At the end of this book, Anthony James Joes has written a two-page epilogue entitled “Conflict in Iraq,” which notes the enormous task that the U.S. government has set itself in the long-term construction of a democratic order in the face of violent opposition and internal social conflict. And while the bulk of the book was obviously written prior to the war in Iraq, it can be read as a constructive critique of U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the months following the invasion. Joes draws on a wide range of cases from over two centuries of guerrilla warfare to illustrate what he sees as the key reasons for the success or failure of numerous counterinsurgency campaigns. His thoughtful and informative analysis provides a useful basis for a comparative perspective that has been largely absent from many of the assessments of the guerrilla war in Iraq and America's counterinsurgency policies.

Joes starts by exploring the origins of guerrilla wars. He examines a series of case studies from all corners of the world, noting the wide variety of factors that prompt people to take up arms against a more powerful enemy. He makes the point that whether guerrillas are motivated by religious oppression, nationalism prompted by a foreign invasion, or some other set of grievances, there are a number of factors that are crucial to sustaining a guerrilla campaign. These factors include maintaining morale and a sense of fighting for a just cause; an infrastructure that links the guerrilla fighters to the general population and provides then with intelligence, supplies and recruits; skillful leaders who have the respect of their followers; assistance from outside the country; and a secure base from which the guerrillas can launch their attacks. If these factors are important in sustaining guerrillas, then clearly governments conducting counterinsurgency campaigns must take them into consideration if they wish to prevail. Joes proceeds to analyze a number of these points and to show how successful governments have dealt with key issues.

The rest of Resisting Rebellion is devoted to a discussion of what Joes sees as proven ways in which counterinsurgency forces can gain the upper hand in a guerrilla war. He views four counterinsurgency campaigns as “especially instructive” (p. 232). The first two, both of which took place at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, were the British defeat of the Boers in South Africa and the American victory over Emilio Aguinaldo in the Philippines; the second two, both of which occurred during the late 1940s and 1950s, were the success of the British against the Malayan Communist Party and President Ramon Magsaysay's U.S.-backed campaign against the Huk rebellion in the Philippines. From these experiences, and others, Joes singles out as especially vital to a winning counterinsurgency strategy a series of basic objectives: the need to isolate the conflict area and especially to prevent outside help reaching guerrilla forces; to establish security for civilians by committing enough resources, including troops, to maintain full control of a region threatened by guerrilla warfare; to treat all members of the general population, including guerrilla prisoners, in accord with the laws of the land and the highest “civilized standards”; to separate the guerrilla forces from their general supporters by addressing people's grievances; to develop a legitimate democratic government; and to establish an effective intelligence service. Joes comes back to these themes in an intriguing chapter in which he compares national approaches to counterinsurgency. And in a final chapter, which brings together the major threads of his argument, he sets out what he deems to be the vital elements of a successful counterinsurgency policy.

While there is considerable merit in much of the author's analysis, some weaknesses can be singled out. First, like many analyses of guerrilla warfare, there is little acknowledgment of the significance of the economic dimension to the rise and fall of insurgency movements. For example, economic factors are often crucial to the mobilization of support for guerrilla groups. Massive unemployment can frustrate even the best counterinsurgency campaigns, while full employment can sabotage the effectiveness of guerrilla movements. Certainly, past guerrilla wars have shown that a policy of resettling a segment of the population is usually not effective if the resettlement centers do not have an economic base. Moreover, diaspora communities, such as the Irish or Tamil communities in North American, have played a critical role in funding, and thereby sustaining, guerrilla organizations in their homelands. Second, more could have been said about the nonmilitary side of government and its role in counterinsurgency. To some extent, the impression is left that counterinsurgency is essentially a military activity. Obviously, the military have an important role to play, but past successful counterinsurgency campaigns show that if grievances are to be addressed and the general population neutralized or won over to the government, the civil side of the government needs to be actively involved. Finally, the fact that the discussion is rooted in a wide variety of historical examples, which in many ways is one of the book's strengths, tends to produce a somewhat disjointed discussion as the author moves quickly from one guerrilla war to another in order to illustrate the point he is making. There is also a tendency to repeat examples in different parts of the book.

But overall, this is an insightful, carefully considered, and instructive analysis. It is particularly useful in pointing out that the United States has successfully waged wars against insurgents in the past and that there is, therefore, no reason why it should not do so in Iraq. However, those in charge of mounting an American counterinsurgency campaign need to read up on their history. Joes provides an excellent guide as to where to look and how to interpret the historical examples.