This is not your average monograph. In part it is a cultural history of Anglo-American debates over equality and aristocracy, which began after the republic stabilized in the early 1800s and continued until America surpassed Britain on the world stage a century later. Yet Huston's new book is also about the contemporary United States, where “an ocean of screams for individual liberty” (167) suffocates democracy.
Because Huston is admirably clear about his politics, it is only fair to admit that I share them. Like Huston, I think that liberty without equality is a cruel joke on everyone but the wealthy, and that the retreat of redistributive policies over the past forty years has impoverished America no matter how high the stock market bubbles. Partly as a result, I find Huston's book original and important, even though I also think it misses something about both the United States and the United Kingdom.
The heart of the book is an analysis of British observations of nineteenth-century America. These writers have long wallowed in Tocqueville's shadow, their words plucked out of context or ignored altogether. Huston recovers their honesty and insight. True, they huffed about American hand-shaking and tobacco-spitting. Granted, they mocked the fundamental mediocrity of Yankee politicians. But whether they were Tories or Whigs, Chartists or Abolitionists, these visitors reflected seriously on what they saw. And what they saw—at least in the northern countryside—was equality.
From New England through the newer states above the Ohio River, Britons marveled at a place where hired hands took their meals with wealthy employers, where every man either owned a farm or expected to buy one, and where most people got along in a kind of rough-around-the-edges civility. Both they and their hosts credited inheritance laws that broke up large estates, constitutions that secured the right to sue and speak as well as vote, and public schools that enabled private citizens to stand tall.
“There were some detractors of American public education,” Huston writes, “but if near unanimity existed among foreign visitors on one subject, it was the excellence of the availability of common education in the United States” (91). Even the most hide-bound Tories rated ordinary folk in the new republic as more intelligent and optimistic than the laboring trolls of the old country, who had no hope of good schooling because they could not pay for it. In the rural North, by contrast, democratic innovations interacted with the magic blend of cheap land and dear labor to foster widespread well-being.
Huston also comments on the decline of the English aristocracy. One tipping point was the 1894 introduction of “Death Duties,” which worked against the monopolistic tendencies of strict settlement. The real break came with new land taxes just before the Great War, after which the House of Lords revolted into political oblivion. Huston follows with a quick but ingenious discussion of American progressives, whose urban outlook made them—and the historians who love them—forget the rural foundations of democratic equality.
Huston is careful to note that British visitors’ reports did not apply to the slave-owning South and that their aristocratic background left out the bourgeois and evangelical viewpoints of the Victorian age. When they looked at the northern democracy, that is, they partially distorted the picture both before and behind their eyes. The overall effect was rather like that of a funhouse mirror. At times Huston adopts those mirages instead of analyzing them, leaving us with an odd impression of both America and Britain in the 1800s.
The southern states in Huston's book sound like aristocratic exceptions to the great experiment. Recent scholarship argues otherwise.Footnote 1 Far from dead-end conservatives, the cotton planters of the antebellum years were the most powerful and militant interest group in North America, perhaps in the Western Hemisphere. In 1838, the export value of their staple crop was twenty times greater than that of New England's fisheries.Footnote 2
Those expanding fortunes only added to southern whites’ constitutional edge. Slaveowners dominated the presidency, the Senate, and the Supreme Court right up to Abraham Lincoln's election. Especially after 1840, they steered U.S. foreign policy into hyper-expansionism. Why not treat these planters as the quintessential Americans? Why point to Lincoln rather than Jackson as the talisman of “the republic of equality” (76)?Footnote 3
Huston also echoes those who associated England with stability or even stagnation. That is well and good for its southern countryside, most of which was owned by a sclerotic nobility—the “no-ability,” as Tom Paine knew them.Footnote 4 Yet as Huston himself notes, most nineteenth-century Englishmen did not work on agricultural estates. Nor did they labor in the dark satanic mills of Manchester. Instead they filled a huge variety of skilled and semiskilled manufacturing jobs, moving restlessly not only through the British Isles but also to North America and Australia.
Britain was thirty years behind the United States and Canada in compulsory public education, but until the rise of the German universities, it was also the premier source of higher learning. It was the home of Edward Jenner, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Charles Darwin no less than of bored fox-hunters. Its elite professionals and lesser gentry hardly fit the classical vision of a leisured aristocracy as they chased fortunes and converts around a free-trade, anti-slavery, evangelical empire.
A distinguished historian, Huston knows all of this; it just doesn't inform his analysis as much as it could. Nonetheless, this book is an impressive feat of historical writing, a powerful reminder that equality is—and was—the heart of democracy.
