Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2005
In a recent article in this journal, we argued that living organ donation from a parent to a child should be described as a beneficent rather than an altruistic act. Emotional relationships can generate an obligation of beneficence to help those with whom we have these relationships. This may involve an obligation for a parent to donate an organ to a child, even though it entails some risk to the parent. The parent's donation is not altruistic because altruistic acts are not obligatory but optional, and they are motivated solely or primarily by other-regarding concerns. In contrast, donor parents' other-regarding concerns are inseparable from their own self-regarding concerns. An individual who donates to a stranger is acting altruistically. She may choose to help others to whom she is not emotionally related for a variety of reasons—sympathy, compassion, generosity, or a desire to give something back to humanity. But she does not have an obligation to do so. Although she may benefit as a consequence of donating, this is not her reason for donating. Instead, her action is motivated by a concern for the recipient's own sake. This is what makes the donation altruistic, and it can be justified without any expectation of benefit to the donor. However, although the potential competent donor decides whether the donation is in her best interests, physicians have the right to refuse to perform a transplant if the risks to the donor are too great or the potential benefits to the recipient are too small.
In a recent article in this journal, we argued that living organ donation from a parent to a child should be described as a beneficent rather than an altruistic act.1
Glannon W, Ross LF. Do genetic relationships create moral obligations in organ transplantation? Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2002;11:153–9.
Hardwig J. Should women think in terms of rights? Ethics 1984;94:441–55.
Elliott C. Doing harm: Living organ donation and “The Tenth Man.” Journal of Medical Ethics 1995;21:91–6; Ross LF, Glannon W, Josephson MA, Thistlethwaite JA Jr. Should all living donors be treated equally? Transplantation 2002;74:418–21.
Aaron Spital challenges both of these claims in two more recent papers. First, he argues that parent–child living organ donation can be characterized as altruistic, because parents do this out of love and concern for their children.4
Spital, A. Intrafamilial organ donation is often an altruistic act. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2003;12:116–8.
Spital, A. Donor benefit is the key to justified living organ donation. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2004;13:105–9.
Spital argues that although parents may have a duty to donate a kidney or liver lobe to their child, their donation may also be motivated by altruism. But it is unclear how one can have an obligation to act and still perform that action for altruistic reasons. If one has an obligation to act, then one has no choice about the matter. One may have a choice about which action will be more likely to achieve the goal in question, but not about whether to act. Both beneficent and altruistic acts are other-regarding. In contrast to beneficent acts, however, altruistic acts are optional rather than obligatory. We can choose whether or not to perform these acts because there is no expectation from others to perform them. Beneficence implies an expectation and thus an obligation to act in a certain way. On grounds of beneficence, it may be reasonable to expect a parent to donate an organ to child and thereby expose himself or herself to some degree of risk because of the emotional relation between them. The expectation and obligation for the parent to benefit the child in this way rests on the shared interests, needs, and values between them.
As we noted in our paper regarding altruistic acts, “What makes these acts laudable or praiseworthy is that they are freely chosen at some cost or risk of harm to oneself and are directed at individuals to whom one stands in no special relationship.”6
See note 1, Glannon, Ross 2002:154.
See note 4, Spital 2003:117.
Spital8
See note 4, Spital 2003.
Kant, I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Paton HJ, trans. New York: Harper & Row; 1964.
In Spital's case, the parents did not deliberate about whether or not to donate. Nor did they consider possible future risks to themselves. This is because they did not perceive the option of not donating as a real option for them. We agree. The love and concern of the parents for their child is indicative of a special emotional relationship between them, a relationship that can generate an obligation to help the child in need. Donating a kidney could be construed as the parents' way of discharging this obligation. But if altruistic acts are optional and are performed for the sake of people to whom we stand in no special relationship, then it would be incorrect to characterize the parents' donation as altruistic. Instead, it should be characterized as a beneficent act. Even if one insists that the parental love and concern that motivates parental donation to children does not generate an obligation to donate, their emotional relationship to the child is such that their actions could not be described as motivated by selfless concern for the child for her own sake. The welfare of the parents is inextricably intertwined with the welfare of the child, and therefore they will be directly affected by their decision to donate (or not donate) an organ to their child. As such, intrafamilial donation should not be considered altruistic.
Spital argues that the classical utilitarian calculation to permit donation based on recipient benefit and donor risk is inadequate because it denies that there are two patients to whom the doctor has a fiduciary obligation. He argues, instead, that the critical risk–benefit assessment at issue is not between the donor and the recipient, but with the donor alone. This suggestion is not original. In 1957, the first successful kidney transplants were performed in identical twins who were minors (under age 21 at the time). Seeking to insulate the hospital from liability, attorneys requested the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to review the planned procedures. Although the Court acceded that the donor did not physically benefit from donation, it accepted psychological testimony that the procedure offered great psychological benefits to the donor, or at least would prevent the serious emotional trauma that would develop if the twin were not permitted to donate.10
Foster v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68674 (Mass., Nov 20, 1957); Huskey v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68666 (Mass., Aug 30, 1957); Masden v. Harrison, Eq. No. 68651 (Mass., Jun 12, 1957).
In donations between emotionally related individuals, the proper calculation is not whether donor benefits outweigh donor risks, as Spital claims, nor whether recipient benefits outweigh donor risks, as in classical utilitarianism. Rather, the proper calculation is whether donor benefit + recipient benefit outweigh donor risk. This is because the welfare of the donor and the welfare of the recipient cannot be separated. The issue of whether psychological benefit to donors should be a requirement for living donation is more germane to potential donors and recipients who are not emotionally related. We reject this requirement even in non-emotionally related donations. Such a criterion would unnecessarily limit the number of living organ donors. We argued that many donors do not donate in order to benefit themselves, though they may derive an indirect psychological benefit as a consequence of donating. In the psychosocial assessment prior to a transplant, it is difficult to estimate the expected benefit to a living donor. Indeed, there may be cases where a potential living donor insists that she does not expect any benefit from donating and that psychological benefit is no part of her reason for donating.
We used the generic example of a person who wanted to donate an organ anonymously in order to “give something back” to humanity.11
See note 1, Glannon, Ross 2002:154.
See note 4, Spital 2003:117.
As moral agents, potential donors have the right to expose themselves to a reasonable degree of risk if it is commensurate with certain benefits, even if these benefits accrue not to themselves but to others. However, competent individuals do not have a right to donate, and they cannot demand that a surgeon perform a transplant.13
Ross LF. Donating a second kidney: A tale of family and ethics. Seminars in Dialysis 2000;13:201–3.
The number of transplanted organs from living donors has now surpassed the number of organs from cadaveric donors. This is significant because of the risk of morbidity, and even mortality, to living donors. We have argued that neither beneficent nor altruistic donations, as distinct types of other-regarding action, require that donors benefit psychologically from their action. If living organ donation is truly beneficent or altruistic, then there is no need to require that the donor expect to benefit psychologically from the donation. Living donation can be justified if (1) the donor is competent, (2) the donor is not exposed to undue risk of harm, and (3) the expected benefits to the recipient and donor offset the risks to the donor.