For over half a century scholarship on the sophists and their movement has sought to rectify Plato’s negative portrayal of them. This is achieved through two main approaches. The first strand of scholarship rejects Plato’s negative portrayal tout court. The prevailing consensus is that the sophists made significant contributions to Greek intellectualism, particularly in the fields of morality and politics, which deserve recognition in their own right. The second strand of scholarship goes beyond correcting Plato’s portrayal by arguing that the sophists’ ideas and argumentation style influenced Plato’s philosophy. A.’s volume addresses both strands of scholarship to contribute to the ongoing debate in a specific way. Corresponding with the two parts of the book, A. focuses on the views of the sophists and of Plato regarding justice and injustice, their value and connection to prospering (eudaimonia).
Part 1 delves into the first strand of scholarship, where A. argues that the sophists developed significant arguments and ideas about justice and prosperity that have shaped the history of moral and political philosophy. In his treatment A. avoids engaging with Plato’s dialogues, with the conviction that ‘to show that the sophists influenced Plato’s philosophy, it would be tendentious in the extreme for me to draw on his philosophical works in reconstructing their thinking’ (p. 8).
Part 2 claims that ‘Plato was very much aware of the sophistic debate about justice, and more than that, he consciously engaged with it [in Republic]’ (p. 9). The connecting thought in both parts is that, for A., ‘Plato’s project in Republic was so decisively shaped by the 5th-century debate about justice’ (p. 177 n. 41; p. 153). In this regard, I take A. to be proposing that we adopt structuralism (but not sola scriptura) as the appropriate methodology for reading Republic’s central argument.
For the reasons noted in what follows, I think that A. does an excellent job in Part 1, but not so in Part 2. Part 1 begins with an analysis of some passages in Hesiod’s Works and Days (WD), from which A. discerns a thesis he calls ‘the Traditional View of Justice, according to which being just is profitable and prudent because the gods reward just behaviour and punish unjust behaviour’ (p. 9). So, readers are warned that, even though the book is about Plato and the sophists, Part 1 begins and ends with non-sophists, Hesiod and Democritus the atomist. That noted, the general question is: can justice itself make one prosper? Hesiod argues that one ought to be just to benefit from ‘External Goods’ like rewards from the gods; for, the ‘gods themselves stand as guarantors of the profitability of justice and the just life’ (p. 25). Later scepticism about the gods cast doubt on the credibility of successful prospering as the reward from the gods for being genuinely just. Some sophists, those A. calls the ‘Moral Cynics’ (or Cynics), argue that for the intelligent person ‘successful injustice does win a better settlement than justice’ (p. 25). In the camp of the Moral Cynics there are the unknown author of the Sisyphus Fragment, Antiphon’s On Truth and two corroborating texts, Pheidippides’ sophistic manoeuvres in Aristophanes’ Clouds and Athens’ treatment of Melos in Thucydides’ Peloponnesian Wars. For the Cynics ‘justice is a bad bargain sold at too dear a price and thoroughly broken. The intelligent individual ought to reject it and pursue calculated intelligent injustice instead’ (p. 48).
The task that the Moral Cynics set for those A. calls ‘Friends of Justice’ (or Friends) was to take over Hesiod’s project of defending that justice is preferable to injustice but without reference to interventionist gods and other religious assumptions. The Anonymous Iamblichi, Prodicus’ ‘Choice of Heracles’ and Democritus’ ethical and political fragments are appealed to as sophistic intellectual resources to defend justice against the Cynics. Against the Cynics, the Friends tout justice in various positive ways: (1) justice is a necessary prerequisite for a well-functioning human society; (2) one is rewarded with eternal renown even if it is done posthumously; (3) justice rewards a psychologically sound state (p. 96). So, the key contrast is between justice’s reward of genuine ‘Refined External Goods’ such as (1)–(3) and injustice’s reward of ‘Crude External Goods’ such as transient goods like wealth. Now, whether Refined or Crude Goods, justice requires recognition from others.
As will have emerged, Part 1 is very interesting. A. is able to demonstrate that ‘we have enough material to paint a very interesting picture of Greek moral and political philosophy in the closing decades of the 5th century without Plato’ (p. 8). Here, A. treads the path of familiar scholarship but also introduces neglected texts like the Democritean fragments (despite not being sophistic material) and maturely shows their relevance in the debate.
In Part 2 A. seeks to defend the claim that ‘beyond merely influencing Glaucon and Adeimantus’ challenge, the sophistic debate in fact shapes the entire trajectory of Republic’ (p. 153). This argument has some strength but also weaknesses. On the strength, A. observes rightly that Plato, like the Cynics and the Friends, eschews religious assumptions in his defence of justice in Republic (in contrast to his views, for instance, in Gorgias and Laws).
On the weaknesses, I limit myself to three. (1) I take issue with A.’s proposed structuralist method for understanding Republic. Of course, there are some conceptual points of convergence in the content of Socrates’ defence of justice and that of the past Friends. But one does not need to know the Friends’ views before one understands Republic’s argument. It is a plus if readers of Republic know the previous debates, but it is not necessary that readers know the past debate before reading Republic. Republic’s interlocuters are well constituted to provide a preliminary information of what to expect in the remainder of the dialogue. The involvement of Thrasymachus should be enough to grant, synecdochically, that Plato is (or hints at being) aware of the past sophists’ debate, especially when it is Thrasymachus’ argument that Adeimantus and Glaucon expand. A. overstates the Friends’ so-called influence so much so that one gets the impression that Plato seems to have plagiarised the views of past debaters. At a point A. has to remind readers that ‘much of Plato’s argument is highly original and inventive’ (p. 200, also p. 188).
(2) Glaucon is given too much intellectual space in the argument; he is presented as intellectually sophisticated in the sense of knowing too much about the past debate. But A. says nothing about Glaucon’s intellectual background.
(3) A.’s discussion of Glaucon’s taxonomy of goods is to show the connection between Republic and the past debate and to facilitate an understanding that Socrates settles on a conception of the value of justice as follows: ‘justice will contribute to the prospering of the just individual even if it is not recognised’ (p. 12). A decisive passage is Rep. 367e1–4, where Glaucon challenges Socrates to argue that justice is good (and conducive to individual prospering), ‘whether it escapes the notice of the gods and other humans or not’ (also Rep. 427d2–7; 580b8–c8; 612c7–d2). So, Socrates is charged to defend this conception of justice not only against Thrasymachus’ tyrant, who is openly unjust, but also against the one A. calls the ‘Dorian Rogue – an individual who is completely unjust but nevertheless cultivates appearance and reputation for justice’ (p. 143).
A. asserts that Glaucon, not the past Friends, discovers the Dorian Rogue. Even if they had found the Rogue, the past Friends lacked the intellectual resources to reject him. Plato, a Friend, intervenes to provide the resources and to settle the debate once and for all. This argument is intriguing, but A. lacks sufficient defence. Socrates’ defence (Plato’s contribution), especially in Books 4 and 9, is given few pages (pp. 189–99). Glaucon’s division of goods takes up a significant part of Part 2. A.’s discussion of the division is even problematic, especially with Glaucon’s third category of goods; I do not see how seeking medical attention should be linked to the search for reputational goods like fame and glory (pp. 168–70).
Despite my reservations, the book has several merits. It is particularly valuable for specialists interested in the Sophistic movement and for general readers seeking an intellectually stimulating and nuanced understanding of Greek morality.
