I
It has become fashionable, of late, to decry the effects of academic specialisation. Since most of these complaints are in some way self-interested – designed either to recall a lost golden age of generalists, or else to sell hoary old narratives to television companies – I have never taken the resulting jeremiads too seriously. But there can be no doubt that the creation of myriad sub-fields and specialisms can result in a sometimes unfortunate fragmentation of the object of study. Certainly, the literature on Elizabethan England has come to be marked by a series of parallel narratives; religious and political; diplomatic and domestic; local and national; and, perhaps most notably and destructively of all, protestant and catholic. This last dichotomy is not, of course, only, or even mainly, a function of academic specialisation, but also of long-standing confessional divisions and cultural assumptions. Here the central conceit is of an ‘England’ that is, almost by definition, protestant and of catholics and catholicism as consequently always already peripheral to the ‘mainstream’ story. Certainly, for the Elizabethan and Stuart periods, that assumption is wrong, and has been shown to be so by a great deal of both revisionist and post-revisionist writing, but the divisions and exclusions in the literature that result from it are, to a surprising and entirely unhelpful extent, still with us and need to be broken down. What follows is an attempt to do that through a close analysis of what I hope will emerge below as integrally connected events, central to both the religious and political history of the reign of Elizabeth I.Footnote 1
The events in question took place between the summers of 1576 and 1578. Of the two strange fates and episcopal surveys of my title, one of each concerned things protestant and the other, things catholic. My first, protestant, fate involved Edmund Grindal. Grindal, of course, was the first, and, at least so far, the only, post-Reformation archbishop of Canterbury to have been first suspended from office by the monarch, and then to have expired years later, still under house arrest. My second, catholic, fate involves Cuthbert Mayne, the first seminary priest to be executed for treason by the Elizabethan regime. Mayne went to his doom at Launceston in Cornwall in November 1577. He is therefore something of an outlier from the main body of clerical martyrs slaughtered by the regime subsequent to the Campion/Parsons debacle of 1580/1. It has never been clear just what – if anything – Mayne had done to bring this fate upon himself or why he met his end just when and how he did. In so far as it has been explained, it has been seen (by A. L. Rowse) as a purely local affair, a function of Cornish rivalries between Sir Richard Grenville and his protestant allies and local catholics, between (protestant) coastal and inland (catholic) interests.Footnote 2
As for my two surveys, again, one concerned protestants, the other catholics. The first was instituted in the summer of 1576, by Grindal and concerned the prophesyings, often monthly meetings of ministers in market towns and other population centres, designed to generate a number of expositions of the same text, before both clerical and lay, elite and popular audiences. The prohesyings can be said to have had three main functions; first to use the expertise of the best preachers to train their less talented, learned and experienced colleagues in the ministry; secondly, to maximise the number and quality of sermons and sermon hours produced by the limited number of trained preachers available to the Elizabethan church; and thirdly, to foster, perform and exhibit the social, cultural and spiritual power of the gospel and of the protestant godly.Footnote 3
The second survey of autumn 1577 concerned catholics. It was organised by Walsingham and the Privy Council, in collaboration with Grindal's de facto successor John Aylmer. A round robin letter was sent to the bishops asking them how many recusants were to be found in their dioceses and what those recusants were really worth financially. It represented a new departure – indeed a more or less unprecedented initiative – and as such bulks large in studies of recusancy which see it, accurately enough, as the first real attempt to map the extent of the catholic threat and actually put a number on the recusant population.
These events – the fates of Grindal and Mayne and the two surveys – are seemingly unconnected; and, for all that they took place in the same weeks, months, indeed in one instance even on the same day, have certainly remained unconnected in the existing literature. They have been discussed separately, as admittedly central events, in what have been, to date, two more or less hermetically sealed, protestant and catholic narratives. The seminal account of the fall of Grindal by Patrick Collinson (upon which, for the most part, this paper relies implicitly) does not mention Mayne or the recusant survey.Footnote 4 As for the survey of recusants it has remained embedded in accounts of catholicism and of recusant policy largely untouched by the storm over the prophesyings, which, on the ‘catholic’ view, was clearly an intra-protestant spat of no particular relevance to the study of English catholicism.Footnote 5
In this paper, I want to argue that these events were in fact connected in ways that have much to tell us about the nature of Elizabeth politics; about the relation between the queen and her councillors, about the relation between ‘politics’ and ‘religion’, between national and local politics and between politics and ideology and, in particular, about the complex, dialogic and dialectical relations between anti-popery and that emergent ideological mode – anti-puritanism.
II
Let us start with the issue of the prophesyings and our first survey of summer 1576. This was organised by Grindal to provide him with material to protect the prophesyings from royal assault. Elizabeth's intermittent attempts to have the prophesyings suppressed started in 1574 and, to use Collinson's resonant phrase, had ‘been kicked into the long grass’ by the collusive efforts of both bishops and lay councillors. In the summer of 1576 Grindal learned from Leicester and others that the issue was back on the royal agenda.
It is not clear just who it was that first raised the propheysings with the queen but we can reconstruct the outline of the case against from the questions put by Grindal to his episcopal colleagues and indeed from the contents of some of the replies. First, it was claimed that the prophesyings were ‘puritan’ institutions; set up and run by puritans, they were occasions for non-conformist behaviour and for the public venting of complaints about the ceremonies and structures of the church and of appeals for further reformation. Secondly it was alleged that they were not under proper episcopal control; the local clergy (often the local puritan clergy) ran them themselves, with no proper discipline or oversight from the bishops. They thus represented exercises in self-government by self-selected clerical (puritan) elites, protected by local lay (puritan) interests. Thirdly, it was claimed that the prophesyings were both popular and divisive in their form and effects. Their dialogic form put different expositions of the same scriptural text before promiscuously mixed, clerical and lay, elite but also popular, audiences. Even more than the most contentious sermon the prophesyings could thus be taken to be constructing an intellectually active and critical audience, an audience called upon, in effect, to judge between different positions. Not an attempt to stop discussion and division by informing opinion, instructing the laity, telling people what they ought to believe, they were rather attempts to start discussion, provoke opinion, raise questions and thus to create division. These propensities were intensified, of course, if the topics under discussion included contentious issues like the controverted ceremonies or the need for ‘further reformation’. Moreover, it was further claimed that the prophesyings were overtly popular in form; that they actually and actively involved ‘the people’. Not just the laity, but the humble laity, artisans even, were involved, not only as spectators, but as active participants in discussion.
On this account, the prophesyings were an emanation of a popular puritan threat to the parochial and hierarchical structures of the church and, as such, agents of religious division, stirrers up not only of dissension but also of disobedience. We know from what the queen said, when she acted personally to suppress the prophesyings, that this was how she saw the matter.Footnote 6 Moreover, it is clear from some of the episcopal replies to Grindal's questionnaire that this was what a dissident minority amongst the bishops also thought.Footnote 7 We can also tell from the nature of the other replies, that is to say, from the anxiety of many of Grindal's respondents to explain just when it was that they had stopped beating their wives, what the nature of the accusations against the prophesyings were.
On non-conformity, some replies were insistent that prayers from the prayer book were used both before and after proceedings; that contentious issues were never discussed; that there was no non-conformity, no complaints about the ceremonies or pleas for further reformation either performed or canvassed at their prophesyings.Footnote 8 Or, alternately, it was conceded that while there used to be some – quite a lot, in fact – of that sort of thing going on, everything was now under control. Others still (and here Bishop Cooper is the best example) admitted that there still was more than a hint of puritanism about some of the prophesyings on his patch and that he would like to, indeed that he would, quash it – if only certain nameless but powerful lay interests would let him.Footnote 9
On lay involvement, it was claimed, by Bishop Curtis for example, that there was no lay in-put, and certainly no artisans active in prophesyings in his diocese.Footnote 10 Or it was admitted that there were some laymen involved – but only learned ones – like George Gifford, then a school master and soon to be a leading puritan minister;Footnote 11 or again that if there were no laity involved, there seemed to be no good reason why there should not be, provided they were learned. Again, it was readily affirmed that the prophesyings were under episcopal control; in some cases admittedly the prophesying in question had not been set up by the bishop himself, but he had approved the arrangements. (Thus Cooper.)Footnote 12 Or, as Bradbridge claimed, while the prophesyings in his diocese had been set up by his predecessor, he was closely involved, sometimes attended himself and even moderated from time to time. But unfortunately, just at the moment, he could not tell you which ministers were actually involved in the exercises – he would have to get back to Grindal on that one.Footnote 13 Or finally, as we have seen, Cooper was reduced to claiming that he was in control, except where he was not, but that was decidedly not his fault.Footnote 14
We can see here not only the thrust of the anti-puritan, anti-popular critique of the prophesyings but also, if not its literal truth, then certainly the origin of its purchase. These straws in the wind certainly do not confirm the prophesyings as the puritan, populist, if not crypto-presbyterian, then inherently anti-episcopal, institutions that their critics claimed them to be – but they do show that there was some truth in the allegations of puritanism and popularity lodged against prophesyings. But even if those claims themselves were – in some sense, at least in some places, some of the time – ‘true’, they were then couched and circulated in such heightened and hyperbolic terms as to render them obviously untrue, as well. That, of course, was what this sort of religio-political caricature and stereotyping did (and does); it exaggerates, pumps up for polemical purposes, elements of the ‘real’, until the resulting picture is not ‘true’ at all, at which point those on other side of the argument, those being denounced and stereotyped, seek to denounce the stereotype itself as simply false and its disseminators as downright, self-interested and possibly subversive liars.
Grindal's survey was designed to expose the untruth of the critics' claims. It was to provide him with ammunition to defend not quite the prophesyings as they actually were but rather as he desired them to be and, indeed, as they might well have become, after a good dose of Grindalian reform and episcopal oversight. His other aim was almost certainly to line up episcopal opinion behind his stand on the prophesyings. As we have seen he was not completely successful here; Scory was positively vituperative on the subject and even Cox had reservations about the prophesyings, both name and thing.Footnote 15
Scory apart, the most overtly anti-puritan response came from John Aylmer. In many ways he was the exception that proved rule, for he was not a bishop but a mere archdeacon and he responded to Grindal's enquiry about the prophesyings in really quite scathing anti-puritan terms. Aylmer had been a candidate for episcopal preferment since the beginning of reign, but had been frozen out and may have become something of a malcontent.Footnote 16 He was certainly denounced as such by his diocescan, Cooper, who, in what was almost certainly a reference to Aylmer, dropped dark hints about the activities of those who hoped to rise by criticising the well doing of others.Footnote 17
If not every school boy, then every moderately informed undergraduate student of Elizabethan England, knows what happened next – Elizabeth told Grindal to suppress the prophesyings and in December 1576, in an elaborately scholarly letter of some 6,000 words, he told her where to go and she told him to get out – first out of the room – ‘it was not your majesty's pleasure then, the time not serving thereto, to hear me at any length concerning the said two matters propounded’Footnote 18 – and then out of office, from which he was sequestered.
As Grindal left others came in – John Whitgift – who had made his name as an opponent of puritan non-conformity and Cartwrightian presbyterianism in the early 1570s got Worcester; Aylmer, no less, became bishop of London, in which role he succeeded the suspended Grindal as the de facto episcopal leader of the national church. Also rising in and through these events – making his final breakthrough from favourite/courtier to councillor – was Sir Christopher Hatton. Aylmer, for one, thought he owed his job to Hatton.Footnote 19 We are seeing here the emergence, at least in outline or prospect, of a new ecclesiastical establishment, pushing a new model ecclesiastical policy. From later letters from Aylmer to Hatton we learn that Aylmer had learnt from Elizabeth herself that ‘it was her majesty's pleasure that I should understand her mind by you in such things’. What the queen wanted apparently was a policy designed ‘to cut off (even as her majesty termed it) and to correct offenders on both sides’, disciplining ‘both the papist and the puritan in anything, wherein disobeying her majesty's laws, they may be indifferently touched’.Footnote 20 Such a policy of even-handed severity to both papists and puritans had provided the rationale for the crack down on the prophesyings, and was now to be put into wider practice by the Hatton/Aylmer nexus. At least in Elizabeth's mind, it represented a radical break from Grindalian dispensation, a dispensation that was personified by the archbishop himself, and given its most obvious institutional form by the prophesyings, but that was also a product of a clique of lay councillors, an inner circle often thought to constitute the so-called ‘monarchical republican’ core of the Elizabethan regime.Footnote 21
Elizabeth was applying to the prophesyings an emergent anti-populist anti-puritanism that had been developed to its highest pitch of coherence and aggression by John Whitgift in his assault on Cartwrightian presbyterianism in the first half of decade. But the logic of Whitgift's anti-puritan case was not limited to the Elizabethan puritan movement, as its application here to the prophesyings showed.Footnote 22 For, for all their links with puritanism and popularity, identified by their critics, as Patrick Collinson has argued, the prophesyings were anything but exclusively or distinctively ‘puritan’ institutions. Rather, as Collinson has shown, they were a place where the devolved power of the episcopate and the zeal of the godly clergy, and of some local lay elites, met in the furtherance of true religion as those groups understood it.Footnote 23 Now the prophesyings were being denounced as popular and puritan. Anti-puritanism was being used here as an aggressive ideological solvent, to disrupt the smooth running of the Elizabethan regime, and the institutions, connections and assumptions of an emergent hot protestant political nation, by none other than the queen herself. In so doing Elizabeth might be thought to have been trying to loosen the cloying control over policy of her leading councillors, both clerical and lay, and to impose her own notions of political and religious order on her church and realm. She was doing it, moreover, via men who, at the start of these events, had not been a part of the real inner circle – via Hatton, not yet a councillor, Aylmer, not yet a bishop – on the basis of an ideology developed by man, John Whitgift, who, at the time he had developed it had not been a bishop but rather merely master of Trinity College, Cambridge.
III
Grindal had been suspended from office in May. By June 1577 diverse elements within the regime were turning their attention to the catholic issue with the aim, it appears, of turning up the heat on the catholics and of turning the attention of the regime, and particularly of the queen, on to the extent and nature of the catholic threat. The initiative came from both the lay and clerical establishments; first we have a letter from Aylmer to Walsingham. He had consulted with Grindal and the other bishops; there was agreement that the catholic threat was on the rise; the existing means of dealing with it were not working. Aylmer proposed a scheme whereby increased fines could be levied on recusant catholics, without the need for a new law. This was the continuation of an approach pushed in the previous parliament, where it had been backed by Grindal, amongst others, but blocked by the queen.Footnote 24 On the one hand, this was conciliar and Grindalian business as usual. But, on the other, we can see Aylmer advising Walsingham just how to pitch it under the new ideological circumstances; her majesty must be ‘given to understand that it is meant hereby as well to touch the one side as the other indifferently, or else you can guess what will follow’.Footnote 25
Second, we have another letter from Walsingham to Aylmer, summoning him and other bishops to a meeting with the Council over the catholic issue, and a more extended memorandum on ‘how such as are backward and corrupt in religion may be reduced to conformity and others stayed from corruption’. This features as a central proposal that ‘letters be sent to the bishops and others well affected in each diocese to make inquiry by such means as by them shall be thought meet after such as refuse to come to church, especially such as are of countenance and quality and do offend in example’. The offenders were to be conferred with for some months by ‘men sufficiently learned, after a charitable sort’. Those that remained recalcitrant were to be treated ‘according to the laws of the realm’. As ‘the number of the recusants is so great as the places of restraint are not able to hold them’, only the ‘most corrupt’ of the recusants of each diocese should be ‘first dealt withal’ and ‘the principal persons such as by law are to be reached unto’.Footnote 26
The outcome of all these discussions seems to have been the second survey of October. Another round robin was sent to all the bishops, this one asking not about prophesyings and puritans but about how many recusants there were out there and about how much they were really worth.Footnote 27 The results would enable the Council to identify and then to target the most substantial recusants and thus gain both a proper sense of the scale of the popish threat and of the extent of the revenue that they might be able to raise by realistic fines levied upon the wealthiest recusants. Both of which were, of course, likely to be subjects of interest to the queen.Footnote 28
Here we have councillors and bishops turning the queen's rhetoric of a ‘middle way’ of equal opportunity repression to be directed at both catholics and puritans against her anti-puritan, and in favour of their own distinctly anti-papal, agenda. If the queen wanted, or at least said that she wanted, an even handed policy towards catholics and puritans, the least they could get out of the demise of the prophesyings was more stringent measures against the papists. But if popery could be established as the problem, then these men could present themselves and, of course, Grindal, as rather a large part of the solution. Thus the two issues – the gravity of the popish threat and the rehabilitation of the archbishop became very closely associated; so closely that the second half of Grindal's reply, as archbishop of Canterbury, to the Council's letter about recusancy was another plea for them to intercede on his behalf with the queen.Footnote 29
The political and ideological logics at work here were impeccable; when Grindal had been in control the line had been that popery, too, was under control; in 1574 Grindal had told Burghley, about the diocese of York of all places, that ‘only five persons have been committed for their obstinacy in papistical religion. For the number of that sect (thanks be to God!) daily diminisheth, in this diocese especially.’Footnote 30 Again, one argument in favour of the prophesyings had been that the papists disliked them; as a crucial means to suppress popery and spread true religion you could show how well they were working by how much papists hated them and you could show that because the only people who complained about them were papists and fellow travellers, who were, of course, not to be listened or pandered to.Footnote 31 If you suppressed the prophesyings, the argument went, you would only be giving aid and succour to papists and popery and that was the very opposite of what you should be doing.
Now, however, with the prophesyings suppressed and Grindal disgraced, those who had made that case could come back with reports of renewed catholic activity and threat. Under the circumstances this represented something like a discrete ‘I-told-you- so’, with the unspoken message clear; if you insist on doing things like this, then the recent upsurge of recusant recalcitrance is precisely what you are going to get. And, just as with the anti-puritan allegations about the prophesyings, there was a good deal of truth to such claims. Diarmaid MacCulloch has shown that one of the main effects of the anti-puritan activities in the diocese of Norwich of that anti-Grindalian, the wonderfully named Bishop Freake, had been the alienation of the local puritan magisterial elite and the consequent reliance, by Freake, on catholic and crypto-catholic figures amongst the local gentry. This had, in turn, prompted complaints about the increase of catholicism from Freake's puritan enemies and victims; and concern amongst the conciliar allies and contacts, indeed in some cases the relatives, of the local puritan magistrates.Footnote 32
This is where Cuthbert Mayne enters the story. During the summer of 1577, Sir Richard Grenville, in his capacity as sheriff of Cornwall, ‘accompanied with nine or ten justices of the peace and with them well near a hundred persons’ had raided the house of a prominent local papist, Francis Tregian. After a full scale search of the premises they had seized the persons of Tregian himself, ‘sundry other his servants’, and ‘one Mr Cuthbert Mayne, a priest’. They then took their charges off to Truro where, conveniently enough, Bishop Bradbridge, one of the most enthusiastic of the defenders of the prophesyings during the previous summer, was on visitation. Bradbridge interviewed Tregian and found him to be a catholic. Both Tregian and Mayne were imprisoned in Launceston castle. Tregian was later bound over to the sum of £2,000 to appear before the Council and lodged thereafter in the Marshalsea. Mayne, however, remained in the county, charged with treason under the 1571 statute, ‘for a bull which was found in his custody, and by him, as they said, procured from the bishop of Rome concerning matter of absolution’. However, the bull found in Mayne's possession had not been procured at Rome but rather printed at Douai where Mayne had bought it from a bookseller as a sort of souvenir.Footnote 33 Moreover, the papal jubilee which it announced had long since expired. It was however a papal bull which Mayne had indeed brought into England and therefore he was technically guilty under the statute. On the other hand, of course, it was perfectly possible to argue that Mayne's was hardly the sort of offence which the statute had been designed to punish and that it was thus unjust to condemn a man on a mere technicality. When Mayne made this case to his judges, Manwood brushed him aside but his colleague, Sir John Jeffreys, demurred. Mayne was sentenced to death at Manwood's insistence, only later for the case to be referred to the Council.Footnote 34 There were clearly very public doubts about the equity of the treatment being dished out to Mayne and Tregian. Tregian meanwhile had already been up to London to be interviewed by the Council where, having had his appeals to the integrity of his conscience brusquely dismissed by Walsingham, he had been taken to dinner by the earl of Sussex.Footnote 35 Sussex proceeded to offer Tregian and his servants their liberty, and Mayne his life, if Tregian ‘would have yielded only for a fashion sake, as they said, to have shown himself at the church’. Tregian, however, resolutely refused, ‘always preferring Christianity before his own immunity or his servant's liberty. And concerning the life of Cuthbert Mayne, always alleging that he would not hazard his own soul unto hell to withhold his man's from heaven.’Footnote 36
Crucial to the argument being pursued here is timing. The discussions between Walsingham and Aylmer, the Council and the bishops took place in June/July 1577. Tregian and Mayne were seized in June and the case dealt with by the Council in August.Footnote 37 The survey of recusant numbers was instigated on 15 October. The letters sent to the bishops wanted a reply in a week.Footnote 38 This was a decidedly odd way to run even an early modern state. The replies varied, as had those to the survey of 1576.Footnote 39 Some were ideologically framed. Bishop Cheney talked as much about puritans as about papists, remarking ‘that the third sort [of recusants] commonly called puritans’ wilfully refuse to come to church ‘as not liking the surplice, ceremonies and other service now used in the church, whereupon they have been arraigned and indicted in diverse and several sessions upon the statute and now remain in prison upon the same’.Footnote 40 But other anti-puritan figures – Whitgift, for instance – while pleading his lack of knowledge of his new diocese – ended with a typically Whitgiftian reminder of ‘how much harm lenity did the last time that the like certificates were made’, and by ‘most earnestly beseeching your honours, even for God's sake, to provide some discipline for them, [the recusants whose names he had returned] lest others, by their example, fall into the like contempt’.Footnote 41 Many did their best, but the replies remained patchy and many excuses were made; most about the rapid turn around time. At least some of these seem not to have been mere excuses. When we find life-long anti-popish zealots like Francis Hastings or the earl of Huntingdon claiming that they had done their ‘best as the short time would suffer’, claiming that the task placed upon them ‘will hardly be performed in so short a time’ and asking for more time so that they could turn ‘suspicions’, which ‘against sundry are very great’, into ‘certain knowledge’ we can, I think, believe them.Footnote 42
And so the obvious question to ask is, why so fast? If we are dealing here with a bureaucratic initiative, the culmination of months, if not years, of planning and thought about what to do about popery, why take three months to think about it, and then give the bishops only one week to reply? The answer, I want to argue, is that Grindal's case was coming to what looked like its climacteric point and his allies on the Council needed information about the nature and extent of the popish threat to make their pitch to the queen about what a genuinely even-handed policy towards papists and puritans would look like and about the necessity, in the current situation, of a unified episcopate; unified by the values and in the person of a suitably repentant and rehabilitated Archbishop Grindal.
The replies to the Council's letter started to come in late October and early November. Grindal's reply to the survey and petition for the intercession and support of the Council was dated 24 October.Footnote 43 On 2 December 1577, Grindal told Matthew Hutton that ‘about six weeks ago’ – i.e. in the middle of October, when the push against the papists was being unleashed – ‘I was put in assured hope of liberty, etc.’ That state of happy expectation had lasted, Grindal explained, until ‘the 26th of November’, about which ‘time arose a sudden contrary tempest, which had brought me to have appeared in the Star Chamber 29 November last, if God had not laid me up two days before of my old disease, the stone’.Footnote 44 As for Mayne, his fate was sealed on 12 November, when the Council not only confirmed his sentence but sent detailed instructions into the county about how he was to be dispatched and what was to be done with his remains. He was to be executed in Launceston
upon a market day, where after he shall be dead and quartered, his head to be set upon a pole and placed in some eminent place within the said town of Launceston and his four quarters to be likewise set upon four poles and placed the one at Bodmin, the second at Torquay, the third at Barnstaple and the fourth at Wadesbridge, and this letter to be his warrant in that behalf.
As it happened, the meeting of the Privy Council that issued this command also witnessed the swearing in as ‘Vice-Chamberlain and one of the Privy Council’ of Sir Christopher Hatton and the meeting of Star Chamber in which Grindal's fate was to have been decided coincided – and clearly these were just coincidences – with the execution in far-away Cornwall of poor Cuthbert Mayne.Footnote 45
IV
The hastily arranged hearing of Grindal's case was to have taken place in Star Chamber on 30/31 November. Grindal was prevented from attending by an attack of the stone. But the issue did not go away. The queen was still seriously upset and by January/February 1578, the prospect of the archbishop's removal from office was back on the table. On 23 January Sir Walter Wilson can be found writing to Burghley to tell him that ‘the queen is much offended with the archbishop and disliketh our darings for dealing with him so at large, whom her highness would have deprived for contempt committed’. By 22 February 1578 the scare seemed over, with Killigrew reporting that ‘there is hope that the bishop of Canterbury shall do better and better daily’.Footnote 46 Between those two observations two more catholics had followed Mayne to a traitor/martyr's death. At Tyburn on 3 February and then on 7 February 1578 first the priest John Nelson and then the layman Thomas Sherwood had both suffered a traitor's death. Nelson, who had been taken in London on 1 December 1577, was brought to trial on 1 February and killed on the 3rd. Sherwood had been in custody for some six months prior to his death.
Both are described in various catholic accounts as having been trapped by their captors into treasonous words. According to Cardinal Allen, Nelson had readily agreed that the English church was both ‘heretical and schismatical’. At this point his interrogators had moved in for the kill, asking him ‘what thinkest thou of the Queen, is she a schismatic or no?’ Nelson
answered that he never so called her, for reverence of her high dignity; nor could tell (for he knew not Her Majesty's meaning) whether this religion were established by her special commandment and authority or no; and, therefore, humbly prayed them not to urge him wittingly to commit any crime, wherein hitherto he had never offended.
But his captors persisted, badgering him on this one point by insisting that ‘this English religion was established by her and by her maintained’. Still Nelson would not bite, having recourse now to the evil counsellor manoeuvre. But his tormentors would not let go; ‘“but what”, say they, “if she were the author of this religion, then whether were she a schismatic or heretic, or no?”’ This was the point at which Nelson broke, or rather at which his conscience betrayed him; finally he said: ‘“If she be the setter-forth and defender of this religion, then she is a schismatic and heretic indeed.”’ And those, of course, were the fatal words for which he swung at Tyburn on 3 February.Footnote 47
A similar story is told of Sherwood, who was actually put to torture on the orders of the Privy Council in December when he threatened to take back his treasonable words about the queen being a usurper and a heretic.Footnote 48 Later Cardinal Allen would recall that ‘young Sherwood’ ‘was the first in our memory that was put to the rack for matters of conscience, then when no man dreamed of any these feigned new conspiracies’.Footnote 49 It is surely to these events that Mendoza the Spanish ambassador was referring later in 1578 when he claimed that a few months earlier Walsingham himself had had the devil's own job to entrap a catholic prisoner into treasonous words; so much so that he had been forced actually to falsify the man's replies, which replies he had then immediately taken off to the queen to persuade her that that was how all English catholics really regarded her. Fortunately, we do not have simply to believe the claims of the Spanish ambassador as literally true to get the picture or to reconstruct the penumbra of rumour surrounding the treatment of these prisoners and the wider political purposes to which their fate was being put. On 12 December Killigrew told Davison about the execution of Mayne and the apprehension in London of Nelson and Sherwood.
I think they be of the number of the twenty four priests sent lately out of those parts. . . into this country to reconcile men . . . with the pope. If you have not advertised of them to Mr Secretary I pray you learn thereof what you can and write the same both to him and to my Lord of Leicester because it may be occasion of much good.Footnote 50
In a later comment on these same events Killigrew spelt out to William Davison what seems to have been at least part of the intended message; ‘the papists are so stout and arrogant that one Sherwood’ ‘being brought before the bishop of London’ behaved himself so ‘stubbornly’ that Killigrew thought that the bishop would henceforth show the more favour ‘to such as, of malice’, were called ‘by the name of puritans’.Footnote 51
Catholic accounts of the confessions extracted from Nelson or Sherwood are confirmed by the official record of what Mayne had been induced to say in a statement taken the day before his execution. Determined not to incriminate his friends, patrons or co-religionsts, Mayne, to the last, had named no names, but he did make a crucial admission, to the effect that
the people of England may be won unto the catholic religion of the see of Rome by such secret instructors as either are or may be within the realm, but what those secret instructors are he will not utter and hopeth that when time serveth they shall do therein as pleaseth God.
Suspicious words were found in a book of his, signifying that ‘though the catholics did now serve, forebear and obey, yet, if occasion were offered, they should be ready to help the execution etc.’. Badgered about what that might mean, Mayne had finally explained that they
were annexed to a text taken out of a general council of Lateran for the authority of the pope in his excommunications and ratified at the last council at Trent where there was a consent of the catholic princes for a reformation of such realms and persons as had gone from the authority of the bishop of Rome, where it was concluded that, if any catholic prince took in hand to invade any realm, to reform the same to the authority of the see of Rome, that then the catholics in that realm so invaded by foreigners should be ready to assist and help them to the uttermost of their powers and this was the meaning of the execution as he saith, which he never revealed to any man before.Footnote 52
In the words of an infamous headline, Gotcha!
The survey of recusants of October 1577 – intended to establish the extent of the popish threat in England – and the interrogations and executions of Mayne, Nelson and Sherwood – intended to establish the treasonous nature of English popish opinion and clerical activity – can thus be put together, as two sides of the same campaign to garner evidence of the nature and extent of the popish threat to lay before the queen. To them can be added the arrest of the long-time Spanish agent, Antonio de Guerras. This too took place in October 1577. At midnight on 19/20, to be exact, when de Guerras's house was raided, he, his secretary and others were arrested and his papers seized.Footnote 53 The ostensible reason was de Guerras's contacts with Mary Stuart and the very rude comments and intelligences about both the queen and her Council that he had been sending to don John of Austria in Flanders. If the questions being put to his secretary the following summer are anything to go by, just like Nelson and Sherwood, de Guerras was asked whether he had defamed the queen and her councillors as heretics and schismatics; about why so many English catholics resorted to him; and about his contacts with Mary Stuart, with Westmoreland and, of course, with Don John himself.Footnote 54
The letters which occasioned de Guerras's arrest had been intercepted early in March 1577, the code in which they were written had been broken by the end of that monthFootnote 55 and the regime's anxiety about alienating don John as a negotiating partner dissipated by the middle of the summer;Footnote 56 why, then, had it taken until October for the regime to act? Again the answer seems to be that material was now needed in a hurry to establish the true nature and extent of the popish threat, and it was hoped that de Guerras would provide the clinching evidence that linked the burgeoning numbers of English catholics and the traitorous opinions and activities of the missionary priests, like Mayne, with the political machinations and conspiracies of English catholic exiles, Mary Stuart and the Spanish crown. Here was convincing evidence not merely for a popish threat but for a veritable popish conspiracy, against which the queen was now being urged to act on a variety of fronts.
All of these bursts of activity occurred, first in October/November 1577 and then again in January/February 1578, clustered around the crucial moments when Grindal's fate appeared to be in the balance. At each point, the fate of Grindal was associated by contemporary commentators with the decision whether to intervene in the Low Countries or not. In September Edward Cheke had conjoined the happy news that ‘I am promised my master's liberty’ with rumours of Leicester's ‘full determination’ to lead the men to be sent to the Low Countries himself, but this is ‘yet unknown to her highness, neither shall she be acquainted with it until she be fully resolved to send’.Footnote 57 In late January the same letter in which Killgrew informed Davison that ‘the bishop of Canterbury is like to be deprived’ also contained the news that ‘it is hardly believed that an army will be sent there’.Footnote 58 Conversely the letter of 22 February which contained welcome news of Grindal's improved prospects also contained the claim that Lord Buckhurst had come from ‘court and said that it was resolved in council to send my Lord of Leicester over with 10,000 men’.Footnote 59 Might we conclude, then, that whenever pressure to act on the Low Countries became too intense the queen turned up the heat on Grindal and whenever Grindal's job seemed to be really in danger (and the question of whether to intervene in the Low Countries seemed about to be decided) the archbishop's allies on the Council simply topped another priest?
I am not arguing for a coherent conspiracy, a concerted and centrally coordinated campaign. On the contrary, what we have here is a mixture of coincidence, cock-up and hastily extemporised expedient, entirely typical of the workings of Elizabethan government. The roots of the raid on Tregian's house and the taking of Mayne were no doubt as much local as national; the interception of de Guerras's letters prompted by fears about international intrigue, Spanish plotting and policy towards the Low Countries. Conversely, the taking of Sherwood, arrested when the son of his catholic patron, ‘whose faith and manners were widely distant from those of his mother’, followed him through the streets of London shouting ‘“stop the traitor, stop the traitor”’, seems to have been pretty much an accident.Footnote 60 The recusant survey was clearly the culmination of discussions that dated from at least the previous summer, and of failed anti-popish initiatives that went back years, even if the decision to conclude it in a week does not betoken the culmination of some long-planned bureaucratic reform.
If anything in their origins united these events it was no more than a sense that popery was on the march; a sense heightened, no doubt, by the suppression of the propheysings and the sequestration of Grindal, and emanating from the centre of the regime, from the godly in the provinces, and indeed from reports from and about the continent. The result was a climate in which it appeared that a variety of both personal and political ends and agendas could be furthered through talking up the popish threat. The resulting discrete incidents then became associated together in a hastily assembled series of manoeuvres designed to push the queen to do things, that (left to her own devices) she did not want to do. Put another way, Sherwood's capture might have been an accident, the product more of certain tensions between his patron and her heretic son, than of any concerted government crack down, but what happened to him next was not.
What we have got here is neither a conspiracy nor a concatenation of mere coincidences, but rather a series of dialectically patterned contingencies. Discrete events, set off by or within a particular ideological moment, were associated together, glossed and deployed, to further a set of increasingly pointed and coherent ideological and political purposes, central to which were the rehabilitation of Grindal and the support of the Dutch rebels. In a memo of December 1577 we can watch Burghley assembling such material to formulate arguments in favour of intervention in the Low Countries to take to the queen. A long list of arguments for the ill-will of the Spanish is topped off by ‘the practises of Guerras with the Scottish queen’.Footnote 61 Burghley also asserted that ‘in all men's judgements that desire change of religion in England’ – a company, of course, now rendered far more numerous and threatening by the recusancy survey and the examinations of Nelson, Sherwood and Mayne – a marriage between don John of Austria and Mary Stuart ‘is the best and only means to restore the realm of England to the church of Rome’. By marriage to Mary Stuart, Burghley alleged, don John will
make his title to her right to the crown of England, whereunto both the pope, the French king, the king of Spain and all potentates catholic will give aid; the pope for religion, the French king by solicitation of the house of Guise, and thereby to avoid all sequel of comforting his subjects of the religion in France; the king of Spain for advancement of his brother don John.Footnote 62
Thus were the dastardly plots of the papists made manifest, the subject changed from the puritan to the popish threat, the need for action emphasised and – perhaps as a side effect, perhaps not – the bacon of Edmund Grindal saved.
V
Extemporised and hastily put together, the resulting mode of queen-centred, anti-papal manoeuvre can be observed operating through another set of contingencies, those set off by the queen's summer progress of 1578.Footnote 63 Starting out from Greenwich in July, the queen wound a circuitous course through Essex and Suffolk to Norwich. As Professor MacCulloch has shown, whether by accident or design, the gentlemen at whose houses the queen stayed represented a wide ideological range; some were puritans, others were overtly catholic, indeed recusant, and still others bare conformists.Footnote 64 The crucial coup de théâtre was played out at Euston Hall, the house of Edward Rookwood. The occasion was described by Richard Topcliffe in a famous letter to the earl of Shrewsbury.Footnote 65 According to Topcliffe, Rookwood was ‘a papist of kind newly crept out of his late wardship’. The royal visit to his house culminated in the queen giving ‘to Rookwood ordinary thanks for his bad house and her fair hand to kiss; after which it was braved at’. But what looked like an extraordinary gesture of royal favour conferred on a known catholic was then transformed by the lord chamberlain, Sussex, who called Rookwood before him; denounced him as an excommunicate papist, ‘demanded of him how he durst presume to attempt her real presence, he, unfit to accompany any Christian person; forthwith said he was fitter for a pair of stocks; commanded him out of the court, and yet to attend her council's pleasure’. Later, on the pretext that there was a piece of plate missing from the court, Rookwood's premises were searched and
in the hay rick such an image of our lady was there found, as for greatness, for gayness and workmanship, I did never see a match; and after a sort of country dances ended, in her majesty's sight the idol was set behind the people who avoided . . . her majesty commanded it to the fire, which, in her sight, by the country folks, was quickly done, to her content, and unspeakable joy of every one but some one or two who had sucked of the idol's poisoned milk.
Here, then, was a physical display of the prevalence of the catholic threat and of the queen's personal repugnance in the face of popish idolatry.
The progress culminated at Norwich where the Council called before them a large number of suspected catholic gentry, including Rookwood, and consigned most of them to prison or house arrest where they were to be forced to confer with protestant ministers.Footnote 66 This was to realise, in parvo, and on the back of the practical lessons learned in the course of the summer progress, the sort of comprehensive anti-catholic policy, concentrated on the confinement, forced consultation with learned divines and eventual exemplary punishment of selected recusant gentry, that we have seen being discussed in the summer and autumn of 1577.
On the other side of the equation, other of the gentlemen with whom the queen had stayed were knighted; some of these were notorious puritans, others conformist crypto-catholics. As Professor MacCulloch observes, there could scarcely have been a clearer enactment either of the rewards of obedience and conformity or of the costs of defiance. Thus, what in prospect must have looked not just like a signal mark of royal favour, conferred on a known catholic, but even a tacit royal acceptance of the possibility of a genuinely and overtly catholic loyalism – the take-home message being that even an acknowledged recusant and excommunicant like Rookwood could enjoy royal favour, if he demonstrated his personal devotion and loyalty to the queen – had suddenly been converted into its polar opposite. What could or should have been an occasion for catholic celebration – as Topcliffe observed Rookwood's kissing the queen's hand was much ‘braved at’Footnote 67 – had been converted into an occasion for the public performance of the queen's loathing for all things popish.
As ever, a shift in policy towards papists involved a change in attitude towards puritans. ‘Shortly after’, Topcliffe remarked,
a great sort of good preachers who had long commanded to silence for a little niceness, were licensed and again commanded to preach, a greater and more universal joy to the countries, and the most of the court, than the disgrace of the papists; and the gentlemen of those parts, being great and hot protestants (almost before by policy discredited and disgraced) were greatly countenanced.Footnote 68
These sentiments were echoed by Sir Thomas Heneage who told Walsingham that ‘my lord, with the rest of her Majesty's Council, have most considerately straightened divers obstinate and arch papists that would not come to the church. And by good means her Majesty is brought to’ think well of ‘divers most zealous and loyal gentlemen of Suffolk and Norfolk whom the foolish bishop had maliciously complained of to her majesty as hinderers of her proceedings and favourers of preciseness and puritans, as he calls them’.Footnote 69
The uses to which the lessons taught by the summer progress were subsequently put can be gleaned from a quite remarkably wide range of sources. On the one hand, we have a letter from the Council which informed the bishop of London of the queen's knowledge of and displeasure at the prevalence of recusancy. This knowledge had been gained on ‘this late progress’, when, ‘having had occasion to repair into sundry shires’, the queen had learned
(to her majesty's no small grief), that sundry persons, being in commission of the peace within diverse counties, have, of late years, foreborn to come to the church to any common prayer and divine service, whereby not only God is dishonoured, the laws infringed but very evil example given to the common sort of people, as in time (if it be not looked unto) may be feared will tend to a division and disturbance of the common quietness of the whole realm.
Moreover, despite repeated conciliar promptings to the bishops, ‘neither have the said persons been, by good conference of the ordinaries, brought to any conformity, nor we advertised of their contempts, as appertaineth to their [the bishops'] callings and special trust reposed in them for such matters to have been done’. Having ‘espied this fault in some shires ourselves’ the councillors were sure that the ‘like may be committed in other places’. Thus, if blame were to be apportioned for the current (shocking) state of affairs, it lay with the bishop/s and not with the Council. But the Council was now on the case, and they instructed Aylmer
upon secret conference with such persons as be well affected to religion within your diocese and you shall think can inform you of such persons as, being justices of peace, refuse to come to the church in any shire under your jurisdiction, to send unto us a particular certificate of their names, qualities and dwelling places and further what time they have been noted to have foreborn to frequent the said divine service.
In other words, Aylmer was being told to cabal with and to rely on the local godly, people who to their enemies, indeed very probably to Aylmer himself, not to mention to poor, embattled Bishop Freake, were ‘puritans’, in order the better to defend the state against ‘popery’.Footnote 70
Here was the Council doing to Aylmer on the catholic issue what others had done to Grindal over the prophesyings. Having convinced the queen of the existence of a threat to the ‘common quietness of the whole realm’, a threat emanating this time from popish recusancy rather than from puritan prophesyings, they were using the royal ire to induce the bishops to pursue anti-popish policies very similar to those discussed and formulated during the summer and autumn of 1577. Here was anti-popery trumping anti-puritanism and royal and episcopal policy being pushed in a direction far more conducive to the interests of the ‘protestant cause’, as at least some members of the Council understood it, than had seemed likely when the disorderly nature of the prophesying and the presumption and disobedience of Grindal had been the business of the hour.
But we can also see the lessons of the summer progress being driven home in an altogether different sort of text and context; in a court entertainment performed before the queen at the earl of Leicester's house at Wanstead, where the progress ended in September. Known as The Lady of May, the piece consisted of a petition to the queen from various country folk to decide between two rival suitors for the hand of the Lady of May.Footnote 71 The discussion of the relative merits of the two suitors became the occasion for a rehearsal of that common topos, the comparison of the active and of the contemplative lives, with the former personified by the hunter, Therion, and the latter by the shepherd, Epilus. The consequent debate was moderated by a pedantic old schoolmaster, Rombus. There are two versions of the piece, one of which concludes with a speech by Rombus who, in presenting the queen with a jewel, in a clear reference to the earl of Leicester, delivered a disquisition on
a certain neighbour, they call him master Robert of Wanstead. He is counted an honest man, and one that loves us doctified men pro vita. . . But so stays the case that he is foully commaculated with the papistical enormity, O heu Aedipus Aecastor. The bonus vir is a huge catholicam, wherewith my conscience being replenished, could no longer refrain it from you, proba dominus doctor, probo inveni. I have found unum par, a pair, papisticorum bedorus, of Papistian beads, cum quis, with the which, omnium dierum, every day, next after his pater noster he semper suits ‘and Elizabeth’, as many lines as there are beads on this string.Footnote 72
This, of course, was to recall in jest, in Leicester's house an earlier occasion, at Euston Hall, when the queen had indeed found herself staying in a house in which all the impedimenta of popish superstition had come to light. But Leicester, of course, was known not for his catholic, but rather for his puritan, sympathies.
What seems to have happened here is that after the scene at Euston Hall, Sidney had added the concluding speech to the entertainment – and here it is worth remembering that the speech occurs only in one of the two extant versions – to reflect back on the events of the summer, when the entertainment was performed before the queen when she returned to Wanstead, in September, that is to say, at the end, rather than at the beginning of the progress (when some commentators take the entertainment to have been performed). In September, the speech would have operated as a very pointed reminder of the significance of what had just happened to the queen and of the stark difference between Leicester's real, and entirely protestant, devotion to the royal person, and the entirely false professions of loyalty of her catholic subjects.
Not that the pointed topicality of the piece was limited to this reminder of the lessons of the summer about the catholic threat. For, as Louis Montrose has argued, the choice presented to the queen, by the central organising conceit of Sidney's entertainment was one between a virtuous, valorous mixture of the active and the contemplative lives, personified by the hunter, and the passive, languorous, voluptuous and, ultimately, both constraining and corrupting, life of contemplation and withdrawal, personified by the shepherd.Footnote 73 That choice was, of course, being offered to a queen confronted, at that very moment, with another choice: whether actively to intervene in the Low Countries, or rather to watch passively from the sidelines, tending her own flock at home, while the fate of the gospel was being decided by others, elsewhere.Footnote 74 Offered what was surely a lightly coded version of this choice in Leicester's garden at Wanstead, we are told the queen opted (predictably enough) for the shepherd as the appropriate husband for the Lady of May.
VI
I want now to draw the argument thus far together and reach some preliminary conclusions. First, I want to argue that the preceding analysis shows the extent to which we cannot hope to understand the catholic narrative in isolation from the protestant one, and vice versa. The stories recounted above have traditionally been told in hermetically sealed compartments, but they cannot be properly understood until placed in relation the one with the other. Secondly, by putting these stories together we can watch the conversion of Elizabethan politics into a ruthless struggle for advantage. If we include the experience of at least some catholics – of Mayne, certainly, but also of his patron, Tregian – who was to rot in prison for another twenty years – the nastiness of Elizabethan politics did not have to wait until 1590s to emerge. The result was a no holds barred struggle in which – and I cannot resist this sound bite – Cuthbert Mayne was publicly eviscerated to save Edmund Grindal's job.
When I first thought about this paper I was tempted to lace such a conclusion with glancing references to the propensity of governments, if not to invent, then certainly to exaggerate, manipulate and exacerbate threats and plots to suit their own wider purposes and hold on power.Footnote 75 I remain tempted enough by that conclusion not to want to give it up altogether, but while, if you live in America, and perhaps even if you live in England, it is easy, and even salutary, these days, to subject official claims about external threats and plots to a certain bracing scepticism, scepticism on its own is not enough.
And so I do not want to end by saying ‘look what those dreadful men did to those nice, innocent catholics’ or, at least, if I do end up saying something like that, I want to do so with a full acknowledgement of what the people doing these dreadful things thought the stakes were; that is to say, with a realisation that the people at the centre of these events believed in the master narratives and organising tropes, the claims, assumptions and prejudices, that they were also instrumentally, perhaps even rather cynically, manipulating, to force others to do what they wanted. For if there really was a threat, then doing whatever you needed to do to convince people of that fact was not manipulation, intimidation and hyperbole, or, still less, dissimulation and tyranny. It was, rather, a necessary service to the common good and the defence of the realm. As ever, what looked, to insiders, like the operations of good counsel in an increasingly dangerous world – the monarchical republic doing what it was supposed to do – appeared, to those observing events from the outside – particularly to those on the receiving end of many of these manoeuvres, that is to say to catholics – very much like a self-serving conspiracy of evil counsel.Footnote 76 Either way, it was the combination of conviction and manipulation, of realpolitick with ideologically enflamed fantasy, that rendered the resulting political mode simultaneously so sinister and so formidable, so transparently manipulative and so effective.
And, of course, there was more involved here than just Grindal's job, but rather the whole notion of ‘the protestant cause’, a view of the world identified by Simon Adams over thirty years ago as capable of integrating events and issues at home – the fates of puritans and papists, of Grindal, and of the cause of further reformation – with the fate of the gospel abroad and indeed with the independence and integrity of the realm.Footnote 77 As ever Collinson has been here before, in two seminal articles relating the Grindal affair, and domestic religious politics more generously conceived, to policy towards the Low Countries.Footnote 78 We might even go further than that and argue that at issue in the Grindal affair at least seemed to be the continuing hold over the queen of those committed to a unitary vision of the catholic threat and of the need for action, in England and the Low Countries, to meet that threat. (This, we might speculate, was why the Grindal affair occasioned so much muttering within the elite about the queen listening to private men rather than to accredited counsellors and about the effects of nameless evil counsellors, called by Sir Francis Knollys, at one point, ‘Richard II's men’.)Footnote 79
So the stakes were very high and the events described here amount to a no holds barred multi media campaign to get the queen to do the right thing/s both at home and abroad; a campaign to which the fates of Mayne and Nelson, on the one hand, and of Grindal, on the other, were integral; with the former providing irrefutable evidence of the nature and extent of the popish threat, and the latter acting as a symbol for the more general fate of ‘the protestant cause’ in the counsels of the queen. As Walsingham observed to Burghley in May 1577 ‘howsoever he hath offended’, a stay in the queen's ‘proceedings against the Archbishop’ was, ‘at this time’, ‘in true policy most requisite’.Footnote 80
Thus was the fall of Grindal connected to the capture and execution of Cuthbert Mayne and to the botched survey of October 1577. Thus were the mid-night raids, the torture and intimidation, the public executions and coerced confessions, visited on the likes of Mayne, Sherwood and de Guerras, connected to the bizarre outbreak of royally sponsored iconoclasm at Euston Hall, and the public shaming of various catholic gentry at Norwich, in August 1578. Thus were the disgusting acts committed in the defence of the realm in the torture chamber and at Tyburn connected, in their turn, to the pastoral whimsy of the ‘Lady of May’.
But to stop even here would still perhaps not be entirely adequate to the extraordinary nature of this story; for while its initial victims were real, live, and then rapidly enough dead, catholics, the resulting exercise in anti-papal vituperation and positioning was not being directed first and foremost at catholics at all; rather it was being directed at other protestants, and, in particular, at the queen herself. Anti-popery was being used by elements in the Council to respond to the newly virulent strain of anti-puritan and anti-popular invective being employed by the queen and her agents – Hatton and Aylmer, and whoever else had stoked the fires of her ire against the prophesyings.
This was a form of intense, court- and queen-centred politics, but it is not anything that we could or should call a factional politics, but rather an intensely ideological politics, conducted in and through the ideological codes of anti-popery and anti-puritanism. Since Simon Adams definitively banished the notion of faction and of factional rivalry from our account of high Elizabethan politics, there has been a tendency to assume that, along with faction, has gone any really serious conflict within the central workings of the regime.Footnote 81 The assumption seems to have been that, with no faction to speak of, there can be no sustained conflict, and, of course, after revisionism, we all know that the opposite of conflict is consensus. This does not seem to me to be a necessary consequence of Adams's argument but it is what a number of people have taken that argument to mean. All we are left with are certain tensions between the queen and an inner core of her councillors about a number of issues – marriage, the succession, Mary Stuart, further reformation, what to do about English catholics, whether and how aggressively to intervene in the struggle against popery abroad – all of them integrally bound up with the furtherance of the protestant cause.
But another way of stating this is to remark, not on the absence of ‘faction’, but, rather, on the presence of ideological division and to register that perhaps the most significant and pressing ideological fault line in Elizabethan England did not run between a unified establishment and a puritan opposition, nor between competing factions, or rivals for the queen's favour, at court, but between the queen and an inner core of her own councillors. At stake here were fundamental differences of view about both politics and religion and about the relations between them, differences which the issue of the prophesyings and the subsequent Grindal affair threatened to bring both to the surface and to a head.
The Grindal affair also showed what was likely to happen if these differences of priority and principle were addressed directly; if, in a series of claims and counter claims, they were raised to greater and greater levels of coherence, of explicit articulation and of overt disagreement. Arguably, in his letter to the queen, Grindal had laid before the queen many of the foundational assumptions of the so-called ‘monarchical republic of Elizabeth I’. At stake were not merely religious differences about the nature of true religion and the role of the national church in fostering it, but questions of royal authority and of counsel. Moreover, the results of Grindal's exercise in plain speaking had been (at least potentially) disastrous, not merely for the archbishop himself but also for his allies on the Council and for the wider protestant cause. If indeed monarchical republicanism ever rose to the status of an explicit ideology, it was clearly an ideology that dared not speak its name at the business end of affairs at court and in counsel.Footnote 82
In the exchanges described in this paper we can see these issues being canvassed, a debate being conducted, as it were, in code, via recourse to anti-popery and anti-puritanism. I am decidedly not claiming here that the real issues were ‘political’ – concerned with royal authority and counsel, the balance of power within the mixed polity of the monarchical republic – and that the religious ideologies of anti-popery and anti-puritanism merely provided outward polemical forms, obfuscatory languages, in and through which the real (political) issues could be discussed. But I am arguing that anti-popery and anti-puritanism nearly always operated as repositories of political (as well as of religious) values and priorities – and that their use almost always involved the assertion and legitimation of some sort of political programme or policy agenda. Which mode predominated at any given moment could shift the ideological spectrum, reordering, as it did so, priorities and policy options. For what was happening when these ideologies were put in play was not merely the defence, from external threat, of a stable regime about the nature of which all could agree, but rather a debate about what sort of regime this was and about what it needed to do now and next to protect and perpetuate itself.Footnote 83
But while anti-popery and anti-puritanism very often brought with them different priorities, values and programmes, they were not anything like mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they overlapped, claiming to defend similar, if not identical, visions of protestant and monarchical order from similar sorts of extreme religious threat. And, in so doing, they used similar means and media in order to mobilise very similar, overlapping, if not identical, publics or constituencies.Footnote 84 In a political and polemical scene in which no one could be overtly pro-papist or pro-puritan, the successful invocation of either anti-popery or anti-puritanism could induce, even coerce, consensus. It could make people who in many ways, or on other issues, did not agree at all, collaborate and cooperate behind a common front or policy. Debate about what the terms puritan and papist might mean and thus about who precisely might be included within those categories was entirely possible and permissible. That was what was going on when the likes of Killigrew or Heneage or Huntingdon referred to ‘puritans as they call them’ or as ‘out of malice, they are called’, or when Sussex tried to get Francis Tregian to at least pretend to conform. But, at the end of the day, everyone had to agree that real puritans and real papists (whoever they were) were very bad things indeed.Footnote 85
What we have here, then, are sharp disagreements about what the real threats were and about what it was best to do about them – debates about principles and policy – being conducted via ideological forms which induced, indeed enforced, consensus rather than division. In the course of the events I have been describing an opening, anti-puritan, anti-popular, bid had been made by the queen, in the course of which even Grindal's natural allies and patrons on the Council had been forced not merely to embrace but to make, in open court, the official case against the archbishop. That opening move had been countered by a renewed playing of the anti-papal card. Putting popery front and centre was a way to bring anti-puritans – Hatton, Aylmer and Whitgift – on board, recruiting them for a reassembled pro-Grindal, pro-protestant cause and anti-papal establishment. The resulting re-jigged common front could then confront the queen about what she needed to do next in order to preserve what Leicester called in a letter to Walsingham ‘her self and her estate’.Footnote 86 Thus it is surely not without significance that, while the likes of Mildmay and Bacon were chosen to make the official case against Grindal,Footnote 87 it was Sussex, who had been so anxious to play down the popish threat and save both Tregian and Mayne from the consequences of their own rigourism in the autumn of 1577, who, in the summer of 1578, had been forced, as lord chamberlain, to unmask the popish Rookwood and expel him from the royal presence, thus underlining the ubiquity and seriousness of the popish threat. What was involved in such manoeuvres and exchanges was partly ideological coercion or cooption – the exploitation of the fact that now, especially, men like Hatton, Aylmer or Whitgift, or indeed Sussex, could not afford to look soft on popery – but it was also, perhaps rather more, a matter of activating or appealing to another, parallel, set of (anti-popish) convictions to which, in their own way, such men were as subject as even the most enthusiastic of Grindal's backers.
VII
As ever, the inner workings of such manoeuvres showed most clearly not when they worked but when they met resistance and I want to conclude with an instance when the Council's insistence on the anti-papal mode broke down before the defiant deployment of anti-puritanism. In a situation in which ‘the friends of Grindal’ had decreed that everyone play up the threat of popery and play down that of puritanism, anyone caught sedulously mentioning the puritan threat was liable to be identified immediately, not as a loyal servant of the queen and defender of the church, but rather as a covert enemy of the archbishop. Thus we find the earl of Huntington complaining bitterly to Matthew Hutton that just at the point when the good offices of (the successfully coopted?) Hatton (of all people) had been about to spring Grindal, ‘the bishops of Durham and York have written to her majesty’, not to complain, in the approved manner, about the prevalence of popery, but rather to report the presence ‘of such sects and puritans’, which reports ‘hath made a stay of his deliverance’. Incensed, Huntington had put Sandys to the test.
I told him a piece of this matter, but said no word of Canterbury, and I did ask him what infection he found in all his diocese, especially for puritanism, as they term it. He answered that he found none to offend that way, neither saith he, have I written any thing thereof.
A couple of now contained instances of puritan defiance aside, ‘of other matters he did not write, but of the increasing of the papists, etc.’.Footnote 88 Sandys, then, knew what the rules were, and, at least to Huntington, claimed to be playing by them.
Not so Bishop Barnes of Durham, who, in a remarkable letter to Burghley, responding to similar allegations that he too had stabbed Grindal in the back, steadfastly refused to say the right, anti-papal, things. On the extent of the popish threat, he gave Burghley the ostensibly happy (but surely also at this point entirely unwelcome) news that in the ‘short space’ ‘since my last letters’ Barnes's poor efforts had met with such ‘very good and prosperous success and effect’ that ‘truly I doubt not but that within this half year your good lordship shall see a wonderful reformation there’. The wild talk ‘in private assemblies’ of some ‘that were of late rebels and some dissolute gentlemen’ aside,
openly they all profess obedience and now, within all Northumberland, I cannot find one person that willfully will refuse to come to the church and communicate (a few women excepted). For I have driven out of that county the reconciling priests and massers whereof there was store. They are now gone into Lancashire and Yorkshire but we are rid of them.
It is true that Barnes noted a sharp contrast between the inhabitants of Northumberland and ‘these stubborn, churlish people of the county of Durham and their neighbours of Richmondshire’. This, he claimed, was a ‘savage people’, ‘as hard stubborn and rebellious as ever they were’, but even there he had got many ‘to haste to amend’, with ‘none extremity showed to any otherwise than by threatening’. The clergy, too, had proved reformable, those of ‘the church of Durham excepted whose stink is grievous in the nose of God and of men’.
On this view, then, not only were there virtually no recusants in the whole of Northumberland, but the real threat to order in the notoriously conservative north-east emanated not from the papists but from the cathedral church of Durham with whose clergy, led by the notorious ‘puritan’ William Whittingham, Barnes was in open feud. This was decidedly not what Barnes was supposed to say and he compounded the offence by replying to the charge that he did not ‘have a good mind to the archbishop of Canterbury in the time of his trouble’, by repeating the official, anti-puritan case against Grindal.
I detest his willfulness and contending with the regal majesty and obstinacy in not yielding to that which your honours sets down, the same being godly and expedient, for this time, the malapertness of brainbusy men considered, who nowadays, if but a proclamation, a decree, or commandment come forth from her majesty, and by your honours' advice, straightways, and first in their conventicles, will call the same into question and examine and determine whether, with safe conscience, they may or ought to obey the same, a thing so perilous as none can be more and savouring overmuch of the anabaptismeys [sic] who wish a popular government.
All the buzz words – ‘conventicle’, ‘popular government’, ‘anabaptism’ – of anti-puritanism were being invoked here, clustered around the figure of Grindal and the issue of prophesyings. As for the prophesyings themselves, Barnes opined, even well ordered, they tended only to the bene esse rather than to the esse, to the well being, rather than to the being or essence, of the church, and as such were ‘not to be so urged of him as by the same to contend with her highness and her Council to the great hinderance of true religion’.
Not that Barnes had been free with these opinions; he had, he claimed, only made this case ‘to some two or three persons at the utmost’ whom he had heard maintain that Grindal was ‘cruelly dealt withal and had not deserved to be straightened’. In reply to such ‘slanders’, ‘I have been forward to affirm his own willfulness and undutifulnes toward his sovereign to be the just occasion of his trouble.’ As for his failure to visit Grindal at Lambeth, on his last visit to London, Barnes had, he explained, intended to pay his respects, ‘but I was warned by those whom I will obey not so to do, which ought to be my warrant’.Footnote 89
This, of course, was to mute, almost to silence, the anti-papal register, that recent actions by the Council had been designed to excite in the bishops and others, and to replace it with an insistence on the persistence and seriousness of the puritan threat that echoed the queen's own values and rhetoric. This was the very opposite of what Sandys, in defending himself to Huntingdon, had at least claimed to be doing. Barnes, however, was having none of that; staring down the pressure exerted on him by individual councillors – in this case, it seems, by Burghley himself – he simply reiterated the official conciliar and royal line on the issue of the prophesyings, on Grindal's wilful disobedience and contempt of royal authority and on the pressing nature of the puritan threat. Whatever their private opinions and preferences, this was the view of the matter which even Grindal's conciliar allies – the likes of Sir Nicholas Bacon, Sir Walter Mildmay and even Burghley himself – had themselves been forced to articulate and endorse, often in public, in the queen's and their own names. Having thus been coopted to the anti-puritan consensus, they had given hostages to fortune that Barnes was now exploiting; even, in that slightly sinister reference to the ‘warrant’ provided him by ‘those whom I will obey’, daring to threaten Burghley, of all people, with the superior authority of the queen. And, of course, in the face of such an outstanding display of obedience and exemplary anti-puritan zeal not even Burghley could demur. There could scarcely be a more perfectly formed example of the enforced consensus which the well-timed recourse to the discourses either of anti-popery or of anti-puritanism could impose on even the most powerful of persons; nor of the often bitter, both ideological and personal, disagreements that could be not merely masked, but actively prosecuted by the skilful deployment of such talk.
But if these exchanges between Sandys and Huntingdon and Burghley and Barnes show us the game being played by the rules, the strange fates of Edmund Grindal and indeed of Cuthbert Mayne show us what happened when conscience got in the way of politics. For just as Sussex's attempt to save Tregian's career and Mayne's life had foundered on the former's conscientious refusal to at least go through the motions of outward conformity, so too were the Council's attempts to rehabilitate Grindal were broken on the archbishop's similarly intransigent refusal – despite all Burghley's careful coaching sessionsFootnote 90 – to grovel before the queen in the approved manner. Put another way, Grindal was refusing to be co-opted (anymore) into supporting policies of which he disapproved by the playing of the anti-puritan card. In effect, he was refusing to accept the legitimacy, the widening ideological purchase, of anti-puritanism, as the functional equivalent, the counter balancing evil twin, of his own virulent anti-popery. The complete failure of that refusal which his sequestration from office represented renders his fall a major turning point in the history of the reign, indeed perhaps, as things turned out, in the whole post-Reformation period.
What we are seeing here is the emergence of something of a pattern – a pattern capable of more general application to the politics of the period as a whole; a politics which, at least in the high Elizabethan decades, might now be conceived not so much as factional, but rather as (emergently) ideological (and therefore as intermittently ‘popular’), with the crucial issue being whether an anti-papal or an anti-puritan agenda predominated. The course of events from the late 1560s to the early 1590s (if not beyond) might then be recast as a struggle between those two perspectives; as various groups and individuals, from the queen on down, struggled to change the subject from one to the other and back again. Thus was the marriage/succession issue of the 1560s displaced by the Vestiaran controversy; and then the anti-puritan focus of that event displaced, in turn, by the virulent anti-popery sparked by the revolt of the northern earls, the queen's excommunication and the Ridolfi conspiracy. Then again the Admonition Controversy sparked a renewed outbreak of a newly coherent and aggressive Whitgiftian anti-puritanism, with the two fighting it out through Grindal's rise and fall. Whitgift's elevation to Canterbury occasioned another outbreak of anti-puritanism, his anti-presbyterian push of 1583/4 coinciding with the outbreak of anti-popish fervour that, amongst other things, produced the Bond of Association. Finally, we might, with Glyn Parry, see Burghley's great anti-catholic proclamation of 1591 as another, final (?) attempt to change the subject from Whitgift's final push against the Elizabethan puritan movement back to the ‘real’ threat of popery.
What was at stake here was not a political style or scene created by a queen balancing factions or favourites, or, still less, by rival factions and favourites contending for royal favour and playing and manipulating the queen as they did so. What were being ‘balanced’ here were not ‘factions’ so much as the contradictory demands of anti-puritanism and anti-popery, as, in an increasingly threatening and confessionally polarised world, different elements within the regime (up to and including Elizabeth herself) sought to invoke and manipulate those two aspects of the royal view of the world in order to gloss events and push royal policy in directions that accorded with their view of their own, the queen's and of the state's interests.
And if, at times, the result of all this was an appearance of ‘balance’, of the pursuit of the sort of equipoise thought uniquely to repose in ‘the middle way’, that was in many ways an illusion; an effect produced by the evolving and mutating stalemate that pertained for much of the reign; a stalemate, of course, both framed and manipulated by the deployment of a rhetoric of moderation and consensus imposed by the queen and used by the various parties to push their preferred policies and priorities. (One thinks here of Alymer's advice to Walsingham that the queen be at least told that equal severity was being used towards the two extremes, ‘or else you can guess what will follow’ and of the Council's later invocation to Aylmer of the need to protect ‘the common quietness of the realm’ from the popish threat.) Thus, rather than the triumph of any one coherent vision of true order, or the realisation of any one version of a stable ‘middle way’ between those two inherently unstable and intensely glossable ideological quantities or categories, ‘popery’ and ‘puritanism’, it was this sort of stasis or stand off, this sort of repeated wrangle both over what the real threats were and over what might best be done about them, that produced the seeming stability of ‘the Elizabethan compromise’.
Rather than pursue these increasingly abstract speculations further, however, I will end by returning to the anodyne historiographical observation with which I began. There have been and will continue to be, different, distinct narratives of this period – the complexity of the events involved, the volume of sources available, make that an inevitable, indeed a, in many ways, salutary division of scholarly labour – but there are moments which both demand and enable those different narratives to be reintegrated – and I have been dealing here with one such moment. The events discussed in this paper have been treated in distinct narratives; a political/protestant narrative, centred on Grindal; a diplomatic narrative, centred on the Low Countries; a catholic narrative, centred on the 1577 survey and on the death of Mayne; a set of local narratives which have been used to explain the course of the 1578 progress and the fate of Mayne largely in terms of gentry factions, and local religious tensions between catholics and protestants, puritans and conformists, bishops and JPs. All these narratives are true in their own way, and it has been no part of my purpose to criticise or disagree with any of them. But it is not until they have been correlated, put (back) into contact or conversation with one another, that we will see just what was happening and why.
So it is partly true that Cuthbert Mayne lost his guts to save Edmund Grindal's job, but stated baldly, such a claim would be both trivial and untrue. However, I have been concerned to argue here that how and why it both was, and was not, true, has a good deal to tell us about nature of Elizabethan politics and religion and the interplay between them.
