Beyond Objectivism and Rationalism in Ethics

Objectivist, rationalist approaches have long dominated the literature that analyzes decision-making in ethics (Hartman, Reference Hartman2008; McCracken & Shaw, Reference McCracken and Shaw1995; Painter-Morland, Reference Painter-Morland, Painter-Morland and ten Bos2011; Parmar, Reference Parmar2014; Poldner, Branzei, & Steyaert, Reference Poldner, Branzei and Steyaert2018; Schwartz, Reference Schwartz2016; Sonenshein, Reference Sonenshein2007, Reference Sonenshein2009). They commonly portray issues as “out there” and their resolution as an application of individual judgment against externally given rules (Sonenshein, Reference Sonenshein2007, Reference Sonenshein2009). Referring back to an analogy proposed by Weick (Reference Weick2001), according to objectivist approaches, ethical issues are comparable to a master code to be deciphered by removing the shield when the ethical individual—the codebreaker—has successfully guessed each piece of the concealed code. Consequently, “unethical behavior [can only be] attributed to flaws in reasoning” (Parmar, Reference Parmar2014: 1105).

Several voices have urged a reexamination of this objectivist “rationality assumption” (Palazzo, Krings, & Hoffrage, 2013: 323), which holds that reason is “quintessential for ethics” (ten Bos & Willmott, Reference ten Bos and Willmott2001: 770). Indeed, rationality as the “epitome of moral thinking” (Painter-Morland, Reference Painter-Morland, Painter-Morland and ten Bos2011: 121) presents serious limitations, including an overestimation of the actor’s rational capacity (Palazzo et al., Reference Palazzo, Krings and Hoffrage2012; Sonenshein, Reference Sonenshein2007), neglect of the emotional, intuitive, and sensorial dimensions of ethical decisions (Scott, Reference Scott2002; Schwartz, Reference Schwartz2016; Sonenshein, Reference Sonenshein2007; Wray-Bliss, Reference Wray-Bliss, Alvesson, Bridgman and Willmott2009), and the reduction of ethical complexity to binary exclusive choices (Painter-Morland, Reference Painter-Morland, Painter-Morland and ten Bos2011). Therefore, these authors call for a reconsideration—if not reconciliation—of the “dual process” problem (Haidt, Reference Haidt2001: 820; Schwartz, Reference Schwartz2016: 767), isolating the intuitive from the system of reasoning. Against this abstract, depersonalized, and individualistic approach, several scholars have called for an expanded view of ethics, by emphasizing the compassionate (Kjonstad & Willmott, Reference Kjønstad and Willmott1995; Wray-Bliss, Reference Wray-Bliss, Alvesson, Bridgman and Willmott2009), embodied, sensorial, corporeal, and somatic dimensions of ethics (Hancock, Reference Hancock2008; Pullen & Rhodes, Reference Pullen and Rhodes2014; Poldner et al., Reference Poldner, Branzei and Steyaert2018). This means turning towards the socially constructed dimension of ethics (Reinecke & Ansari, Reference Reinecke and Ansari2015; Parmar, Reference Parmar2014; Sonenshein, Reference Sonenshein2007, Reference Sonenshein2009) by emphasizing the subjective, intersubjective, and socially informed processes at work. In this vein, the sensemaking perspective has emerged in the study of ethics, as we explore next.

Approaching Ethics as Sensemaking

The dominant approach is to study sensemaking in terms of “those episodes when some ongoing activities have been interrupted and need to be restored” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, Reference Sandberg and Tsoukas2015: 25). It is portrayed as triggered by particular disruptive events. Thus, the phenomenon of ethical sensemaking generally refers to “those processes by which people seek plausibly to understand ambiguous, equivocal or confusing issues or events” (Brown, Reference Brown2015: 272). And it is only natural that contexts of crisis or change (Weick, Reference Weick1988; Maitlis & Sonenshein, Reference Maitlis and Sonenshein2010) often characterized by “ambiguity, confusion, and feelings of disorientation” (Maitlis & Sonenshein, Reference Maitlis and Sonenshein2010: 552) have constituted privileged terrains from which to study sensemaking. Despite this dominant, episodic approach to sensemaking, we build on and offer a response to calls for sensemaking to be approached as a “continuous” or “ongoing” process (Gephart, Topal, & Zhang, Reference Gephart, Topal, Zhang, Hernes and Maitlis2010: 281; Maitlis and Christianson, Reference Maitlis and Christianson2014: 67; Weick, Reference Weick2012: 146). We therefore embrace a more “immanent” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, Reference Sandberg and Tsoukas2015: 26) perspective of sensemaking, where this practice is “ubiquitous” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, Reference Sandberg and Tsoukas2015: 22), i.e., actors are more or less permanently engaged in sensemaking and sometimes an event will cause sensemaking to “shift in terms of phenomenological quality by entering overtly in the meaning making arena” (Guiette & Vandenbempt, Reference Guiette and Vandenbempt2016: 86). In our research, this event relates to ethical issues where individuals are especially “compelled to ask themselves, and those around them, what is going on” (Maitlis & Sonenshein, Reference Maitlis and Sonenshein2010: 554). Indeed, ethics is an exemplary domain of complexity, indeterminacy, and equivocality (Reinecke & Ansari, Reference Reinecke and Ansari2015), where traditional ways of processing information, relating to one another and to organizations, are put to the test. We refer to ethical sensemaking as those processes of making sense and constructing meaning with regard to moral questions (Reinecke & Ansari, Reference Reinecke and Ansari2015).

Overall, these processes can be characterized as subjective and constructed, i.e., dependent on “individuals’ meaning construction,” rather than “objective properties” to which individuals “react” (Sonenshein, Reference Sonenshein2009: 223). From a sensemaking perspective, ethical issues do not stand outside of individuals who react to them but rather are “created from the sensemaking of employees parsing and interpreting ordinary organizational events” (Sonenshein, Reference Sonenshein2009: 223). In a way, ethical issues are part of the individual, their context, and their relationships (Parmar, Reference Parmar2014). Consequently, ethics are not “an objective feature of reality,” but rather subjective, social, and situational; indeed, “something is moral (vs. amoral) when a particular thinker interprets a situation as such” (Parmar, Reference Parmar2014: 1108). Going back to Weick’s analogies, ethical sensemakers are like mapmakers in front of a puzzling terrain. There is no pre-existing map to be discovered; rather they are converting “a world of experience into an intelligible world” (2001: 9). Against the “One Best Map” or “One True Map” (Weick, Reference Weick2001: 9) concept of a particular terrain—or ethical challenge—there are as many maps as there are different worlds of experience. Therefore, the challenge for the ethical sensemaker is to get a sense of provisional stability in the continuous flow of ever-changing organizational life, without any sense of certainty or durability.

While various sources of sensemaking have been explored (Maitlis & Christianson, Reference Maitlis and Christianson2014), from intrapersonal sources such as individual cognitions (Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, Reference Klein, Moon and Hoffman2006) to interpersonal sources such as collective deliberation (Reinecke & Ansari, Reference Reinecke and Ansari2015) and social interactions (Parmar, 2015), they are often studied in isolation. Our research answers the call to investigate interplays between the sources of sensemaking (Cornelissen et al., Reference Cornelissen, Mantere and Vaara2014; Holt & Corneslissen, Reference Holt and Cornelissen2014; Reinecke & Ansari, Reference Reinecke and Ansari2015), in this case emotions and reflexivity, and we explore this interplay at the intrapersonal level.

Next, we review the roles of emotions and reflexivity in sensemaking and ethics.

Emotions in Sensemaking

The predominantly “intellectualist” (Sandberg & Tsoukas, Reference Sandberg and Tsoukas2015: 7) approach to sensemaking, where it is depicted as a “deliberate” process as seen above, limits the examination of sensemaking to cognitive or linguistic domains, eschewing the exploration of other forms of embodied sensemaking, such as emotions (Cunliffe & Coupland, Reference Cunliffe and Coupland2011; Maitlis et al., Reference Maitlis, Vogus and Lawrence2013; Sandberg & Tsoukas, Reference Sandberg and Tsoukas2015). Consequently, very few studies explicitly look into the effect of emotions on sensemaking efforts (Sandberg & Tsoukas, Reference Sandberg and Tsoukas2015). But Sandberg and Tsoukas (2015: 7) insist that the fact that emotions are underexplored has more to do with a conceptual challenge connected to onto-epistemological underpinnings (the way we approach and define sensemaking as episodic and deliberate) than its being “under-researched (in a statistical sense of the term),” per se. Under the dominant episodic view of sensemaking, emotions—both felt and expressed—are largely portrayed as an “impediment” to sensemaking (Maitlis & Sonenshein, Reference Maitlis and Sonenshein2010: 566). Indeed, when puzzled by a situation, individuals’ anxiety, fear, and frustration may only increase their trouble, “consum[ing]” (Heaphy, Reference Heaphy2017: 645) their cognitive abilities and depriving them of the ability to attend to cues that might fully support the sensemaking activity, thus leaving them to fall back on habituated and rigid responses. Studying expressed emotions in the context of sensemaking under pressure (as in the case of the Stockwell shooting), Cornelissen et al. (Reference Cornelissen, Mantere and Vaara2014) underline the role of emotional contagion, i.e., a process through which emotions spread across individuals to generate a joint emotional state that triggers common sensemaking. In particular, they emphasize the potential for emotional escalation of commitment when emotions, built on each other, are reinforced through “gestures and expressions” (729) leading to a joint emotional state of panic.

However, research is increasingly documenting nuanced views on emotions in sensemaking (Helpap & Bekmeier-Feuerhahn, Reference Helpap and Bekmeier-Feuerhahn2016; Steigenberger, Reference Steigenberger2015). Positive emotions can also “derail” sensemaking when they cause individuals to “judge situations overly optimistically and misinterpret indicators of dangers” (see the example of climbing disasters) (Maitlis & Sonenshein, Reference Maitlis and Sonenshein2010: 567–8). However, positive emotions appear to enhance change by acting as sensegiving devices, supporting the value of change and facilitating commitment.

More generally, emotions play a positive role when they act as cues for interpretation in contexts of change (Heaphy, Reference Heaphy2017). They can play a signaling role when they enable “detecting and attending to anomalies” (Maitlis et al., Reference Maitlis, Vogus and Lawrence2013: 223). Felt emotions also signal plausibility when they are consistent with one’s interpretation and action orientation; here they can help conclude sensemaking (Maitlis et al., Reference Maitlis, Vogus and Lawrence2013). Vogus, Rothman, Sutcliffe, and Weick (Reference Vogus, Rothman, Sutcliffe and Weick2014) underline the benefits of emotional ambivalence, which leave individuals more open to alternative perspectives and more likely to engage in “adaptive sensemaking” (Cornelissen et al., Reference Cornelissen, Mantere and Vaara2014: 703), where they “update or revise their framing” instead of “holding onto a single, and possibly erroneous, frame” (731). Sonenshein (Reference Sonenshein2009) arrives at the same conclusion about the enabling role of ambiguity in sensemaking. Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010: 573) also point out how emotions potentially play a role of “functional magnetic resonance” when they mirror those of the person next to them. Finally, Steinberger (Reference Steigenberger2015) suggests that emotions not only constitute an input for sensemaking activity but also an output insofar as sensemaking influences the emotional states that people develop in response to a given issue.

Reflexivity in Sensemaking

Derived from subjective and intersubjective ontologies, and informed by humanistic and critical traditions (Cunliffe & Jun, Reference Cunliffe and Jun2005), reflexivity is concerned with “questioning what we, and others, might be taking for granted—what is being said and not said—and examining the impact this has or might have” (Cunliffe, Reference Cunliffe2016: 741). Under this umbrella, two forms can be distinguished: self-reflexivity and critical reflexivity. Being self-reflexive means engaging in a dialogue with the self about one’s own beliefs and values, and the nature of one’s relationships with others, how we speak to them, and how we treat them (Cunliffe, Reference Cunliffe2016). A self-reflexive coach might, for example, question his or her own relationship with an issue at stake like burnout, identifying any resonance between stories that might influence or interfere with his or her interpretations. While self-reflexivity targets self-examination, critical reflexivity targets organizational practices, policies, social structures, and knowledge bases. Informed by postmodern and poststructuralist approaches, critical reflexivity brings assumptions underpinning practice to the surface, provides a way of thinking more critically about the effects of such practice, and encourages (or supports) the design of alternative ways of organizing. A critically reflexive coach might, for example, examine discourses that sustain the use of coaching in organizations, ideologies, and theoretical assumptions that inform coaching (Askeland, Reference Askeland2005), and/or strategies for practicing control and discipline, as coaching has been portrayed in the critical literature (Louis & Fatien Diochon, Reference Louis and Fatien Diochon2018; Nielsen & Nørreklit, Reference Nielsen and Nørreklit2009).

A few studies account for the role of reflexivity in sensemaking. For example, in their study of the micro-processes of sensemaking during change implementation, Guiette and Vandenbempt (Reference Guiette and Vandenbempt2017) show how macro-level discourses of top-down change management inhibit sensemaking by constraining reflexivity. They document how the managerial approach to change suppressed the reflexivity present among employees prior to its potential emergence. In an earlier study on learning, Guiette and Vandenbempt (2015) identify reflexivity as generating one type of sensemaking—grounded in mindful coping—different to those grounded in detached coping or absorbed coping.

Next, we present our research methodology.

Phase 1: The Emergence of the Issue

Coaches notice something unusual that requires their attention and disorients them. For example, Patricia has to “pinch [her] arm” several times to double check that she has correctly heard the HR Manager’s request to tell the coachee she was badly dressed. Judy feels increasingly uncomfortable with a director’s requests for “speedy coaching results,” like a “gun over her head.” This pressure contradicts her vision of coaching where the coach matches the coachee’s own pace. And while David is assigned a client to improve her performance through greater team cohesion, he gradually realizes that the coachee is in a general state of exhaustion that he attributes to a “dash-for-profit organizational culture.” He is unsure of the role he wants to play in this system. Finally, while in the middle of a team-building debriefing, Jacky is puzzled when she witnesses a doctor acting violently towards a nurse, twisting her arm and making a chair fall over. “How did I allow this to happen? What did I miss?” she initially wonders. And a bit later, “how can the violent doctor be neutralized without stigmatizing him?” Overall, we see that phase 1 is a period of doubt where coaches are disoriented because their habitual way of defining or engaging in coaching is brought into question.

Phase 2: Processing the Issue

After the first phase of disorientation, coaches process the issue, trying to understand what is really at stake and to figure out the scope of their action. For most coaches, this processing involves reaching out to another person, usually a colleague with more experience (or a supervisor). François used this period to “take notice and appreciate” what was going on, Flora to “collect data,” Beth to “deconstruct to reconstruct later,” and Amanda to “construct a discourse” that made sense. This journey involves “permanent micro-adjustments” (Diego). This “readjustment” (Virginia) entails reframing: Marie explains that over the course of the coaching job, “it became obvious” that what she had initially considered—talking to HR—was not the right thing to do now, but rather “it was time to do more thinking.” This change in perspective resulted in the coaches holding “a position above” (Monique), or “meta-communicating with the client” (Dorian). This reframing allowed them to see “HR with a different eye” (Julie), understand why “after all, they might be angry with the employee” (Marie). It enabled Amanda to “distinguish the essential from the important.” In brief, processes of data collection, construction and deconstruction, and framing and reframing characterize phase 2.

Phase 3: The Decision

After processing the issue, and with its newly redesigned parameters, coaches are able to make a decision. For Samantha, this meant refusing a coaching contract given the lack of agreement with the HR Manager over its orientations and objectives. For Sandro, it meant finally deciding to trust his gut and, “at the right time,” share his conclusions that there was a lack of emotional connection with the client. Flora decided to use her “duty to inform,” i.e., share with her coachee the view that she might be a victim of moral harassment, which contradicted her initial neutrality principle.

How were these decisions made? For Ryan, it required him to “play a little game” with himself, while Jose had to “negotiate” with himself to make sure that he was “reinforcing [his] ethics, not compromising them.” It was interesting to hear a few coaches explain how arriving at this phase meant that they had managed to create a “little territory of autonomy” for themselves. As François explains: “There’s no easy answer to ethics [laughs] . . . but it’s about the margin of freedom that one chooses for oneself.” Similarly, Marie has worked towards “determining an area of freedom,” which is described, by Julie, as her “room for maneuver.” This space sets Amanda’s “limits of intervention,” and Julie similarly explains that up to this point she “can share [her] point of view.” Coaches either explicitly use the word “freedom” to designate this space in which they create the conditions to make a decision when faced with an ethical issue, or express the same ideas with other words such as “autonomy” or “authorization.” This freedom often refers to the ability to depart from externally imposed rules, such as those provided by the code of conduct of a coaching association, or from principles taught in coaching programs. Dorian mentions “the deviation from the expected standards” that led him to apply the “spirit of the code,” rather than the code itself. Flora mentions the “risks” she is taking by distancing herself from her company’s non-interventionist coaching model. A few interviewees, therefore, concluded that ethics can be difficult since “embracing one’s freedom is scary” (Flora). In brief, in phase 3, coaches make a decision based on interpretation and subjectivity in order to choose a course of action.

Overall, we see that our interviewees’ ethical sensemaking is a process that unfolds over time and which we have depicted in 3 phases. This process is characterized by an unsettling period of doubt (phase 1), engaging the sensemaker in data collection, framing and reframing (phase 2), requiring interpretation and subjectivity in order to choose a course of action, often departing from taken-for-granted practices, which some coachees compare to the construction of a freedom space (phase 3).

Next, we depict the interplay between emotions and reflexivity in each of the three phases of ethical sensemaking.

Phase 1: Emotions as Alerts

During the first phase—the emergence of the disorienting ethical issue—it is very common for coaches to experience “a range of emotions” (Monique). Interviewees present themselves as “taken aback,” “groggy,” “knocked out,” or “stunned”; they also mention “panic,” “disgust,” “incredulity,” and “powerlessness.” Tom quantifies his reactions: “80 percent curiosity, 20 percent fear.” Jose portrays his emotions in a negative way: “a feeling of betrayal, shame, and guilt,” made up of “uneasiness and discomfort.” Ryan also experienced guilt, as well as anger towards the organization: “This company is really stupid not to take care of these employees . . . They are ‘rare jewels’ that should be ‘pampered’!” Bernard expressed very similar feelings and was angry with his client “for making his life more complicated!” Virginia was “trembling with fear on her chair,” taken aback to discover several months after the job was over that the director was not satisfied with the coaching she had provided for a staff member. Meryl describes her initial “internal breath of panic,” asking herself “what am I going to do about this?,” i.e., about the HR request to make the coachee “endorse the managerial uniform of the company.” Vincent, meanwhile, experienced “remorse and guilt, furious to have been outsmarted by this ‘bitch’ who had maneuvered behind [his] back.” He felt like a “stupid boy,” “pathetic and ashamed.” A few coaches experienced more positive emotions, such as Marie who confesses to being “rather flattered and pleased” to have been identified as a qualified coach “for a complex job,” given the stakes of the coaching intervention. Ruth was honored to have worked for this “extremely wealthy and accomplished Indian businessman,” while Jose experienced “positive stress”: he was “excited” by the “sensitive, yet fascinating coaching mission.” While a few coaches depict these emotions as something to overcome, many of them sense their potential value.

Many of the coaches express how the ethical conflict first emerged as an emotion that required investigation. Mila’s first sense was that “something was not aligned . . . a kind of fear of ‘not being honest’ that caught [her] attention and required analysis.” Nick told us: “ethical issues are not processed mentally at first. Rather they go through emotions; it is very much part of the body, and I tell myself ‘oh oh, this is not OK . . . I will work this out with my supervisor.” Similarly, Marie explains that the way her coachee’s manager framed the request made her feel “as though [she] was turning white with a small pain in [her] stomach and tension in [her] jaw.” She needed to address the situation to avoid “constantly going over the same issues and staying trapped in a hamster wheel.” Emotions can thus be processed and work as a “signal that one is entering a grey zone” (Beth) to “transform a difficulty into an opportunity” (Beth). The interviewees used several images to describe this signaling role of emotions: “a signal,” “an alert,” “a red light,” “a flashing light,” or “an indication.” For this signal to work, coaches will tap into their reflexivity to decipher the origin of the alert. Often with the help of a senior colleague, or supervisor, they will try to understand the meaning of the signal. Indeed, a key hypothesis of most coaches is that what they are experiencing at the emotional level mirrors a problem that should be addressed. For example, Monique framed her relationship with the client as an “observation laboratory” of a wider dysfunction that needed investigation. Sandro raised the hypothesis that his own lack of emotional connection with his client, Nancy, might be a clue to understanding her own relational difficulties with her team. Similarly, Nick describes how he reflected his feelings back to the coachee: “Here is what I felt when you said this to me. I intuitively sense that this feeling is very similar to what your teammates are experiencing and that it is challenging.”

In brief, we see that during this first phase, reflexivity allows coaches to use their emotions as an alert to a potential problem to be addressed.

Phase 2: Personal Ecology and Power Detection

Overall, the second phase sees coaches both investigating and distancing themselves from the emotions generated during the first phase. Jose told us his initial reaction “seems very impulsive ... I need to dig further in.” Similarly, Amanda says: “I should not bury what I am feeling, but rather go after it.” She explains that she must “pay attention and listen to what is going on at an emotional level,” understand “what it affects, challenges, and precisely why it puts [her] in difficulty.” We suggest distinguishing between the role of self-reflexivity and critical reflexivity in this second phase.

First, self-reflexivity allows coaches to clarify their own connection with the issue at stake that generated such acute emotions. Most of the time, the emotions will be related to an issue that is not “trivial” (Beth), but rather specifically resonates with the coach, who can identify a personal connection with the situation or client. This is well put by Judy, who asks herself, “What belongs to my own history? What belongs to the company? To the coachee? To the coaching?” Beth refers to “parallel processes” occurring. These connections with the case range from a personal identification with the client to the issue raised, etc. For example, Bob clearly expresses “some projection with this guy [his client], very cool, with a brilliant profile,” which made it easier to “consider [him] the victim” and potentially take his side. Judy refers to her “personal history” to explain why her client’s attitude challenges her: “It made me angry, but this has to do with my own issues with the ‘failing male’,” referring to how the fragilities of her client echoed the deficiencies of the masculine figures in her own past. Similarly, Amy recognizes that she might be projecting her own burnout experience onto what the client is experiencing. For Sandro, the client “came to find [him] in issues [he him]self had.” This dissection of and distance from emotions that reflexivity allows develops an awareness of what belongs to them and what belongs to the case. Our respondents framed this role of reflexivity in terms of “cleaning” or “personal ecology” (Mila): there is constant work to be done to distinguish between “what belongs to the coach and what really belongs to the client and is legitimate to experience” (Mila). “Is this anger against me or against the client?” Samantha asks herself. Coaches perform their job with their own “hollows and bumps” (Beth). Their own “fragilities” (Beth) need to be sorted out to avoid reinforcing “the weaknesses of the system or relationship.” Self-reflexivity thus allows coaches to put their emotions at a distance and study them to sort out the personal connection with the topic, so that with increased awareness they gradually build a decision.

Critical reflexivity is the second type of reflexivity that facilitates this dissection of and distance from emotions. It helps coaches reflect on power relations, either as a subject of power (generating abuse of power as a coach) or object of power (potential victim of abuse of power).

Let us begin by looking at the coach’s potential abuse of power. Among the emotions that coaches experienced in the first signaling phase, a good number relate to their own power and associated dangers. Portraying coaching as “a transformation process,” Beth defines the responsibility of the coach as “maintaining the integrity of the coachee.” However, it is very easy to cross the line. For example, Caroline shares her astonishment: while she defines her job as a coach as “not wanting or knowing anything in the client’s shoes,” in this situation, she “chose to force the coachee to succeed.” She explains how her only solution was “to have a project for this guy; I had chosen success on his behalf.” She wanted him to change more than he himself wanted to; according to her, she had, therefore, gone too far. “Ethical juggling” (Alex) is thus required to navigate the fine line between “staying in the comfort zone” (Chloe) and “pushing too far, asking questions that are too hard” (Beth). This question of the coach’s influence also relates to their specific position as third parties where they can spot issues that are more difficult for those inside the system to identify. Flora wonders whether she can open her client’s eyes to an issue she has identified, but of which her client is totally unaware and has not inquired about. “What right do I have to open his eyes?” asks Flora. Similarly, Mila explains that “just because we see things doesn’t mean we must share them. Some, yes, and at the right time.” Beth also says that “the director was absolutely not asking to be challenged personally; rather he wanted teambuilding.”

Critical reflexivity also operates in coaches’ ability to identify in their emotions’ power relations of which they might be victims. Nick explains how, behind his initial discomfort, he could analyze manipulation by the manager: “She operates with me as she does with her team.” Virginia also tell of her guilt about the fact that she gradually became “numb” against her will, becoming an “element of the organizational culture of secrecy.” Several coaches similarly spoke of the risk of being “caught up in the organizational power dynamics” (Vincent), “manipulated” (Stephany; Mila), or “instrumentalized” (Alice; Sophia; Tom; Paul-Roger), playing a role that moves them away from that of coach. Rather, they become a “loudspeaker” (Meryl; Gabriella) for a manager who lacks courage, spies for a HR manager who wants to fire an employee (Judy, Tom), an accomplice of a culture of “double speak” (Maya), a member of the “clothing police” controlling how people dress (Patricia), etc. We see here that critical reflexivity allows coaches to step back from their emotions by dissecting what they reveal in terms of power issues and dynamics; with increased understanding, coaches are better equipped to purposefully use their emotions in choosing their course of action, which is the next phase we present.

Phase 3: Emotions Neutralized or Used as a Compass

After reflexivity had allowed the coaches to use their emotions as an alert (phase 1) and to distance themselves from personal issues raised by the case or identify power relations (phase 2), it then helped them to use emotions purposefully by either consciously neutralizing them, i.e., putting them aside, or using them as a compass.

First, for a few coaches, making a decision regarding their ethical issue entails putting emotions aside, having first identified their presence and origins during the previous phase. This is the case of David, who explains how he “is mindful to put [his] emotions aside . . . so that they do not pollute [his] relationship with his client, and so [he is] as neutral as possible.” Bob also forces himself to abide by the code of conduct: “I followed my reason, not my emotions.”

Now, let us turn to the image of the compass, the term used by Ruth to explain that she does not embrace a model where she “need[s] to expel emotions, rather a model where they offer support.” She told us how “invaluable” it is for her to experience emotions because “emotions are a compass.” In a similar vein, Sandro offers a very good illustration. While at the beginning of his decision-making process he was unsure of whether and how he should communicate “his lack of emotional connection with her” to his client, he now feels more confident about building on his emotions. Therefore, when he sensed, through “micro-signals,” that it was the right moment, he took the risk of sharing his feelings with Nancy, which proved to be a pivotal moment in the coaching process. Alex’s example, from the epigraph, is also very interesting. In the last phase of his decision-making process, he depicted his decision as being made up of “disembodied compassion,” i.e., an ability to “‘be’ in strong and authentic relationships with people, associated with a strong determination, a bit metallic, cold and distant towards the system, to avoid manipulation.” He uses the term “ethical juggling” to refer to this “area where you are able to be split, in a way schizophrenic, between compassion and determination, while at the same time connecting the two, and looping them back to one another.” He concludes by mentioning the importance of “being sure of one’s doubt or in one’s doubt.” He even explains how “doubting is what reassures” him:

Phase 1: Emotional Awareness

During the first phase of ethical sensemaking, we saw how the interplay between emotions and reflexivity functions as an alert, directing coaches to an issue that requires their attention. This finding builds on existing research that points to the “signaling” (Maitlis et al., Reference Maitlis, Vogus and Lawrence2013: 226) role of emotions, also captured as a “somatic marker” (Steigenberger, Reference Steigenberger2015: 436) that provides “information on the perception that triggered the emotion.” However, in these studies, emotions are often presented as a stimulus that is difficult to decipher. When referring to these emotions, individuals are often confined to moral dumbfounding (Haidt & Hersh, Reference Haidt and Hersh2001) with phrases like “I don’t know, I can’t explain it, I just know it’s wrong” (Haidt, Reference Haidt2001: 814), revealing that some of our emotions remain unconscious (Cornelissen et al., Reference Cornelissen, Mantere and Vaara2014; de Klerk, 2017). If left unconscious, these emotions run the risk of being an unattended or even muted signal. But our research actually suggests that, when intertwined with reflexivity, these emotions can gain in consciousness and act as a “readout” (Catino & Patriotta, 2016: 441), given that emotions should be viewed as “intelligent responses to perceptions of value” (Nussbaum, Reference Nussbaum2003: 1). With increased consciousness of one’s emotions, one reduces the risk of disregarding moral issues that still challenge and influence us, a neglect often rooted in the lack of attention paid to emotions (de Klerk, 2017). In this way, the sensemaker can be mindful of recognizing the presence of emotions and their potential value; ethical issues can thus be seen as “critical emotional incidents” (Sloan & Oliver, Reference Sloan and Oliver2013: 1845) that often constitute as turning points. We can also expect this awareness to mitigate the valence of emotions (how positive/pleasant or negative/unpleasant the emotion is) and their impact on sensemaking (Maitlis et al., Reference Maitlis, Vogus and Lawrence2013), as well as the characteristics of the sensemaking (for example, social or solitary; see Maitlis et al., Reference Maitlis, Vogus and Lawrence2013) that will unfold.

We can see that in phase 1 the interplay between emotions and reflexivity supports emotional awareness, defined as the process whereby reflexivity allows us to be aware of the presence of our emotions, inviting us to further explore why we “just know it’s wrong.”

Phase 2: Emotional Unpacking

Exploring why and how we “just know it’s wrong,” to come back to Haidt’s quote mentioned above (2001: 814), or whether this is not so wrong after all, is what happens during the second phase. Here the interplay allows coaches to distance themselves from the issue and dissect their emotions to facilitate emotional identification (Rosenberg, Reference Rosenberg1990) where reflexivity enables the interpretation of emotions. More specifically, we have identified how this interplay supports “personal ecology” (when self-reflexivity allows a personal connection with the issue raised to be clarified) and “power detection” (when critical reflexivity facilitates the dissection of power relations). These two roles very closely echo key mechanisms identified by Foucault in ethics: “personal ecology,” in making it possible to clarify one’s own connection with an issue, leads to the development of “power over oneself” (Foucault, Reference Foucault and Rabinow1984: 286–87), i.e., “mastery” over “oneself and one’s appetites” to avoid being a slave to oneself; and “power detection,” which helps clarify power relations and is a way to avoid “abuse of power” (Foucault, Reference Foucault and Rabinow1984: 288), i.e., when “one exceeds the legitimate exercise of one’s power and imposes one’s fantasies, appetites, and desires on others,” to regulate one’s “power over others.” In brief, Foucault portrays relationships with both the self and others as key in ethics, which our results also confirm.

We suggest encapsulating the interplay in phase 2 as emotional unpacking: through reflexivity, individuals “unpack” (Alvesson & Willmott, Reference Alvesson and Willmott2012: 33), i.e., dissect, step back from, analyze, and decipher the emotions connected to the ethical issue. This function builds on the study by Ruebottom and Auster (2018: 469), who argue that reflexivity allows reflection on the systems of values and relationships, in favor of social change. By locating not only cognitive but also emotional disembodying in reflexivity, Ruebottom and Auster contribute to analysis of the emotional components of reflexivity, embracing the call for an emotionalization of reflexivity (Holmes, Reference Holmes2010; Burkitt, Reference Burkitt2012), i.e., a reconsideration of the role of emotions in reflexivity.

Phase 3: Emotional (Dis)engagement

Finally, during phase 3, we have identified that reflexivity either allows emotions to be consciously neutralized as a potential impediment to sensemaking, or used as a compass, a guide for action. Here we suggest that the interplay supports emotional (dis)engagement (from) with the process to resolve the issue, whereby individuals decide to engage or not with their emotions when connecting to others (Sloan & Oliver, Reference Sloan and Oliver2013). Here reflexivity allows for either emotional engagement with the conscious display (Rosenberg, Reference Rosenberg1990) and regulation of one’s emotions, or disengagement from one’s emotions. Our results complement the psychoanalytical perspectives of de Klerk (2017), depicting how certain types of engagement with one’s emotions (such as undue avoidance, inappropriate regulation, or lack of regulation) lead to morally questionable decisions. Echoing de Klerk’s analysis of the importance of consciously dealing with one’s emotions in the support of ethical behaviors, our research points to the interplay between reflexivity and emotions.

Overall, reflexivity supports the management of emotions through an interplay that takes on three main generic forms throughout the course of the ethical sensemaking process. First, emotional awareness, where reflexivity allows sensemakers to be aware of their emotions—an invitation to tap into them. Second, emotional unpacking, where reflexivity supports the dissection and analysis of the emotions connected to the ethical challenge. Third, emotional (dis)engagement, where reflexivity determines whether the person engages with their emotions, and steers this engagement. Given the long-term antagonism between emotions and cognition (Catino & Patriotta, 2018) and the “dual process” problem (Haidt, Reference Haidt2001: 820; Schwartz, Reference Schwartz2016: 767) separating the two, our research instead suggests the intertwining of emotions and reflexivity in ethical sensemaking.

Therefore, we portray ethics as a fabric, produced through the knitting of emotions and reflexivity together. While building on earlier work presenting ethics as constructed (e.g., Sonenshein, Reference Sonenshein2007, Reference Sonenshein2009; Reinecke & Ansari, Reference Reinecke and Ansari2015), our research uncovers its granular or fine-grained aspect. The term fabric designates the aggregated dimension of ethics, resulting from production that consists of a constant knitting or weaving process of two fibers—emotions and reflexivity. Our use of the terms produce or production reflects the political and performative dimension of the process (Foucault, Reference Foucault1980). Our results are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1:

Emotional Reflexive Interplay in Each of the Three Phases of the Ethical Sensemaking Process