Liberalism, the interwar period, and Central Europe do not seem to make natural, comfortable companions. Oskar Mulej’s book uses the term “national liberal heirs” to facilitate a comparative study across three former Western Habsburg lands. His study reveals interesting differences and similarities. In some comparisons, the Czech lands and Slovenia are coupled together because of the similarities, while Austria is treated separately. This is also the general trend for most comparative analyses throughout the book. There are few continuities with the shared Habsburg past—the most important of which is nationalism. The First World War and formation of successor states transformed the nature of political language, policies, and parties, as well as state structures, hence Mulej’s stress on “heirs.”
Indeed, many of the parties Mulej investigates specifically rejected the “liberal” label. Why are they then grouped together in this study? When defining “national liberal heirs,” Mulej notes the inherited organizational structures, social milieu, inner heterogeneity, and “tolerance for pluralism” (146). Mulej concedes that the groupings ultimately shared a negative definition, neither Marxist nor clerical. Is this enough to form an analytical category? What are we to make of this “motley assortment” (132) with “ideological eclecticism” (102)? I wonder if, to some extent, socialism, especially the moderate strand, and traditional establishment conservatism also shared many of the characteristics of “national liberal heirs.” This ambiguity, especially in connection to conservatism, forms part of Mulej’s discussion of their ideological profile (160–4).
A further issue is the relationship with the Habsburg Monarchy. The first chapter convincingly points to a nationalist turn within the Monarchy in the late nineteenth century. Yet, as Mulej highlights throughout, this had different effects in the post-WWI world—integrative state building in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, state negation and desire for union to form a Greater Germany in Austria. Why these three states? Were there specific contextual particularities that make the term “national liberal heirs” appropriate for these Western Habsburg successor states, or is it useful elsewhere—Poland, Hungary, Romania, or even Italy or Germany? As for the book’s title, I wonder why the actual state names, Czechoslovakia and Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Yugoslavia, are not utilized.
The book is structured in the form of interconnected essays, rather than an overarching narrative or historical argument. There is much comparative analysis without exposition of the political context, party foundations, key individuals, and other background. Overall, I would have preferred a more conventional framework outlining the separate trajectories before undertaking a systematic, substantive comparison. Mulej’s methodology combines linguistics, political philosophy, ideologies (Michael Freeden’s work is a reference point), and focuses on political parties (particularly programs, major speeches, and key publications).
It begins with some historical background stressing the nationalist turn in the Habsburg Monarchy. The second chapter investigates the various semantics of “liberalism” and associated terms. Generally, liberalism was associated with the “old world,” and other political labels such as “progressive” or “freedom” were used. The next chapter is titled “‘National Liberal Heirs’ as Region-Specific Type of Political Party,” though as pointed out earlier, there is no real discussion about special regional particularities for these three former Habsburg lands. The political parties that constitute the heart of the analysis are discussed in depth—the Czech National Democrats led by Karel Kramář, the Slovene sections of Yugoslav democratic and national parties, and the Greater German People’s Party in Austria. All pushed a nationalist agenda, dealt with a disintegrating Bürgertum, and exhibited enormous diversity and fragmentation. Any traditional liberal elements seemed to be marginal, historical residue.
Chapter 5 asks the question underpinning much of the book: How liberal were these “national liberal heirs”? The Greater German People’s Party believed in a Volksgemeinschaft (folk community) and union with all German speakers. Its language was permeated with racial ideology and harsh antisemitism. The Czechoslovak and Slovenian political groupings were less overtly racist but strongly supported national integration and powerful state building. Little wonder that Mulej has given this chapter a questioning title: “‘National Liberals’. Devoid of Liberalism?”
Chapter 6 shows some glimpses of liberalism as Mulej looks at economic policies. Here, again, the past was distanced—in this case, outright laissez-faire policies associated with the “old” world and Jewish interests. In place were notions of national solidarity and social responsibilities. Class struggle and interest politics were rejected, while partnership, cooperation, and general economic development were emphasized. The Great Depression, which was especially deep in Central and Eastern Europe, brought a profound crisis for the “liberal heirs.” Many questioned the fundamental principles of liberal democracy and shifted toward radical right-wing nationalism. Vague ideas of corporate order (both Catholic bottom-up and Fascist top-down ideas) also circulated. Mulej makes no reference to possible connections with older corporate traditions in Central Europe within the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy.
The final chapter moves beyond the focus of political parties and looks at the persistence of some liberal values into the inter-war period. A number of liberal havens existed, such as elite government positions (especially in law and economics), chambers of commerce, and the Viennese press (often associated with Jewish ownership and editorial control). A short, illuminating section is devoted to social liberalism promoted by a handful of left-leaning intellectuals, who were quite close to pragmatic, moderate socialists, but without the Marxist baggage. There is no substantive conclusion.
Mulej’s work indicates potentially fruitful directions of study. Comparative frameworks, moving beyond the traditional nation-state paradigm or singular focus on one political party, can facilitate conceptual thinking about regions. The Habsburg legacy in the successor states has been a strong historiographical focus in recent years. The effects of Habsburg political culture, language, and practice on post-WWI states are still under-researched. Mulej’s book poses many questions and opens the door to future work.
