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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 February 2006
Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force. By Janice Bially Mattern. New York and London: Routledge, 2005. 303p. $25.95.
Janice Bially Mattern's impressive first book comes with all barrels loaded. Although her subtitle suggests that she will take on the usual suspects, realist power-politics and neoliberal common-interest approaches, she also includes a critique of the approach closest to her own, namely, constructivism. The book can be read for the strength of its theoretical arguments alone; although the author labels this view a “post-constructivist” approach, it is perhaps better understood as a “linguistic turn.” Theoretical arguments are “tested” against the Suez crisis of 1956, in particular the breakdown and reconstitution of the so-called Special Relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.
Janice Bially Mattern's impressive first book comes with all barrels loaded. Although her subtitle suggests that she will take on the usual suspects, realist power-politics and neoliberal common-interest approaches, she also includes a critique of the approach closest to her own, namely, constructivism. The book can be read for the strength of its theoretical arguments alone; although the author labels this view a “post-constructivist” approach, it is perhaps better understood as a “linguistic turn.” Theoretical arguments are “tested” against the Suez crisis of 1956, in particular the breakdown and reconstitution of the so-called Special Relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.
The author is most concerned with what she sees as a problem facing all three dominant approaches to the study of international politics, namely, their inability to theorize fully international “order,” especially the all-important transition from moments of disorder—crises—to a new international order. Order is (rather minimally) defined as “stable, shared expectations and behaviors among states” (p. 5). For the author, the primary source of international order is “identity.” Identity is defined in strong relational or intersubjective terms: The variety of relations (including negative ones) states have with one another “endows states with a self-definition” (p. 6). In the course of everyday interaction, states produce and reproduce a shared pool of knowledge about one another, shaping expectations about their (common) future, and thereby mutually constituting themselves and international society. At moments of crisis, identity breaks down; by the same token, so does order. The task is to understand how states reconstitute identity following crises, in other words, how international order is reestablished.
Drawing especially on the work of the French literary and cultural theorist Jean-François Lyotard, Bially Mattern's explanation of how order is reestablished marks her distance from the constructivist approach, which, although it might deploy some of the same terms (identity, intersubjectivity), does not have a coherent theory of how identities reform once they have broken down. The postconstructivist view is that during moments of crisis, agents involved in bilateral relations use a variety of narrative means to reconstitute mutual identity. Narratives are stories; here, they are the stories that states tell about themselves and each other to each other. Through these stories, identity is made and remade. The author's particular focus is on what she calls the narration of “representational force,” a form of “language-power” that leaves the “victims” with little choice but to accept the narrative demands being made of them “or face subjective death” (p. 14). Faced with an offer (identity) they cannot refuse, the subjects of the linguistic threat back down, accept the dominant narrative (while perhaps rewriting it slightly), and thereby reconstitute mutual relations, self-identity, and international order. The centrality of agents, their purposive actions, and the use of power to shape interested outcomes makes a comparison with realist power-politics obvious and is, rather surprisingly, welcomed by the author: “[A] post-constructivist identity turn … may end up looking … very much like a sophisticated return to the classical realist roots of IR: to a realist or coercive constructivism” (p. 251).
Bially Mattern's empirical chapters analyze the language used by American and British leaders during the Suez Crisis in 1956. The crisis began when the UK, France, and Israel invaded Egypt, hoping to undo Gamel Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. It ended with the United States and the United Nations forcing the invaders home, humbled and publicly shamed, without the use of military force. If the Suez Canal was not geopolitical cause enough, what made this crisis even more significant was that it took place at the same time as the Soviet invasion of Hungary.
The author discusses three “phrases in dispute” (which can be understood as condensed linguistic signs, conveying multiple meanings and contextual references) that became rhetorical axes around which American and British identities broke down and reformed. The British narrative of Betrayal combined an account of U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles as a false friend whose actions and words were at complete odds with each other with horror that the United States would turn to the United Nations to sanction British behavior. The use of financial pressure to force them to leave the canal was the last straw. The U.S. narrative of British Bellicosity represented Nasser as small fry, his nationalization of the canal as a perfectly legal action with little importance for U.S. national interests, and, most damning, consistent British dissembling to hide the truth of their collusion with the French and Israelis to carry out the invasion.
During the crisis, each of these terms became symbols of the other's perfidy and reflected their lack of mutual understanding. The crisis ended with the reconstitution of these terms and their meanings, and the production of a new narrative. This new script allowed each party to recognize each other again in the telling, thereby allowing the resuturing of British and American identities and the making of a new international order. Of course, the process was neither obvious nor easy nor equal.
According to the author, what forced the United States to restore order with Britain—and make narrative concessions to British self-esteem—was the ongoing Cold War and the realization that British and American identities were mutually constituted in the representation of a good, moral West pitted against the evil empire of the Soviet East. This idea of the West was not consistent with a British return to imperialism, especially during the Soviet invasion of Hungary. This historical interpretation is not new, but what is valuable is the careful language-based analysis of the reconstitution of the Special Relationship, producing a novel understanding of how states rebuild relations with each other following crises of identity.
The strengths of the epistemological critique and the possibilities manifest in the close-reading method make this study an important addition to the literature. However, perhaps “identity” is being asked to do more work than may be possible, given its simultaneous usage as (self-) identity and (relational) identification. The complexity of resolving multiple, sometimes incompatible, identities competing for dominance within each state is glossed over. Order is defined minimally, occluding the possibility that international “orders” might be inherently unstable or in a permanent state of disequilibrium. The difficulties of discussing identity and order when more than two states are involved is left hanging. It is unclear why certain terms were chosen (e.g., Bellicose rather than Imperial, to describe British behavior) and why Nationalization did not do more work for the British when the United States had just overthrown the elected governments of Guatemala and Iran for precisely than sin. Particularly jarring is the author's opening fantasy of giving statesmen better tools to help shape the world, as if this is the real purpose of theories of international politics. What would Lyotard say?