“It is time we gave due credit to Dwight D. Eisenhower” (183). The final sentence of Mark Shanahan's excellent book Eisenhower at the Dawn of the Space Age: Sputnik, Rockets and Helping Hands expertly summarizes the persuasive argument Shanahan has produced. Using the case study of space policy, Shanahan attempts to rehabilitate the historical image of President Eisenhower, showing him to be a far more active President than the traditional “do nothing” (xi) of conventional historical narrative. Shanahan delves into the historical archive surrounding sputnik and presents Eisenhower not as a President who reacted in a panicked fashion, but one who was calm and unfazed and who continued to implement an American space policy already well planned. Consequently, Shanahan has delivered not only an excellent historical account of the development of American space policy, but a vital contribution to the revisionist understanding of Eisenhower's tenure inside the Oval Office.

Shanahan questions the orthodox history of Eisenhower as an inactive President who allowed the Soviets to catch up to the Americans, a school of thought which holds sputnik as a perfect case in point, instead locating his approach amongst revisionist works which challenge the view of Eisenhower as a passive President. Central to Shanahan's approach is Fred Greenstein's revisionist work The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (1982). Greenstein's Eisenhower was a skilful politician who disguised the fact by delegating to others and appearing evasive, allowing him to share in success but distance himself from failure; he was a “hidden hand” working in the background to push through his policies. For Shanahan, Greenstein's view is too broad and presents an omnipotent Eisenhower abreast of everything. Shanahan's Eisenhower is neither the all-seeing political master of Greenstein's revisionism nor the passive, ineffective leader of the orthodox scholars. Viewed through the lens of space policy, Eisenhower is a long-game planner who utilized “helping hands” (107) to implement policy but who was altogether more human than Greenstein's Eisenhower, making mistakes as he went. It is these mistakes, particularly around sputnik, that have fuelled the orthodox view of an inactive President.

Through impressive archival research, Shanahan challenges the orthodox narrative of American space policy beginning in earnest with John F. Kennedy. Instead, Shanahan argues that the James Killian-led Technological Capabilities Panel of 1955 and the formation of the President's Science Advisory Committee prompted Eisenhower to implement a long-term plan for space policy, centring on ICBM development, U-2 and the Corona program. This, Shanahan claims, was the real birthplace of American space policy. Following Eisenhower's reaction to sputnik from this basis, Shanahan asserts, demonstrates that his reaction was far from shocked or knee-jerk but entirely consistent with the longer-term plan for space that Eisenhower had already implemented and therefore entirely “logical” (66).

What went wrong for Eisenhower on sputnik was his failure to understand the media and psychological impact. Eisenhower's delay in speaking out publicly after sputnik has been characterized as indicative of his panic and shock; however, Shanahan argues that because of the U-2 program Eisenhower knew there was no real change to the strategic balance and did not initially feel he needed to speak publicly. This was a mistake, Shanahan argues, as the empty space this created allowed politicians and others with vested interests to grab the media impetus and fuel panic over a crisis for their own ends. It was this period of inaction from Eisenhower which created the sputnik panic and is used by historians to point to his passivity as President. However, through an impressive analysis of the press, Shanahan details how, once Eisenhower spoke out publicly, the sputnik panic was short-lived. Indeed, Shanahan points to the muted reaction to Sputnik II, so often incorrectly lumped together with Sputnik I, as proof that when Eisenhower got ahead of the story, the issue became far less important. Sputnik was a failure of PR and crisis management by Eisenhower rather than a failing in his space policy.

Sputnik and the public-relations problems Eisenhower caused himself, Shanahan writes, were a prime example of the fallibility missing from Greenstein's revisionist account and the narrow focus which orthodox historians exploited in their presentation of Eisenhower as an inactive President. Shanahan then goes on to use the birth of NASA as further evidence for his theory, joining Robert Caro in arguing that Lyndon Johnson's role has been overdrawn and that in fact Eisenhower, through his helping hands, was significant in the development of the organization.

Whilst one is left wondering whether his handling of space policy is the exception rather than the norm in Eisenhower's leadership style and we come back to the perennial question over the effectiveness of “judging” a President's policies, Shanahan has produced a compelling work which argues persuasively that Eisenhower laid the long-term foundations of American space policy well before sputnik. Moreover, Shanahan presents an important contribution to the historiography of the Eisenhower presidency, challenging the orthodox view of a passive President whilst developing a more human Eisenhower than the traditional revisionist account.