Human Rights as a Way of Life is about the political dimension of Henri Bergson's work, focusing mainly on The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, the last original book by the French philosopher, published in 1932. The Two Sources of Morality and Religion is a work of maturity, written at the dawn of the Second World War. By then Europe was already facing some of the major challenges regarding the social and political consequences of natural human tendencies, such as conflict and warfare.
The political dimension of Bergson's philosophy has been the subject of several approaches in the last decades by Philipe Soulez, Frédéric Worms, and, more recently, by Nadia Yala Kisukidi. But the Bergsonian hermeneutics was surely in need of a study such as the one now presented and its development of the pressing issue of human rights.
Human Rights as a Way of Life takes forward the ideas that Alexandre Lefebvre presented in “Bergson and Human Rights,” published in Bergson, Politics, and Religion (Duke University Press, 2012). The author rethinks the present status of a philosophy that has not always been well understood by critics, showing that Bergsonian political and ethical thought is, if I may, alive and well. Lefebvre's readers learn that even if humanity shall always face the problem of war as one of its most disturbing menaces, Bergson's analysis still gives us food for thought by warning us against the dangers of making the same mistakes over and over again.
The strong metaphysical matrix of Bergson's philosophy may have been one of the reasons for some discredit of him as a thinker during the second half of a postmodernist twentieth century. But fortunately this tendency has been rejected in the past decade, mainly due to books like Human Rights as a Way of Life, that highlight the urgency of foundational questions such as What is human nature? or, more specifically, What can serve as grounds for human rights? (28).
Bearing this metaphysical perspective in mind, Alexandre Lefebvre studies the implications of the 1932 book on the contemporary philosophy of human rights. But the author recognizes how the ideas developed in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion have their philosophical grounds in Bergson's previous books. This not only respects the integrity of Bergsonian thought, but also allows readers to see the deeper connections between a political and ethical concept such as “human rights” and Bergsonian metaphysical evolutionism, explained in Creative Evolution (1907). Establishing this connection is an essential methodological step to a full understanding of Bergson's conception of morality, which, as Lefebvre states, is based on a theory of life, that is, on biology expansively understood (36).
Like other important concepts in the works of Bergson, such as time and nature, human rights are central to the understanding of the main arguments of Two Sources of Morality and Religion; but they were not the focus of a systematic explanation in the 1932 book. Bergson allows us to cross the path and, fortunately for his interpreters, Alexandre Lefebvre took on the challenge, presenting his outlook with the required philosophical depth and writing style that grabs the reader from the start.
Human Rights as a Way of Life does not take the easy path of arguing in favor of Bergson without facing some of the hidden implications of his thought. On the contrary, the depth and sharpness of Lefebvre's arguments are revealed as he presents and ingeniously answers some of the major critiques that Bergson's theoretical stands face, like the confrontation with Émile Durkheim, Gilles Deleuze, or even Richard Rorty's positions on human rights. But the author goes beyond this and in the last chapter of the book calls for Hannah Arendt's perspective on the humanity of man to take further the concept of dignity sketched by Bergson. Had Bergson lived to see the horrors of the Holocaust, Lefebvre argues, his views on evil would make him develop the concept of dignity as a natural human structure to respond to what Arendt calls the “superfluity of man.”
Thus, in its philosophical contents, Human Rights as a Way of Life makes several important contributions. We will highlight three.
The first important philosophical feature of Lefebvre's contribution, either to the study of Bergson or to the philosophy of human rights, is to place human rights at the core of Bergson's political philosophy. The author claims that there is an original concept of human rights in Bergson, understood as a composite of the closure and the openness of life tendencies. Human rights are presented as “the best-placed institution to overcome the closed tendency of society and morality” (83).
In this sense, human rights extend their influence beyond the political realm, being at the same time the way through which individuals are able to achieve the top significant point of a true human existence: the ethical commitment to humanity.
According to Bergson, defending the biological origin of morality doesn't mean advocating determinism or even dismissing the reality of human spirituality. In this sense, we shouldn't look for the ground of human rights within the classic “picture of morality”—a phrase coined by Lefebvre—that postulates a progressive enlargement of the attachment to exclusive and more closed groups, like family and friends, to the promotion of all humanity (4–5). What is at stake in Bergson's ethical perspective is something of a rather different kind, what Deleuze called the “Bergsonian leitmotiv”: people have seen differences of degree where there are differences in kind (Deleuze, Bergsonism [MIT Press, 1988], 23). There is no quantitative amplification of our moral obligations toward other human beings, but a qualitative leap into a perspective of human rights not just as a legal way to protect the individuals on a social and political sphere (closed), but also as an inner criterion for a philosophical way (open) of life.
The second important philosophical feature of this book is that it places itself in the hermeneutic lineage of eminent Bergson experts, such as William James, Vladimir Jankélévitch, and Frédéric Worms, stating that the main contribution of Bergson's work is not a scholarly matrix, but the inner orientation of the human being toward personal transformation or conversion. In this sense, Lefebvre positions himself as a true disciple of Bergson, in the way that Étienne Gilson described in a public tribute to Bergson in 1967: “By asking where your disciples are these days, some make the mistake of looking for philosophers that repeat what you said, but your true disciples rather try to do as you have done.”
This takes us to the third noteworthy philosophical feature of Human Rights as a Way of Life: the concept of love as the essence or foundation of human rights, within a political but above all an ethical dimension. What allows Lefebvre's arguments to grant a philosophical understanding of love is the fact that love is qualitatively different from the usual emotion of attachment to a specific object of concern. Love means, then, a trained ability to overcome all forms of closure in life and implies subscribing a spiritual practice of care without content (100). This love is called “open” not only due to its inclusive genre, but also because it gives voice to the élan vital, the creative dynamic of life as the substance of a permanent movement of novelty and difference.
This new way of looking at emotion, enhancing its propulsive force, as Bergson calls it in Two Sources, is the core of the spiritual transformation or conversion. This makes full sense in light of the fundamental purpose of human rights, according to Bergson: to initiate the individual in the open tendency of life's élan, protecting the human species but, above all, making each and every one of us become worthy of his life (133).
The question behind the scenes of Bergsonian political thought is, then, the one with which Lefebvre ends his book: Do we want merely to live or to live well? The urgency for answering it, beyond any simple academic curiosity, is the main reason to read Human Rights as a Way of Life.
