Arthur Paulson's goal in this work is not only to revive the concept of realignment as a useful tool for analysis of historical American politics, but to argue that the 1964–1972 period, classified by many political scientists as a period of dealignment, was actually the most significant period of electoral realignment in American history. This new work is an update of Paulson's earlier book, Electoral Realignment and the Outlook for American Democracy (Praeger, 2000), and includes analysis of the impact of elections, international events, and economic forces on realignment since 2000.
Paulson forcibly and persuasively argues against the two most common recent criticisms of realignment theory. Some political scientists who found ample evidence of critical realigning periods in American electoral history through the 1930s have since the 1970s found evidence only of a dealigning trend in which political party affiliations were of declining significance both to voters and in government. Other political scientists have looked back and concluded that realignment theory never did provide any useful analysis of American political development anyhow.
Paulson is able to counter both sets of criticism of realignment theory through extensive analysis and description of the presidential elections of 1964–1972 and their aftermath. That series of elections shook up the old American party coalitions to such an extent that Paulson believes the United States is closer to a parliamentary model of responsible party government than ever before in the country's history.
In previous decades, American political parties were umbrella or “catch-all” organizations containing leaders from across the ideological spectrum. Democrats had a liberal northern wing and a conservative southern wing. Republicans also had a liberal northern wing and a conservative wing based in parts of the Midwest and West. While realignments up until the 1930s did tend to lead to a surge in one party's fortunes and consequent changes in government policy decisions, the basic regional nature of the constituent coalitions did not change a lot.
However in the 1960s and 1970s, the most interactive political change in the party coalitions in American history occurred, with conservative southern Democrats switching in large numbers to the Republican Party in presidential elections, and smaller but significant numbers of liberal northern Republicans beginning to switch to the Democratic Party. Paulson argues that many supporters of dealignment theory have missed the significance of these elections due to the lag in which regional groups of voters in congressional elections continued to favor the parties they had before the 1960s, even after switching in presidential elections.
Yet by 1994 and into the current decade, that lag seemed to be over. Conservative southerners are now overwhelmingly Republican in both presidential and congressional elections, while more liberal northerners are now more likely to vote Democratic for all offices. Despite former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill's maxim that “all politics is local,” even congressional elections seem to swing increasingly on a national basis.
Paulson demonstrates through a series of tables that previous analysts of American political history were correct that electoral realignments had occurred throughout American history. But he adds that what has occurred since the 1960s was not a dealignment, but a new form of realignment, a form even stronger than those in the past, creating ideologically based parties and clear choices for voters. Political party differences now revolve far more around policies and issues rather than the patronage and pork basis of party organizations in the past.
In that past, Paulson notes, realignments largely arose due to changes in strength among internal party factions within the Republican and Democratic Parties. It is only since the 1960s that there has been widespread interactive realignment between the parties with significant numbers among voter groups leaving each major party for the other. These changes led to a collapse of the consensus of support for welfare state policies and a bipartisan foreign policy that existed during the decades after World War II.
Paulson is right to note that the decline of patronage jobs, the reliance on political primary nominations, modern campaign financing, easier geographic mobility, and the growth of mass media and the internet have permanently ended any chance to return to nineteenth-century political party organizations consisting of interests from all ideologies and relying on grass-roots support. This does not make political parties meaningless, however. Strongly ideological parties provide clearer choices to the electorate and may be better at addressing and resolving conflict, argues Paulson, rather than the umbrella parties of the past that often avoided conflict and necessary change and sometimes prevented legitimate dissent.
Paulson may perhaps emphasize the critical or abrupt nature of realignment in the presidential elections of 1964–1972 too much in his work. While those elections were certainly a major catalyst in the electoral changes in American politics that followed, and while Paulson acknowledges that the realignment in congressional elections since that period was much more gradual, the shifts in voter coalitions and increased ideological polarization between the two major parties in presidential elections were also part of a more gradual process.
As late as the 1990s, Democratic Party leaders were rallying around a governor from Arkansas as a presidential candidate because they thought it was necessary to nominate a moderate southerner in order to win the election and because so many party leaders were still southern moderates themselves. And many Republican leaders in the 1990s were still proclaiming the need for a “big tent” party, which included elected officials with all ideological views on abortion or affirmative action. The striking regional divisions in the Electoral College that led the media to begin its discussion of the “red states” and the “blue states” did not begin until the 2000 presidential election. The 2006 congressional elections only continued this decade's long realigning process as several of the few remaining northern moderate Republicans were defeated for reelection by liberal Democrats.
One potential problem in all works addressing current events is that some assertions can appear outdated soon after the publication date. Paulson believes that unified party government for the presidency and Congress is much more likely now that the realignment process among voters is more complete than it was prior to the 1990s. He may be right, but divided party government reemerged just as his book was being published—it will remain to be seen what happens in 2008 and whether unified party government will be more common in the long term than it was in the preceding forty years.
It is also not clear that unified party government in the United States will lead to responsible party government. The experience of the American national government during the first decade of the twenty-first century was more of legislative support for increased executive authority during periods of unified government rather than any parliamentary-style tradition of questioning of executive leadership or attempts to provide a broad policy agenda.
However, Paulson is exactly right and was quite prescient of the 2006 elections in one part of his predictive analysis: libertarian-oriented voters, skeptical of government spending and government power, and culturally tolerant, may be the new swing electorate. Many of them voted for Ross Perot in the 1990s, and many voted Republican in congressional elections since then. However, in 2006, it was that group of voters, along with moderate Republicans, which seemed to switch in large numbers and put the Democrats in control of Congress in 2007. Paulson correctly assesses that both parties will be putting a lot of effort into attracting this group of voters in the presidential election of 2008. Those wishing to learn more about where American electoral realignments of the future might lead can learn much from Paulson's analysis.
