This long-awaited book is a synthesis of the authors' previous works, presented in the form of easy take-aways articulated in (for the most part) simple language. The authors infer from the history of sovereign debt markets from 1870 to 1913 lessons that can inform the current debate on the problems of international sovereign debt markets, a valid comparison because in both episodes governments in emerging markets borrowed largely by selling bonds to dispersed groups of investors rather than borrowing directly from banks. Yet, the book makes clear that these two historical episodes were so different as to make it difficult to apply old solutions to current problems.
The first of three principal take-aways is that institutional changes that commit governments to respect the property of their citizens did not yield an instantaneous reduction of the implicit risk premium of sovereign debt in emerging markets between 1870 and 1913 (as would be expected from Douglas C. North and Barry R. Weingast's 1989 article in this Journal). Wars, closely followed by macroeconomic fundamentals, were more important determinants of sharp movements in a country's risk premium in the past. The second take-away is that today's spreads, because they mostly move in a synchronized fashion, do not seem to respond to these country-specific factors. The third is that the resolution of sovereign debt crises was significantly different, perhaps smoother, in the past than today thanks largely to the coordination of creditors through the Committee of Foreign Bondholders (CFB) and the fact that most bond issues had tax revenues or specific assets as collateral.
The book consists of eight chapters. In chapter 2, the authors identify their data and sources and explain the main differences between sovereign debt issues in the past and today, chief among them that in the past bonds had longer maturities, different redemption options, and specific assets or custom revenues as collateral. In chapter 3, the cases of Meiji Japan, Czarist Russia, and England after the Glorious Revolution are used to examine the effects of wars, institutional changes à la North and Weingast, and the adoption of the gold standard, among other things, on the risk premium of sovereign bonds. The authors find that institutional changes do not have an immediate effect on the risk premium series, and that adoption of the gold standard yielded a sharp reduction in the risk premium of Japanese bonds but had no effect on the Russian series. Wars, however, had a strong effect on the risk premium series in most of these cases. These results are confirmed in chapter 4 by correlating the number of newspaper articles about wars, institutional changes, economic reforms, and other circumstances with movements in the risk premium series for all of the countries in the authors' larger sample.
Chapter 5 uses multivariate regression analysis to test the authors' four basic hypotheses: (1) that adoption of the gold standard should reduce sovereign risk because it provides a “good housekeeping seal of approval”; (2) that macroeconomic fundamentals are what matter most in determining sovereign risk; (3) that winning wars provides credibility and reduces country risk; and (4) that members of the British Empire should have lower country risk. The authors find that there is no winner because all of these factors, excepting the fundamentals (which are not always significant across specifications), are correlated with lower risk premiums between 1870 and 1913.
Chapter 6 shows that co-movements among risk premium series across countries were stronger in the 1990s than in the pre-1913 period. The authors argue that this is related to stronger covariance in commodity prices today as well as to the (herd) behavior of institutional investors. They also find that there was less contagion (or comovement) in country risk in the past because country-specific factors seem to drive most of the variation. If commodity prices mattered, one wonders why the authors did not use prices or dummies for different commodities in any of their estimations in the previous chapter.
Those unfamiliar with how sovereign debt restructurings worked in the past and how challenging they are today will find chapter 7 instructive. The chapter focuses on the actions of the CFB, which attempted to coordinate creditors' actions so as to facilitate the renegotiation of sovereign debt, and facilitated the imposition of credible penalties after a default during the period 1870–1913. The main lesson to be learned here is that the effectiveness of the CFB was based on its capacity to coordinate its members, given that usually only a couple hundred bondholders were represented. Today, the authors argue, this kind of institution would not work because sovereign bonds are held by thousands of investors worldwide. Also, defections by the so-called “vulture funds” are more common today than in the past. These funds buy the bonds after a country defaults and do not join the agreements that larger bondholder organizations negotiate with debtor nations, preferring to sue these countries in American or European courts to try to secure payment of their claims in full.
The book is a fun read for those familiar with the literature on globalization and the history of international finance. Nonexperts are advised to read chapter 7 and then go back to the Introduction. Because the book's objective is to use the past to inform current debates, readers unfamiliar with the topic would do well to start with chapter 7, which lays out the current problems in sovereign debt markets. Reading the book in the order suggested makes it suitable for use in a course in global economic history or international finance. The comparisons of today's sovereign debt markets with those of the past and clever use of cartoons from The Punch in every discussion make this an engaging book with which to elucidate the benefits and challenges of globalization.
