Has Newman been properly appreciated by philosophers? This book begins by quoting some eminent Oxford philosophers and theologians (Kenny, Mitchell, Kerr, and Ker) who believe the answer is, no, he has been largely ignored by philosophers. In this book Pratt Morris-Chapman sets out to show that Newman's writings have been used by philosophers to a much greater extent, and on some points to more significant effect, than the Oxford consensus would allow.
The first part of his argument is a general survey showing how philosophers of various schools have engaged with Newman's writings. He gives a list of ‘Oxford’ people who have done this, culminating in the work of William J. Abraham (1947-2021), a Northern Irish theologian and philosopher of religion, whose epistemology of religious belief is developed from the framework of Newman's writings, something that came about (our author believes) through Basil Mitchell's direction of Abraham's doctoral work at Oxford. More about him below.
Newman was a somewhat isolated figure within 19th century English philosophy, largely because his more classical, Aristotelian approach was not shared by the utilitarian majority. But he was a well-known and controversial figure, and philosophers were already engaging with his writings for some decades before his death, usually in a critical and adversarial way.
In the 20th century, a reference by Wittgenstein, in discussing certainty, to ‘H. Newman’ was taken to be a reference to J.H. Newman and came to be regarded as a turning point for Newman's recognition as a philosopher. It led some to speak of Newman anticipating Wittgenstein and even to being ‘a major influence’ on his work on certainty. There is uncertainty, however, about who ‘H. Newman’ actually was. He may have been a lesser-known colleague of Wittgenstein, and our author takes a reserved view about its importance for evaluating J.H. Newman's philosophical legacy.
Newman's work was certainly appreciated, however, by American pragmatists such as James and Dewey, by philosophers formed by James, as well as by Whitehead and Hartshorne. ‘Boston personalists’ and ‘phenomenologists’ were also aware of Newman's writings and often cite them. An interesting association is Newman's connection with Franz Brentano, a forerunner of phenomenology, who travelled to Birmingham to meet him. Newman was also important for some neo-scholastics, as well as for philosophers working in specific areas such as education, politics, morality and especially religion.
The general survey shows at least that Newman is a writer whom many philosophers felt obliged to acknowledge, some of whose ideas and arguments were appreciated even if, obviously, there was never such a thing in philosophy as ‘Newmanism’ or a ‘Newman school of thought’.
The second part of the argument focuses on ‘epistemological particularism’, an approach associated with the philosopher Roderick Chisholm (1916-1999) as well as the theologian already mentioned, William J. Abraham. It explores whether and how Newman's work might have been important for Chisholm as it was for Abraham. Epistemological particularism is contrasted with ‘epistemological methodism’, where one first seeks to determine the criterion of knowledge before proceeding to claim any reliable knowledge. Particularism by contrast begins with trust in the knowledge we have while in a second moment submitting it to reflection and evaluation. If we begin by trying to work out ‘how do we know’ we end up either in a circle or in skepticism. Begin rather with what we think we know and then work out criteria for how we know. Epistemological rules may be formed retrospectively. Both Chisholm and Abraham appeal to the Aristotelian principle, that different levels of precision are required for different subject matter: Abraham names this principle ‘Aristotelian Epistemic Fit’.
The next step is to consider interpretations of Newman which compare (and in some cases contrast) his work with that of epistemological particularists. Pratt Morris-Chapman believes this comparison is favourable to Newman overall and encourages us to regard him as having strengthened, if not actually influenced, Chisholm's approach. Newman was familiar with sources that were important for Chisholm, in particular Sextus Empiricus and Pyrhonnian skepticism as transmitted by theologians of the early modern period. They were both familiar with the empiricism of Locke and Hume and both criticized it for the same reasons: empiricism is a form of ‘methodism’ in allowing criteria to render sensible beliefs irrational. An important source for Chisholm and for Abraham is Thomas Reid, and although Newman was critical of Reid, his (Newman's) belief that our commonsense beliefs should be taken on trust aligns him with the particularist tradition for which Reid is an important source. There are also ‘thomistic’ sources that are important for both Newman and Chisholm and that also support the principles of epistemological particularism, something that becomes clear post-Newman in the work of Cardinal Mercier to which Chisholm is indebted. As our author points out, ‘the most significant philosophical connection shared by all of these writers is their knowledge of Aristotle’ (p.96).
Newman's work is considered then in more detail to see to what extent ‘antecedents of particularism’ can be found in it. If there are such antecedents it shows that at least in regard to this issue, Newman's philosophical legacy has been underestimated. His persistent criticism of ‘liberalism’ is Newman's way of rejecting epistemological methodism which employs narrow and external criteria in religious enquiries leading inevitably to a reductionist account of theological truth. The principle of Aristotelian Epistemic Fit is not respected. Knowledge occurs prior to epistemological enquiry, Newman says (in this agreeing with Thomistic authors) and this is a further endorsement of the particularist approach. What Nicholas Lash described as Newman's ‘methodological pluralism’ is what Abraham calls Aristotelian Epistemic Fit – every subject has its own level of proof. Even the ‘criteria’ for doctrinal development are not conditions for future development but rather tests or ‘notes’ by which to evaluate the authenticity of the developments that have taken place up to now.
The penultimate chapter considers the distinction of simple and reflex (or complex) assent as presented in Newman's Grammar of Assent, showing how that presentation manifests epistemological particularist tendencies. The similarities between Newman and Chisholm are striking even if clear lines of ‘influence’ from one to the other cannot be determined. At least it is known that Chisholm read the Grammar (p.155), and he acknowledged the influence of two neo-scholastic writers, Mercier and Peter Coffey, who in turn had read and referred to Newman.
Finally, Abraham's indebtedness to Newman for his philosophy of religion is considered. Abraham is clear that his particularist account of the rationality of Christian belief develops insights ‘brilliantly opened up’ by Newman. A lifelong Methodist in the theological sense, Abraham aligns what he regards as a Protestant rationalization of the Christian faith, owing to its biblicist application of the principle sola scriptura, with what Chisholm calls epistemological methodism. Instead, Abraham develops an approach which he calls ‘canonical theism’, believing that revelation continued after the time of the apostles, through the millennium of the undivided Church. It brings him close to Newman's own journey through the patristic period, and Abraham links the recovery of the patristic faith to Chisholm's epistemological particularist approach: the Church offers no formal theory as to how it knows that it possesses the truth about God (thus rejecting the Reformers’ starting point of a criterion of scripture), an omission that is good for the Church and for epistemology. The Church presented to people, not a criterion of religious knowledge, but means of grace which immersed them into the life of God on which they could then reflect to appreciate what they had come to know.
Newman never uses the phrase ‘epistemological particularism’ but his desire, like that of Abraham, is that the revelation of God be judged on its own terms (Aristotelian Epistemic Fit applied to Christian faith, best served philosophically by a particularist rather than a methodist approach). Abraham follows Chisholm philosophically but his application to religious belief of what he learns from Chisholm has more in common with Newman. A remaining difficulty, however, is the ‘ecclesiological gap’ in Abraham's thought – in which body are the means of grace given so that human beings can be immersed into the life of God? Everybody knows Newman's answer to that question. Abraham for his part believes that the revelation of God is ongoing and that Roman Catholicism turns the Magisterium into an epistemic criterion, a move comparable to what Protestant thinkers did with the Bible. There is thus an ‘ecclesiological vacuum in Abraham's account’: he does not specify which contemporary church is the carrier of the revelation he believes to be still ongoing.
This book is dense, a bit repetitive in places, but the fruit of impressive research and is informative and stimulating throughout. At times the data available – e.g., regarding the use of Newman by philosophers – may seem meagre, but the main questions it considers are clearly of the greatest importance. It will help to secure Newman's place as a significant contributor to the philosophy of religion as well as bringing to people's attention, if they were not aware of it before, the epistemological approach of Roderick Chisholm and William J. Abraham.
