When the Soviet Union collapsed and rapid integration into world markets failed to produce anything like an effective capitalist economy in its Russian successor state, many economists found that failure puzzling. Not Douglass North. So far as I know, North did not predict the Soviet Union's fall or the subsequent chaos of its economy. But he had long since put in place an account of economic change raising serious doubts that markets alone could even function reasonably well, much less transform whole economies, without extensive institutional underpinnings.
Unlike many major North American economic historians of his vintage (for example, his 1993 co-winner of the Nobel Prize, Robert William Fogel), North eschewed econometrics. Instead, alone and in collaboration, he wrote reflective institutional history, asking repeatedly how such innovations as marine insurance and property rights in land promoted economic growth in North America and Western Europe, while the absence of growth-promoting institutions handicapped most economies elsewhere. Recasting insights of Robert Coase, North became a vigorous, vigilant advocate of low or high transaction costs as the key to recognizing the difference between efficient and inefficient institutions. He insisted strongly on the distinction between institutions (basically rules of the game) and organizations (basically actors in the game). Effective institutions, in his account, lowered transaction costs. His analyses called for looking at every economy in terms of its institutions, assessing to what extent they both decreased the cost and increased the predictability of economic transactions and their outcomes.
North's Understanding the Process of Economic Change lucidly summarizes many of these older analyses. But it moves beyond them in three remarkable ways. First, it commits itself strongly to connectionist (rather than computational) cognitive science as a fundamental alternative to the thin representations of choice-bound rationality that long prevailed in neoclassical economics. North utterly rejects the assumptions of near-certainty built into a wide range of economic analysis in favor of the argument that the human environment and human comprehension of that environment remain irreducibly uncertain. They remain uncertain, he argues, both because human capacity for understanding complexity faces powerful limits and because human interventions themselves alter the world so unpredictably that any projections based on past experience soon run awry. (He repeatedly uses the exotic term “non-ergodic” to describe that discontinuity in human experience.)
Second, North's new analysis represents the accumulation of human beliefs about the world—both true and false—as the central process within which institutional innovation occurs, and therefore the engine of economic growth. “Increase in the stock of knowledge,” he declares, “has been the fundamental source of increased human well-being” (p. 17). He portrays humans as incessantly exploring their environment, forming ideas about how it works, trying out procedures based on those ideas, receiving feedback from those interventions, and modifying both beliefs and procedures in response.
Third, North draws heavily on Friedrich Hayek's ideas concerning the (non-Darwinian) evolution of knowledge, belief, and culture. His borrowing from Hayek includes the notion that once humans expanded beyond small circles of acquaintance and coexistence in which they could know and control one another's behavior (and therefore created strongly redistributive economies), they necessarily entered a world that surpassed their ability, individual or collective, to understand and control their social environments.
North displays more ambivalence about Hayek's distinction between made and spontaneous orders, since the main lines of the Northian argument undercut any hope that the economy's spontaneous order, left to itself, will generate greater human benefits than continuous, concerted, experimental intervention. When it comes to political order, North displays even greater skepticism than the very skeptical Hayek. He argues implicitly that “political markets” necessarily resist coherent analysis more than economic markets do. They do so not only because they require behavioral assumptions concerning the interaction of ideology and self-interest but also because political markets shape economic markets while receiving strong feedback from them. North deftly inverts this last observation, however. Drawing on Hayek and Michael Wohlgemuth, he makes the case for democracy as the institutionalization of open-ended learning and discovery, hence the enemy of authoritarian control over beliefs and interventions.
North never resolves two deep tensions, one quite new and the other very familiar, introduced by his analytic program. First, even accepting that connectionist cognitive science provides a superior explanation of individual decision making than the microfoundations of neoclassical economics, what models of organizational behavior does it imply? After all, institutions supply the rules, but organizations do the crucial behaving. When giving examples of institutional innovation, he does not show us how they result from cognition as cognitive scientists now portray it, but resorts to just-so stories of invention and diffusion. Second, given the deep uncertainty, frequent falsehood, and fundamental “non-ergodicity” of human knowledge, how could we ever know ex ante which increases in knowledge and which institutional innovations would, in fact, reduce transaction costs, generate growth, and increase human well-being? For the most part, North simply returns to American experience, suggesting ultimately that the Soviet Union's economic catastrophe resulted from its failure to build an “institutional structure that in the face of the ubiquitous uncertainties of a non-ergodic world will flexibly try various alternatives to deal with novel problems that continue to emerge over time” and create an innovation-promoting belief structure (p. 154). Without a much more fully specified theory, you cannot get there from here.
