSAMS: i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Mexico and South Korea) (Gratius, Reference Gratius2011a: 1). In this section, we investigate the EU’s commitments with these three groups of strategic partners.
The EU’s Traditional Strategic Partners
After the Second World War, the USA, Western Europe, Canada and Japan became loyal allies in the fight against the Soviet Union and communist ideology. Thus, when speaking about partnerships with traditional EU partners, it should be mentioned that these have been long-term, time-honoured relationships based on common values.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, most Eastern European countries decided to ally themselves with Western Europe rather than with Russia, and, accordingly, the EU became the largest transatlantic strategic partner of the USA. Thus, Burghardt (Reference Burghardt2006), writing in 2006, argues that the EU–USA relationship, combining some 60% of the world’s GDP, has been and remains the most powerful as well as the most comprehensive and the strategically most important relationship in the world because of major converging concerns, largely compatible values and overlapping interests. He stresses that the EU and the USA share common objectives with regard to coherent strategies for the promotion of peace, stability and economic development around the globe and cannot accept any other alternative to the EU–USA relationship. Joao Vale de Almeida (Reference Vale de Almeida2010), ambassador of the European Union to the United States, highlights that the EU and the USA share strategic objectives on the most important foreign policy issues and cooperate closely on diplomatic solutions. It can be observed that the vast quantity of areas in which these agents cooperate derives from the huge number of goals that they share, which in turn is a reflection on the compatibility of values that characterizes this bilateral relationship.
Notwithstanding, the Trump administration seems not to follow the line previous American administrations had established with foreign partners. According to Demertzis et al. (Reference Demertzis, Sapir and Wolff2017), the current administration not only aims at reducing the USA’s role as an anchor of the global multilateral system but also is probably on course to challenge it by imposing protectionist measures. The USA is drawing back from globalization and liberal values. Even the USA’s military commitment to NATO is questioned. The Trump administration seems to consider not only China and Mexico, but even Europe as rivals rather allies. In such circumstances, the EU cannot count on the USA in constructing an efficient multilateralism and should seek for support from its other traditional partners or from emerging powers in the Multipolar New Order.
The EU–Canada strategic partnership has been a long-term relationship marked by a Strategic Partnership Agreement and other key agreements and declarations. Long and Paterson (Reference Long and Paterson2015) highlight Canada´s preoccupation with the possibility of being absorbed into the USA and, from this perspective, Europe together with Japan were considered as options in Canada´s attempt to strategically pivot away from the USA. Mérand (Reference Mérand2015) stresses that regarding the specific challenges for the transatlantic area, the EU–USA/Canada relationship is not about widening, but about deepening, the already-strong existing bond.
Over a long period of time, the EU–Japan relationship was dominated by economic friction, and smooth-running political relations emerged very slowly. Nowadays, Japan’s strategy seems to have taken on a more global look, enhancing its alliance with the USA, and promoting strategic partnerships with countries within a broad-based arc of ‘freedom of prosperity’. According to Japan´s National Security Strategy (2014), Japan will further strengthen its relations with Europe, including cooperation with the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). De Prado (Reference De Prado2014) argues that the EU and Japan are developing compatible strategic capabilities, which facilitate greater bilateral, regional and global collaboration. Following Japan´s National Security Strategy it can be understood that the strategic partnership between Japan and the EU is based on sharing universal values of freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, and principles such as market economy, and is aimed at taking a leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community.
BRICSAMS EU’s Partners in a Multipolar World
Peña (Reference Peña2010) highlights the increasing importance of new forms of policy-making in the international realm, with a lower degree of institutionalization as represented by G7, G20 and BRICS, when emerging countries try to get more power in the International System through new dimensions of cooperation, and multilateralism is becoming the principle behind the foreign policy of most States. Philipovic (Reference Philipovic2011) stresses the dissatisfaction with the global financial and economic order on the part of BRICS countries, criticizing G7 leadership and wanting to see the G20 reinforced. Following the recommendations by the European Council (2010), the European Union’s strategic partnerships with key players in the world should provide a useful instrument for pursuing European objectives and interests such as enhancing trade with strategic partners through Free Trade Agreements, economic recovery, job creation and EU’s security. In this regard, the full participation of emerging economies in the international system should allow benefits to be spread in a balanced manner and responsibilities to be shared evenly.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to speak about equal relationships between the EU and the BRICS countries, taking into account the different levels of economic development, the divergent political systems, incompatibility with EU values, and different goals and interests at the international stage, among other important issues.
The EU–Russian strategic partnership seems to be the most problematic. Thus, Smith and Timmins (Reference Smith and Timmins2003) deny the existence of a real strategic partnership between Russia and the EU and state that a more precise terminology to define this relationship would be to consider it a ‘pragmatic’ partnership at best. De Wilde and Pellon (Reference De Wilde and Pellon2006, 123) argue that ‘the strategic partnership between EU and Russia is a real challenge from the point of view of common values.’ Kempe and Smith (Reference Kempe and Smith2006) also mention a growing gap concerning specific issues such as the structure of democratic institutions, the rights of civil society, and the concept of state sovereignty. Haukkala (Reference Haukkala2010) highlights that Russia at the outset demanded the more privileged status of a strategic partner. Blanco (Reference Blanco2016, 47–49) argues that for Russia, ‘strategic partnership’ was an attractive conceptual framework that could be used to neutralize the asymmetries of EU–Russia relations at the end of the twentieth century. According to his point of view, the fact that for more than 15 years ‘strategic partnership’ was the political label accepted by both parties to frame EU–Russian relations and develop a number of institutional channels of dialogue and cooperation, demonstrates that a gap in values does not exclude the possibility of defining a relationship as a ‘strategic partnership’. He highlights that although the gap in values definitely destabilizes EU–Russian relationships, the strategic partnership can be considered as a parallel discourse that challenges the references to incompatibilities, allows the parties to overcome their differences and keep working together even in episodes of disagreement.
Despite the fact that Federica Mogherini (Reference Mogherini2014) declared that Russia is not, in reality, a strategic partner of the EU anymore, Voynikov (Reference Voynikov2015, 21) argues that even though at present EU–Russian relations have largely been determined by the political situation in Ukraine, the EU and Russia are not ready to give up their strategic partnership and that is why their relationship could now be defined as a ‘forced strategic partnership’. Thus, according to Voynikov (Reference Voynikov2015), Russia and the EU continue to consider each other important, even necessary, partners, and we can conclude that there remains a strategic partnership between EU and Russia, albeit in a chilly and mostly uncooperative state.
The strategic partnership with India, like the EU–Russia strategic partnership, was created as an asymmetrical relationship, in which the EU became the one who should show its partner the way towards development, whereas the EU–China relationship does not seem to be asymmetric. Thus, Rocha-Pino (Reference Rocha-Pino2013) argues that the different meanings that each Actor gives to the concepts of sovereignty, global security, and Human Rights have not been an impediment for establishing cooperation nexuses between the EU and China. Blanco (Reference Blanco2016, 47) points out that the cases of Russia and China demonstrate that despite EU being aware of incompatibilities with these countries concerning core values such as democracy and human rights, the EU has had a broad agenda with these states. The use of ‘strategic partnership’ by the EU, therefore, can be seen as a ‘pragmatic move’ through which the clashes on norms and values that could undermine cooperation with a group of ‘key partners’ can be neutralized but not totally removed. Demertzis et al. (Reference Demertzis, Sapir and Wolff2017) discuss whether the EU and China are willing and able to jointly support the multilateral system as the USA steps back from its central role, and if they can act in a coordinated manner, as the EU and the USA have done in the past, but at the same time they admit that this will be rather difficult, taking into account that the European and Chinese economic systems differ much more than the European and American ones.
Regarding the EU–Brazil strategic partnership, Gratius (Reference Gratius and Hofmeister2008) argues that the EU is Brazil’s most important foreign partner, but this is an asymmetrical relationship, since trade relations with Brazil do not have the same importance to the EU. As there is no ‘gap in values’ with Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea, their entrance into the group of ‘privileged partners’ of the EU seems to be justified by a similar worldview rather than by common economic or geostrategic interests. For these countries, the strategic partnership with the EU serves rather for the elevation of their status at the international stage than for obtaining concrete economic and political benefits.
Thus, it can be concluded that the EU is trying to maintain a very difficult relationship with certain key agents, always having to manage the dilemma of disagreements regarding EU values and norms and the will to obtain maximal commercial benefits from bilateral relationships. The EU needs a kind of approach and strategy that allows it to develop a viable relationship with Russia, China and India, without focusing overmuch on the incompatibility of core values.
Regional and Interregional Organizations
The EU’s intention was to develop strategic bilateral relationships not only with its key partners but also with certain multilateral, regional and interregional organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe (CoE), the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the African Union (AU), with the purpose of reinforcing auspices of a global government.
Regarding this intermixed EU strategy, which presupposes a combination of bilateral and multilateral approaches towards strategic partnership, experts do not seem to agree with each other. Grevi (Reference Grevi2010) argues that bilateral and multilateral partnerships should be seen as something connected instead of representing alternative levels. Bendiek and Kramer (Reference Bendiek, Kramer, Husar and Günther Mair2010) stress the uncertainties with regard to the relationship between bilateral ‘strategic partnerships’ and the EU’s inter-regional ‘strategies’ (i.e. between EU–Brazil and EU–Mercosur or EU–China, EU–India and EU–ASEAN, etc.), which in the past led to undesirable levels of competition. Quevedo Flores (Reference Quevedo Flores2012) perceives the EU’s conception as languishing in a confused state, given that it implies the mixing of partnerships with multilateral institutions, regional groups and individual Actors. De Vasconcelos (Reference De Vasconcelos2010), on the contrary, argues that the multilateral objective and bilateral approach of EU’s concept of strategic partnerships is in fact totally coherent because, in such a way, the EU promotes the common understanding of shared global responsibility for global peace and security among different strategic partners.
González and Garrido (Reference González and Garrido2011) suppose that for the EU it would be better to focus on the multilateral network given that this would make it easier to assert its ambitions as a global power, while Gratius (Reference Gratius2011b) argues that the EU’s strategic partners are so heterogeneous as to represent a collective response to multilateralism, and the bilateral approach should be applied, taking into consideration the necessities of each country. Demertzis et al. (Reference Demertzis, Sapir and Wolff2017) point out that, strategically, the EU should continue its bilateral trade and investment relationship with its partners but the bilateral deals should be designed as stepping stones rather than obstacles to the multilateral issues.
Institutionalization of the European Union’s Strategic Partners
There are three main elements of strategic partnership (Pałłasz Reference Pałłasz2015, 5):
Promoting trade and investment.
Promoting multilateralism and strengthen international cooperation.
Border-sharing in security matters.
Following Pałłasz (Reference Pałłasz2015), the procedure used to form a new Strategic Partnership starts with a formal proposal by the European Commission through a Commission communication which then is transferred to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU for their approval to establish the partnership. The EU Parliament approves the proposal and, finally, in agreement with the partner, a joint statement is made to formally announce the partnership. Such a mechanism was applied for establishing Strategic Partnerships with China, India South Africa, Brazil and Mexico. The EU–South Korea Strategic Partnership did not follow this procedure as it was announced at a summit without any previous formal proposal.
The term ‘Strategic Partnership’ figures in various EU official documents and first was applied to Russia at the end of the 1990s (see Table 1).
Strategic partnership in EU official documents.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of EU’s official documents.
1 The full text of the documents is available at https://eulacfoundation.org/en/documents/1999-rio-declaration (accessed 5 February 2017).
2 The full text of the documents is available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed 5 February 2018).
3 The full text of the document is available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf (accessed 13 March 2019).
4 The full text of the document is available at: http://es.euabc.com/upload/books/lisbon-treaty3edition.pdf (accessed 13 September 2018).
5 The full text of the document is available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/EUGS_0.pdf (accessed 13 October 2019).
It is worth mentioning that for carrying out the Strategic Partnership in practice it is necessary to prepare an efficient jurisdictional and institutional basis with the partner in question. The institutional framework usually reflects the characteristics of the strategic partnership. Strategic partnerships can be institutionalized in different ways. Thus, according to Zhongping and Jing (Reference Zhongping and Jing2014) the mechanisms established between Russia and China are the most comprehensive and effective, including the Sino-Russian Regular Presidents’ (together with a hotline for direct communication between them) and Ministers’ meetings, the Energy Negotiators’ Meeting, and the People-to-People Cooperation Committee. As for the EU, it tries to institutionalize and legitimize the Strategic Partnership with its partners. Nevertheless, while the EU’s partners increasingly work directly with EU institutions, the Treaty of Lisbon and other EU innovations have done little to diminish the EU’s institutional complexity and to facilitate collaboration with the EU as with a coherent and united actor on the international stage. Thus, despite continual institutional rejigging in Brussels, at the end of the day all policymaking in the EU still depends on the consent of member states, and as a result the EU’s strategic partners still have to develop strong bilateral relationships with individual EU member states. In this regard, Hamilton (Reference Hamilton2010) draws attention to ex USA Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remark to her European colleagues that the system was designed in such way that it was impossible to have a real strategic dialogue.
The EU has institutionalized ways of understanding foreign policy and structuring relations around a document – in this case, a strategic partnership document. Regarding the jurisdictional basis of the Strategic Partnership, Pałłasz (Reference Pałłasz2015, 6) highlights a so-called ‘holy trinity’ of agreements: modernized trade and investment agreements, an all-encompassing political agreement, and a framework participation agreement, which would allow partners to participate in EU crisis management operations. It is worth mentioning that the EU has signed all three agreements only with South Korea. The jurisdictional basis with EU’s ‘Special Ten’ is presented in Table 2.
EU´s jurisdictional basis with its ‘Special Ten’.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of EU’s official documents.
From Table 2 it may be concluded that the EU not only extends and renews the jurisdictional basis with key partners but also actively carries out agreements with certain region and inter-regional organizations.
Misunderstandings between Strategic Partners
The absence of an official definition of Strategic Partnership (Jain, Reference Jain, Seidelmann and Vasilache2008; Renard, Reference Renard2010) has caused misunderstandings both within the EU and with third countries. Following Kim (Reference Kim2012), the term has usually been used to signify the establishment of long-term friendly relations in the commercial field.
Even when countries recognize each other as strategic partners and a treaty of strategic partnership is signed, if the parties involved continue to have different approaches and interpretations of what the partnership actually entails, then obviously the fulfilment of the development of their relations can be hampered by this fact. Thus, for instance, the different interpretation of the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia first led to isolation and then to open confrontation. The strategic partnership between the USA and the EU is still informal, and the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 continues to be the frame for the USA–EU relationship. Although The US Department of State (2013) describes the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) as ‘building an economic and a strategic relationship’ with the EU, the USA still prefers to define their relationships as a ‘transatlantic partnership’ instead of applying the term ‘strategic partnership’. In this regard, Blanco (Reference Blanco2016, 51) called strategic partnership ‘the new joker’ in the language of international politics and stressed the necessity of recognizing how other agents besides the EU conceptualize and employ this term. He argues that not only more empirical research is needed but also further development and operationalization of approaches that take into account the different meanings of the term ‘strategic partnership’ as it appears in varying usages. The different understanding of strategic partnership nations have is detailed in Table 3.
Different approaches towards strategic partnership.
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of official documents.
From Table 3 it may be concluded that Russia and China concur in a pragmatic approach towards strategic partnership while that of the EU and the USA is more tightly based on common values. It seems that multilateralism is a basis of strategic partnership for the USA, the EU, Russia and China, but for Russia and China this idea of multilateralism really means multi-polarity. After analysing four approaches towards strategic partnership, it is worth mentioning that only the EU has a clear official list of its strategic partners, and if China at least defines the priorities between strategic partners, the USA has used the term in a chaotic and unmethodical way. Thus, the term ‘strategic dialogue’ has been used to signal its intent to improve relations, as with Nigeria, Angola, South Africa and Vietnam, or to manage difficult ties, as with Russia and China (Hamilton, Reference Hamilton2015). Moreover, Hamilton (2015) highlights that it has cobbled together a variety of partnership arrangements to deal more effectively with adversaries such as Iran and North Korea.
Concerning the number of strategic partners, it can that be stated that only the EU has a limited number of partners according to a strict interpretation of the term. In this regard, Vasiliev (Reference Vasiliev2014) defined the Strategic Partnership as the destination toward which the Agent intends to concentrate its main resources for achieving the main strategic objective, highlighting that it is impossible to have many strategic partners. Kim (Reference Kim2012) argues that what matters is not the number of strategic partners but the quality of such relationships.
As we can observe, economics and mutual economic benefits remain the basis for strategic partnerships. Nevertheless, with time, the focus of the partnerships has expanded to include horizontal, multilateral, and foreign policy issues. As examples of such extension, the following may be proposed: the EU–China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, which started with security and peace, and the EU–Japan relations, which were strengthened with common security and defence policy exercises. Thus, Quevado Flores (Reference Quevedo Flores2012) argues that Strategic Partnership does not fragment into the function of just one economic, political or security system, given that the vital interests of the Parties passes through these different dimensions, thereby requiring the multidimensional approach toward collaboration. The negative experience of relations between the EU and Russia also demonstrated that it is impossible to build real a strategic partnership just by developing the commercial field while ignoring serious disagreements on security issues.
Despite the imperfection of the strategic partnership concept, many countries have decided that pursuing identified strategic partnerships might pay dividends for their national interest. In this regard, Zhongping and Jing (Reference Zhongping and Jing2014) argue that not only has China avoided war or serious confrontation with major powers and obtained enormous economic benefits from these partnerships but it also has successfully steered into a new multipolar world. However, they stress that the biggest deficiency of China’s strategic partnership policy is that it has not prepared itself to become a great power owing to the lack of the global agenda.
It is logical to assume that Strategic Partnerships should have a high efficiency, which would be impossible to achieve via a different type of relationship. And if in the commercial field efficiency can be measured by such indicators as volume of investments, volume of commercial trade, number of joint venture companies, etc., it is quite difficult to find appropriate indicators for estimating efficiency in the political, security or cultural fields. Moreover, it must be remembered that strategic partnerships, being an essential instrument that enables dialogue and cooperation for effective multilateralism, constitute a long-term investment, which should not be abandoned because of transient difficulties. Thus, the problematic partnership between the EU and Russia has a high-gain or high-loss possibility for both parties. It should also be said that after the crisis of 2008 the EU´s attractiveness as a strategic partner may have diminished.
Taking into consideration the theoretic framework and by using a multidimensional approach towards strategic partnership, the empirical framework will be described in the following section.
Data and Methods
For our research database we included the indicators suggested by the European Strategic Partnerships Observatory (ESPO, 2012) and other indicators related to values of the EU, common historical-cultural roots, geographical proximity and legal and institutional basis.
In addition, the variables related to discriminating actions between partners, taking into consideration the negative European–Russian strategic partnership experience, were added. The period of research comprises the data from 2009 to 2014.
The research embraced 143 (we only researched countries for which we had not less than 80% of information for all variables) and six regional organizations, taking into account that the EU not only proclaimed the strategic partnership with key actors but also with regional and interregional organizations. The investigated regional and interregional organizations are the following: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Central American Integration System (SICA). The organizations were chosen according to criteria requiring them to demonstrate that at least they had managed to create a viable economic union, and limiting every regional organization to having as a member not more than one of the EU’s official strategic partners. As further research is carried out, more regional and inter-regional organizations will be included.
The main hypotheses of our research are the following:
Not all of the EU´s official strategic partners are really strategic.
The ASEAN, the EAEU, the Mercosur and the SAARC are attractive as strategic regional partners for the EU.
The EU’s strategic partners are too heterogeneous to formulate a collective response to multilateralism, and that is why the bilateral approach should be applied toward every partner.
First of all, the variables were arranged into the following groups: economic, commercial, political, social, common values, geographical-cultural, juridical, institutional and discriminative. Second, for every group the Categorical Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA)Footnote 1 was applied, and we obtained the following 14 categories: partner’s economical weight, partner’s economic freedom, common commercial interests, partner’s sustainable governance, partner’s political weight, partner’s social development, collaboration in science and education, common values, partner’s geographical closeness, common historical-cultural roots, common legal basis, common institutional basis, economic adversarial relationship and obstruction regarding a free circulation of citizens. Third, the Principal Components Analysis (PCA)Footnote 2 was applied, which led us to three principal components (the description of these components obtained in the analysis is provided in the next section). Finally, on the basis of the three principal components which we obtained, Cluster Analysis was applied.
Results
The three principal components account for 66.12% of all the information. The first component (Comp. 1) represents 44.1% of the total variance and explains where the highest weights comprised such factors as the partner’s political weight, partner’s economic weight, partner social development and common commercial interests. The second component (Comp. 2) represents 33.95% of the total variance and explains where the highest weights comprised such factors as partner’s political freedom, partner economic freedom and common values. The third component (Comp. 3) represents 21.94% of the total variance where the highest weights comprised such factors as geographical closeness, legal and institutional basis. The results of the PCA for the first 15 countries or regional organizations by three components (Comp. 1, Comp. 2, Comp. 3) are presented in Table 4.
Ranking by countries and regional/interregional organization.
– Official EU Strategic Partner
– Regional/interregional organization
Source: Own calculations on the basis of SPSS.
From Table 4 we can deduce that the EU’s official strategic partners hold high positions and are situated very close to each other only in the first component. That is why this component is called the Strategic Component. The second component embraces the countries with whom the EU shares common values and concurs in point of view regarding global issues. We call this component the Partner in Spirit Component.
The EU has developed what may be referred to as predominately a legal and institutional basis with countries that might be regarded either literally or figuratively as its ‘neighbours’, in particular with those nations that could then be viewed as potential EU members. Therefore, we call this the Good Neighbour Component.
While the EU’s official strategic partners hold high positions and are situated very close to each other only in the first component, the other two components also are not irrelevant for our research. The Cluster Analysis applied on the basis of the three components is carried out with SPSS software using the K-means Cluster Procedure.Footnote 3 The first Component has the largest F contributing the greatest separation between clusters (see Table 5).Footnote 4
ANOVA.
Sources: Own calculations on the basis of SPSS
We stopped with seven clusters, as this to us seems to yield the most realistic results. This first allowed us to discard a huge number of counties and, second, to concentrate on those countries that are of at least some interest as EU strategic partners. The number of cases in each cluster is presented in Table 6.
Number of cases in each cluster.
Sources: Own calculations on the basis of SPSS
The second, third and sixth clusters have a low value of the Strategic Component (Comp. 1) (see Table 7) and that is why we conclude that the countries concerned are not interesting for the EU as Strategic Partners; hence we excluded them from our further investigations. Countries of the second cluster with a strong Good Neighbour Component (Comp. 2) could be defined either as potential EU members or partners for the EU Good Neighbour policy.
Initial clusters’ centres.
Sources: Own calculations on the basis of SPSS
Distribution of countries and regional organizations by the clusters with high Strategic Component is presented in Table 8.
Distribution by cluster.
Sources: Own elaboration
From Table 8 we conclude that ASEAN, EAEU, Mercosur and SAARC have a high value in the Strategic Component while SICA and CARICOM are not interesting for the EU as strategic partners. Mexico and South Africa, being official strategic partners of the EU, seem to be almost irrelevant, according to our cluster analysis.
The fifth cluster represents countries with a strong strategic component with whom the EU has developed a jurisdictional-institutional basis but that do not concord with EU norms and values (the Partner in Spirit Component [Comp_3] is negative). These countries are strategically attractive partners for the EU but they are problematic when it comes to common values. Mercosur is probably situated in the fifth cluster due to Venezuela’s membership. Venezuela was suspended in 2016, but our research only includes data until 2014, when it was still member of Mercosur.
The first cluster also represents countries strategically attractive for the EU but with low coherence regarding common values. With these countries the EU does not have a strong jurisdictional-institutional basis. Only China is situated in the first cluster, and this is what makes it special in comparison with other partners.
The fourth cluster includes five partners of the EU’s ‘Special Ten’ which are of strategic value for the EU and have a positive Partner in Spirit Component but with whom the jurisdictional-institutional basis is not well-developed. Finally, in the seventh cluster we find countries that, in spite of their Strategic Component not being so high in comparison with the other three clusters, show very high coherence with EU norms and values and have a strong jurisdictional-institutional basis with the EU. They are the EU’s potential strategic partners based primarily on shared values.
Conclusion
In this contribution, the EU’s strategic partners were subjected to analysis. It was empirically demonstrated that not all of the EU’s official strategic partners concur with the EU’s values, norms and general point of view regarding global issues. Moreover, the EU’s understanding of ‘strategic partnership’ does not always tally with what is understood by the term by the EU’s partners themselves. Despite the EU’s leaders’ rhetoric regarding the priority of common values, democracy, human rights and the rule of law in relationships, the main criteria of being chosen as a strategic partner for the EU seem to be the political and economic partner’s weight together with common commercial interests.
The cluster analysis has demonstrated that Mexico and South Africa are not of sufficient strategic interest to qualify as the EU’s official strategic partners. Thus, our first hypothesis was proven. Australia, Chile, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, despite not having such a high strategic component as other strategic partners, nevertheless have the potential to become EU strategic partners based on common values. Regarding the investigated regional organizations, it was empirically demonstrated that ASEAN, EAEU, Mercosur and SAARC are attractive as strategic regional partners for the EU, while SICA and CARICOM are not. So our second hypothesis is also proven.
The cluster analysis has confirmed that the EU’s strategic partners are too heterogeneous to formulae a collective response to multilateralism that would confirm our third hypothesis. There are at least two different groups of strategic partners: one group concurs with EU norms and values, the other group is, right from the outset, problematic from the perspective of common values. With respect to the latter, the EU should decide either to aim for a more pragmatic approach towards strategic partnership, which presupposes collaboration in fields of common interest and glosses over common values, or to refrain from considering them as EU strategic partners, giving priority to common values rather than common commercial interests. The former course of action would mean reneging on the initial concept of precisely developing a strategic partnership with those countries that concur with EU norms and values. By all accounts, only by developing an individual approach toward every partner, and by taking into consideration the particular features of each, can the EU confidently entertain the likelihood of its heterogeneous strategic partners being compatible with its articulated foreign policy – or indeed with its overall Global Agenda.
About the Authors
Pablo Podadera Rivera is Jean Monnet Professor ‘Ad Personam’ in European Economy at the University of Málaga (Spain). Recent publications comprise: (2012) ‘Crisis and regional distribution in the European Union. Considerations of economic policy’. Journal of Economic Issues; (2015) ‘The strategic triangle: EU–Russia–Asia: future EU strategies in the Eurasian zone: a solid and lasting UE-Russia Economic Partnership’. Sylwan Journal Review; (2016) (with Anna Garashchuk) ‘The Eurasian economic union: prospective regional integration in the post-Soviet space or just geopolitical project?’ Eastern Journal of European Studies 7(2), 91–110; (2017) (with Anna Garashchuk) ‘The Eurasian economic union and its potential relationship with the European Union’. Revista Europea Universitaria.
Anna Garashchuk received her PhD from the PhD Programme in Economics and Business, Universidad de Málaga, Spain, and is a researcher in the Jean Monnet Center of Excellence on European and Global Studies and Research, of which Pablo Podadera Rivera is Director. She holds a Masters in International Cooperation and Politics of Development. For recent publications, in collaboration with Pablo Podadera Rivera, see above.
