It was with great expectation that I awaited IJMES' review of my book on the Iraqi communist movement, Red Star over Iraq: Iraqi Communism before Saddam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), published in the November 2012 issue. However, any hope of a balanced assessment of my work—the result of many years of painstaking research—disappeared as soon as I began reading Professor Tareq Ismael's review. Ismael, who is the author of the only other work on the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) that has been published in English in recent times, might seem like an appropriate scholar to offer a specialist view on the topic. But this proved not to be the case.
Sadly Ismael fails to engage with any of the main topics that are raised by the book. He does not mention how the book carefully and attentively contextualizes the rise of the ICP in the 1940s and 1950s, showing how an indigenous Iraqi organization struggled with the peculiar concept of “communism” and how to make sense of this in an Iraqi context. He does not comment on the role played by education in shaping a new type of intelligentsia in the 1920s and 1930s, something that was a fundamental precondition for the emergence and rapid popularization of the party, and which is treated at length in the book. He similarly fails to make any mention of what is perhaps the main contention of the book, namely that the ICP gradually transformed itself into an “Iraqist” nationalist party—not dissimilar from other political parties in the country at the time—rather than merely being a Soviet “satellite” party, which Third World communist parties usually are said to have been. It is this syncretization of political ideologies that is key to understanding the role of the ICP in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The ICP went from being a Marxist-Leninist party with a dogmatic understanding of Iraqi society to becoming an Iraqi party espousing an ideology of waṭanī (nationalist/patriotic) socialism. Instead Ismael finds it worthwhile to devote his whole review to details such as when exactly Akram al-Hourani's Arab Socialist Party merged with the Baʿth Party in Syria, or whether Yemen was included in the ICP slogan calling for a federal union with the United Arab Republic in the aftermath of the 1958 revolution, or what military rank members of the Revolution Command Council in Baʿthist Iraq might have held.
Ismael further questions my assertion that the Free Officers who pulled off the coup that led to the revolution in July 1958 were organizationally modeled on the communist party. He refutes this by saying that they were modeled “in every respect” on the Egyptian Free Officers. In reality, at the time of the military coup there was extensive contact between the various political groups in Iraq and both the ICP and the Baʿth Party had their own clandestine organizations within the Iraqi army. No doubt the need for a highly secretive approach and the organizational setup of operating through small cells was something that the Free Officers had emulated from well-known communist practice—not just in Iraq but in every country where communist parties had operated since Lenin successfully implemented these practices during the October Revolution in Russia.
Another assertion that might be linguistically correct, but which clearly is contextually wrong, is Ismael's claim that the reason ʿAbd al-Karim Qasim—the leader of the Free Officers and the ruler of Iraq from 1958 to 1963—was called al-zaʿīm was because this meant brigadier general. Disregarding the fact that it would have been rather strange for Qasim's supporters to have run around shouting his vocational title, the fact is that al-zaʿīm in this case did not refer to his military title but was a shortened form of the full epithet al-zaʿīm al-awḥad (the sole leader). This was conferred on Qasim to render him support in the power struggle he was embroiled in with ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif at the time.
Ismael questions my sources on two occasions. The first is in relation to the date of a key ICP meeting. In this instance, my source was not just an unnamed “veteran communist” as Ismael asserts, but the memoirs of Bahaʾ al-Din Nuri, the one-time leader of the party. The date was further corroborated by Adel Haba, who indeed is a veteran communist and a former member of the party's Central Committee. Second, Ismael asserts that I quote a “long-time ICP member” for an “opinion of an event that occurred fifty years earlier.” Again this is erroneous, and if Ismael would take the time to read the passage carefully he would see that what I am actually saying is that his own version of events in his book was based entirely on one source, which was a book published by the wife of Salam ʿAdil, the ICP leader involved in that particular incident. What I said was that “Salam ʿAdil's wife, Thaminah Naji Yusuf, is undoubtedly a biased source.” This was a case of expressing my own assessment. I then added, and this is where Ismael gets confused, that this assessment was shared by Ghanem Hamdoun, who is a long-time ICP member, but crucially also the former editor of the party's journal al-Thaqafa al-Jadida (and as such a senior member of the party leadership). Hamdoun was quoted as saying that he thought that Yusuf's account of Salam ʿAdil had been biased and had put ʿAdil “in too favourable a light.”
This type of misunderstanding or careless reading typifies Ismael's review. Thus, for instance, he asserts that in the introduction to the book I claim that the ICP was “arguably the largest and most important communist party in the Arab world at the time,” to which Ismael has added in brackets “[1979–2003].” In fact, I make no such assertion, which is not surprising since the book ends in 1979! What the statement refers to is the preceding period, the one the book actually looks at.
Finally, rather than presenting a concluding remark on the merits of the book, Ismael finds it appropriate to plug another work (one that deals with the possible U.S. involvement in the 1963 Baʿthist coup), an article he refers to as “excellent.” That may well be, but this reference is neither here nor there as it has very little bearing on the study that he was supposed to review. Ismael finishes by saying that the book would have “benefited from intensive editing because it is riddled with grammatical, structural, and syntactical errors”—a statement that is rich in a book review that doesn't even spell the name of the book author correctly.
As a concluding note, suffice it to say that other members of the Middle East studies community have been less dismissive of the book; in fact it was recently shortlisted for the prestigious Book Prize of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies and received an honorable mention. The judges commented that the book was “a solidly researched and insightful single-volume history of the Iraqi Communist Party from its inception to its annihilation by Saddam” and “a highly readable and instructive history of secular political ideologies in Iraq.” I leave it to IJMES readers to decide which is the fairer assessment.
