After the American Civil War, individual states were central to the process of Reconstruction. Each Southern state that had seceded had a different trajectory throughout the war and its aftermath, and Reconstruction was reversed within each state by discrete but related campaigns of violence, fraud, and antidemocratic reform that ensured permanent control by white supremacist Democrats. One of the best ways for historians to understand Reconstruction, then, is to look at its course within a specific state, as evident in Michael Fitzgerald's definitive new history, Reconstruction in Alabama. Unlike some works of similar ambition, it is based not on synthesizing findings in the secondary literature but on Fitzgerald's years of deep primary source research. Reconstruction in Alabama not only makes a coherent historical narrative out of the intricacies of Alabama's political factions and social geography; it offers convincing explanations for them.
The introduction is principally historiographic, which unfortunately underplays some of the book's strengths. It begins by noting that there has not been a comprehensive history of Alabama's Reconstruction since a racist account by Walter L. Fleming in 1905. But by structuring much of the rest of the introduction around discrete points made by subsequent revisionist historians, Fitzgerald positions some of his most important arguments as correctives in a broad but scattered literature rather than stand-alone conclusions that can reshape how we think of the course of Reconstruction.
Unlike some Southern states, Alabama had a fairly robust cohort of elite Whigs before the war, concentrated among the plantation owners of the black belt of the center of the state. They claimed to practice political moderation and eschewed fiery states’ rights conservatism, whereas independent white farmers in the less-prosperous counties of the northern part of the state favored a hardline small-government Jacksonian Democracy. But when secession came, the axes of moderate and conservative Southern politics shifted: Democrats in the North opposed secession while former Whig plantation owners in the black belt overwhelmingly supported it. These prewar political differences complicated the course of Reconstruction, particularly in regard to vigilante violence and the role of the plantation in the post-emancipation political economy. Fitzgerald asserts that throughout both Presidential and Military Reconstruction, elite planters in the black belt moderated on aspects of racial repression for better labor relationships with insurgent black tenants, while former Unionist areas became the hotbed of Klan violence.
The strength of African American activism and, to a lesser extent, the moderation of elite planters meant that in the black belt Reconstruction essentially worked. Sharecropping developed as a compromise that allowed white planters to make money while black workers preferred its relatively greater autonomy in comparison to slavery. As a result of the labor compromise that developed, the black belt saw less terroristic white supremacist violence than did northern Alabama. Fitzgerald's work thus adds specific teeth to the arguments of Steven Hahn—and before him, W. E. B. Du Bois—about the political acumen and solidarity of rural African Americans. White planters obviously were at the top of economic and political ladders, but black tenant farmers were real agents of power.
Perhaps the strongest aspects of Reconstruction in Alabama are its explorations of moderate white politicians, its untangling of the labyrinthine history of railroad corruption, and its analysis of white terrorism. Much of the first part of the book analyzes a wide swath of white men whom Fitzgerald calls Unionists. Some had opposed secession; others had been moderate planters who embraced it. Though most had become Confederates, after the war many were willing to work with the federal government on the process of Reconstruction. None of these white men supported full black equality, though some joined the Republican Party and became known as scalawags. They shifted with prevailing political winds, attempting to stabilize the state's political economy and ensure they remained at the top of whatever coalitions developed.
Many of these men tried to jumpstart Alabama's industrialization with a campaign of railroad building through patently corrupt deals between the state government and private capital. Fitzgerald places the blame for the resulting boondoggles upon Democrats. An unexpected consequence was, for a brief period, increased political opportunity for African Americans. As Fitzgerald writes, it was these “persistent white divisions over finance and ideology, and the practical value of labor peace in a recovering economy” that African Americans exploited for their own place in the politics of Reconstruction (8). The resulting racial compromise reached its peak during the governorship of Robert Lindsay, a Democrat who won election in 1870. Unlike in virtually every other Southern state, when Democrats first retook control of Alabama they did not eliminate Republican's access to political power wholesale. Lindsay's governorship saw a reduction of white supremacist violence—largely because of the federal investigation into the Klan, not Lindsay's own actions—but ever-deepening financial crises around railroad building.
Against this backdrop of an essentially successful detente between African Americans and elite white Alabamians in the black belt, Fitzgerald highlights the rampant white supremacist terroristic violence that swept through other parts of the state. North Alabama had seen substantial guerilla violence during the Civil War, both due to local Unionist sentiment and military invasion. Fitzgerald considers the considerable unrest in the region during the war and the early years of Reconstruction, and explores fascinating demographic research into hundreds of white men identified as participants in the Ku Klux Klan from 1867–1871. He finds that most were young men of very little property in 1870 who had been the sons of wealthy slave owners before the war. He thus attributes membership in the Klan to “drastic postwar impoverishment” (180). There are some limits to the usefulness of purely economic explanations for racial violence, and Fitzgerald might have further explored the perpetrators’ ideological commitments, but his research is thorough and groundbreaking. The Klan mounted a campaign of violence that first helped to get Democrats elected in 1870, resulting not yet in Redemption but an uneasy truce.
But Republicans’ presence in Alabama politics would not last. Cotton's profitability collapsed with poor crops and depression in 1873. The planters of the black belt gave up compromise and embraced the racist hardline previously wielded in the rest of the state in 1874, becoming literal White Liners. A new virulent form of white supremacy papered over economic and political differences between white men with a widespread campaign of racist rhetoric and political violence. Redemption won the planters the long game. They not only seized full control of the state's politics, but oversaw the gradual diversification of Alabama's economy, becoming the “big mules” of the industrialized New South. Their earlier corruption was forgotten and their complicity in racist violence forgiven by the historians of the Dunning School like Walter Fleming. Michael Fitzgerald's Reconstruction in Alabama is the definitive repudiation of those historians. But it is much more than that. Broad but precise, sweeping in scope but measured in claims, it will not only inform anyone interested in Alabama's history, but also remind historians of the importance of individual states for understanding Reconstruction's rise and fall.
