Fair and equitable treatment [FET] is an indispensable element of the bilateral investment treaty [BIT], a standard of investment protection that is the most invoked provision against host countries. The book provides a comprehensive understanding of the FET standard and highlights how it creates inequity and imbalance against developing countries. The scholarship problematizes the arbitral tribunals’ interpretation of FET provision in favour of foreign investors without considering the different contexts of developing countries. Within eight chapters, the book suggests that the sociopolitical and economic conditions of developing countries should be considered in the BIT negotiations and in determination of FET obligations.

Most of the recent BITs have incorporated FET provisions without any precise definition and uniform approach. The standard continues to differ in scholars’ views and tribunals’ interpretation. However, Dr Islam categorizes FET as FET minus, Simple FET, and FET plus in Chapter 3, and suggests that developing countries should assume that a tribunal will interpret the FET standard as an independent and autonomous standard which gives more freedom for discretionary interpretation. The fourth chapter investigates the country classification and, rightly said, classifications do not give images of the economic and social levels of development, and the disparity within them. Hence, arbitral tribunals need to accommodate the developmental issues and challenges of host developing countries. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the arbitral tribunals’ practices relating to political, sociopolitical, and economic crises of the host developing countries. However, although tribunals refer to the crisis and acknowledge political instability and sociopolitical consequences, they do not give enough weight in their determination of liability. The Tecmed and GAMI Tribunals did not consider the context in their award, while the Mamidoil v. Albania Tribunal found public policy was relevant to the FET obligation and held no violation. Similarly, tribunals did not consider an economic crisis as an exemption of liability. For instance, the AWG and CMS v. Argentina Tribunals acknowledged the economic crisis but found that this was not an exemption from liability, while the Enron Corp. vs. Argentina Tribunal totally discarded any defence of necessity. The author concludes that tribunals were overly enthusiastic to protect the interest of foreign investors but ignored the economic crises of host developing countries, but here the reviewer differs in opinion. The book analyzes tribunals’ decisions and finds inconsistent interpretations (p. 172) and an inadequate approach to FET (p. 173) in addressing host developing countries’ concerns, and that impacts a developing countries’ trust in the arbitration mechanism. The author rightly says that reconceptualization is required to provide clear guidance to address disputes against host developing countries and to ensure greater certainty of the FET standard. However, it may not be true that tribunals only interpret FET to favour investors; rather they apply discretionary power and interpret as they deem fit.

This book fills gaps in the literature regarding challenges for host developing countries in investor-state dispute settlement and the problems therein. Further, this scholarship may help to interpret the FET standard in the context of developing countries’ crises.